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In a context of transforming expectations regarding the who, how, and what of heritage 
stewardship around the world, this dissertation examines caste’s revitalization through boundary 
work carried out by a variety of actors and across a range of practical and discursive moments.  
Through a wide selection of ethnographic vignettes, it analyzes such boundary work around caste 
from multiple vantage points to illustrate how this category of identification is reproduced in 
tension with and in the service of neoliberal processes that have shaped Sri Lanka’s “traditional 
craft industries” since the 1977 implementation of an “open economy policy.” Grounded in two 
years of ethnographic fieldwork in the country’s central province, the dissertation offers 
anthropological insight into what happens at the level of everyday experience when the logics of 
neoliberal economics and democratic egalitarianism become entangled with nationalist 
investments in heritage on the one hand, and the apparent specters of pre-modern preoccupations 
with hierarchy and honor on the other. In this majority Buddhist island country, caste among the 
Sinhalese has long been popularly rejected as an anachronistic and lamentable artifact of pre-
colonial society, its public discussion generally avoided to an extreme (Silva and Hettihewage 
2001:63). Focusing on two industries regarded as exemplary of Sri Lanka’s traditional 
handicrafts, Dumbara rata weaving and the hana industry, I document the complex ways in 
which some of the country’s most historically marginalized peoples, individuals at the lowest 
rungs of what is often figured as a Sinhala caste hierarchy, face the consequences of caste’s quiet 
but indisputable reproduction in their daily lives. Challenging a persistent sense in scholarship on 
	
the country that caste is somehow destined to disappear, the dissertation’s primary aim is to 
demonstrate not just that caste as a category of identification is alive and well, but also how this 
is so. As significantly, it is to illustrate beyond any doubt that its reproduction is the shared 
responsibility of actors across the strata of class, gender, age and caste.  
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Introduction 
 “Wading in,” a saying anthropologists-in-training often hear in reference to the initial 
phases of ethnographic research, conjures an image of one moving confidently if cautiously into 
the generally steady calm of “the field.” Like that of most anthropologists, however, my 
experience carrying out the research upon which this dissertation is based was more akin to 
taking a tumble in rough surf and, to push the metaphor just a bit further, trying to regain my 
footing as another wave barreled toward me.  
Anthropologist Janelle Taylor laments that the rise of “regimes of accountability” that 
have come to shape expectations around graduate student fieldwork has made a “casualty” of the 
element of surprise valued in mid-20th century anthropological training (Taylor 2014:523;530). 
She notes the degree to which funding applications nowadays almost necessitate that at least a 
portion of the proposed work already be completed. In this context, as she argues, “surprises now 
have the status of rare anomalies rather than expected and valued learning experiences” (531). In 
my case, and despite the surety with which I crafted my own applications for field funding to 
support research in Sri Lanka, it was not so much a refusal to admit the inevitability of surprise 
as the impossibility of anticipating its exact nature that would frustrate my own attempts to 
gracefully “wade in.”  
To explain, the following chapters focus on two spheres of productive activity: The hana 
industry in a village I call Atwaedagama, and Dumbara rata weaving in a village I call 
Redigama. Like almost all small-scale enterprises of artistic production regarded as Sri Lanka’s 
“national” and “traditional crafts,” Dumbara rata weaving and the hana industry have long been 
recognized as caste-based occupations. They are occupations performed by individuals at the 
lowest rungs of what is today commonly referred to as a Sinhala caste hierarchy 
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(Coomaraswamy 1907; Gunasinghe 2007; Knox 1981; Ryan 1953; Silva 2013; Tennent 1860). 
And yet, setting out to conduct my dissertation research, I had not anticipated caste, or, more 
precisely, I had not anticipated caste’s salience as a category of identification for the Sinhalese 
men and women engaged in these industries. That such salience would prove a surprise to me 
was due in part to a reigning silence around and disavowal of caste. In India, perhaps the most 
obvious case for comparison given its geographic proximity and historical-cultural parallels, a 
constitutionally enshrined and largely caste-based national affirmative action program has been 
in effect for nearly seventy years (de Zwart 2000). While myriad forms of caste-based 
discrimination persist in the country, individuals disadvantaged based on their caste status have 
recourse—even if such recourse is often more theoretical than actual—to anti-discrimination 
laws over which there is vibrant public discussion. In short, caste is a publicly acknowledged and 
conspicuous feature of the social landscape. In Sri Lanka, by contrast, caste (and caste among the 
Sinhalese, in particular) has long been publicly rejected as an anachronistic and lamentable 
artifact of pre-colonial society (Silva and Hettihewage 2001:63). Caste’s public discussion is 
often avoided to an extreme. The country’s constitution makes no mention of positive 
discrimination, and legislative policy-makers have only rarely taken up the subject of caste-based 
discrimination (Uyangoda 1999:22). The men and women whose lives I focus on here, though 
finding themselves disadvantaged on the basis on caste, are loath to seek redress through the 
public invocation of caste. 
This public silence around caste, I argue in the following pages, is also reflected in and 
reinforced by the topic’s handling in recent social scientific literature. That caste’s salience 
would prove the most instructive surprise to me during my dissertation research, however, was 
due to something inclusive of but extending beyond such silence: It was due to the striking and 
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often counter-intuitive ways in which concerns with caste figure in the lives of those residing in 
and around these two government-designated “traditional handicrafts villages.”  
As I learned during the core eighteen-month period of research upon which this 
dissertation is based, and as the following chapters make clear, concerns with and practices 
around caste in contemporary Sri Lanka are fraught with contradictions, many of which are 
inextricably linked to the public silence around and disavowal of caste. In an instance when one 
might expect identification as low caste to be only an encumbrance, ethnographic examination 
revealed instead a double-edged utility. Threatened by the possibility of losing control over a 
regional weaving industry to which they have historically been recognized as lineage-based 
heirs, low caste weavers in Redigama denounce what they view as their high caste neighbors’ 
tendency to dwell upon caste as conservative and non-modern. Simultaneously, and often in the 
same sentence, they emphasize their own caste position to claim legitimate proprietorship over 
the craft and thereby resist these neighbors’ efforts to weave independently of village workshops 
historically controlled by low caste families. Near my second field site of Atwaedagama, high 
caste individuals would (quietly) point to the incidence of inter-caste marriage between 
individuals from this low caste village and high caste individuals from other parts of Sri Lanka as 
evidence that caste “no longer matters.”1 They would immediately add, however, that the parents 
who had allowed their children to marry individuals from Atwaedagama had done so 
unwittingly. Likewise, a woman in Atwaedagama, also offering what she saw as evidence that 
caste is not relevant in contemporary Sri Lanka, pointed to her (low caste) son’s employment at a 
local bank, the kind of job that many in Atwaedagama have historically been barred from having. 
																																																								1 In fact, inter-caste marriages in Atwaedagama were rare, and in this respect served more as 
“exceptions that prove the rule.” 
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She urged me, however, not to broadcast this fact since, were anyone at the bank to learn of his 
caste background, he could lose his position. Finally, and to give an example of a slightly 
different variety, a high caste (Goyigama) student researcher who had visited Atwaedagama and 
written about the village’s hana industry for her undergraduate degree shared with me that, 
because of their caste status, artisans there are “backward” and not interested in developing 
economically. In the same conversation, she criticized these very individuals for what she saw as 
their preoccupation with money. When she visited them, she explained to me, they refused to 
cooperate with her study and were only interested in selling her the items they made.  
Ultimately, inconsistencies such as these did more than recommend caste-based 
identification as a topic worthy of anthropological investigation. These phenomena, which, 
despite my not seeking them out, rose to the surface of the unexpectedly turbulent waters around 
me, demanded attention to something beyond caste in and of itself. As I demonstrate 
ethnographically throughout the following chapters, they pointed to caste as prismatic of the 
practical and ideological entailments of several domains of cultural production that, through their 
entanglement on the ground of lived experience, condition (and in turn are conditioned by) the 
lives of the men and women whose voices animate this dissertation. The metaphor of a “prism” 
is especially fitting here given that, much like white light, caste is largely “invisible” in Sri 
Lanka. When I say that practices around caste are “prismatic,” then, I mean that, much like a 
prism fans out variable wavelengths of light, they facilitated an analytical parsing out of other 
cultural forms whose interplay is generally imperceptible. In doing so, then, they not only 
rendered such forms visible, but also supported an examination of the locally meaningful ways in 
which they articulate in daily life in Sri Lanka. For instance, they focused analytical attention on 
and revealed the overlapping force of the institutionalization of a narrative of national heritage in 
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which caste has no place, a widespread “political discourse of social egalitarianism” (Uyangoda 
1999:21) and ideals of democratic citizenship, the operation of neoliberal processes and, finally, 
the persistence of an ostensibly pre-modern status hierarchy.  
 In theory, any of the cultural forms that I consider in the following pages might serve for 
the others the prismatic function that I have assigned to caste. Examining the ideological and 
practical entailments of democratic citizenship, for instance, draws our attention to the 
contradictions that arise when this mode of political belonging runs up against the logics that 
underpin other modes of identification. The same may be said of national patrimony shepherded 
collectively or of the neoliberal privileging of exchange-value and individuated entrepreneurs.  
 Why, then, caste? When I first arrived in Sri Lanka, I hired a young woman from Kandy 
named Shanika to assist me in getting my bearings in Redigama, my initial field-site. In hushed 
tones and often toward the end of lengthy introductory conversations with village residents about 
the area or the local weaving industry in which I was interested, our interlocutors, confident that 
I would not understand, would quietly and almost embarrassedly confide in Shanika that there 
was “a caste problem” in the village. “Kiyanna epaa” (“don’t tell her”), they would whisper to 
her while nodding in my direction. But for the subject matter, the frequency with which these 
words, “kiyanna epaa,” passed by the lips of my informants was almost as comical as it was 
puzzling. In my second field site of Atwaedagama, concerns with caste, once again urging me to 
look the other way, almost derailed my research agenda for what we will see would have been 
the second time. In this way, and in true fashion to the enduring ethnographic fascination with 
public secrets, caste demanded my notice by demanding that I not notice it.  
My decision to follow up on these disclosures of caste was grounded initially in the sense 
that, as Michael Taussig (following Walter Benjamin) puts it, “truth is not a matter of exposure 
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which destroys the secret, but a revelation which does justice to it” (Taussig 1999:2). Revealed 
and just as quickly re-concealed, the bewildering presentation of caste’s significance smacked of 
the theatrics to which anthropologist Kimberly Theidon refers when she writes, “public secrets 
may be privately known but collectively denied such that the drama of revelation amounts to ‘the 
transgressive uncovering of a secretly familiar’”(2015:S194). My decision to focus on caste was 
motivated in part by a desire to make sense of this drama—to understand what motivates it, what 
compromises it, and what it says about life in contemporary Sri Lanka.  
Ultimately, however, choosing to write about caste required an uncomfortable reckoning 
with risks that, given the topic to which I originally addressed myself, I never anticipated having 
to consider. To call out caste is, at least on the face of it, to do precisely what many of my 
interlocutors feared I would do. Writing about caste would not only confirm the persistence of 
something that is generally considered a pre-modern category of identification and is publicly 
disavowed. As importantly, and especially with consideration of my low caste interlocutors, 
writing about caste, and more specifically their caste, could re-inscribe the social boundary on 
one side of which they have historically found themselves marginalized. And yet, to not write 
about caste would be to reaffirm the very real basis for my interlocutors’ fears. Indeed, not 
writing about caste would not only reinforce the erroneous notion, implicit in some recent 
scholarly writing, that Sri Lanka is or soon will be post-caste, but would also reproduce a silence 
that, I argue, is instrumental to the continued marginalization of those historically deemed “low.”  
To be clear, my central motivation for writing about caste was not to disrupt the 
continued marginalization of those considered to be low caste. I did not choose to write about 
caste because I feared that not doing so would reproduce the silence around it. I chose to write 
about caste because, despite the public silence around caste, the data that I collected demanded 
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that I attend to the phenomenon. Like the silence itself, they demanded that I do so not from any 
moral position, but rather from the perspective that, like any other cultural form that is 
fundamental to the reproduction of society, it must be analyzed to be understood. These data 
were unique to the place and time of my research. And yet the account that I have built out of 
them here disrupts any notion that caste somehow emanates from the mostly low caste people 
with whom I am primarily concerned in the following pages. Through an analysis of the ways in 
which differently structurally situated individuals reproduce this category of identification in 
their daily lives, it demonstrates that while it is low caste men and women who may feel the 
consequences of this reproduction most acutely—and while the burden may fall 
disproportionately upon them to call out this reproduction—it is not they who are solely 
responsible for it.  
Drawing attention to the place of silence and, more accurately, silence asymmetries, in 
this co-reproduction of caste, this dissertation adds to a topically and geographically vast body of 
historical and anthropological literature dealing with the subject of silence in all its 
methodological and theoretical complexity. Michel-Rolph Trouillot’s Silencing The Past: Power 
and the Production of History is among the most forceful accounts on the topic; and his 
conceptualization of “pastness” as “a position,” a conceptualization we must also extend to the 
present and the future, encapsulates the element of interestedness in the story of heritage and 
caste I tell here (1995:15). To speak to the breadth of globally relevant topics regarding which 
this dissertation serves as a comparative example, this literature on silence also includes 
ethnographically grounded analyses of silence as a tool of resistance, as in Himika 
Bhattacharya’s (2009) writing on narratives of violence among women along the Indo-Tibetan 
border. Alejandro Castillejo-Cuéllar’s (2005) analogous work on silence as a reaction to the 
		 	 	 	 8	
intrusions of academics and other “experts” in the context of traumatic events of violence and 
oppression is particularly relevant to the argument I will make in Chapter 3. This literature also 
includes examinations of public silences around racism, as in Christina Sue’s work on state-
sponsored silencing of racism in Mexico (2015), where, to gesture toward a state of affairs that 
will soon ring familiar, “scholars have paid little attention to the sociocultural aspects of 
Mexican racism” in part because “government officials have declared the nation free of racism 
and the topic unworthy of discussion” (114). This dissertation also speaks to what anthropologist 
Pedro Paulo Gomes Pereira, in his work on human rights and HIV in Brazil, calls the “dilemma 
of silence and voice,” or the hazards of speaking and of remaining silent on the part of both 
anthropologists and their interlocutors (Pereira 2008:38). Finally, it contributes to the 
anthropological conceptualization of silences that are “practiced in the absence of explicit 
coercion or enforcement” but that tend “to be constituted through, and circumscribed by, the 
political interests of dominant groups” (2000:114), as in the kind of silence Robin Sheriff has 
termed “cultural censorship.” Such varied methodological and theoretical strands within the 
literature on silence are taken up in different ways throughout this dissertation. 
The audiences that I envision for this dissertation are multiple, but they are comprised 
first and foremost of scholars (Sri Lankan and otherwise) of Sri Lanka. Anthropologists 
unfamiliar with Sri Lanka may be disappointed by the absence of any sweeping historical 
overview of the country, or of a social taxonomy of caste, in the following pages. I would direct 
readers who desire such material to the abundance of scholarly literature on Sri Lanka in libraries 
around the world. I expect that this dissertation will be of greater interest to scholars who already 
have at least some acquaintance with the country. Hoping that the range of ethnographic 
instances described in the following pages will ring familiar to my Sri Lankans readers, my 
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primary aim for this text is twofold: that it will not only offer insight into the hitherto largely 
undocumented micro-politics of caste’s reproduction, but also and by consequence that it will 
compel fellow specialists of the country to question and, where appropriate, resist the persistent 
scholarly portrayal of caste as destined to fade. By examining practices around caste from 
multiple vantage points, I intend for the descriptions and arguments I offer here to facilitate 
appreciation for and prompt scholarly discussion around caste’s often subtle and paradox-ridden 
reproduction in the present. As importantly, and at the risk of being repetitive, I aim for this 
account to leave no question that this reproduction is not the sole purview of a particular group 
(high or low caste individuals, for instance), but rather a consequence of boundary work carried 
out by individuals across structural positions. 
Silencing Caste 
To make sense of the reluctant disclosures of caste’s significance that I encountered early 
on in Redigama, and to situate the stories that I tell in the following pages, it is useful to begin by 
sketching, even if only in broad strokes, some of the historical conditions that have helped 
generate the ambivalence that characterizes concerns with caste among the Sinhalese today. Over 
the course of the 19th and 20th centuries, “caste’” became reified as a category of identification at 
the same time that it came to be publicly rejected as out of place in a country perceived to be on 
modernity’s doorstep. While states throughout the history of the island we now know as Sri 
Lanka “made [‘caste-like’ groups] central to their administrative structures,” pre-modern Sinhala 
did not even have “words that expressed the distinctions found in the English-language 
categories of ‘caste,’ ‘race,’ or even ‘religion’” (Rogers 2004b:53; Rogers 1994:13).  
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From the late 18th to early 19th centuries, a colonial power oriented primarily to the 
“extraction of tribute” and grounded in “the mercantilist rationality of sovereignty” shifted to a 
reliance “upon the productivity and consumption of an improving public” (Scott 1999:43-45).  
In the emergence of a “new political rationality” rooted in liberalist principles, the largely caste-
based mode of political hierarchy entailed in rajakariya [lit. duty to the king], the pre-colonial 
administrative foundation of ritual and occupational service to the monarchy, was to be 
dissolved. In its place, colonial administrators sought to institute “principles of economic 
authority and distinction…defined by the abstract and self-regulating demands of the market, 
which operated not on such aggregates as caste but on individuals responding only to the rational 
or natural pressure of want and self-interest” (Scott 1999:48). In the promotion of its civilizing 
project in then Ceylon, understanding (and seeking to influence) the island’s population emerged 
as a central undertaking of colonial authority (Scott 1999:44). In the process, however, the 
various “investigative modalities” (historiographical, ethnological, museological, medical, 
etc.)(Cohn 1996:5) developed by British administrators to understand and thereby better control 
the populations they sought to govern led, as they had on the subcontinent’s mainland, to a late 
19th century “growing self-consciousness about caste” (Blackburn 2010:89). As A.P. Kannangara 
has argued, a certain “caste consciousness” was in fact heightened during British colonial rule 
when “what was [formerly] taken for granted became more explicit” (Kannangara 2011:103). In 
addition, although the essentially feudal governing apparatus to be found in rajakariya was 
officially abolished in 1833, the British continued to pay “due heed” to caste-based 
hierarchization in the allocation of administrative titles and offices (Jayawardena 2000:161). Into 
the late 19th century it was “consciously revived and reactivated,” and often forcefully so, when 
colonial administrators realized that, as Governor William Gregory (1872-1877) put it, “‘matters 
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went far more smoothly and efficiently when the native officers were selected from ancient 
lineage rather than men who, though excellent of character and experience, had risen from the 
ranks’” (Gunasinghe 2007:48;58; See also Dewasiri 2008 and Jayawardena 2000).2  
  While aspects of caste-based hierarchical authority were reinforced under British rule, 
however, in the 19th century consolidation of what John Rogers has called a “modern sociology 
of knowledge,” it was race, ethnicity, and nationalism that became central markers of who one is 
while identification in terms of religion, language, and what is in English referred to as caste 
acquired an inferior status (Rogers 1994:13).3 At a moment marked by the ascendance of 
Victorian racial theory, race was affirmed as the privileged category of identification when it 
came to representative politics (McGilvray 2008:40; Thiranagama 2011:111; Spencer 1990:8) 
while caste, now “more hidden from view and spoken about less publicly,” was “relegated to the 
private sphere of home and family” (Jayawardena 2000:161).   
Caste did not simply fade quietly from public life, however. Between the late 19th and 
mid-20th centuries, many voices chimed in to offer justification for and approbation of a largely 
deliberate and institutional silencing of caste. Even though caste had served as a “primary 																																																								2 This is not to say that, insofar as colonial administrative and economic policies facilitated a 
reinforcement or reproduction of caste-based distinction, they necessarily always did so in terms 
of pre-existing hierarchies. In some instances, as Kumari Jayawadena has argued, 
transformations associated with both colonial and capitalist practices also “reordered the 
question of who was ‘high’ and ‘low’ in society” (Jayawardena 2000:xxi). 3	“In South Asian languages,” Stirrat notes, “there is no verbal concept semantically identical 
with ‘caste’” (Stirrat 1982:11). As noted in Chapter 2, the term “kulaya” (also sometimes 
translated as “family”) is generally regarded as the closest Sinhala approximation of the 
Portuguese-derived English term “caste.” As Stirrat has also noted with respect to his work in 
Wellagoda, however, while marked by greater semantic variation than “kulaya” (“related to the 
idea of ‘kind’ or ‘species’ or ‘variety,” the term “jātiya” is more often used to denote “either 
racio-linguistic identity (e.g. Sinhalese or Tamil) or religious identity (e.g. Catholic or 
Buddhist)”), “jātiya” is at times also used in reference to the sort of “hereditary groups” denoted 
by the English term “caste” (Stirrat 1982:11). 	
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category that was used in all regional censuses” (Silva, Thanges and Sivapragasam 2009:1) until 
the late 19th century, it was “never enumerated in any of the modern censuses that began in 
1871” (Rogers 2004 Caste as a Social Category:72). Caste was omitted, according to the 
compiler of the 1891 census, because “‘it would have led the people to believe it was important, 
while the ‘declared policy’ of the government is to disregard it’” (Rogers 2004:72). Arguing that 
“in no Eastern country…have the barriers of caste been more rapidly pushed aside than in 
Ceylon,” colonial administrator E.B. Denham reported in 1912 that the Ceylon Census did not 
collect information pertaining to the subject since “caste does not play in Ceylon the important 
part it does in India” (Denham 1912:177).  
The institutionalization of universal suffrage following the recommendations of the 
Donoughmore Commission in 1931 also foreclosed any possibility of caste figuring explicitly in 
representational politics.4 The formation of an “electoral structure which made no concession to 
‘communal’ interests” (De Silva 1981:422-423) was a liberal development with which various 
“caste associations that had come forward during the Commission sittings” were distinctly 
unsatisfied (Wickremasinghe 2006:148).5  
This latter instance of caste’s institutional silencing is worth dwelling upon because its 
consequences help us to appreciate a significant feature of the reproduction of caste-based 
																																																								4 This is not to suggest that concerns with caste have been irrelevant in electoral politics, 
although the extent of this relevance has been debated over the years (See, for instance, Jiggins 
(1979), Roberts (1982), and Jayanntha (1992)). 5	As recounted in a 1928 newspaper report on the Irish Lord Donoughmore and his fellow 
commissioners’ visit to the island, “Wherever these British commissioners went they found 
themselves bombarded by representatives of the minority communities who told them their 
interests could be safe only if persons belonging to their particular caste or creed alone sat in the 
legislative chamber and acted as their spokesmen” (Singh 1982:9). In the end, the author noted, 
such “appeals had exactly the opposite effect to that which had been desired by the individuals 
and deputations which made them” (Singh 1982:9).	
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identification considered in the following pages. Bryce Ryan (1953), generally considered the 
scholarly authority on caste in Sri Lanka, visualized the distribution of Sinhalese castes as an 
inverted pyramid. Unlike in India, where the ritually superior castes are occupied by few 
(Brahmins) and the ritually inferior castes occupied by many (Sudras), Ryan estimated that those 
who have historically been regarded (though not without contestation) as ritually superior among 
the Sinhalese, the Goyigama or “cultivators,” constituted at least half of the Sinhalese population 
(Ryan 1953: 95). This ritual superiority has never mapped onto a politically or economically 
homogeneous Goyigama population, and some have even questioned whether authors writing 
between the late 17th and early 19th centuries may have included more groups in the caste 
category “Goyigama” than was warranted given the realities of social distinction on the ground 
(Dewasiri 2008:193). Nonetheless, and with the institution of universal suffrage, by the early to 
mid-20th century those who identified as belonging to this “highest and most numerically 
important Sinhala caste” (Wickremasinghe 2006:149) saw a certain fortification of their political 
dominance (Farmer 1965:433).  
Crucially, then, while caste as a now clearly articulated object of knowledge was often 
publicly derided as a lamentable anachronism firmly out of place in a “modernizing” Ceylon, the 
numerical dominance of the Goyigama was consolidated in an electoral advantage. In this 
context, in other words, caste could not serve as grounds for grievances that might be brought by 
those ritually inferior minority populations. As we will see in the following chapters, the 
contradictions that obtain in this liberal development would find expression in the “persistence of 
caste privilege in the form of castelessness” (Subramanian 2015: 294-295). Today, caste is at 
times figured as a (backward) feature of low caste communities rather than as a category of 
identification whose significance is reproduced by actors across social strata.  
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At a moment marked by the promulgation of what historian K.M. De Silva characterized 
as a “broad impulse towards social welfare” (De Silva 1981:436), public expressions of antipathy 
toward caste were pointed. Soon after the introduction of universal suffrage, a contributor to 
Young Ceylon gave a fiery statement expressing what she regarded as the mismatch between this 
supposed archaism (caste) and the liberal currents that defined the present: In “Wither Ceylon,” 
Pearl Jayasundera voiced the egalitarian sentiment underlying support for new policies to ensure 
equal access to medical care and education, condemning the “caste system” as “the greatest of 
our social evils” (Jayasundera 1938:71). Jayasundera argued, “with the change in the psychology 
of the people, the disappearance of the slave mentality, the more liberal education, the advance 
of progress and the realization of the legal equality of all citizens, the caste system has become 
obsolete” (Jayasundera 1938:71). Thus declaring her faith in the march of liberal advancement, 
she called upon her readers to recognize that one “whose great-grandfather was a treacle maker 
or a goldsmith has just the same opportunities as a descendant of an adigar.”6 “Man,” 
Jayasundera concluded assertively, “is master of his fortune and does not require the prop of a 
worm-eaten superiority of caste to raise him to a pedestal” (Jayasundera 1938:71). (On the flip 
side, however, and unlike in India (see p. 3), neither could one use the handicap of caste 
inferiority to contest his inability to reach that pedestal.)  
The “traditional arts” largely referring by this time to productive practices historically 
associated with caste-based occupations, the notion that caste was impeding such arts’ 
development was also gaining traction. In an article elegiacally titled, “A Heritage in the Dust,” 
K.V.P. Goonatilleke explicitly attributed elements of a purported “decay” in the “rich heritage” 
																																																								6 An adigar, or Adikaarama, is a Kandyan chief.	
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of the Sinhalese to “the barriers created by caste” (Goonatilleke 1935:386).7 In later years, as we 
will see in Chapter 2, those concerned with the promotion of the “traditional arts” gave further 
voice to this sentiment and called for such arts to be sanitized of any caste association. Around 
the time of independence, the “traditional arts and crafts” associated with Kandy acquired force 
as cultural symbols of an ostensibly homogeneous Sinhalese collectivity. In articulating such 
industries as foundational elements of a distinctly national patrimony whose preservation was 
essential to staving off the ruinous effects of industrialization and westernization, the scholars 
who advocated most enthusiastically for their protection and development were keen to strip 
them of any caste association. 
In 1956, a post-World War II moment in which delegates of the still newly created 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) “portrayed world 
citizenship as the path to world peace, and as a necessary step in the evolution of mankind from 																																																								7 Notably, Jayasundera and Goonatilleke’s opinions on the matter were in striking contrast to that 
of art historian Ananda Coomaraswamy, to whom it was the capitalistic drive toward profit that 
had disrupted the “coordination” between parts of a “traditional society” (caste and the arts, 
namely) that he saw as fitted together like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle” (141). Shortly before his 
passing in 1947, Coomaraswamy penned The Bugbear of Democracy, a piece in which he 
rejected the desirability of the “progress” to which Jayasundera referred. Speaking on behalf of 
the Ceylonese, Coomaraswamy stressed, “’we do not want the incredible American way of life” 
(124-125), and argued that the caste system “cannot be judged by concepts of success that 
govern life in a society organized for overproduction and profit at any price” (2005:147). 
Observing that “modern civilization is fundamentally a ‘racket,’” he questioned the wisdom of 
the equal opportunity that Jayasundera had celebrated: “Suppose that men were really free to 
choose their work, and refused to undertake any such uncongenial tasks as, for example, mining, 
or refused to assume the burdens of public office? Might not a conscription of manpower be 
needed even in times of peace? That might be worse than the caste system looks even to be” 
(Coomaraswamy 2005:149). While stressing that he was not an apologist for caste, in delineating 
“the prejudices that are aroused in every hundred per cent progressive and democratic-egalitarian 
mind by the (Portuguese) word ‘caste,’ Coomaraswamy defended the latter against the “bugbear 
of democracy” by arguing that the “sanctified” status of “traditional arts” on the subcontinent 
was owed to a correspondence between “the state or [a craftsman’s] own ambition” and his “due 
inheritance,” or “that station of life to which it has pleased God to call him” (i.e. caste 
status)(Coomaraswamy 2005:123;134-135).			 
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tribes to nations” (Sluga 2010:393), contributors to the UNESCO-sponsored Conference on 
Traditional Cultures in Ceylon deemed caste a thoroughgoing hindrance on the development of 
“the arts.” As University of Peradeniya Lecturer of Education J.E. Jayasuriya put it in calling for 
a revival of the “indigenous crafts,” “an essential condition…seems to be that they should be 
rooted up from their caste and occupational associations so that they are no longer attributes of a 
caste or occupation but become related to life at all levels in the community” (Jayasuriya 
1956:69). To Jayasuriya, the “survival and development of some of the arts and most of the 
crafts” necessitated the elimination of the caste-basis of such practices (Pieris 1956:8; Jayasuriya 
1956:69). His colleague, University of Ceylon sociologist Ralph Pieris, described caste as, like 
“magic” and “superstition,” a phenomenon with “few defenders now” (Pieris 1956:8). 
Advocating a strategy by which to generate the “respect” that such artists deserve, and 
concluding that “ancient prejudice can be removed in democratic conditions,” Pieris likewise 
called for the “removal of the stigma of caste attached to the artist and craftsman” (Pieris 
1956:9). As we will see, the vehemence with which such calls were made, though proportionate 
to the abovementioned silencing of public discussion around caste, did not ensure such removal.  
A Resilient Narrative of Caste’s Demise 
The historical longevity of the notion that caste is out of step with political and economic 
transformations sweeping across Sri Lanka is an almost ironic indication of the resilience of this 
perceived archaism. While most of my Sinhalese interlocutors would quietly admit that caste still 
plays some role in contemporary social life, particularly when it comes to marriage, perhaps the 
most significant domain in which knowledge about caste is reproduced, almost all would more 
volubly profess that it is on the decline. It is not only less important than it was “in the past,” 
they would stress, but also (and much like tradition), destined to diminish over time. This 
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narrative of caste’s inevitable waning, as already indicated, is nothing new. Over fifty years ago, 
in fact, anthropologist Nur Yalman wrote, “In Colombo one is likely to hear that ‘caste is no 
longer very important, and that in any case it is disappearing’” (Yalman 1960:78). More recently, 
a young officer in the Department of Industrial Enterprise Development put it to me in a 
conversation about artisans in Atwaedagama: 
Well, it has been 200 years since the king died. That means that it has only been a few 
generations since then. So, do you think that the things that are rooted in them will go away 
anytime soon? No. It will take around 50 to 100 years. It will probably reduce in another 50 
years. 
  
This statement, notable also for its portrayal of caste as a thing “rooted” in low caste individuals, 
a notion to which I will return in Chapter 3, encapsulates the general attitude that I encountered 
in my conversations with residents in and around Kandy and Colombo: Caste is a regrettable 
holdover from an unenlightened past, and as the distance between what is commonly referred to 
as “the Kings’ time” (raja kaaleya) and the present expands, and in particular as the economy 
continues to develop in accordance with liberal market principles, the importance of caste-based 
identification is fated to diminish.  
 In general, I encountered assertions such as this as expressions of faith in the ascendance 
of a market economy in which one’s achieved social status trumps her ascribed identity. One of 
my centrals concerns in the following pages is with the contradictions—at times quite subtle—
that point to the articulation between this market economy logic and reinvestments in caste 
hierarchy. The words of a government officer, a woman who assisted me soon after I arrived in 
Atwaedagama by providing what she hoped would serve as a historical overview of the area, 
offer one sense of what this contradiction can look like. Echoing an idea I encountered among 
almost all of my interlocutors that caste is mismatched to the country’s presently developed 
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economic condition, she noted of caste, or “those things,” as she put it, “We must respect them 
and we must care about them, but I don’t approve of them.” They are “not relevant in the present 
society,” she added.  
To give another example, toward the end of my stay in the country, I was chatting with a 
gentleman from the census department in Colombo and trying to make sense of the various 
administrative block names around Atwaedagama. Noting that several of the administrative 
divisions in the immediate area included Atwaedagama’s former name rather than the one by 
which its residents have known it for decades, I shared off-handedly my understanding that 
Atwaedagama’s name had in fact been changed by President Premadasa many years earlier. 
Atwaedagama’s former name, as we will see, is more closely associated with the low caste status 
of the area’s residents, which is reportedly one reason why Premadasa renamed the village. 
Suddenly looking up from the census schedule we had been reviewing together, the man adjusted 
his posture and, fixing his gaze toward me as though to command my attention, explained 
matter-of-factly that, in the past, there was “a thing called caste” in Sri Lanka, and the people in 
Atwaedagama performed a caste-based service (mat-weaving) for the king. “But that was in the 
past,” he related seriously, “people don’t think about those things now because we have 
developed and because of our economy.” Concluding this diversion by cheerfully boasting of Sri 
Lanka’s “numbers” (its rising GDP) in comparison to those of other countries in the region, he 
stated confidently, “No, people don’t think about that at all.” As he bowed his head back down 
toward the pages on his lap, he gazed blankly at their white edges for some time before adding in 
a confessional tone, “Well, except in marriage. Even my mother didn’t want me to marry a girl 
from a low caste family.”  
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Such contradictions tell us much about the always-already “indigenized” forms of what 
Sahlins has called a “new planetary organization of culture”: “Unified by the expansion of 
Western capitalism over recent centuries,” Sahlins writes, “the world is also being re-diversified 
by indigenous adaptations to the global juggernaut” (Sahlins 1999:ix). In keeping with this 
compelling assessment of global transformation, in the ensuing chapters I read these 
contradictions not as paradoxes whose resolution lies in what critics have referred to as an 
“unfolding trajectory of the teleological path of a single [political-economic] rationality” (Scott 
1999:43), but as evidence of the very re-diversification to which Sahlins refers.  
Scholarly Prognostications of Caste’s Demise 
While scholarly interest in caste burgeoned between the 1960s and 1980s (Jiggins 1979; 
Leach 1960; Stirrat 1982; Yalman 1960, 1967, 1989), the topic has since largely fallen out of 
fashion among social scientists of Sri Lanka as they have redirected their primary attention to 
questions of national and ethnic identification given urgency by the eruption of civil war. 
Scholarship on caste in the intervening years has generally not dealt with the contemporary 
period. In addition, it has tended to highlight upward social mobility among those identified as 
belonging to certain caste groups, a fact that at least some have argued has “overshadowed the 
conditions of exclusion and marginality experienced by other caste communities” (Uyangoda 
2012:39; See also Kannangara 2011:100). Kumari Jayawardena, for instance, examines how a 
changing economic landscape over the course of the 19th century not only facilitated the 
emergence of a commercial-oriented Sri Lankan bourgeoisie that “acted as a class” but also, and 
in accordance, occasioned unprecedented opportunities for caste mobility among the Kerava 
(Jayawardena 2000). Relatedly, Kannangara has studied the strategic and “propagandist” 
practices of “rising non-Goyigamas” to assert caste superiority in 19th and early 20th century 
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caste disputes (Kannagara 1993). Nirmal Ranjith Dewasiri’s recent work examines the mid-18th 
century caste composition of peasant settlements as well as transformations in the dynamics of 
class and caste mobility under Dutch rule in Western Sri Lanka (Dewasiri 2008). Finally, 
Michael Roberts has examined how Kerava families rose from social and economic disadvantage 
to positions of remarkable financial standing by the early 20th century (Roberts 1982).  
With the important exception of Tamara Gunasekera, to whose work I will turn 
momentarily, it has generally been scholars in disciplines other than anthropology, and, notably, 
a few local scholars in particular, who have spearheaded a scholarly return to questions around 
contemporary practices of caste-based identification.8 Political scientist Jayadeva Uyangoda and 
sociologist Kalinga Tudor Silva are at the forefront of a generally social-justice oriented revival 
of interest in the topic (Matthews 2004; Silva 2013; Silva, Sivapragasam, & Thanges, 2009; 
Uyangoda and De Mel 2012). Framing some of the most pertinent questions at hand in terms of 
caste-based discrimination, these scholars have done much to highlight what sociologist-
anthropologist Siri Gamage has described as a “dominant caste syndrome…at the core of the 
political process and governance” (Gamage 2014).  
For his part, Kalinga Tudor Silva has endeavored to confound the notion that “the basis 
of the explicit primary identity of individuals is shifting from caste to ethnicity” (Silva 
1999:201). Rather than arguing a necessary displacement of one category of identification over 
another, Silva finds it productive to inquire as to why individuals in certain situations might 
																																																								8 There are indications that the tide is turning. Signaling the timeliness of this dissertation, 
Gananath Obeyesekere and other renowned anthropologists of Sri Lanka took up questions 
around caste at a November 2016 conference on “Caste, Social Justice and Democracy” in 
Colombo.	
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“renounce or at least undervalue their caste identity and replace it with a higher order ethnic 
identity” (Silva 1999:202).  
The formulation of “an identity,” ethnic, caste, or otherwise, is not amenable to the kind 
of analysis in which I am interested here. However, I am in full agreement with Silva’s argument 
that a tendency in contemporary Sri Lanka to “look down upon any open expression of caste 
distinctions” may not amount to an actual “decreased importance of caste” in all spheres of 
social life (Silva 1999:212). Indeed, as I would argue, such a tendency is elemental to a rhetoric 
of liberal development that, if it does facilitate them, at least helps conceal the ways in which 
caste’s importance is reproduced. And yet there are those who suggest that, for example, the 
trend of using “more fashionable names, particularly on the part of those from deprived caste 
backgrounds” (Silva 1999:210) reflects either caste mobility or a decline in concerns with caste. 
According to sociologist Amarasiri De Silva, personal and family names “have become 
increasingly recognized as a marker of an individual’s social status in the wider society,” the 
average annual number of name change notifications published in Sinhala newspapers increasing 
by a factor of nine between 1976 (484) and 1993-1995 (De Silva 1999:81). Roughly seventy-one 
percent of name changes between 1993 and 1995 were ones in which individuals or families 
changed names associated with a “‘low caste’” status to ones associated with identification as 
high caste Goyigama or Radala Goyigama (De Silva 1999:82). In his initial writing on the topic, 
De Silva interpreted this phenomenon as reflecting an actual transformation of status.9 As he 
																																																								9 In his more recent work, De Silva revises his position, writing that it “is not certain if a change 
of family name indeed changes one’s status but, when a whole family changes its name and 
adopts one of a different caste, it is possible that its caste status also changes” (De Silva 
2009:19). While finding that “individuals who changed their names to Goigama-like names 
comprised a large percentage of the total number of family name changes” in the sample 
considered, De Silva reports that it cannot be said that “such individuals completely severed their 
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acknowledges in his more recent work, however, and as Silva seeks to stress by referring to caste 
as a “‘hidden identity,’” the picture is more complicated. I will elaborate upon this complexity in 
Chapter 3. To offer a preview, one of my research assistants, a young Muslim woman from 
Kandy, generally lamented contemporary preoccupations with caste among the Sinhalese and 
often spoke favorably of what she viewed as an overall decline in its significance. One afternoon, 
however, she related to me with remarkable sympathy the difficulty that the mother of a close 
Sinhala friend was having in locating a “suitable” (i.e. like-caste) marriage partner for her 
daughter. Registering an involuntary expression of surprise on my part, she frowned and 
explained that the phenomenon of name changing presents a vexing challenge—though, 
significantly, not an insurmountable one—when it comes to ascertaining who others “really are.”  
To explain the general anthropological and sociological turn away from caste among 
contemporary Sinhalese as a central topic of consideration entails a degree of conjecture. Though 
limited in explanatory force, I would argue that we ought not discount the role of an acceptance 
even among some scholars of the hopeful notion that, “in the context of a modern society…a 
person who was compelled to be known as a man of low caste [can] now…raise himself in the 
spheres of educational, economic, political and social status” (Somathilake 1998:358). In other 
words, caste no longer has the kind of bearing on social life that might warrant our analysis of it. 
I will return to this notion and its implications momentarily. Here, however, I want to offer a few 
potentially more definitive explanations for the relative neglect of the topic in contemporary 
scholarship.  
																																																																																																																																																																																		
relationships with their family and kinsfolk in the villages and that they assumed an entirely new 
caste status” (De Silva 2009:19). In my personal communication with him, Professor De Silva 
noted that he revised his interpretation of the phenomenon after conducting interviews with 
individuals who had changed their names. 
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In the first place, it could simply be that caste has been overshadowed by the arguably 
more pressing concerns raised by a protracted civil conflict typically understood first and 
foremost as a matter of ethnic difference.10 In addition, however, a shift away from 
considerations of caste in the present might also extend from the public and institutional silence 
around caste described above. This silence, which may derive fundamentally from a widespread 
public denial of caste’s significance in a modern democracy, manifests most significantly in the 
absence of any serious reckoning with caste-based discrimination in the country’s constitutional 
framework and a general neglect of the topic in the development of socioeconomic policy (Silva 
and Hettihewage 2001:63; Uyangoda 1999).  
Beyond further suggesting the irrelevance of caste in the present, a general dearth of 
public or demographic information pertaining to caste has likely also compounded scholarly 
disinterest over the years. This dearth of information is an artifact of what I have already 
discussed as a long history of the institutional silencing of caste even while concerns with the 
status hierarchies to which it refers remained salient. As Rogers notes, while “in practice the 
British never disregarded caste completely…the normative view that it was undesirable took 
hold quite quickly among many officials” (2004:640). This view had consequences in terms of 
the kind of information that was collected and acted upon. Particularly following the 
Colebrooke-Cameron Commission of 1833, a reform effort heavily shaped by a concern with 
“universal ideas of political rights, civilization, and progress,” “regulations and policies that took 
																																																								
10 The more than thirty-year war between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) came to a bloody end with the latter’s defeat in May 2009, just over four 
years before I began the core period of fieldwork upon which this dissertation is based. 
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explicit note of caste were repealed or ignored” (Rogers 2004:639-640).11 The national census, 
we will recall, long ago dropped questions regarding caste from its schedule.  
The lack of “hard data” resulting from the institutional disregard of caste has 
disappointed some scholars interested in the topic and may have also dissuaded others from 
taking caste up as a topic worth investigating. In 1945, for instance, sociologist William H. 
Gilbert complained that “there are no community surveys including caste data along with other 
relevant social facts concerning residence, segregation, present occupational activities, incomes, 
endogamy, and tendencies toward disregard of caste rules” (Gilbert 1953:340). He concluded 
rather sardonically, “Evidently, the European administrators of Ceylon thought that it was 
possible to make this social phenomenon disappear by ignoring it” (Gilbert 1953:340; 306). As 
though responding to Gilbert’s somewhat desperate cry that “even a single instance of such a 
survey would go far toward throwing light on the present social conditions of the Sinhalese 
castes” (Gilbert 1953:340), Bryce Ryan would publish his seminal Caste in Modern Ceylon: The 
Sinhalese System in Transition (1953), less than a decade later. Over sixty years have since 
passed, and the data that Ryan presented therein remains the most comprehensive snapshot of the 
distribution of castes among the Sinhalese (Jabbar 2005:3; Silva and Thanges 2009:13).   
Although current anthropologists of Sri Lanka typically give at least some mention of 
caste in their accounts (Lynch 2007, Gamburd 2000, Hewamanne 2008), writing on the topic in 
terms of contemporary social life among the Sinhalese is conspicuously limited in relation to that 
which deals with caste among Tamils (McGilvray 2008; Thiranagama 2011). While it is difficult 																																																								11 As David Scott (1999) has noted, these reforms, which “led to the unification of the 
administration of the island, the establishment of executing and legislative councils, judicial 
reform, the development of capitalist agriculture, and of modern means of communication, 
education, and the press,” have been viewed historiographically as “establish[ing] the definitive 
moment of the break with [Ceylon’s] “medieval” or “feudal” past” (42). 
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to speak of trends when dealing with such a small body of literature, recent scholarly treatment 
of the topic is also marked by enduring and implicitly hopeful predictions of caste’s demise. 
Some scholars appear to have gotten caught up in the ultimately linear and deterministic currents 
that characterize the abovementioned claims that caste is necessarily on the decline. In accounts 
that otherwise offer nuanced analyses of contemporary social life in Sri Lanka, they demonstrate 
fealty not only to the claim that, as Wendy Brown puts it in her critique of progressive narratives, 
“history has reason, purpose, and direction,” but also to the notion that “modernity 
itself…emerged from a more primitive, religious, caste- and kin-bound, in-egalitarian, 
unemancipated, bloody, unenlightened, and stateless time” (Brown 2001:5-6). Indicating a 
reluctance to abandon this “structure of progressive expectations for the future” (Donham 
2002:244), Sri Lanka anthropologist Bambi Chapin has for example written, “the importance and 
legitimacy of caste is being eroded throughout Sri Lanka by political and economic development 
as well as by popular sentiment” (Chapin 2014:29-30). While acknowledging that it is 
“happening more slowly than is claimed” and that it would therefore be “premature to write 
[caste’s] obituary as some smart town folk are inclined to do,” Kannangara nonetheless likewise 
writes that “[t]he decline of caste continues as it will continue” (Kannangara 2011:111-112). 
Similarly, in an account that is, like Kannangara’s, commendable for drawing attention to the 
contemporary prevalence of concerns with caste, Bruce Matthews observes that caste, though 
“still crucial,” has “long been challenged by class…as the leading social hierarchical indicator” 
and is “slowly diminishing in authority” (Matthews 2004:86;98). In his ethnographically 
grounded work on transformations in ritual practice and knowledge among the Berava in 
southern Sri Lanka, Bob Simpson has also written of a “progressive backing away from 
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hereditary, stigmatized occupations among the [Sinhala] lower castes…such that the vestiges of 
caste-based identity are rapidly being expunged” (Simpson 1997:44). 
If the idea of modernity, “in its more optimistic versions,” as Webb Keane puts it, tends 
to encompass the notion of a “rupture from a traditional past, and progress toward a better 
future” (2007:48), such scholarly anticipations of caste’s demise conjure a distinctly modernist 
cheer of approval. In one sense, it is worth noting here, such anticipations recapitulate the trend 
of thought against which sociologist Hans-Dieter Evers wrote in the late 1960s. In describing the 
work of his contemporaries, Evers observed that “traditional Sinhalese institutions and values are 
depicted as disintegrating under the pressure of various factors of change and only limited 
attention is paid to institutions which effectively counteract westernization, modernization, and 
possible change” (Evers 1969:685). Examining a phenomenon Weber dubbed “monastic 
landlordism,” Evers argued that a pre-colonial temple system prevalent around Kandy, enjoying 
a certain fortification when “reforms abolishing the Kandyan feudal administration in the 
eighteen-thirties exempted the religious sphere,” ended up effectively helping to “maintain the 
feudal aristocracy” and “perpetuating caste distinctions” in the region (Evers 1969:687;686).  
Anthropologists and other social scientists have of course at times been at the vanguard 
of the almost eager composition of “cultural obituaries” (Herzfeld 2004:60; Berliner 2014).12 It is 
to such “obituaries” that Evers addressed himself. While the predominant sentiment around such 
perceived losses is generally one of urgency or lament, however, the modernist strand of 
determinism that we observe with respect to caste instead suggests the frustrated sense that those 
																																																								12 As David Berliner (2014) has also stressed in his writing on “exonostalgia,” to note as much is 
not intended to “minimize the historical fact that human groups [have been] annihilated” 
(Berliner 2014: 376). Rather, it is to argue that the familiar trope of “vanishing cultures” has 
done little justice to the fact of cultural (re)production in societies throughout history. 
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things that should be dead and gone but are not are thoroughly anachronistic in their stubborn 
persistence. Insofar as it lays bare the shared strand of linear thinking that underpins both sorts of 
claims, the irony here is noteworthy.  
I will return to the implications of this linearity momentarily. First, I want to point out 
that, to the extent that caste is acknowledged as a salient category of identification in the present, 
it is formulated not so much in positive terms as an instance of cultural resilience as something 
“vestigial” (Simpson 1997:440). Recalling the late 19th century anthropological ‘“doctrine of 
survivals,’” an evolutionist notion oriented to the “survival of the unfit” (Stocking 1968:97), this 
aspect of the contemporary handling of caste is not new to scholarship on the subcontinent. It 
resembles something political scientists and India specialists Lloyd and Susanne Hoeber 
Rudolph described almost fifty years ago. Scholars distinguishing between “modern society” and 
“traditional society,” they observed, envisioned “[features of the latter] as residual categories that 
have failed to yield, because of some inefficiency in the historical process, to the imperatives of 
modernization” (Rudolph and Rudolph 1967:4).  
Treating caste today as a “residue” in excess of those political and economic processes 
supposed to obtain in the juggernaut of “modernity” not only encourages a disregard of 
contemporary practices of caste-based discrimination (“it will soon be a thing of the past, 
anyway,” so the idea goes), but is also deceptive insofar as, in relying upon something like a 
myth of perpetual demise, it suggests that if we just turn our heads long enough, when we look 
back we will not see caste at all. The very real implications of such a conceptualization ought not 
be underestimated. To ascribe to the popular fiction that concerns with caste are somehow 
destined to diminish as an operation of an all-encompassing logic of history is, I would argue, to 
be complicit in the reigning silence on the topic in public and political discourse in the country in 
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general (Uyangoda 1999; See also Moore 1997). As I will argue in the following chapters, this 
silence, one for which individuals across caste strata are responsible, ensures a definitive if not 
always obvious place for caste in social life among the Sinhalese.   
The critical eye with which Sahlins and others have approached the “postmodern panic 
about the possibility that anything like ‘a culture’ actually exists” any longer (Sahlins 1999b:xx), 
then, also informs the ethnographically grounded skepticism with which I approach 
contemporary claims of caste’s demise in Sri Lanka today. I would elaborate, however, and 
suggest that there is an instructive resemblance between this explicitly anxious regret over the 
passing of the so many “cultures” to which Sahlins refers and the implicitly hopeful faith in the 
disintegration of a category of identification (caste). Although to my knowledge they are not 
typically brought into focus simultaneously, we ought to recognize how, in both moments of 
anticipation, the bewildering contingency that obtains in the “ever-changing same” is passed 
over for the surety afforded by a “future that ‘will be’” (Chakrabarty 2000:251). Whether the 
anticipation for this “to be” is marked by dread on the one hand (as in the loss of culture(s)) or by 
a forward-looking sense of achievement on the other (as in the societal triumph over a form of 
institutionalized inequality), it deflects attention to that which is in the present as something 
other and much more than “the dead hand of the past” (Sahlins 1992:21). Put otherwise, anxious 
regret over expected loss may obfuscate the “resistance of culture” (Sahlins 1999a:412). In the 
same way, I argue, the implicitly celebratory projections of caste’s eventual elimination, a 
prognostication permitted by the notion of a future that “forms itself in the calculations and 
desires of the subject of political modernity” (Chakrabarty 2000:251), encourages a neglect of 
the contemporary reproduction of caste-based identification and the discrimination that may 
attend it. Examining these latter phenomena is a task far better served by a recognition that, to 
		 	 	 	 29	
borrow from Chakrabarty, the way the “archaic comes into the modern [is] not as a remnant of 
another time but as something constitutive of the present” (2000:251).  
A Present-Day, Anthropological Intervention 
Anthropology’s distinctive methodological pursuits serve a singular role in the 
recuperation of caste as a topic worthy of scholarly investigation. Among the anthropologists to 
explicitly address the topic of caste among the Sinhalese, however, only one, Tamara 
Gunasekera (1994), has dedicated an ethnographic monograph to an examination of 
contemporary caste-based hierarchy in light of the widespread “popularization of an egalitarian 
ethos” (Silva 1999:212). In this respect, the task to which Gunasekera sets herself is a significant 
counterexample to the abovementioned overstatements of caste’s passing. Through an analysis of 
social stratification during the late 1970s and early 1980s in two Sinhala villages (Rangama and 
Devideniya) in Kegalle District, Gunasekera seeks to challenge the notion that caste-based 
hierarchization gave way to class-based antagonism in the second half of the 20th century. Far 
from promoting a “sense of unity” based on shared class position, she argues, a post-
independence reduction in caste-based “privileges and obligations” has in fact and “on the 
contrary exacerbated class and caste tensions” (Gunasekera 1994:2). 
Gunasekera’s is a valuable and atypical anthropological effort to explicitly foreground 
the persistence of caste-based stratification against imaginings of the formation of consciously 
class-based collectives. There are two major counts on which her approach to caste differs from 
that which I adopt in the following pages, however. In the first place, Gunasekera sets out to 
examine “the social structure of caste” and, more specifically, “the determination of the caste 
groups” and the interaction between them (1994:31). I find the suggestion of pre-existing caste 
groupings whose identification and hierarchical ordering is the primary task of the anthropologist 
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to be vulnerable to an essentialism that misses the practices by which social distinctions are 
reproduced (and never necessarily so). In Gunasekera’s circular formulation, castes are “groups 
possessing differential degrees of social honour and prestige,” and “[i]n societies where caste is 
present…social honour and prestige or status accrues to an individual by virtue of his birth in a 
particular caste” (Gunasekera 1994:7). Caste groups, in other words, are ready-made entities 
whose hierarchical relationality awaits social scientific documentation.  
As we will see in the following chapters, much more work goes into reminding 
individuals of their proper social (and geographical) place than a formulation such as 
Gunasekera’s would tend to admit. Heeding calls for a nuanced analytical vocabulary that 
eschews essentialistic “identity” talk in favor of an examination of practices of identification, I 
do not approach practices of caste-based identification here as evidence of “primordial ties” 
(Brubaker Cooper’s 2001; Shils 1957:134) brought forth into the present. Rather, and in the spirit 
of Fredrik Barth’s seminal and still deeply relevant Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (1969), my 
concern is with the on-going and historically contingent reproduction of social boundaries 
through practice (Bourdieu 1977). As Thomas Blom Hansen writes, “[c]aste groups…are not 
‘out there’ as groups an sich,” but must be “named in public rituals, organized, and reproduced 
through performative practices” (Hansen 2001:10). Instead of accepting caste status as reducible 
to the “social honour and prestige” (or lack thereof) accruing “by virtue of [one’s] birth,” then, I 
examine the ways in which caste is reproduced as a category of such identification through 
active boundary-making between individuals whose dissimilarity is not given, but made. 
Approached from a point that seeks to avoid both radically essentialist and radically 
constructivist interpretations, actions that Gunasekera might perceive as reflecting a pre-existing 
and invariable positionality vis-à-vis others are understood here as constitutive of that 
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positionality. My concern rests with neither the identification of purportedly ready-made groups 
nor the examination of behaviors that attest to such groups’ given separability and hierarchical 
relationality. My interest is in delineating the locally meaningful and often unpredictable actions 
(discursive and otherwise) by which historically situated individuals identify with and 
differentiate themselves from others. 
The second and closely related feature of Gunasekera’s account that I wish to consider 
here, an intolerance for ambiguity, surfaces in her discomfort with certain inconsistencies around 
“native” rankings of caste groups. Gunasekera is committed to the enumeration and proper 
hierarchical ordering of castes in the area in which she worked, and in particular to the 
documentation of an order already established in the scholarly literature. This commitment 
thwarts her instinct to consider one of the more curious mysteries she encountered in Rangama 
and Devideniya. Facing a point of disagreement with high caste (Goyigama and Walawwe) 
residents of the area as to the relative positioning of two lower castes, the Gallat and Vahumpura, 
Gunasekera distinguishes between “subjective ranking” and “objective ranking” to resolve a 
potentially revelatory moment of contradiction. While pointing out that elsewhere and even by 
non-high-caste residents in the area, the Gallat are considered superior to the Vahumpura (the 
“objective view”), Gunasekera reports that high caste residents (Goyigama and Walawwe) and 
the Vahumpura themselves maintain that, here, the Gallat are in fact inferior (the “subjective 
view”). The justification given by high caste individuals, as reported by Gunasekera, is that they 
have always had “a close and trusted relationship” with the Vahumpura (1994:40). Gunasekera 
argues that this assertion of superiority is at odds with an “objective” ranking in which, 
according to inter-caste interaction (namely, asymmetrical forms of address and the fact of other 
low caste individuals’ performance of certain caste-based services for the Gallat but not the 
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Vahumpura), the Gallat enjoy the superior position. Gunasekera offers the example to illustrate 
the “danger of accepting native models of society uncritically” and concludes that the 
“behavioral reality” is that the Gallat are superior. The high caste model suggesting otherwise, 
she argues, amounts to a “distorted view” of social actuality (1994:40).   
I am not interested here in questioning Gunasekera’s conclusion that, based on the criteria 
of inter-caste interaction she has privileged as indicating “objective” relative caste status, the 
Vahumpura are in fact superior. Neither would I dismiss the importance of considering how the 
representations that people have and make of the world may conflict with or even depart entirely 
from their actions within it. My concern rests instead with Gunasekera’s handling of a local 
model of social order at odds with her own. Gunasekera chooses to resolve the inconsistency 
between claims and practice by reducing the former to subjective fancy rather than, as may have 
been more productive, asking how, despite interactional-based indices of Gallat superiority, the 
high caste residents of Rangama and Devideniya maintain things as otherwise. Unfortunately, we 
have little more to go on than Gunasekera’s postulation of self-interest. She invites us to assume 
that the village’s high caste residents are guilty of an opportunistic declaration of the superiority 
of the Vahumpura to justify their own “close and trusted relationship” with them. It is unclear 
whether there is more to the story. One is left wondering whether, out of sheer discomfort with 
the conflict between this “subjective ranking” and the “objective” criteria that she has selected, 
Gunasekera has passed up an opportunity to interrogate a locally meaningful logic of hierarchical 
ordering to leave intact the logic of another. In the end, what presents as a potentially revelatory 
puzzle is papered over in favor of maintaining the neatness of an abstracted caste hierarchy. 
While ranking itself is generally not disputed in Atwaedagama and Redigama, the subject 
of caste is, as already noted, riddled with contradiction. It is such contradiction—an aspect of the 
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messiness inherent to social life—that can be occluded by a commitment to the excavation of 
any putative underlying order or structure. As we will see in Chapters 3 and 4, for instance, it is 
precisely in the evident inconsistencies characteristic of the practices (including narrative 
practices) of Atwaedagama “insiders” and “outsiders” that one may observe the effect of forces 
demanding both indifference toward and allegiance to one’s ostensibly proper social and 
geographical “place.” I do not read these ambivalences and contradictions as blemishes on an 
image of social life whose abundant and objective clarity may be discerned if we just tune out 
the subjective noise. Rather, this work is carried out in a spirit of scholarship advocated many 
years ago by R.L. Stirrat. Reflecting on the “somewhat confusing” notions of caste that he 
encountered in the coastal Catholic Sinhalese village of Wellagoda, Stirrat related, “this 
confusion is in itself crucial to caste in Wellagoda,” and argued that “any attempt to avoid it 
would…amount to a bowdlerization of the data” (Stirrat 1982:9). The contribution that this 
dissertation makes to the anthropological literature on caste in Sri Lanka extends from its similar 
embrace of such contradictions. I do not approach these contradictions as conflicting data points 
to be reconciled. Rather, and here is the core of my intervention, I approach them as prismatic of 
the practical and ideological entailments of a range of cultural processes—those pertaining to 
democratic citizenship, narratives of national heritage, and neoliberalism, for instance—that 
articulate with one another in unpredictable and locally meaningful ways to condition the lives of 
the individuals we will meet in the following pages.13 
Overview of the Chapters 
																																																								
13 Following Marshall Sahlins (2000), and given that it is as much “constituted and orchestrated 
by meanings” as is “society,” I approach the economic as cultural (2000:17). 
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Chapter 1 provides an overview of each village and introduces several areas of 
anthropological significance taken up more extensively in subsequent chapters. Attending to 
some of the most important features of local socio-economic history in each location, I outline 
the methodological considerations that guided my investigation and helped determine its objects.  
Before delving further into the present-day ethnographic material I amassed for this dissertation, 
in Chapter 2 I present an analysis of mid-20th century efforts around the consolidation of a 
nationalist conceptualization of heritage and of the contradictions that characterize these efforts. 
As we will see in subsequent chapters, this consolidation and the tensions found within it 
continue to animate the work and lives of contemporary artisans. The chapter examines post-
independence (1948) calls for the study and promotion of the country’s “traditional arts and 
crafts” (Pieris 1956).  It contextualizes these calls in terms of post-independence economic 
policies oriented in a firmly “statist direction” (Moore 1997:75) and the parallel formulation of 
an “ethnonationalist conceptualization of ‘a deep horizontal comradeship’” (Silva 1999:212) 
among the country’s majority Sinhala population. More specifically, focusing on the University 
of Ceylon’s 1956 UNESCO-sponsored “Conference on Traditional Cultures in Ceylon,” it 
examines two discernible but interwoven nationalistic projects that characterize this early post-
independence discursive production of national crafts. The first of these projects is the narrative 
privileging of Kandyan arts and crafts as uniquely suitable vehicles for national patrimony, an 
endeavor centrally concerned with distinguishing the “foreign” from the “local.”  The second 
project centers on the discernment of the “traditional” from the “non-traditional,” a task that, as 
we will see, involved a careful and ultimately contradictory handling of perceived continuity and 
change regarding both the “traditional arts” and the individuals responsible for producing them.  
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The discursive and practical efforts to associate the “traditional arts and crafts” with a 
homogenized Sinhala national collectivity not only sidelined non-Sinhala artistic traditions, 
including those of Tamils, I argue, but also continue to have consequence in the lives of the 
Sinhala craft producers I introduce in later chapters. Consolidating the burden of responsibility 
for collectively held national heritage production upon Kandyan artisans, these efforts sought to 
purify craft of caste. Ultimately, however, this conceptualization of a national heritage sanitized 
of caste has come to serve in caste’s reinforcement. In subsequent chapters, my concern shifts to 
the ways in which aspects of this conceptualization of national heritage articulate today not only 
with the democratic egalitarianism with which it is more mutually imbricated, but also with 
neoliberalism and with caste as a meaningful category of identification.  
Having explored the tensions that characterized earlier efforts to define the “traditional 
arts” in Ceylon, in Chapter 3 I examine how Atwaedagama’s emergence as a “traditional 
handicraft village” and site of an industry often regarded as archetypal of Sri Lanka’s national 
heritage, the hana industry, intersects with the reproduction of caste-based difference. 
Despite the wishes of the early architects of the “traditional arts and crafts” category, what we 
will see in this chapter is the resilience of a socially reproduced link between the craft as a 
traditional craft and caste. The chapter focuses on residents’ encounters with what they perceive 
as their humiliating representation as “backward” in popular and scholarly writings in which they 
figure as exemplars of Sri Lanka’s traditional artisans. The first part of that chapter outlines 
Atwaedagama’s 20th century consolidation as an object of scholarly and popular interest, a 
village that has come to be prized as a place to be studied, documented, and preserved in its 
ostensibly archaic splendor. Since Coomaraswamy’s publication of Mediaeval Sinhalese Art in 
1907, students, scholars, journalists and filmmakers have rendered accounts in which the village 
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and the creative work of those who reside there are portrayed as demonstrative of an essential, 
socio-temporal difference. Until little more than a decade ago residents of the area had little 
access to such accounts, many of which were intended for an English-speaking readership. 
Today, however, they are well aware of their portrayal in scholarly and popular accounts that, 
while arguably intended as celebratory appraisals of Sri Lanka’s cultural heritage, re-inscribe 
that difference and, in the process, ensure these individuals’ discursive relegation to a past that 
they would just as soon rather forget.  
Drawing on ethnographic evidence gathered over a ten-month period beginning in May 
2014, the second part of the chapter focuses on the area’s residents’ interpretation of their 
representation in these contemporary scholarly and popular writings as instances of their acute, 
public humiliation. In communicating their misgivings toward the scholars, journalists, and 
students who come to study and write about them, Atwaedagama’s residents spin a narrative of 
collective insult. They criticize the reproduction of a tired tale in which hana industry 
participants are figured as either developmentally stagnant or facing imminent extinction on the 
doorstep of modernity. However, as I will discuss in the final part of the chapter, these same 
residents formulate the object of their complaint as a myopic fascination with “old” or 
“historical” things and, in doing so, reproduce an idea commonly used to delegitimize their 
concerns in the first place: since caste is a thing of “the past,” bearing little force in 
contemporary Sri Lanka, grievances articulated in its terms cannot be taken seriously. In this 
respect, they inadvertently collude with the local students, scholars and journalists whose 
writings they resent. As we will see, in their interpretation of the insult and in the strategy of 
silence that they adopt to wrest some control over the situation, residents of Atwaedagama 
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unintentionally contribute to the very social boundary maintenance that they are anxious to 
overcome. 
Chapters 4 and 5 examine how the logics of neoliberalism, democratic citizenship, and 
nationalist investments in heritage articulate with caste hierarchy in practices around what is 
referred to locally as “hana work” (hana waeDa). Paralleling the argument that I develop in 
Chapter 3, these chapters consider the ways in which the caste-inflected social and geographic 
boundaries of Atwaedagama are reproduced not only by those who Atwaedagama residents refer 
to as “outsiders” (pita minissu), including government officials and high caste residents in the 
village’s immediate vicinity, but also by village “insiders” for whom such reproduction is often 
ultimately disadvantageous. On the one hand, as we will see, both insiders and outsiders happily 
point to the logic of a market economy in which all is reduced to exchange value. On the other 
hand, conveying the unease to which Simmel’s formulation of money as a “frightful leveler” 
refers (Simmel 1969:52; Simmel 2004), they also reinforce a notion of money as a defensive 
barrier against intimacies of social proximity that might compromise hierarchical caste 
distinctions.   
More specifically, Chapter 4 focuses on high caste individuals in Atwaedagama’s vicinity 
who perform activities one might reasonably assume to qualify as hana work. It examines the 
ways in which such individuals characterize either the work itself or the circumstances by which 
they have come to engage in it in a manner that maintains their elevated social distance from 
their low caste neighbors in Atwaedagama. In examining these efforts, I borrow Weber’s notion 
of negative monopolization, a concept meant to indicate that which occurs when, “in order to 
maintain its specific way of life, [a] status group must not own and manage” certain “special 
trades” (Weber 1998:191). Working from the assumption that violations of such imperatives 
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reveal more about the social worlds in which they operate than the rules themselves, I examine 
what is revealed about local social life and the commitments that undergird it when individuals 
around Atwaedagama transgress one such boundary of monopolization.  In this case, I argue that 
the tendency for higher caste individuals who engage in hana work to characterize their work as 
they do stems from the local resilience of a tri-partite association between people, work, and 
place.  
Chapter 5 examines how Atwaedagama residents trouble the boundaries distinguishing 
them from “outsiders” while drawing upon (and thereby reinforcing) the logics of such 
distinction as they remind one another of their proper social and geographical “place.” It 
highlights, in other words, the subtle ways in which the area’s residents reinforce the parameters 
of caste-based difference according to which the social and geographical boundaries of 
Atwaedagama are continually redrawn. Issuing pointed moral evaluations of individuals seen as 
trying to set themselves apart from either their neighbors in the village or from the industry for 
which the village is known, Atwaedagama residents invoke a conceptualization of money as 
having an essentially dangerous and disruptive capacity to permit those who have recently 
acquired it to forget where they come from and who they “truly” are (a phenomenon indexed by 
the idiom of “hiding the mat”). As we will see once again, in negotiating local behavioral 
expectations and criteria of moral evaluation, residents of Atwaedagama are impelled toward a 
complicity in their own social and economic marginalization. 
Chapter 6 turns to the village of Redigama, some 30 kilometers east of Atwaeadagama 
and the site of a recent struggle over the decorative cotton weaving industry known locally by the 
name Dumbara rata (lit. Dumbara designs). The chapter offers a look at the contradictions 
around caste’s reproduction in a place where industry organization and local socio-economic 
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transformation have resulted in a rather different set of orientations to caste. There, Berava 
individuals recognized as the industry’s traditional heirs face their high caste neighbors-cum-
employees’ calls for the right to weave Dumbara rata textiles independently of the village’s 
Berava-owned workshops. Drawing in locally meaningful ways upon the logics of a market 
economy, nationalist conceptualizations of heritage, and caste-based difference, individuals on 
both sides of the struggle over Dumbara rata weaving negotiate their relationships to a 
historically caste-based industry reportedly booming with a rebound in international tourist 
arrivals since the end of Sri Lanka’s civil war in 2009. 
In a place where post-war demand for “heritage craft” (Local Artisans 2016) items has 
burgeoned and where we might expect the eager engagement of those identified as high caste in 
a traditionally low caste industry to either reflect or prompt a waning of concerns with caste, the 
chapter examines how the resulting conflict over Dumbara rata weaving has presented 
opportunities for claims of identification along caste lines. While popular associations between a 
caste-based transmission of knowledge and Sri Lanka’s “traditional craft industries” furnish, for 
some, the ideological moorings of claims of “inherited ability” and descent-based ownership 
over the industry, for others they motivate a purposeful (neoliberal) articulation of entitlement 
based upon individual, self-taught skill. While criticizing their high caste neighbors for what they 
see as a backward preoccupation with their elevated caste status, Dumbara rata weaving’s 
recognized low caste heirs invoke caste in defending their right to control the industry. By 
contrast, their high caste challengers, limited in the terms with which they can assert rights over 
the industry without compromising their privileged social position, invoke ideals of a modern 
democratic capitalist state in which national heritage is collectively held and the status of the 
citizen-consumer trumps the communalism implied by claims to ownership rooted in caste.  
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Chapter 1 
Fieldsites: Atwaedagama and Redigama 
 
Located in the Dumbara valley, a region stretching eastward from Kandy to the Knuckles 
Mountains, Redigama and Atwaedagama are both home to craft traditions associated with the 
name Dumbara. While what have come to be called Dumbara rata, or Dumbara designs, have 
historically appeared on items woven in both places, however, the phrase “Dumbara rata” is 
more typically used to refer to the weaving industry of Redigama. Meanwhile, although 
Atwaedagama is known locally for what are called Dumbara kalala (Dumbara mats), the name 
by which the craft industry (not just weaving) carried out in the village today is commonly 
known is hana karmantaya (hana industry). This name refers neither to the village’s 
geographical location nor to the designs that may appear on items produced there, but rather to 
the plant, hana, that residents of the village have used for decades to produce woven mats and 
other items.   
I selected Redigama and Atwaedagama as research sites not so much because of the 
designs they hold in common, but more primarily because they are locally reputed to be 
“traditional handicraft villages” (Mudugamuwa 2013). My original objective in each location 
was to investigate how participants in one corner of Sri Lanka’s traditional craft industries 
understand themselves and their work in the context of an emerging, post-war “economic 
formation” characterized by “an acceleration of neoliberal development” (Winslow and Woost 
2004:97; Kadirgamar 2013, Economic & Political Weekly, “Second Wave of Neoliberalism: 
Financialization and Crisis in Post-War Sri Lanka”). An investigation into the weavers and 
weaving traditions of each village, I posited, would inform our understanding of larger order 
issues pertaining to nationalism, heritage, and patterns of identification that characterize present-
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day Sri Lanka. 2013, the year in which I began my fieldwork in earnest, was marked by the 
hyper-politicization of post-war development and reconciliation. Despite this, I imagined my 
original research objective to be comparatively non-political. Studying weavers in a part of the 
country somewhat removed from the trauma wrought by over three decades of civil war, I 
expected that I would enjoy freedom and ease of access when it came to establishing 
relationships with and collecting information from artisans and other residents of the areas. As I 
would discover early on in my fieldwork, I could not have been more wrong. The angle from 
which I was able to approach each site (and the material things within it) was thoroughly 
determined by the local political landscape, where the interests and motivations of my would-be 
informants cropped up like jagged boulders before me and impelled me to go here, not there, to 
see this, not that, and to talk to this person, not that one. As is often the case among 
ethnographers, the terms and even the object of my investigation were as much dictated to me as 
they were of my own choosing. Ultimately, I took this as a positive development that would in 
the end reveal more of the local world to me on its own terms than I might have seen otherwise. 
In navigating the uneven social terrain that I encountered in each field site, I was 
surprised to find myself adopting orientations to the past and to the things that animate the 
present in ways I could not have anticipated. To say that I was compelled to don blinders to 
make progress in my research would not be an exaggeration. In Redigama, for instance, I had 
originally intended to study all aspects of Dumbara rata textile production. Dumbara rata 
textiles are ubiquitous in Colombo and Kandy. They adorn public buildings, private homes, 
upscale spas, craft stores, and even the offices of Colombo’s largest transnational advertising 
firm, where anthropologist Stephen Kemper found Dumbara rata cushion covers to “domesticate 
the feel of the place” (2001:123). I expected that the attention these items invited in such spheres 
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would extend to the place where they are produced. Arriving in Redigama amid the 
abovementioned struggle concerning proprietorship over the local weaving industry (the subject 
of Chapter 6), however, I found myself having to literally avert my eyes from these material 
things and even deny interest in Dumbara rata weaving to allay suspicion that I might be there to 
help those on one side of this struggle “steal” the industry. Despite my repeated assurances that, 
as a student researcher, I did not pose a threat to business, the men and women recognized as 
Dumbara rata weaving’s hereditary heirs were suspicious of my interest in their work. 
Ultimately, and while it was not my original intention, I assured my nervous listeners that I was 
explicitly not interested in the industry or the textiles themselves, but rather in people’s lives and 
histories. 
In Atwaedagama, selected similarly because it is the location of an inherited industry, I 
found myself avoiding an issue about which, thanks in part to my experience in Redigama, I had 
expected my interlocutors to be especially talkative—their and their industry’s history. In this 
second field site, however, I was urged to profess an interest only in “the industry,” a category 
whose sanitization of the “past” and “social context,” as we will see in subsequent chapters, is of 
central concern to the practitioners of the craft for which the village is known. Only later 
recognizing the broader symbolic consequence of the moment, I vividly recall the surprise I felt 
on an occasion when a woman proudly unrolled a hana wall-hanging woven by her husband and 
invited me to photograph the item. Sensing that I might also capture her image with my camera, 
she held the textile up to cover her body before signaling to me that she was ready: “Hari!” 
(“Okay!”). Negotiating my interlocutors’ desire that what they referred to as their “society” and 
its history not enter the frame of my research, much of my energy in Atwaedagama was 
exhausted disabusing village residents of the idea that I was there to dredge up “the past” or to 
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write in ways that might reinforce the caste stigma—a stigma historically conveyed via sartorial 
or other bodily signs—associated with their productive and artistic activities. 
In Atwaedagama, the traces of these things’ value as heritage objects, a value readily 
accrued to them in other spheres, ran up against their capacity to conjure a history of poverty and 
social marginalization. In certain instances, my examination of a purse or a duster, or my 
questions about the techniques by which such items were produced, would prompt suspicions 
that my goal was to tease out this past. By contrast to the situation I encountered in Redigama, 
however, my expressions of interest in the things at hand—mats, dusters, pencil cases, etc.—
were also met at times with what seemed like sighs of relief that my attention had apparently set 
upon “the industry” and not “the people.” Such cases pointed almost explicitly to the 
“semiotically underdetermined” (Keane 2001:69) quality of things, or what Roland Barthes has 
referred to as their “wavy meaning” (i.e. their inability to be “sutured in any simplistic way with 
the ‘sociological’ or ‘political ‘reality of any particular historical moment” (Pinney 2005:267). In 
Atwaedagama, the capacity of things to conjure an unsavory past or a fact about the social 
condition of their makers seemed amplified in some instances, irrelevant in others. As an 
anthropologist wholly dependent on her interlocutors, my job included honing a sensitivity to 
this capacity and adjusting accordingly. 
Encountering head-on the truth in Trouillot’s trenchant observation that “the past—or, 
more accurately, pastness—is a position” (1995:15), I was also driven in each field site to bring 
my research goals into alignment with local temporal orientations. Certain residents of 
Redigama, for instance, interested in expanding the temporal horizon to establish the legitimacy 
of their claims to Dumbara rata weaving, were keen to talk about the origins of the industry and 
how the knowledge that it entails had been passed down the generations into their hands. They 
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were eager to report on aspects of the past that they believed could best explain and defend their 
present control over the industry and its largely tourism-based growth in recent years. In 
Atwaedagama, by contrast, I found residents preoccupied with collapsing the temporal horizon to 
secure a measure of dignity—a form of dignity central to an ideology of democratic 
egalitarianism (Taylor 1992)—in a place where “the past” is commonly seen as a time of caste-
based suffering and impoverishment. There, the avoidance of the past itself emerged as an object 
worthy of investigation.   
To make sense of these contrasting orientations to things and to time and, as importantly, 
to contextualize the voices of the individuals who embody these orientations in subsequent 
chapters, a review of these two villages’ present situations and their recent histories in terms of 
broader political economic currents is in order. 
Redigama  
The Decline of a Local Agricultural Economy 
Redigama is in most respects like many of the other villages dotting the floor of the 
Dumbara Valley in Sri Lanka’s Central Province. The village comprises approximately 1,000 
acres, including government-owned forest and roughly 200 acres of paddy land. As of 2012, it 
was home to 120 Sinhala Buddhist families, nearly a quarter of whom qualified as low-income. 
The village’s population is divided among two castes, those identified as Berava, considered a 
low caste, and those identified as Goyigama, considered the highest of all Sinhalese castes and 
that to which the majority of Sinhalese have historically been said to belong (Wickremasinghe 
2006:149). (As of the last census to account for caste, the Berava were estimated to make up 
three percent of the Sinhala population (Jabbar 2005).) A small, old temple complex which, 
according to local lore, once sheltered the sacred tooth relic, is located to the west of the main 
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road cutting north to south through the village. Most of the houses in Redigama are set back from 
this main road and concealed by vegetation or line lanes shooting off the road’s western edge. A 
small number of others are tucked under trees across the paddy fields to the east, accessible in 
some cases only by foot. A one-room cement block structure serves as an office for the local 
Grama Niladhari (GN), an administrative officer assigned to the village by the government. A 
small, dark, and largely dilapidated wooden kade, or shop, one of two in the village, is situated in 
a long and otherwise abandoned structure on the eastern side of the road. During my time in 
Redigama, I often found its owner, a middle-aged woman who worked as a seamstress for a large 
tailoring business in Colombo before returning to the village, keeping the shop with the 
assistance of her skinny, orange tabby. Perching himself like a parrot upon her shoulder, he 
meowed softly at customers purchasing from the minimal collection of soap, tea, and biscuits the 
woman procured from a grocery in the nearby town of Udadumbara. 
Soon after settling into a small home in Udadumbara in 2013, I joined a crowd of men, 
women and children waiting by a defunct state-owned Sathosa cooperative grocery store, 
boarded up long ago, and followed their lead as they piled onto a bus headed down into the 
valley below. Hooking a right at the town clock tower, the driver kept the heavy old vehicle’s 
transmission out of gear as he meandered down a steep and winding road. Laborers in the major 
re-development of a network of roads in the region, construction workers and their respective 
“baases” (foremen) paused from their arduous work and, wiping sweat from their brows, moved 
to the side of the narrow road as we passed. As we rolled onto level ground, my belly felt the 
engine turn as it reluctantly sputtered to life. The predictable onslaught of Sinhala pop music 
blasting out of the overheard speakers, a ubiquitous feature of bus travel in the country, followed 
as we wended our way past paddy fields and grazing dairy cows. Minutes later, I stepped off the 
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bus, my ears ringing, and was struck by the dead calm of my surroundings. In the coming 
months, I would come to recognize and appreciate the significance of this quietude as an artifact 
of both an exodus of residents out of Redigama, my destination, and what many report as a lack 
of sociality among those left behind.  
Like most other parts of rural Sri Lanka, Redigama has been dramatically reshaped in the 
wake of the 1977 implementation of “open economy” policy reforms and the consequent shifting 
“endowments of land and human capital” (Kumanayake, Estudillo and Otsuka 2014:28). Prior to 
the late 1970s, residents of the village and surrounding areas enjoyed a local agricultural 
economy bolstered by government fertilizer subsidies and restrictions on food imports. Today, 
they live in what has become one of the most economically vulnerable areas of the Mahaweli 
River basin (Adaptation Fund Board 2012). With trade liberalization intensifying as it did in 
many parts of the world in the late 1970s, export-oriented industrialization initiatives, the 
cessation of food and fertilizer subsidies, and the importation of global market-priced fertilizers 
wrought havoc on the local agricultural economy. While most residents of the village formerly 
relied upon chena (swidden) and rice cultivation, due to government restrictions concerning the 
preservation of the biodiversity of the nearby Knuckles Mountains, chena also reportedly began 
to drop off after the 1980s and ceased entirely within the last decade. As has happened 
throughout rural Sri Lanka, then, the area’s “food self-sufficiency” has steadily eroded 
(Yamaguchi and Sanker 2007). While per capital GDP has increased since the 1970s, 
agriculture’s contribution to economic growth in Sri Lanka has also steadily declined from 27% 
in 1980 to 12% in 2009 as industry and service sectors have come to dominate (Kumanayake, 
Estudillo and Otsuka 2014:28-29). Reporting the already low capacity of their land due to water 
insecurity, farmers in Redigama note that the 30-35 rice busal (bushels)/acre that they are able to 
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cultivate is dwarfed by the productivity of large-scale agricultural businesses. After accounting 
for the cost of fertilizer and the support of day laborers, many explained to me, they are simply 
unable to compete. In fact, the profit one sees after compensating day laborers is so minimal, 
some related, that several farmers in Redigama often leave their land fallow.  
Day laborers who might assist with farmwork are also increasingly hard to recruit. The 
doubling of internal rural-urban migration between 1996/97 and 2003/04, driven by higher 
wages in urban industrial and services sectors, has left places like Redigama feeling like ghost 
villages to those left behind. As far as many of those who remain in Redigama are concerned, 
and in keeping with the observation that “81% of [internal] migrants [in the early 2000s] were 
job seekers with better education coming from remote and lagging regions,” those who do well 
in school move away from the village (Kumanayake, Estudillo and Otsuka 2014:31). Seeking 
employment as teachers, construction workers, hotel employees, and factory workers in and 
around the island’s urban centers, they leave behind farmers who, facing the high cost of 
fertilizer and the expense of hiring farmhands where they once had the ready support of their 
neighbors and family members, find it increasingly difficult to farm.  
The silence that shocked my senses as I got off the bus in Redigama in 2013 was 
symptomatic of this decline of the local agricultural economy and the exodus that has 
accompanied it. It was perhaps also indicative, however, of a reported dissolution of sociality 
that many in the village associate with the country’s development in recent decades. There is a 
sense that the introduction of amenities like electricity, running water, and pre-packaged foods to 
replace what was once cultivated locally, in combination with the movement (and periodic 
return) of residents to more urban areas, has exacted a toll on the physical and collective 
wellbeing of the village.  
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This sense of a decline in rural social life is neither new nor unusual. In the early 1990s, 
political economist Mick Moore reported that, particularly in “the less accessible parts of the 
Kandyan hills and the Dry Zone,” the “rapid spread of public transport, schooling and literacy, 
and the high levels of extra-village employment and part-time farming imply that there is a core 
of truth in older villagers’ laments about the decline of community” (Moore 1992:35). In a 
volume in which Jonathan Spencer sensibly cautions that the word “community” is “perhaps 
better suited to politicians and other practitioners of the discourse of manipulation…than to the 
sober assessments of social science” (Spencer 1992:385), Moore surmised that, to “the extent 
that villagers had less external contact and fewer external sources of livelihood and information 
than they do today, their degree of commitment to their community was greater than it is now” 
(Moore 1992:35).  
In Redigama, the sense that social relations among village residents have suffered with 
the country’s development cuts across the lines of class, caste, age, and gender. Achini, an 
elderly Berava woman and former weaver who moved to Redigama after marrying a skilled and 
highly regarded weaver in the village in 1965, explained this transformation to me one afternoon 
in her son’s weaving workshop. Remarking on the incidence of diabetes, high blood pressure, 
and other maladies plaguing a rising proportion of Sri Lanka’s population, Achini related that 
people ate well, worked in collaboration, and took care of one another in the past. “Now” she 
noted sadly, “we spend our lives alone because of the development of the country.” Tharanga, a 
Goyigama man in his late 40s and a weaving employee of Achini’s nephew, communicated the 
same sentiment:  
There was no electricity here when we were little. It came later. But that unity between 
people has broken (ekemuthukama kiyana eka gilihuna). We remember how when we 
were kids, after cutting the harvest in the fields, there were lots of kids playing together. 
		 	 	 	 49	
But the kids these days don’t play like that. They only concentrate on education. In the 
past, our neighbors would come to our house. We would go to their houses. It was like 
that in the villages, compared to the towns. That was a great friendship (sabadiyawa). 
That has really declined. With the development of the economy, all those good qualities 
have been destroyed (ara arthika diyunu wenne wenne guna dama kiyena ewa pirihila 
tiyenne).  
Q: Why do you think that happened? 
The reason is that people are going to the town and they bring things from the town to the 
village. The town has a boundary wall culture, right [Nagere are thappe welin wate 
wechchi sanskruthiyakne thiyenne, needa]? I think they only get together for funerals. 
People have that culture in their minds, and they think that signifies wealth [Ee 
sanskrutika thamayi minissunge hithete wadila tiyenne posathkama kiyala]. I mean, 
people are more concerned about money. Those good qualities [guna dam] have 
disappeared. 
 
Tharanga noted that, in his youth, one would receive a lunch rice packet from one’s neighbor 
when working his fields. Today, he related sorrowfully, laborers bring their own meals. Pointing 
further to the significance of food in the maintenance of social relations in the village, he offered 
a poetic anecdote to illustrate the breakdown of the life in unity that he believes the area’s 
residents once enjoyed:   
When one house prepared food they would share a little of it with the neighbors. But now 
that’s disappearing. Try to imagine, one house would prepare oil cakes. When a house 
prepares the oil cakes, it starts to smell. So, we knew that we would also get the oil cakes 
in the evening. But now we only enjoy the smell.  
 
Sashika, a Goyigama woman and former employee of one of the village’s weaving workshops, 
echoed Tharanga’s reference to urban “wall culture” in remarking on the general changes that 
she has seen in the village since her childhood. With the introduction of electricity, paved roads, 
and running water, she explained, “villagers started to live like city people.” With that change, 
she explained:  
The harmony between the families has decreased [paul paul attera samagiya adduwela]. 
The people have started to live their lives on their own [Minissu tani taniyen jiwatwenna 
wela]. That harmony and coordination that was in our fathers’ time isn’t there anymore 
[Apee appachchila ina kaale tiba ekamutukama samagiya daen naeae]. People are trying 
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to live on their own, in a boastful way [respect eke inda taniyen inna tamayi minissu 
balanne]. It’s like that now.14  
 
Explaining that those who “have abilities use them to get ahead and leave the village,” Sashika 
observed that even the village’s children’s and sports societies have “wasted away.”  
Beyond the perceptible and relatively constant quiet, there were other hints that a certain 
collective dimension of sociality was wanting in Redigama when I arrived in October of 2013. 
The construction of a public hall, for instance, funded by a grant from the government, had been 
halted when a dispute broke out over the property on which it was being built. Missing windows 
and doors, it had been abandoned to a pack of dogs. Those in need of an occasional meeting 
space, while complaining that the community was incapable of coming together to drive out the 
dogs and clean up the building, resigned themselves to the use of a dilapidated ambalama 
(resting place) near the shop described above. Once a shelter for pilgrims and travelers along the 
main road running through the village, razor sharp protrusions along the edges of the old 
structure’s low and nearly rusted out corrugated sheet metal roof threatened the heads of those 
who dared to step across its threshold. 
																																																								14 Many of my interlocutors in both Redigama and Atwaedagama used the English term 
“respect” (respect eka) to convey a prideful arrogance that they associate with others’ upward 
mobility. This term is similar in meaning to the Sinhala term “adambara,” generally translated as 
pride or arrogance (See Clough 2010, p.63), but seems to have a stronger connotation of showing 
off. “They’re trying to show me their respect,” for instance, carries the meaning, “They’re trying 
to boast to me.” In Sashika use of the term here, it is intended as a negative assessment of others’ 
efforts to live (and to make a show of the fact that they are doing so) independently, as she and 
others believe people do in cities. The usage is a collective criticism of the trappings of wealth 
and convenience historically associated with “respectable” persons or, put differently, a critical 
comment on an apparent bargaining away of coordination and harmony with others in exchange 
for independent prosperity.  
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These observations are not intended to reproduce the hackneyed narrative of rural decline 
rightly criticized by Jonathan Spencer in the early 1990s (Spencer 1992). Neither are they meant 
to reinforce the romanticized idea of “the village community” (and the notion of that 
community’s dissolution) popular throughout the 20th century in both Europe and Sri Lanka. At 
the same time, one may speak, as Spencer does, of changes ““in the texture of social relations” 
(Spencer 1992:370), and it is with precisely such changes that I 
believe Redigama residents like Tharanga and Sashika are 
concerned.  
The Rise of Dumbara Rata Weaving 
In addition to the decline of the local agricultural economy and 
the associated changes in social life in the village, there has been 
another transformation in the area that may also explain the 
jarring silence I encountered during that early visit to Redigama. 
In roughly the same period that local agriculture has contracted, 
Redigama has seen significant growth of the weaving industry 
for which the village is now known. One indicator of such 
transformations is the rapidly widening circulation of Dumbara 
rata textiles over the second half of the 20th century. There is 
evidence that some variation of the textiles now called Dumbara 
rata circulated beyond Redigama between the 17th and 19th 
centuries (Vangeyzel 2008:53), the area’s Berava weavers said to have woven for Kandyan 
royalty. For example, at least a half-dozen diya kachchi and larger rectangular cloths dating from 
the 18th and 19th centuries and adorned with hallmark Dumbara designs, including mal paetta 
Figure	1-Diya	kachchi	with	Dumbara	
designs.	18th-19th	c.	Colombo	National	
Museum.	Van	Geyzel	2008:287,	285.	
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(flower petals), mal paeti hatara (four-petal flowers), iri kondu (hair lines), and birds, are held in 
the collection of the Colombo National Museum (Van Geyzel 2008).15 
In the early 20th century, Dumbara rata textiles were on display at an agricultural 
exhibition in nearby Kandy. Adorned with cobra, bird, and Bo leaf designs, they were also sold 
since at least that time at the Kandyan Art Association. Writing with respect to Redigama in 
particular, in fact, Coomaraswamy noted, “the villagers themselves still use some of the cloth 
made, but the industry would hardly survive were it not for the demand of etirili made through 
the Kandy Art Association (Coomaraswamy 233-234).16  In the Association’s 1914 price list, 
“Dumbara cloth,” sold at fifteen rupees per six by three foot swath, is categorized under 
“Miscellaneous” alongside just three other items, including “Dumbara mats” likely manufactured 
in Atwaedagama.  
While Dumbara rata textiles circulated to some degree beyond Redigama well before the 
20th century, present-day elders in the village report that, prior to the 1960s, the village’s low 
caste Berava weavers, who once wove the textiles on “pit looms” in their homes, primarily sold 
minimally decorated cotton linens to their neighbors in the immediate vicinity. In the years 
following Sri Lanka’s independence from the British in 1948, a series of nation-wide 
																																																								15	In his Sinhala English Dictionary (2010 [1892]), Clough translates diya-kachchiya as a 
“bathing dress” or “small piece of cloth worn around the waist by the cinnamon pealers and 
cultivators of the ground” (243). In the appendix of his Sinhalese Folklore Notes, Arthur Perera 
described the diya-kachchiya as a “coarse cloth bathing dress which it is the duty of the dhobi to 
supply at the bath” and noted that it “is also called Diyaredi or Diyapiruwata” (1917:vi). Van 
Geyzel describes it as “an ancillary male garment or undergarment worn while hunting, working 
in fields or bathing and also by watchmen or guards.” The “garment consists,” she writes, “of a 
band or belt worn around the waist with another band passing between the legs and attached to 
the waistband in front and at the back, often with an elaborate decorated apron in front” 
(2008:11) 16 Clough (2010 [1892]) translates aetirili as sheets or pieces “of cloth spread upon chairs and 
other seats out of a respect to a guest” (93). 
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developments around traditional crafts would help to expand the sale of Dumbara rata textiles 
well beyond the village. In turn, this expansion would set the stage for the conflict that I found in 
the village, and that would ultimately prompt my somewhat hasty departure from it, in 2013.  
As explored in greater detail in Chapter 2, the 1950s saw a concerted and nationalist-
driven effort toward the institutionalization of the country’s traditional “arts and crafts.” The Arts 
Council of Ceylon, for instance, modeled after Great Britain’s Arts Council and incorporated by 
an act of parliament in 1952, was concerned with reviving the “dormant and neglected culture of 
the villages” by, among other things, working “to preserve, promote and encourage the 
development of such arts and crafts as are indigenous to Ceylon” (Bandara 1972:20). While the 
Arts Council and other interested entities organized exhibitions of handicrafts, by the 1970s there 
were also several government departments that, oriented explicitly either to poverty alleviation, 
the promotion of traditional arts, or both, organized or conducted training courses in Dumbara 
rata weaving and other “traditional occupations” (Bandara 1972:20) throughout the island. One 
weaver reportedly left Redigama in the late 1950s to complete a two-year training sequence at a 
government weaving training center where, already a skilled weaver of Dumbara rata textiles, 
he learned to also weave saris. By the time the local agricultural economy began to suffer the 
consequences of the open economy reforms of 1977, a series of training initiatives had also 
already been carried out in the village itself. In the mid-1970s, for instance, the Department of 
Small Industries funded the construction of a weaving training school. During the six years of its 
operation, the school was managed first by an elderly Berava weaver and later by his son, each 
of whom taught ten primarily high caste students in two-year training sequences. Into the 1990s, 
the National Craft Council established in 1982 funded smaller training classes in which the 
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village’s low caste weavers provided home-based weaving instruction to their high caste 
neighbors.  
While some private dealers and outlets transacted regularly with weavers in Redigama 
from the 1970s, the sale of Dumbara rata textiles during the period between the early 1900s and 
the implementation of the “open economy” reforms was dominated primarily by governmental 
and quasi-governmental organizations like Laksala and the Kandyan Art Association. Since the 
1980s, however, Dumbara rata textiles have become widely available in private boutiques and 
crafts shops throughout Kandy and Colombo. In recent years, weavers in Redigama have also 
received direct commissions from Sri Lankan Airlines, the Colombo Hilton, and from the newly 
established Academy of Design International Design Campus, a Colombo-based partner of 
Northumbria University in the UK. Over the last century, then, the primary circulation of 
Dumbara rata textiles has shifted from within and immediately beyond Redigama to an 
international marketplace.  
This liberalization of Redigama’s weaving industry has coincided with a transformation 
in national rhetoric on crafts and a general shift toward emphasis on private enterprise. Insofar as 
it helps to contextualize the current conflict in Redigama, it is worth deviating momentarily to 
outline what this shift has looked like. From the early 20th century to the early 1980s, advocates 
of Sri Lanka’s arts and crafts tended to emphasize the responsibility of the government and local 
buyers to patronize artisans who were figured as anything but “businessmen.” The purpose for 
doing so, so the idea went, was not in the end an economical one. In an early 20th lecture in 
Ceylon, Ananda Coomaraswamy condemned the Sinhalese for their failure to contribute to a 
“revival of national art and craft in Ceylon” (1904:22). Noting that they “have certainly made no 
effort to keep up their crafts,” Coomaraswamy lambasted his Kandyan audience for their 
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unabashed consumption of “the most rubbishly and tawdry of European wares” to the neglect of 
“your Kandyan mats and brassware and jewelry” (Coomaraswamy 1904:16). To 
Coomaraswamy, the work of the ideal craftsman was essentially the work of an artist, not a 
“trader.” Any “decorative touch” that a craftsman added to his work came about “almost 
unconsciously” (Coomaraswamy 1904:2). To Coomaraswamy, such capacity to embellish was 
something over which “tradition” had given the craftsman “full command,” and it was not to be 
confused with an interest in making a sale (Coomaraswamy 1904:2). 
 Fifty years later, sociologist Ralph Pieris similarly placed responsibility for a “revival” of 
traditional crafts with consumers. “From the point of demand,” he wrote, “an art is ‘dead’ only 
because of the negative attitudes of the people who have no interest in it.” One consequence of 
this “negative attitude” of would-be consumers, he explained, is that “the artist’s work declines 
in quality or quantity of both” (Pieris 1956:3). Raising the question of whether, given “social and 
economic conditions militating against the continuance of these arts and crafts, they should be 
rehabilitated,” Pieris’s colleague, P.E.E. Fernando, stated, “frankly, I must say we can import at 
cheaper rates articles of comparable utility and artistic merit.” Noting, however, that doing so 
would require one to “take into consideration the artistic heritage that will be lost to the future,” 
Fernando concluded that Ceylon best follow the lead of “Enlightened countries [where] efforts 
have been made and are being made to revive such traditional arts and crafts” (Fernando 
1956:57). Grounding the justification for the “rehabilitation” of arts and crafts in matters of 
heritage and Enlightenment rather than economic calculation, Fernando argued that the purpose 
of such rehabilitation should unequivocally not be “to provide more plentiful souvenirs or 
‘objects of art’ to rich people who indulge in the pleasure of collecting museum pieces” 
(Fernando 1956:57). Pointing to the “weavers of Dumbara,” Fernando observed critically, “they 
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depend mostly for their sales on producing ‘souvenirs’ for tourists and visitors to carnivals and 
exhibitions” (Fernando 1956:56).  
 Anxieties about the influence of monetary concerns on support for the traditional arts and 
crafts also informed the shaping of the Sri Lanka’s National Craft Council and Allied Institutions 
Act, a piece of legislation intended to comprehensively institutionalize governmental support for 
the country’s crafts and crafts producers. In the parliamentary debates leading to the Act’s 
passage in the early 1980s, Lakshman Jayakody, then a Minister of Parliament and later the 
Minister of Cultural Affairs, expressed strong reservations about the role that “business” might 
play in government efforts to “safeguard the arts.” “We have to decide whether business should 
follow the arts, or whether the arts should follow business,” Jayakody proclaimed, “and what I 
have to say is that business should follow the arts” (Hansards of Parliament, August 3, 1982). 
  The sentiments articulated by Jayakody and others quoted above are by no means 
entirely absent from present-day conceptualizations of craft in Sri Lanka. At a moment when 
“liberal state-based regimes of protection of patrimony” around the world have given ground to 
“marketized relationships which position cultural heritage as a resource” (Coombe and Weiss 
2015:43), however, their public expression is often overshadowed by a logic in which it is 
business and not art leading the way. In important respects, as we shall see, the conflict in 
Redigama that I examine in Chapter 6 has everything to do with the tension between these 
logics. Speaking of laksha (lacquer-work) and biralu (lace), and articulating an approach 
diametrically opposed to that of Fernando, a government officer quoted at length in Chapter 6 
explained to an audience of weavers in Redigama, such “things are our heritage, so we sell them 
to foreigners.” A writer for Laksala, the government-run handicraft sales and marketing outlet 
that has supported crafts producers since the 1960s, struck a similar tone. In a 2010 
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organizational report, “The Way Forward,” the author writes of the need for “coordinated efforts 
and enthusiasm from all stakeholders” and stresses the foreign exchange earnings to be gained 
“by exploiting the rich cultural heritage and wide range of unique crafts Sri Lanka produces” 
(Laksala 2010:2).   
If the goal, however idealistic, of earlier champions of Sri Lanka’s “traditional arts and 
crafts” was to safeguard such spheres of artistic production with little regard for fiscal gain, 
expressions of this emergent neoliberal approach suggest that the pendulum has more than 
swung the other way. At an Atwaedagama village meeting attended by officers from the National 
Craft Council, the Ministry of Traditional Industries and Small Enterprise Development and the 
local Divisional Secretariat, discussion turned to the scarcity of hana, the plant whose fiber is 
used by the villagers to produce woven wall hangings and other items. When a weaver suggested 
that the government assist artisans by importing hana from India, the Assistant Secretary of the 
local Divisional Secretariat balked, “People shout at us for bringing unnecessary things from 
abroad!” When the weaver pointed out that Laksala has begun selling imported items, the 
exchange suddenly escalated into something more hostile while laying bare the dominance of 
market considerations: “Yes,” the Assistant Secretary agreed, “when they don’t get good 
products from people like you,” Laksala will “go for a substitute.” 
In some ways epitomizing this shift away from an emphasis on state-based protection of 
patrimony, in much of the marketing material pertaining to crafts production in Sri Lanka today, 
the figure of the “crafts entrepreneur” has eclipsed that of the “traditional craftsman.” Whereas 
earlier spokesmen like Coomaraswamy and Pieris placed the onus on the buyer, and more 
specifically, the Sri Lankan buyer, to patronize the country’s crafts, the discursive emphasis 
today is on adapting to buyers’ desires, or, as Laksala lists first among the organization’s “Core 
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Values,” “delighting the customer.”17 In these narratives, a neoliberal rhetoric stressing market 
flexibility and entrepreneurial skills development on the part of crafts producers has all but 
displaced emphases on public patronage and consumer obligation found in earlier and more 
explicitly nationalistic narratives around traditional crafts. Consumers were once charged with 
responsibility for adapting their tastes to satisfy an expressly non-economic goal of supporting 
the country’s explicitly-not-business-people crafts producers. Now, it is artisans who, urged to 
become like “neoliberalism’s quintessential actor” (Freeman 2007:252; Also Bourdieu 1998 and 
Harvey 2005), must adapt to the shifting demands of an international consumer base.  
In subsequent chapters, I take up contradictions arising out of an articulation between a 
nationalist conceptualization of heritage preservation—a conceptualization largely consolidated, 
as I argue in the following chapter, at an early post-independence moment marked by state-
centric economic politics—and the logics of a market economy that has gained force in more 
recent years. As an example of such a contradiction, while some praise artisans for their 
adherence to “tradition,” others condemn them for intransigence and inflexibility when it comes 
to meeting market demand. As I chatted with one scholar of the “traditional arts” at a café in 
Colombo one afternoon in 2012, he praised the country’s artisans and shared his belief that it 
was a good thing an anthropologist such as myself had come along. “Everyone has come and 
worked with the craftsmen, given them designs, and so forth. What those people don’t 
understand is that it’s tied to a way of life. All of those craftsmen are deeply tied to the 
environment and the history.” Complaining that, in Colombo, “people don’t understand the 
social rhythms of culture,” he explained, “Tradition is where you go to the craftsman and he 
works at his own pace. This was one of Coomaraswamy’s points. The attitude of the traditional 																																																								17	http://www.laksala.gov.lk/about-us.php. Accessed January 9, 2017.	
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craftsman is that you come to them.” By contrast, in a conversation on creating an upscale “niche 
market” for handicrafts, a representative from the country’s Export Development Board 
channeled a capitalistic ethos when she stressed to me that the “attitude and mindset of the 
traditional craftsmen” need to change. Artisans in places like Atwaedagama and Redigama, she 
explained, need to understand that that they must meet deadlines and adhere to standards.  
As national rhetoric around crafts has shifted, craft producers in places like Redigama 
and Atwaedagama have come to grapple not only with competing representations such as these, 
but also with other consequences of the same liberal market forces that drove this shift in the first 
place. Of primacy on this front in both villages are the transformations artisans have experienced 
both in their roles as makers and sellers and in their relationships to those around them. To return 
to Redigama, the village’s low caste Berava weavers have found themselves increasingly drawn 
into a marketplace that extends well beyond both the local and largely interpersonal transactions 
in which previous generations of weavers in the village engaged and the mostly small-scale 
transactions that characterized their relationships with Laksala and the Kandyan Art Association. 
At the same time, relations with their high caste Goyigama neighbors have also changed.  
To begin to explain the nature of this transformation, an overview of the industry’s 
present set-up in Redigama is in order. There are currently six separately owned and managed 
home-based weaving workshops, including four run by three brothers and their sister, one run by 
one of the brothers’ adult sons, and one run by a male cousin of these four siblings. There are 
also several Dumbara rata workshops beyond the village owned and managed by close relatives 
of these six family members. For instance, the cousin mentioned above has a brother who runs a 
three-employee workshop approximately 130 kilometers to the north. A brother of the adult son 
operating a workshop in Redigama also keeps a workshop/display room at a government-run 
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marketing and sales complex, Apee Gama (“Our Village”), in Colombo, while his wife weaves 
in the village. Additionally, the younger brother of the wife of one of the siblings maintains a 
workshop in Matale, where he reportedly has eight immediate family members who assist him 
on a regular basis.  
In general, these Berava workshop owners call upon members of their immediate families 
(their spouses or their own children) or other close relatives (spouses of children, for instance) to 
help only when necessary (when, for instance, they are inundated with orders or, as is the case 
today, they find their workshops understaffed). While such individuals almost invariably know 
how to weave, having watched and practiced for as long as they can remember, Redigama’s 
workshop owners seem keen to see their children take up jobs other than weaving. To that end, 
they have invested in their children’s education in ways that would have been impossible not 
long ago. “Excluded from the formal education system on the grounds of caste” in the 1930s, 
Berava children continued to face “systemic prejudice in the education system” until at least the 
1960s (Simpson 1997:50). Although “school attendance was expected,” anthropologist Bob 
Simpson explains, “it came second to the needs of the informal system of teaching through 
apprenticeship” (Simpson 1997:50). Things look quite different for Berava children in Redigama 
today. The daughter of a man regarded as the most successful workshop owner in the village, for 
instance, attended high school in Kandy, about a 50-minute bus ride away, and is now employed 
as a civil servant in a nearby government office. Notably, the only English-speaking individuals I 
encountered in the village were close relatives of the workshop owners. One, a daughter, teaches 
English and has moved to an area closer to Kandy. Another, a close cousin, is a customs and 
immigration officer at Katunayake International Airport. Several close male relatives serve in 
various branches of the military, while other more distant relatives have left the village for jobs 
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as teachers. As has been the case with the village’s high caste residents, many of the village’s 
Berava seem to have moved elsewhere. Most of the Berava men and women who continue to 
live in Redigama, all of whom are reportedly related to the siblings who run the village’s 
workshops, are or were at one time involved in weaving. Yet even those who intend to remain 
involved in Dumbara rata weaving may not wish to do so as weavers. For instance, the son of 
the only female workshop owner in Redigama proudly shared with me his intention to attend 
business school so that he and his sister could start their own weaving business. When I asked 
whether he planned to weave like his mother, he explained that the point would be that others 
would do the weaving.  
The Origins of Discord and the Anthropologist’s Sudden Departure 
According to some, the sale of simple household linens (Rs. 50 for a bed sheet, for 
instance) once brought Redigama’s Berava weavers into moments of affable exchange with their 
high caste neighbors. As Dumbara rata textiles have transformed into more precious collectibles 
(Rs. 1,000 for a cushion cover or Rs. 4,000-8,000 for a wall-hanging, for example) purchased by 
unknown foreigners and affluent Sri Lankans, such moments of exchange within the village have 
reportedly vanished. As one Berava weaver put it to me, the village’s high caste Goyigama 
residents can no longer even afford what is produced in the village’s weaving workshops. At the 
same time that business transactions between Redigama’s Goyigama and Berava residents have 
disappeared, however, another context for their meeting has arisen. Faced with economic 
uncertainty stemming from the contraction of the local agricultural economy, many of the high 
caste individuals who have remained in Redigama have turned to the village’s Berava-owned 
weaving workshops for employment. Generally, the individuals operating the large floor looms 
in the Berava weavers’ workshops today are high caste and mostly female.  
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The number of high caste employees in these workshops in Redigama presently ranges 
from two to around a dozen. This number is reported to have oscillated considerably since 
peaking in the 1980s when one workshop had 20 employees, more than three times the number it 
has today. Many report that high caste weavers began quitting the workshops in droves 
beginning in around 2008, shortly before the country’s civil war came to an abrupt and bloody 
end and right around the time when the government began investing in infrastructure 
development projects in the region around Redigama. A number of men from the village, 
including at least one workshop owner, reportedly took jobs on the road construction crews hired 
by a Korean engineering and construction firm managing a multi-year project in the area. 
Redigama’s high caste residents do not refer to the sudden generation of employment 
opportunities in explaining the reported exodus of employees out of the workshops, however. 
Instead, they cite low salaries and the failure of their employers to make required contributions to 
government-mandated employee retirement funds. When government officers would visit one 
workshop to check the owners’ compliance in this regard, the owner, aware in advance of the 
date of each visit, would reportedly give his employees the day off so that it would appear as a 
“family-only” business and therefore qualify as exempt from the mandatory contribution. 
Redigama’s high caste residents and weavers are also acutely aware of the discrepancy 
between the prices that Dumbara rata textiles fetch in the island’s urban centers and the amount 
that they receive for their labor. Paid per piece, a weaver might for instance earn Rs.100-200 for 
a day’s work weaving a cushion cover that will ultimately sell for approximately Rs.1,000. Such 
individuals will often credit the greed they believe underlies such discrepancy for driving 
employees out of the village workshops in recent years. At the same time, the way they discuss 
this “greed” suggests more than dissatisfaction with salaries. To gesture toward the focus of 
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Chapter 6, it also suggests a discomfort with a transformation in inter-caste relations that has 
resulted from the development of Dumbara rata weaving. Asked why employees have 
reportedly fled workshops in recent years, one former employee and current construction worker, 
Gamini, explained, “Because when they [his Berava neighbors] earn more money, they forget the 
past. That’s the main reason…In terms of caste, they tried to become big people.” Gamini and 
others explained that the Berava workshop owners, in trying to “become big people,” had begun 
offering food and drink to their employees. When the latter refused the attempt at commensality, 
perceived as an attempt to collapse the hierarchical social distance between them altogether, their 
employers became angry and had reportedly started speaking to their employees “in a proud 
way,” driving the latter to quit. Epitomizing the orientation to the past that I describe above, 
Gamini’s wife, also a former employee, explained, “Even though we work there, we don’t drink 
tea or eat from their places. Because of that, they’re very angry. During the past, during my 
grandmother’s time, they [her family] didn’t even let them [the Berava family’s ancestors] sit in 
the chairs, and if they came to speak to our families, they stayed outside and spoke. But now it’s 
changed.” 
Transformations in the weaving industry and in the local agricultural economy have 
driven the recalibration of a once established hierarchical relationship between the Berava and 
their high caste neighbors. I examine what this recalibration has meant in Chapter 6. To situate 
both the struggle that has unfolded in the village in recent years and my own rather unfortunate 
research experience there, however, Redigama’s high caste weavers have since the 1990s had at 
least some interest in weaving independently of their low caste employers. When demand for 
Dumbara rata textiles exploded following the end of the war in 2009—around the time residents 
associate with an exodus of employees out of the village workshops—this interest became much 
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stronger. Just three years later, the village’s high caste residents got what they believed would be 
their chance to begin weaving independently of their low caste neighbors.  
In 2012, shortly after I had visited Redigama to meet with workshop owners and assess 
the suitability of the area as a potential field-site for my research, a representative from the office 
of the Divisional Secretariat, Senuri, was tasked with generating a proposal to “develop the status 
of the villagers and the small industries” of Redigama. With Rs. 10 lakhs (approximately 8,000 
USD at the time) allocated for the project by the Sri Lanka Tourism Development Authority, 
plans were drawn up to renovate an abandoned schoolhouse to be used as a central Dumbara 
rata weaving training and production center for all villagers. When an argument broke out over 
who would manage the center—the village’s high caste residents wanted someone from the 
government while their low caste neighbors insisted it should be one of the existing (Berava) 
workshop owners—the Divisional Secretariat reportedly became nervous that the initiative was 
creating discord and cancelled the project. The bitterness that the ordeal generated was only 
exacerbated when, just over a year later, the village’s high caste residents found another advocate 
for their right to weave independently in a locally assigned officer from Samurdhi, the 
government’s rural poverty alleviation program. 
 It was into this environment that I, blissfully unaware, inserted myself in October of 
2013. Beyond the disquieting silence I encountered when I got off the bus on that early visit, 
there were other signs I would soon encounter that all was not quite right in Redigama. While in 
2012 several of the village’s Berava workshop-owners had welcomed the idea of my returning to 
the village the following year to carry out my research, I now found their feelings to be quite 
otherwise. When I called the only female workshop owner in the area, a woman who just a year 
prior had generously shared her time with me and had even suggested that I stay with her upon 
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my return, she angrily asked why I could not simply speak to someone else and leave her alone (I 
ended up staying permanently in Udadumbara town). When, on a phone call with my research 
assistant, that woman’s brother noted that he was too busy at the moment to speak, I said that I 
planned to be in the area for a long while and would be grateful to speak with him when things 
had settled down and he had more time. Before abruptly hanging up on my assistant, he told her 
sternly, “Look, no matter when it is, I’m not going to talk to you all for more than a few 
minutes.” 
While others were not so curt, and indeed while several were ultimately very generous 
with their time, I gathered early on that there was a general suspicion among the Berava 
workshop owners and their relatives that I was in Redigama as a businesswoman or, worse, as a 
collaborator with the government. I assured those willing to speak to me that my intentions were 
neither to open my own Dumbara rata weaving “showroom” nor to aid the government in any of 
its projects to “spread the industry out” to others in the area.18 Ultimately, however, my words 
fell on deaf ears, and in January 2013, just four months after I had settled down near Redigama 
to carry out the research for this dissertation, I was faced with one of those deeply regrettable 
situations in which the anthropologist realizes that she has unintentionally imperiled the 
wellbeing of her informants. Several weeks prior, I had accepted the invitation of two weavers—
																																																								18	The latter suggestion, that I might be collaborating with the government, was ironic. As was 
likely the experience of other American students and scholars carrying out their research at the 
height of the “Rajapaksa Regime,” the mid-ranking government officials I encountered during 
my fieldwork regarded me with more than a little suspicion. I arrived in Redigama in 2013 amid 
the country’s preparations to host the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, an event 
that drew international attention to allegations of human rights violations committed during Sri 
Lanka’s long drawn-out civil war. Coming from the United States, a country that in March 2012 
had voted in favor of adopting a resolution to hold Sri Lanka accountable for the investigation of 
such allegations, I was questioned at length at the local Divisional Secretariat about my presence 
in the country and the particulars of my research agenda.  
		 	 	 	 66	
a husband and wife, both employees of one of the Berava workshop owners—to dine with them 
and their adult daughter at their home some distance from the main road passing through the 
village. Travel being both difficult and dangerous after dark, and darkness falling well before 
dinnertime, the couple had invited me to spend the night. I happily accepted, and we four spent a 
pleasant evening chatting, watching television, and enjoying the meal of rice and curry that they 
had generously prepared. Weeks later, I was shopping for stationary in Udadumbara when a 
friend of my hosts tapped me on the shoulder and delivered the unwelcome news: the couple, 
employed as weavers for nearly 20 years, had been fired. Not long after our social gathering at 
their home, I learned, my hostess, Kiyoma, had delivered the couple’s most recently completed 
order of Dumbara rata textiles to their employer, the workshop owner, as she had so many times 
before. Expecting him to give her the yarn she would need to complete the next order in return, 
she was surprised to find that he had no intention of doing so. Putting her off with “some 
excuse,” as it was told to me, he sent word soon thereafter that she and her husband were to 
disassemble and return the loom that he had loaned to them so that they could weave for him 
while carrying on with their farm work and household chores. A relative of the workshop owners 
and a neighbor of my hosts had reportedly explained the reason for his dismissal of the couple. 
Invoking what is locally considered to be a rather disparaging term, she noted that it was because 
they had “talked to the suddi” (white woman). They had talked to me.  
Soon after this troubling event, my research in Redigama ground to a halt. I had, without 
any way of anticipating it, stumbled into a place where, thanks to processes set in motion long 
before my arrival, a contestation over a local weaving industry had come to a head. It is crucial 
to point out that my presence likely exacerbated the tension brewing beneath the surface in 
Redigama. I cannot know for sure the extent to which my being there influenced the events that I 
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observed and write about in the following pages. In the end, however, the consequences of my 
presence became too much of a distraction both to myself and to those whose lives I had no 
intention of interrupting, and I decided I had better withdraw from the scene. 
Atwaedagama 
Following the unfortunate sequence of events that precipitated my departure from 
Redigama, in April 2014 I turned my attention to Atwaedagama, a village of approximately 300 
people about 30 kilometers to the east. Given its relative proximity to Redigama and its similar 
association with the name Dumbara rata, I hoped that selecting this village would facilitate 
continuity in the research I had already begun. I also hoped and, though it makes me wince to 
admit it now, fully anticipated that I would not encounter anything like the local dispute that had 
thwarted my original research plans in Redigama. However, while I did not find the unique 
difficulties of navigating Redigama’s rocky social landscape to be replicated in Atwaedagama, 
my expectation that all would proceed without incident proved to be a naïve one. I was suspected 
of being neither a potential business competitor nor an aid to government officials seeking to 
challenge claims of lineage-based proprietorship over the local weaving industry. I was, 
however, suspected nonetheless—this time, of having an interest in reproducing a hackneyed 
historical narrative about the caste-based difference and associated historical destitution of 
Atwaedagama and its residents.  
There is no getting around the fact that Atwaedagama has historically been recognized as 
a “mono-caste” village, an area populated almost exclusively by persons identified as Kinnara, 
considered to be one of the two lowest castes among the Sinhalese.19 As noted above, however, 
																																																								19 In the last census to account for caste (1911), Kinnara were estimated to make up .3 percent of 
the Sinhala population (Jabbar 2005). 
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much of my energy in the village was spent reassuring people that I was not interested in 
perpetuating their stigmatization as low caste and essentially socially different from other 
Sinhalese. As I relate in Chapter 5, one uniquely suspicious informant, Piyumi, stressed that, if I 
write a book in which I note, “these people are low caste, they only marry each other, they’re 
poor, they do this job,” it is they who will suffer. Piyumi and others stressed that I should “just 
focus on the industry” and that the “social context” is irrelevant. Significantly, this advice 
directly opposes that given by heritage professionals and policy-makers working at national and 
transnational levels. “Crafts stem from a relationship between humans and their environment 
within their historical, cultural, and social contexts,” an author writing on behalf of UNESCO 
tells us, and this “intimate relationship should be understood and respected by designers 
attempting to develop crafts” (Craft Revival Trust, Artesanías de Colombia S.A. and UNESCO 
2005:vi).  
By broaching a topic that, as discussed above, is in general publicly silenced, I am 
arguably facilitating the understanding for which this Craft Revival Trust author calls at the cost 
of re-inscribing the lines of social distinction that Piyumi and others in Atwaedagama resent. 
However, I neither see “the industry” or “craft” as isolable from the social relations that produce 
it nor agree that silence would accomplish the outcome that Piyumi and my other interlocutors 
desire, for caste’s relevance to simply go away. As I have noted already and as I will argue in 
subsequent chapters, it is in many respects the silence around caste that has facilitated its 
perpetuation as a meaningful category of difference in contemporary Sri Lanka. Piyumi 
suggested that I write a counter-narrative, however, and, in endeavoring to heed the following 
words of Thomas Blom Hansen, I believe I have done so: 
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[T]he task of the social scientist is to produce knowledge and writing that defies ethnic 
closures by documenting and exploring the richness, diversity, and multivocality of the 
social world of even the smallest of localities. Good scholarship is usually unsettling to 
established or widely held ideas, and scholars, to my mind, should strive to make their 
work as useless as possible for those who promote ethnic closures (2001:17). 
 
While not remaining silent on the topic of caste, I have tried to write in a manner that “defies 
ethnic closures” or, put otherwise, resists essentializing any terms of identification. My hope is 
that, in doing so, I have produced, if not the exact counter-narrative that Piyumi envisioned in 
her request, then at least an account that is “useless” to the reproduction of caste-based difference 
in Sri Lanka.  
Of Population, Plants and Paeduru: The Emergence of a Local Market 
To situate the concerns of Piyumi and others I encountered in Atwaedagama, and to 
appreciate how it is that caste-based identification has come to figure differently in the lives of 
those engaged in the hana industry than it does for Dumbara rata weavers in Redigama, it helps 
to highlight some of the ways in which these two villages differ. Two specific points of 
differentiation serve to orient a discussion of Atwaedagama’s situation vis-à-vis broader currents 
in Sri Lanka’s political economy. They also serve a more extended examination of the ways in 
which caste in and around Atwaedagama articulates with the ideological and practical 
entailments of neoliberal processes, notions of heritage for the nation, and a long-standing 
“political discourse of social egalitarianism” (Uyangoda 1999:21).  
To begin, whereas the population in the district subdivision in which Redigama is located 
has steadily decreased with migration to more urban areas in recent years, that in which 
Atwaedagama is located has skyrocketed. Between 2001 and 2012, Udadumbara, the location of 
Redigama, was one of only two areas in the Kandy District to see its population decline (the 
other, Gangawata Korale, the location of the city of Kandy, is the most heavily populated in the 
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District). Over the same period, Kundasale, where Atwaedagama is located, saw a population 
increase of 20,805, by far the most significant rise in all of Kandy District.20  
            For those in Atwaedagama, this population explosion has coincided with an abundance of 
day labor opportunities afforded by housing construction and infrastructure development. 
Atwaedagama is roughly equidistant between two larger towns at each end of a very busy road. 
Two significant temples, one belonging to the Ramanya Nikaya (monastic order) and slightly 
north from Atwaedagama, the other (with which a small temple in the heart of Atwaedagama is 
affiliated) belonging to the Siyam Nikaya and located in the town at the northern end of the main 
road, draw considerable traffic.21 The road, now well-traveled by local buses, motorcycles, three-
wheelers, construction lorries, and vans shuttling people from Atwaedagama and surrounding 
villages to and from their shifts at a nearby garment factory, became increasingly dangerous for 
pedestrian use in recent years. Just months prior to my arrival, the election of a monk at the 
temple nearer to Atwaedagama to a senior position in the Order prompted the widening of the 
road, a development about which all in the area were delighted. The construction of houses along 
the road for mostly Sinhalese and Muslim families (one of the nearby town boasts a well-
attended mosque) was also booming, and the appearance almost overnight of an opulent 
																																																								20 The population of the area seeing the second highest growth in Kandy district, Udunuwara, 
was 11,353 (http://biomassenergy.lk/files/Kandy%20-%20Final%20Report.pdf) 21 Notably, of these two monastic orders, ordination practices within the Ramanya Nikaya are 
said to be more flexible as regards caste. 
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reception hall not far from Atwaedagama attested further to a strong local economy. Hardly a 
day went by when, walking to and from the room I rented from a young Muslim family in one of 
these nearby towns, I did not see workers along this road shoveling sand or gravel, laying bricks, 
or pouring cement foundations for new buildings.  
While these developments in Atwaedagama’s immediate vicinity and in the region more 
generally have presented ample casual labor opportunities for men from the village, for those 
engaged in the village’s hana industry they have also presented a new challenge: a decline in the 
availability of hana, the 
large succulent whose 
fibers, or kaendi, are 
used by artisans in and 
beyond Atwaedagama to 
produce a variety of 
handmade items. While 
residents of 
Atwaedagama report that 
they have always had to 
travel some distance in 
collecting the large plant, 
they are increasingly driven further away from the village to do so (Figure 2). 
Figure 2-Hana Distribution, 2004-2015. Produced by author using My 
Map, Google. 
àAreas where 
Atwaedagama 
residents regularly 
collected hana before 
2004.  
àAreas where hana 
was planted since 2004 
but has now been 
depleted. 
 
àAreas where 
Atwaedagama 
residents regularly find 
hana today. 
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The decline in locally available hana has driven a degree of collaboration between individuals 
who had once sought out the plant on their own either by foot or bicycle. Indeed, the distances 
that Atwaedagama residents must now travel to secure the plant are often so great that they must 
hire a lorry (due to the plant’s thorny edges, they are prohibited from bringing hana onto buses) 
to transport the leaves back to the village. Since the cost for an individual to do so is 
prohibitively expensive, groups of five to eight individuals will often pool their resources and 
hire one collectively. After taking the bus to their destination, they 
will typically cut the plant on temple or government lands. If 
women are participating, they will generally return by bus while 
the men will return with their hana bundles via lorry.  
Even after sharing the expense of a driver and fuel, the cost 
of securing hana, which most families who use the material will 
do at least once or twice per month, is still much greater than it 
was just over a decade ago. To add to this, as the population 
density increases throughout the island, Atwaedagama’s artisans 
find themselves increasingly having to venture onto private lands to secure the plant. As we will 
see in Chapter 5, they are not always welcome in doing so. Many find themselves either having 
to pay for a plant that was once freely available or, should they attempt to cut it without consent, 
being chased away by angry and sometimes knife-wielding property owners.  
Most in Atwaedagama are willing and able to brave these obstacles, but an increasing 
number have also begun either supplementing hana or, in some cases, replacing it altogether 
with a cheaper and more readily available material, woven plant fiber mats, known locally 
simply as paeduru, or mats, imported from India.  
Figure 3-A letter holder 
made of paeduru and ready-
made cloth. 
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The shift to paeduru began, according to local lore, when a buyer, the owner of a small 
store in the village of Wewaldeniya, suggested the material as a substitute. Wewaldeniya, after 
wewwael, or “cane,” is situated along the main road between Kandy and Colombo and is popular 
among Sri Lankans and foreigners alike for its abundance of shops selling cane furniture, 
baskets, and other locally (and, reportedly, in recent years, not so locally) crafted items. 
Atwaedagama’s artisans have found a steady market there for their change purses, pencil cases, 
and other woven hana-based products. In 2009, however, when a shop-owner reportedly 
discovered that mice had destroyed his stock of hana goods, he suggested that they try using 
paeduru. The suggestion, possibly also motivated by the shop-owner’s desire to sell paeduru 
mats, resonated with his contacts in Atwaedagama and, in the years since, an increasing number 
of residents in the area have begun incorporating paeduru into their work. 
Until about five months prior to our meeting in 2014, Sarath, 65, and his wife, Chandi, 
50, had worked exclusively with hana. They began using paeduru around the time when a 
woman from a neighboring village who keeps a shop along the main road added the mats to her 
store of fabrics, glue, cardboard, and other materials that Atwaedagama’s artisans now use on a 
regular basis. One afternoon, I found Sarath seated at his sewing machine in the doorway to his 
home, his bespectacled eyes straining as he took advantage of the mid-afternoon sunlight to sew 
zippers onto paeduru square cutouts. Glancing up periodically at his daughter’s home just yards 
from his own on the same property (the latter was in Cyprus while her husband, a driver, cared 
for their two children with the help of Sarath and Chandi), Sarath recounted how he and Chandi 
had made the switch to paeduru. “In our ancestors’ time” he explained, “there was hana 
everyplace. It was nearby and we didn’t have to go far away. After that, over time, little by little, 
it disappeared. Little by little, we had to go far away.” 
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Figure  SEQ Figure \* ARABIC 5-A partially woven 
hana mat	
          For Sarath, at 65, the labor involved in going out to collect hana and weaving the mats that 
are then cut into smaller pieces used to make change purses and other smaller items is 
significant. We get a sense for what collecting the plant looks like in Chapter 5. Procuring the 
leaves (pathu) is just the beginning of a painstaking process, however. Upon their return to 
Atwaedagama, the green pulp of each 
leaf must be scraped away with the 
sharpened edge of an albisiya stick to 
extract the plant’s long, floss-like 
fibers. The preferred time of day for 
this particularly strenuous task is the 
early morning when the air is still cool. 
The fibers must then be dried, dyed 
(with a range of mostly synthetic but 
also some natural pigments), and again left out to dry for several hours. Strewn over broad, black 
rocks, spread out on rooftops next to heaps of chopped breadfruit, or hanging alongside blouses 
and sarongs on clothes lines, bunches of natural, black, and, most often, neon-yellow, -green, and 
-pink hana punctuate an already vibrant forested landscape. After being dried, each bunch of 
hana is struck (often with an albisiya stick) repeatedly to soften the stiffened fibers. It is then 
rubbed with a small amount of ituru tel (oil leftover from scraping coconuts) and combed with a 
boar bristle brush for upwards of thirty minutes to separate the strands. Twine is then tied tightly 
at even intervals along the length of the bunch, which is then hung from a small tripod before the 
strands, drawn out 10 to 20 at a time, are twisted together to form weft threads for weaving.  
4-A partially woven hana mat 
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Like others whose children have taken advantage of alternative employment 
opportunities in recent years, Sarath finds it difficult to enlist the help of his sons and daughters 
in collecting the plant and assisting in this arduous process of preparing the fibers for weaving 
(which, due to his failing eyesight, he also finds increasingly difficult to do). In addition to his 
daughter working as a domestic servant in Cyprus, Sarath has two other daughters who have 
married and moved to a village in Matale, to the northwest. Sarath’s two sons, though still living 
in Atwaedagama, work as three-wheeler drivers and are rarely available to assist.  
Sarath finds the switch to paeduru to make economic sense. No longer able to weave 
hana mats themselves, he and Chandi would have to purchase them from others in Atwaedagama 
to keep up with production. The cost of a two by twelve foot (the length of a loom, or haeda) 
striped (paaten-paaten) or plain hana mat, which takes two to three days to weave (plus another 
two to three days to gather and prepare all the materials), is typically Rs. 1,200-1,500. For a mat 
with more complex designs, the cost may range from Rs. 3,000-5,000. The cost of a single four 
by six foot paedura, by contrast, is just Rs. 600.  
 The income that Atwaedagama’s artisans derive from paeduru-based items would seem 
to be comparable to that derived from woven hana-based items. The cost of making a small 
purse may be half as much, for instance, but one will also sell it for half as much. At least some 
in Atwaedagama explain, however, that, because of the price at the point of sale, paeduru-based 
or partially paeduru-based items sell more quickly than those made exclusively of hana. “Even if 
I sold [a hana change purse] for Rs. 100,” Sarath explained, “it would still be a loss for us, but 
we can’t even sell it at Rs.100. This [paeduru] has better business.”  
I am unable assess the actual economic gains or losses entailed in the substitution of 
paeduru for hana mats. While it may be true that paeduru “has better business,” most in 
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Atwaedagama today continue to use hana even while an increasing number will at least 
occasionally mix the two together. Some, for instance, will turn to paeduru during the monsoon 
season when collecting hana is hindered by the threat of leeches and the difficulties of traveling 
in the rain and when the processing and drying of hana is complicated by sudden downpours 
throughout the day. Others may use it when those who typically help them in collecting or 
processing the plant, or to weave for that matter, are unavailable.  
To many of the government representatives and Colombo-based designers with whom I 
spoke in carrying out this research, the substitution of hana by paeduru is lamentable. Notably, 
however, it also complicates what many of them regard as the intransigence or unwillingness to 
adapt that they say characterizes Sri Lanka’s artisans. To offer an example, in 2002, Sri Lanka’s 
Export Development Board identified all the country’s “traditional crafts” and, in an effort to 
create a high-end local and tourist “niche” market for the items, began to focus on the 
introduction of design and entrepreneurial skills training in select villages. Reproducing an 
image of artisans that, as we will see in Chapter 2, was largely consolidated during the early 
post-independence period, a senior official involved in the effort explained that artisans in 
Atwaedagama and Redigama, neither of which were among the villages selected, are especially 
resistant to change “because [their industry is] handed down from generation to generation” and 
they are simply doing things the way they have always done them.  
 A representative from the National Craft Council (NCC) who has worked closely with 
artisans in Atwaedagama echoed this sentiment following a meeting in the village one morning. 
In the company some of the more successful individuals mentioned above—individuals who, in 
addition to manufacturing small purses and other items, tend to be among the few who still 
weave decorative wall-hangings—he addressed me and my assistant: 
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People who are artisans [shilpi] and living in villages are the hardest people to develop. 
It’s unlike other villages. These people, they have traditional ideas [sampredayaka 
adahas]. [Addressing the men present] I’m not blaming you all, I’m just saying. These 
are the results that people have gotten through research. Artisans living in villages are so 
unwilling to change…So, some people who have gotten away from these ideas, like you 
all, are the people who have developed in this industry. 
 
Those who have adhered most closely to what government officials and designers regard 
as the most “traditional” of hana items, decorative woven wall-hangings made exclusively out of 
hana, are also praised, then, for getting away from “traditional ideas” (sampredayaka adahas). It 
is these individuals who, as the NCC officer puts it, have “developed” (or profited most) in this 
industry. In fact, most of these individuals have always enjoyed a structurally superior position in 
Atwaedagama. One is the grandson of the village’s last headman, recalled locally as the last 
duraya.22 A skilled weaver of decorative mats, he and several of the others are individuals who 
were either commissioned or are the children of individuals who were commissioned by an 
American in the mid-1960s to produce a collection of decorative wall-hangings that, as described 
in Chapter 3, were later displayed in exhibitions throughout the United States. The benefits of 
this connection, which positioned these same individuals to profit further from a booming tourist 
market for their wall-hangings, are not without consequence today. These individuals tend to be 
the ones who have maintained close business connections with high-end crafts emporia in 
Colombo and Kandy—shops that, as many in Atwaedagama report, would be loath to accept 
anything other than hana-based goods. Lak Pahana, Laksala, the Academy of Design, and other 
buyers sell largely to foreigners and affluent Sri Lankans for whom hana, a locally sourced 
natural fiber, is believed to be a marker of the authenticity of these “traditional handicrafts.” 
																																																								22 As John Rogers notes, “Non-Goyigama headmen were appointed only for non-Goyigama 
villages. They were called durayas, a term that distinguished them from the arachchis, the 
Goyigama village headmen” (Rogers 2004a:66). 
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 Unlike most of government officials and urban designers with whom I spoke in carrying 
out this research, most in Atwaedagama look favorably upon the sudden availability of ready-
made, imported paeduru, a material that they see as serving the same purpose as woven hana. 
Despite their characterization by some as intransigent, many of those who have adopted paeduru 
in fact see themselves as successfully responding and adapting to transformations that are 
beyond their control. Shifting global political economic currents have translated into an 
expanding Sri Lankan middle class and a booming local population that, in a very real sense, 
have rendered hana somehow less local than the paeduru that one may purchase in the shop 
down the road. To Sarath, for instance, the incorporation of paeduru, or, in his case, its replacing 
hana altogether, demonstrates both a natural progression and an adaptive kind of resilience. 
When I asked what he made of the transformation, he replied: 
I don’t think anything about it. This is what we are left with…Someday soon this will 
also go away and there won’t be any mats to work with. Once the mats disappear, we will 
find another alternative [wikalpeya]. That is how we should learn [igenaganna one]. 
 
To Sarath, there is nothing remarkable about the shift to paeduru. Although he did not mention 
an arguably comparable earlier shift from a fiber known as niyanda to hana, to be discussed in 
Chapter 2, he sees a certain inevitability in the periodic location of alternative materials. There 
are, however, also those in Atwaedagama who, unlike Sarath, defend the notion that hana is 
more authentic and regard the use of paeduru as a regrettable phenomenon. One gentleman, 
Chaminda, declared in a public meeting, “We cheat people, saying that these are hana products 
when in fact we use substitutes!” In an ironic twist, he suggested to a government officer that, 
since hana is no longer readily available nearby, perhaps the government should import the plant 
from India. Just prior to the suggestion, the officer had in fact noted that, “as the world develops, 
we have to use substitutes because there is less natural land.” She invoked the importation of 
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cotton thread and yarn from India as an example. Now, however, she referred to recent public 
outcries over the country’s importation of kankun (water spinach) and dismissed Chaminda’s 
suggestion of importing hana outright.    
 The privileging of hana as more ‘true’ than paeduru has real implications for those in and 
around Atwaedagama. High-end crafts emporia are generally unlikely to purchase items that are 
not (save zippers and trim) made exclusively of hana.23 Government support for artisans in the 
village is also conditional. When Rs. 75 lakhs were allocated to develop the industry in the 
village, for instance, weaving hana was privileged. While sewing machines were provided for in 
the original budget for the project, the government officer in charge of its implementation, 
suspecting that the machines would be used for “other purposes,” had removed them. In a public 
meeting about the project, he noted that it is the individual who weaves hana who is the “true 
artisan [shilpeya]”: “When we talk about the Dumbara rata, we are talking about the ‘mats.’ 
Even in this instance, I don’t give priority to those who make bags and purses. The first person 
that we all need to protect is the one who weaves the mat.”  
 Significantly, this identification of mat weaving as the work of the true artisan cuts 
another way. To government officers and others working in reference to an idealized, caste-free 
vision of collective patrimony—a vision that, as we will see in Chapter 2, was largely 
consolidated in the mid-20th century—it is decorative mat weaving, the work of the “true 
artisan,” that, as an embodiment of national heritage, must be privileged and protected. In nearly 
every piece of literature that has ever been published on “the Kinnara,” however, it is “mat 
weaving” that is identified as the primary occupation of the caste. As we will see in subsequent 																																																								23 I did happen upon paeduru-based pencil and change purses at a high-end textile boutique in 
Colombo. The items, apparently not very popular with the shop’s customers, were set off in a 
corner and had been marked down considerably from their original price.   
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chapters (where the phrase “hiding the mat” is a significant one), it is also mats and mat weaving 
that most readily communicate the caste status of those in Atwaedagama. The positive 
resonances of “national handicrafts” and the negative resonances of “pavement crafts” are 
complicated by the “semiotically underdetermined” (Keane 
2006:69) quality of things. Whatever multiplicity of meanings 
might animate things at the moment(s) of consumption, at the 
level of production, the articulation between narratives of 
national heritage and the persistence of caste-based 
identification has meant that different elements of what is 
generally referred to as hana work (including working with 
paeduru) have come to carry markedly different semantic 
loads. As we will see, sewing purses is for instance something 
that even high caste residents in the village neighboring Atwaedagama may “get away with.” 
While not regarded as the work of the true artisan, and therefore not worthy of government 
support, in and around Atwaedagama the practice of sewing is also not semantically saturated in 
the same way that we find mat-weaving to be. It is in part for this reason that one young man, 
Figure 5- Hana wallet purchased 
from a clothing store in Colombo 
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Figure  SEQ Figure \* ARABIC 6-Woven hana wall-hangings, 
purses and other items for sale at Colombo's Lak Pahana crafts 
emporium	
evidently fearful that I would re-inscribe the lowly caste status of Atwaedagama’s residents in 
my writing about the industry, communicated his disgust for hana work and in particular for 
making dusters. Of sewing, however, he noted, “Yes, that’s okay.”  
 The tendency to at least supplement if not substitute woven hana with the imported mats 
is significant in part because it indexes broader political economic transformations that 
Atwaedagama’s residents find themselves facing today. Since the 1960s, as noted above, 
Redigama’s Dumbara rata weavers have seen the consumer base for their cotton textiles shift 
from locals to foreigners and affluent Sri Lankans, the rise in the price of their decorative wall-
hangings, cushion covers, and other items far exceeding the buying capacity of the average Sri 
Lankan consumer. Many in Redigama are proud of the fact that Dumbara rata items are no 
longer what they call “pavement crafts.” By contrast, over the same period, most of those 
engaged in the hana industry (now a bit of a misnomer) report to have seen their population of 
buyers shift from a largely foreign and wealthy demographic to a local and less affluent one.  
In the late 1950s, Raghavan reported that Dumbara mats woven by the Kinnara 
constituted a “luxury product” (Handsome Beggars 1957:50). Even plain hana or reed-based 
sleeping mats (nidaaganna 
paeduru), also woven in 
Atwaedagama until the 
late 1990s, according to 
some, did “not command 
the market and the ready 
sale” enjoyed by mats woven by others (Handsome Beggards 1957:50). Beginning in the 1960s 
and 70s, tourist-driven demand reportedly shot up for Dumbara mats, items that were sold by the 
i  6-Woven hana wall-hangings, purses and other items for sale 
at Colombo's Lak Pahana crafts emp rium 
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Kandyan Art Association as early as 1914.24 Tourist demand at the time was so great, in fact, 
that, according to an elderly weaver in the village today, the government sent someone in the 
1960s to assist the villagers in organizing a cooperative society through which Laksala could 
make its purchases and keep up with demand for the items. Nearly everything that the 
approximately forty individuals who participated in the society made was bought up almost 
immediately. By 1971, the government had sponsored the construction of a “training center” 
(madhyastaaneya) in which, with support from the Department of Small Industries, residents 
would learn to weave, or, many having learned already from their parents, practice their weaving 
technique under the instruction of Lakshman, one of the most skilled weavers in the village.  
In recent years, largely foreigner-driven demand for Atwaedagama’s wall-hangings has 
been dwarfed by local demand for smaller and less expensive items thanks to an expanding Sri 
Lankan middle class. Villagers have also 
come to rely less upon the patronage of 
government-run Laksala, an organization 
that many condemn for being 
increasingly managed like a private 
corporation. Lakshman, who retired as 
the teacher at the local training center in 
2003, has not been replaced. Today, in 
addition to housing several sewing machines for villagers’ use, the building serves not primarily 
as a training space, but as a workspace for those who lack room or suitable lighting at home. 
																																																								24 We will recall from the preceding section on Redigama that Dumbara mats (sold at Rs.1-2.50) 
are listed alongside Dumbara cloth in the Kandyan Art Association’s 1914 price list. 
Figure 7-Punya and Eromi prepare weft threads for 
Renuka as the latter weaves a hana mat 
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None of the fifteen individuals (eight men and seven women) who regularly use the center weave 
there. Utilities for the building, once covered by Laksala, are now paid for by funds these 
individuals pool together each month for the purpose. Nowadays, almost everyone sells to 
private businesses rather than to Laksala. Reflecting mournfully on this transformation, the 
teacher mentioned above related: “In those days, we grew because of Laksala. We even built our 
house through Laksala. In those days, it was called the Mahagedera [ancestral home or “great 
house”] of Sri Lankan Handicrafts. They started paying us monthly, and then the payments 
started coming late, and then it just stopped. Now, most people don’t give to Laksala anymore.”  
Village residents report that up until the 1990s, when the cooperative society dissolved 
after allegations of corruption among its officers and people returned to selling their items 
privately, busloads of tourists came in search of the area’s famed wall-hangings. In 2014, 
however, Lakshman related, “I can’t even remember a day when we sold anything to a tourist. 
It’s mostly Sri Lankans. Teachers and people in the government sector. People like that.” Sarath 
similarly explained, “In the past, people used to buy things from Laksala. Laksala would sell to 
foreigners [sudhu mahatwaru, lit. white gentlemen or “sirs”] and, in those days, only places like 
Laksala sold things. But not anymore. Now, there are so many people in Sri Lanka who [buy 
from us].”  
Many of my interlocutors in Atwaedagama welcome this shift to a local market as 
evidence of the strides that Sri Lanka has made in terms of economic development. When I 
remarked upon the phenomenon to one woman, Renuka, she paused her weaving and, lifting her 
head, smiled and said, “Because now Sri Lanka is developed, no? Women are working, so they 
buy these things. See, we even have this new road, and in Kandy they’re making nice tunnels, 
and escalators—just like in other countries!” 
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Today, there are fewer than a dozen individuals in Atwaedagama who weave decorative 
wall-hangings made exclusively out of hana. Most but not all of these artisans are men, who, 
having learned how to weave designs when they were children, continue to sell the 
comparatively high-priced items to large craft outlets like Laksala and Lak Pahana in Colombo. 
Several of them, however, have also become successful by virtue of their position in terms of the 
broader labor organization within the village. Like others, they see profit not in wall-hangings, 
but in the smaller items that that have come to sell more readily in the local market. Two such 
households have acquired multiple sewing machines (three in one case, several more in the 
other) and have enough floor space that they employ others in the area to work on their premises. 
Others either buy finished purses from or pay a piece rate of around four to six rupees to other 
residents of Atwaedagama—and, as we will see, to some in neighboring villages—to hand-stitch 
the edges of woven hana or mixed hana-and-paeduru change purses and pencil cases. One 
individual, for instance, purchases finished purses at approximately Rs.125 piece from his 
neighbors before selling them at a markup at large shops or craft exhibitions organized by the 
government. Another relies on the assistance of four others, all of whom work at their own 
homes, to help him complete large orders for shops in Kandy and Colombo. A number of young 
women I came to know regularly sew for several individuals and could often be found doing so 
as they sat chatting with family, watching television, or visiting with their neighbors as the latter 
wove or brushed hana. On the evening before a large order was due to his neighbor, one man 
whose family I grew to know well sat on the floor of his poorly lit kitchen and busily put the 
finishing touches on a collection of purses. His daughter having sewn late into the evening while 
he finished weaving a mat on the family’s loom, he now sat beside a pile of the colorful, striped 
items, carefully holding a dripping candle to each one as he burnt off stray strands of hana fiber. 
		 	 	 	 85	
There are approximately twenty individuals who also weave plain or striped (paaten-
paaten) mats and sell them to these few wealthier neighbors. The latter, after cutting the mats, 
will glue a piece of cardboard between the woven hana and kaemberala (Cambrelle, a nylon 
fabric) before using a sewing machine to sew cloth piping or zippers along the edges of the 
pieces and then pay yet another to sew the parts of small purses or pencil cases together by hand. 
Mohan, who we will meet in Chapter 5, purchases hana from others, dyes it himself, and then 
redistributes it to yet others who will weave the fabric to his specifications and then return it to 
him. Selling directly to large crafts emporia like Laksala and receiving sizable orders from other 
businesses (a bank or other organization hosting a conference may, for instance, ask him to 
produce 500 file covers), he designs the necessary items and, after in some cases using an 
industrial machine in Kandy to cut the necessary amount of cardboard, will commission others to 
glue and sew the final products.  
Several of these more successful individuals belong to a crafts society (or council) in the 
village, and in that capacity serve as intermediaries between Atwaedagama artisans and 
government agencies that have sponsored development projects in the village in recent years. 
(Notably, this “Society” is reputed to have formed in around 2013 when its leaders learned of a 
Rs. 75 lakh government-sponsored development project slated for the hana industry.) Most in 
Atwaedagama, whose monthly earnings from hana work average Rs. 8,000-10,000, do not wield 
such economic power, however. Collecting and preparing their own hana, and weaving their 
own mats, families in the village create change purses, pencil cases, “dusters” (also called “fly 
whisks,” or chaamera), and letter holders in the shape of “dolls” (boniko). Although some who 
find travel difficult, such as elderly widows who might make dusters, for example, might sell 
such items to middlemen in the village, others are able to sell directly either to small shops or on 
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the street in towns throughout the island. While a few women travel to nearby areas to sell the 
items—one sometimes peddles dusters on the steps of a popular grocery store in Kandy, for 
instance—most often it is men who travel considerable distances to do so. Said to be “doing 
business,” they take buses to areas all over Sri Lanka and, after spending the day selling on the 
streets or moving from shop to shop, stay the night in a rented room or at a local temple before 
returning to Atwaedagama or moving on to another town. “If we had a meter attached to our 
legs,” one young man said of the work, “it would explode!” 
Local Boundaries, Global Horizons 
There is another significant transformation that Atwaedagama has undergone in recent 
years that is worth highlighting in this introduction to the village insofar as it helps us to 
appreciate not only Piyumi’s and other area residents’ suspicions toward researchers such as 
myself, but also the efforts to which some in the village go to distance themselves from or 
downplay their engagement in hana work. Even while, by contrast to the situation in Redigama, 
the international market for their hana and paeduru-based items has contracted in relation to the 
local demand that the items enjoy, many in Atwaedagama have in a sense become more 
international. Since the early 1990s, a high proportion of the village’s population, and women in 
particular, have taken up employment as domestic laborers in the homes of families overseas, 
primarily in Lebanon, but also in Kuwait, Dubai, Saudi Arabia, Cyprus, Qatar, Israel, and 
Singapore. According to a former Grama Niladhari for the area, upwards of 75 percent of 
Atwaedagama’s population of adult women have been overseas at some point. I rarely met 
anyone in the village who did not report to have a close female relative who was abroad. 
Considering some of the ways in which this phenomenon has shaped Atwaedagama’s residents’ 
perceptions of themselves and the world around them can help us to not only make sense of the 
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wariness and sensitivity with which many of these individuals respond to scholars and students 
like myself, but also to appreciate why caste as a category of identification presently operates 
rather differently in Atwaedagama than it does in Redigama.  
There is a way in which boundaries seem to dissolve when it comes to talk about work 
abroad. My interlocutors in Atwaedagama would often use the geographically non-specific 
phrase “piTa rata” (abroad, or, literally, “outside the country”) when discussing their own or 
others’ time overseas, indicating a certain irrelevance as to one’s particular destination. 
Typically, after all, no one intends to stay abroad. Similarly, there is a sense in which, after one’s 
return to Sri Lanka, the social and geopolitical boundaries that carve up this small island seem 
less relevant. Vimala, 50, owns one of two small kades or shops in Atwaedagama. Her father, 
who had land in the village, brought her and her mother there when Vimala was just two months 
old. Now a mother of five, Vimala left Sri Lanka for the first time in 1990 when her children 
were small. Over a period of seven years, she spent time in Lebanon, then Saudi Arabia, and 
finally Kuwait. Two of her own daughters and one son are now also abroad. Another daughter 
sews hana purses in Atwaedagama while a second son works as a day laborer in housing 
construction. Sitting in her living room with me, my assistant, and a neighbor, a woman who had 
never been abroad, Vimala noted how different she found other countries to be and shared her 
observation that, when one returns home, one sees that everyone is “the same”: 
Now, look at Nuwara Eliya. You’ll see that all the people are the same [as we are]. All 
are one type. The only difference you might see is in the houses. Now, if you talk about 
the Sinhala people, we all speak Sinhala. There is no difference. If there is some kind of 
difference, the only way we would know is…You can’t see a difference… 
 
To Vimala and others with whom I spoke, life abroad facilitates a recognition of the sameness of 
all Sri Lankans (setting aside the crucial fact that, in these narratives, this “sameness” generally 
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refers to those Sri Lankans who are Sinhalese and Buddhist). While Vimala demonstrates some 
uncertainty toward the end of this observation when she indicates that in fact there might be 
“some kind of difference,” even if you can’t see it, she suggests that, at least ideally, the relevant 
horizon of difference becomes one that is national rather than sub-national. The flip side of this 
recognition is the frustration that boils over when one contrasts the local persistence of social 
boundaries with what one perceives as the irrelevance of categories of identification, and caste in 
particular, in other countries. Piyumi, mentioned above, has spent years in Singapore. As I note 
in Chapter 5, she stressed to me that the “real people” in whose homes she has worked as a 
domestic servant “don’t care about caste.” Likewise, Liyoni, 37, spent three years working in 
Cyprus so that she could build a home for her husband, a bus driver, and her two daughters. In a 
conversation that I detail further in Chapter 4, Liyoni remarked on what she views as a high caste 
preoccupation with caste status (though, notably, she never used the word caste, or kulaya). “I 
think this should change because we are all the same people, right? We are Buddhists, we are 
Sinhalese, we are all the same…Now, in other countries, what I saw is that all are the same 
people. They don’t have a jati problem or a religion problem or anything. All people are the 
same. It’s only here. And in India, too, right? In India, we also have it.”25 
 In subsequent chapters, I examine the reasons for and mechanics of the boundary 
maintenance processes that undercut this notion that “we are all the same.” Insofar as life abroad 
has for many in Atwaedagama resulted in a shift in the horizon of differences that (should) make 
a difference, this transformation may motivate the sentiments that residents of the village have, 
																																																								
25 Contrary to what one might expect, few of my interlocutors invoked a notion of Buddhist 
egalitarianism in lamenting caste. Far more common, as the ethnographic material throughout 
this dissertation makes clear, were invocations of a modern and developed economy premised 
upon individuated citizen-consumers.  
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for example, toward their representation in popular and scholarly accounts that accentuate their 
caste-based distinction from other Sinhalese (the topic of Chapter 3). Juxtaposed to the apparent 
boundarilessness of life abroad and the unified (Sinhalese, Buddhist) Sri Lanka that becomes, for 
some, a more salient vision following one’s return is the fact that, as the following chapters make 
clear, in and around Atwaedagama, social and geopolitical boundaries are often vigilantly 
policed and acutely felt. 
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Chapter 2 
Crafting Tradition 
 
In 2013, a representative of Sri Lanka’s National Craft Council (NCC) held a meeting in 
Atwaedagama’s Handicraft Training Center to discuss the government-sponsored distribution of 
work huts to artisans in the village. The budget for the project, pitched as part of an initiative to 
“strengthen traditional handicraft villages” and thereby promote a “cultural revival” in the 
country, had originally also provided for the distribution of sewing machines. By the time the 
project was implemented, however, the NCC had struck these from the plan. Although many in 
attendance at the meeting regard them as increasingly essential to their productive involvement 
in the industry for which Atwaedagama is known, the machines were deemed superfluous to the 
traditional industry that the NCC was interested in supporting. Pointing at a Singer sewing 
machine at the back of the room and then at a handloom nearer to himself, the representative 
who had organized the meeting admonished his disappointed audience, “the main requirement 
for this industry is not that machine; the main factor in this traditional industry is this machine, 
the one that is used to weave the mat.” Proceeding to the next item on the agenda, the 
construction of the work huts themselves, the question was raised as to whether the structures 
could be improved upon by recipients. Acknowledging that the project would provide materials 
for the work hut’s roof, floor, and pillars alone, the NCC officer replied, “Yes, you can even put 
up walls.” When a middle-aged man eagerly queried, “Can we use wattle and daub?” the 
representative gave a laugh and asked him in reply, “What, in this day and age you want to use 
wattle and daub?” “If you use cement blocks, that would be nice,” he explained, adding before 
the meeting concluded, “We can’t always harp on the traditional and just stay there and become 
stale.”  
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Identified as “traditional handicraft” producers in rural Kandy, the men and women with 
whom I am concerned in this dissertation bear something of a double burden. Charged with the 
(re)production of heritage claimed for the nation, they are compelled toward faithful adherence 
to an ever-shifting conceptualization of a tradition whose parameters are, in the end, arbitrarily 
defined. Subsequent chapters explore how this burden (and the contradictions that it entails) 
manifests in the lives of contemporary artisans. This chapter examines how this legacy was 
consolidated in the years immediately following Sri Lanka’s political independence in 1948 
when the task of identifying “the traditional” and truly “national” became central in efforts to 
preserve, protect, and develop what are typically referred to as the “traditional handicraft 
industries.” More specifically, it centers on the analysis of a compilation of papers presented at 
the University of Ceylon’s 1956 “Conference on Traditional Cultures in Ceylon,” a gathering 
prompted by UNESCO at a time when the organization had begun a concerted campaign toward 
the “protection of cultural heritage” as a central means of promoting “mutual understanding 
between nations’” (Blake 2000:61). Important elements of the discourse instantiated in these 
papers continue to reverberate in some of the most current Sri Lankan scholarship on what is 
today popularly referred to as “traditional knowledge (TK) and traditional cultural expressions 
(TCE).” Situating the conference in terms of broader ideological currents of early to mid-20th 
century Ceylon, I examine the tensions and contradictions that arise out of two discernible but 
interwoven projects that preoccupied the conference’s participants. These projects continue to 
influence the lives of the contemporary artisans with whom I am more generally concerned in 
this dissertation. As is the case with respect to the paradoxical practices (discursive and 
otherwise) of contemporary artisans and others considered in subsequent chapters, these tensions 
and contradictions signal points of articulation between ideological and practical entailments of, 
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among other things, a liberal market economy, caste-based hierarchy, and democratic 
egalitarianism. 
“Virtually all nationalisms,” Herzfeld reminds us, “are centrally concerned with purity 
and pollution,” and the flavor of nationalism that we encounter in these papers is no exception 
(Herzfeld 1997:71). The two projects preoccupying contributors to this 1956 gathering of 
scholars at the University of Ceylon are perhaps best conceived of as efforts at purification. 
Responding to the supposed juggernauts of Industrialization and Westernization, the authors of 
the papers considered here were centrally concerned with the identification of a national heritage 
that could effectively channel the spirit of a resilient (and only newly independent) country. The 
first project entailed in this effort was the discursive sanitization of “the local” of “the foreign.” 
Contributors to the 1956 conference engaged in the selective privileging of particular things and 
people as archetypal of the artistic and cultural heritage of the nation. As we will see, their 
narrative handling of “traditional arts and crafts,” or “traditional cultures,” as they were 
identified at the meeting, contributed to the privileging of a particular (Sinhala, Kandyan, 
Buddhist) form of identification at an early post-independence moment when, to quote Stanley 
Tambiah, “the voicing of…nationalist-Sinhalese-Buddhist claims reached a crescendo” 
(1986:70).  
The second project in which these conference participants engaged involved sanitizing 
the traditional-as-preservation-worthy of the non-traditional, or the traditional-as-antiquated. Put 
otherwise, it entailed articulating those traces of the past that, deemed palatable in a modern 
democratic present, allow the nation to “express its historicity at the same time that 
it…declare[s] its novelty, its freedom from History” (Duara 1995:30-31). While establishing a 
thread of historical continuity such that the antiquity of the “traditional cultures” could be 
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established, conference participants also advocated for the elimination of those things that, while 
apparently accessory to that antiquity, they regarded as anachronistic. Among these things that 
were seen to exist in but not properly belong to the present, caste was foremost. 
 If, to the extent that it succeeded, the first project reinforced the sense that it is Kandyan 
artisans who are ultimately responsible for the reproduction of national heritage and thereby 
consolidated the burden of such responsibility borne by the men and women we meet in 
subsequent chapters, the second project had its own consequences. As we will see in examining 
the contradictions that attend it, this latter effort not only figured artisans as largely incapable of 
determining what things from “the past” are acceptable in the present (handlooms and mud 
walls, for instance), but also reinforced a notion that, to the extent that caste-based identification 
has not been relegated to the past, continues to have implications for contemporary artisans: 
figured as averse to change, it is low caste individuals who are often portrayed as “clinging” to 
caste while the (majority high caste) world around them is ready to move on. 
*** 
The 1956 conference at the University of Ceylon was convened by UNESCO as part of a 
pan-Asia initiative to address the question of how, as one contributor put it, the “traditional 
cultures can be saved from industrialization” (Wijesekera 1956:18). That Sinhala nationalist 
sentiment and an ideological rejoinder to industrialization would converge on “traditional art and 
crafts” was in some respects over-determined in the moment. In the first place, an understanding 
of craft as the obvious and natural foil to modern industry was far from unprecedented in Ceylon. 
“[D]uring much of the colonial period,” Pfaffenberger argues, “[native Sri Lankan arts and 
industries] were viewed as only pale and pathetic imitations of their much more sophisticated 
Indian counterparts” (Pfaffenberger 1993:347). In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, however, 
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the mostly British planters in control of the country’s agricultural economic formation opposed 
investments in urban industry, and a new idealized vision of (rural) arts and crafts came to serve 
a purpose. Advocating investments in coconut, rubber, and tea, these planters cultivated a 
“profoundly bucolic ethos” both conducive to and augmented by an idealized discursive 
construction of small-scale “village industries” (Pfaffenberger 1993:352). As part of its 
ambitious Rubber Exhibition held in Kandy in 1906, for instance, the Ceylon Agricultural 
Society, founded by Ceylon Governor Sir Henry Blake in 1904, sponsored the first ever 
“exhibition of arts and crafts representative of the whole Island” (Wright 1907:307; Willis, 
Bamber & Denham 1906:226). In his remarks at the exhibition’s opening ceremony, Governor 
Blake called his audience’s attention to the structure within which they had convened, reflecting, 
“this beautifully decorated building has been erected simply by the labour of the ordinary 
Kandyan villager, without the assistance of an architect, without the drawing of a plan” (Willis et 
al. 1906:16). The building “arose as if by magic,” he added, and declared that he knew “of no 
country in which by the work of the ordinary villager without professional assistance anything 
like this could have been accomplished.” The effect of exhibiting this and other “gratifying 
evidence of the artistic feeling of the Kandyan people,” he hoped aloud, would go a long way 
toward “stimulating the revival of village industries that add so much to the comfort and the 
interest of a rural population” (Willis et al. 1906:16).  
Ananda Coomaraswamy, who had been charged with managing the Arts and Crafts 
exhibition for the Ceylon Agricultural Society, leveled a more pointed and forceful critique of 
industrialization in the handbook he authored to accompany the displays. Organizers of the 
Rubber Exhibition praised in general the “conservatism of the Kandyan,” whose architectural 
and artistic productions reportedly “expressed their national art and religion in the form 
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consecrated for them by ages” (Willis et al. 1906:7). Coomaraswamy’s vision for the Arts and 
Crafts exhibition went a step further. Displaying “craftsmen actually at work,” the exhibition was 
intended to convey the “real advantages of handwork” over the “establishment of factories with 
all of their attendant evils” (Anonymous 1906:11).  
At a moment when British administrators like E.B. Denham reported an “unprecedented 
increase” in the import of foreign and, namely, British goods (Jayawardena 2000:131-132), the 
exhibition was for Coomaraswamy not just an add-on to the agricultural showcase that served as 
its backdrop. Rather, it was an extension of a campaign against industrialization and, more 
specifically, a reigning desire for “machine made European goods” with which it was popularly 
believed Sinhalese crafts could not compete (Coomaraswamy 1904:15). Not long before the 
rubber exhibition, Coomaraswamy gave a lecture at the nearby Kandy Town Hall in which he 
not only reminded his audience, “[t]he Sinhalese have always been an essentially agricultural 
people,” but also lamented the degradation and in some cases complete “perishment” of 
Sinhalese “arts and crafts” due to their “contact with commercial and utilitarian ideals” (1904:1-
2). Denouncing what he viewed as the deplorable accumulation of “useless luxuries” and the 
most “tawdry of European wares,” Coomaraswamy sharply admonished the Sinhalese for 
making “no effort to keep up their crafts” by patronizing the local manufacturers of mats, 
brassware, and jewelry. To an essentialized image of “men who take only a pecuniary interest in 
the productions of their factories” (1904:17), he juxtaposed an equally one-dimensional 
representation of a Sinhalese craftsman who was “in no hurry and never I think worked over hard 
or over anxiously,” making “things well and handsomely and certainly with no lack of care and 
honesty” (Coomaraswamy 1904:2). To Coomaraswamy, Sinhalese purchasers bore ultimate 
responsibility for shielding local artisans from the devastation wrought by the “long arm of 
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commerce,” a threat he found in the increasing reliance upon imported aniline dyes in local 
textile production. 
Ironically, Coomaraswamy’s distinctly nationalist and romantic valorization of tradition 
accorded with the “bucolic ethos” (Pfaffenberger 1993:352) that colonial British planters were 
articulating at around the same time in resisting industrializing activities that would have 
interrupted the flow of profits in agriculture. His romanticized vision of the arts and crafts would 
also come to serve centrally in the anti-Western sentiment given full expression in the 1956 
conference papers considered here. It is important to note that there was no political movement 
leading up to Sri Lanka’s independence from the British in 1948. In large part, this had to do 
with the fact that the Sri Lankan bourgeoisie that emerged over the course of the 19th century 
was, as Kumari Jayawardena has described it, a “dependent” class—or a class whose “creation 
and continued existence was based on protection and opportunities provided by the colonial 
state” (Jayawardena 2000:vii). Failing to “attain that maturity and autonomy which was the 
hallmark of the bourgeoisie in countries where a development of industrial capitalism took 
place” (Jayawardena 2000:vii-viii), this class never amounted to the actively anti-imperial force 
which had in India helped to prompt a political independence movement. The emergence of 
overtly nationalist sentiments in early 20th century Ceylon was associated not with a mass 
political struggle against imperial rule, then, but with movements that were explicitly “cultural-
revivalist” in nature (Silva 1999:202; Spencer et al. 1990). The “whole ethos of assimilation and 
collaboration” associated with an “Anglicized elite” during the mid-19th to early 20th centuries 
helped to initiate “processes of resistance based on notions of cultural revivalism” (Jayawardena 
2000:248-9). The Ceylon Social Reform Society founded by Coomaraswamy in 1905, for 
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instance, was more concerned with “cultural and moral rather than directly political or 
constitutional” reform (Brown and Coomaraswamy 1999:70).  
The early 20th century discursive construction of craft as foil to not only industrialization 
but also the Anglicization associated with British imports thus gained a certain momentum in the 
decades leading up to independence and the 1956 conference. By the 1930s and 1940s, some of 
the most incisive expressions of antipathy toward “the West(ern)” saw in “Ceylonese arts and 
crafts” a barometric gauge for the strength of the nation. Soon after it published an article 
explicitly calling for a “Cultural Regeneration of the Sinhalese” (Gurusinghe 1936), for example, 
the journal Young Ceylon published a piece titled, “Soul of Lanka in Peril,” in which the author, 
after lamenting that the adoption of “Western manners, customs, and mode of life” was 
effectively “destroy[ing] the soul of the nation,” pointed to the “comforting revelation…that 
there is a gradual realization that imitation does not pay and that there is a slow revival in the 
interest in Ceylonese arts and crafts” (Pathmanabha 1940:60).  
Interest in such a revival culminated with the University of Ceylon’s conference on 
“traditional cultures” in March 1956. The real work entailed therein was a matter not so much of 
revival, per se, however, but more fundamentally of fashioning what Duara has called a 
“narrative of discent,” or a narrative that, in altering how the “boundaries of [a] community” are 
viewed, places certain “persons and groups associated with objects, acts, and ideas,” to invoke 
Williams, “at both a pragmatic and an ideological disadvantage” (Duara 1995:65; Williams 
1989:435). The concept of discent encapsulates the two primary projects that conference 
participants undertook, the first, we’ll recall, having to do with privileged difference, the second 
with the assertion of continuity with or inheritance from the past. Now, it would be misleading to 
suggest that the intention on the part of the conference participants was to contribute to the 
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practices of ethnic polarization that would soon engulf Sri Lanka in violence. As legal scholar 
Janet Blake points out, however, “the identification of cultural heritage is itself a political act” 
(Blake 2000:68). In this respect, the effort to devise an agenda around the mitigation of what 
conference participants viewed as industrialization’s tenaciously homogenizing effects—its 
attempt, as one phrased it, to reduce society to “one standardized drab pattern” (Wijesekera 
1956:19)— reinforced conceptual and practical bases for exclusionary processes of identification 
that helped sustain (and in turn be sustained by) the country’s thirty-plus-year inter-ethnic 
conflict. The reason for this is that the answer to industrialization, formulated as merely a 
contemporary instance of the change “humanity [has] always feared,” required an agenda 
centered on the articulation of something that, if not directly opposed to change, served at least 
superficially as its conceptual other (Wijesekera 1956:18). But if “tradition,” the something to 
which conference participants turned, was to somehow counter or ultimately evade the forces of 
industrialization, then the issue was a matter of not only discerning the social and geographic 
parameters of that tradition, but also of establishing its continuity with the past while admitting 
the transformation (and degradation) that necessitated its “revival.” In the following pages, I 
examine how conference participants tackled each of these tasks. In doing so, I consider how the 
narratives of discent that they articulated were carefully fashioned in terms of historically salient 
social distinctions (foreign/local, urban/rural, elite/common) such that the links between certain 
forms of identification (Sinhala as Buddhist as Ceylonese) were naturalized while others (Tamil 
as Ceylonese) were muted if not rendered wholly unthinkable. While marginalizing people and 
practices deemed non-Sinhala, such narratives also served to consolidate a central feature of the 
burden now born by Sinhala artisans in Kandy to produce heritage for a nation in which they too 
face marginalization as “low caste.” 
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The Elevation of Kandy 
Fredrik Barth once observed how “much of the activity of political innovators is 
concerned with the codification of idioms,” or “the selection of signals for identity and the 
assertion of value for these cultural diacritica, and the suppression or denial of relevance for 
other cultural differentiae” (Barth 1969:35). In this section, I will examine how scholars 
contributing to the conference on Traditional Cultures in Ceylon deployed a variety of rhetorical 
strategies by which, through the selective nomination of objects and people (Kandyan, Sinhalese) 
as insignia of “the nation,” they accomplished precisely such codification. Before doing so, 
however, and to appreciate the broader implications of this codification, I want to begin by 
sketching a few key features of the moment in which the conference occurred. As Frederick 
Cooper argues, “the ‘political fiction’ of the nation…can crystallize, at certain moments, as a 
powerful compelling reality” (Cooper 2005:63). Understanding how the “fiction” of national 
craft as rural, traditional and Sinhalese came to be requires at least a superficial understanding of 
the landscape against which the legacy of “traditional handicrafts” was consolidated. 
There are of course a vast number of details that one could amass to capture how social 
and political currents sweeping through Ceylon when the conference was held would have lent 
not only a particular significance to the papers presented therein, but also a particular salience to 
the ideas that the conference participants voiced. In addition to marking the 2500th anniversary of 
the Buddha Jayanthi (the birthday of Lord Buddha), the year of the conference, 1956, was also 
one in which Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike was carried to electoral victory by “a wave 
of Buddhist nationalism” (Spencer 1990: 2). Following the passage of legislation to make 
Sinhala the official language of the country, this nationalist sentiment fueled (and was further 
fueled by) communal rioting between Tamils and the Sinhalese majority (Spencer 1990: 2).  
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A tumultuous economy compounded the antagonisms, increasingly understood in ethno-
linguistic terms, plaguing newly independent Ceylon. Despite a short-lived Korean War boom in 
economy from 1950 to 1951, the years between independence (1948) and the conference (1956) 
were characterized by rising unemployment and increasing financial pressure due largely to 
“sub-imperialist” policies that, under the guise of market liberalism, continued to maintain 
British colonial economic interests after independence (Pfaffenberger 1993:351). Emerging in its 
newly independent form as a “dependent economy” (Tambiah 1986: 83), Ceylon was a country 
whose importation of roughly 66 percent of its grains (Moore 1989: 185-186) and whose 
“traditional patterns of export of cash crops such as tea, rubber, and coconut [were] reducing it to 
a peripheral status under conditions of worsening terms of trade” (Tambiah 1986: 83). 
Paving the way for what is commonly known as The Sinhala Only Act (officially the 
Official Language Act), grievances around rising unemployment converged with a general 
realization that “a minority elite of less than 10% of the population practically ruled the country 
and monopolized the prestigious occupations on the basis of its knowledge of and education in 
the English language” (Tambiah 1986:73-74). Given its relationship to educational and 
occupational access and achievement, language had itself come to be viewed as “an economic 
issue” (Jayawardena 1985:64). Debate surged over which of the mother tongues, Tamil or 
Sinhala, should take the place of English as the national language. With Bandaranaike’s election 
in the year of the conference, the country not only settled on the latter with the passage of the 
Sinhala Only Act, but also saw the reversal of the liberal market policies that the ruling party had 
continued when it took over government control from the British. A long period (until 1977) of 
expressly “statist, anti-capitalist economic policies” began under Bandaranaike’s leadership 
(Moore 1997:62). By this time, Chauvinist Sinhala Buddhist propaganda, which focused in prior 
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iterations on “alien bureaucrats, traders and workers said to be denying the Sinhalese their just 
rights and opportunities for trade and employment,” was “rediscovering” that it was not the 
British but rather the Sri Lankan Tamils who were the “‘traditional enemy’ of the Sinhalese” 
(Jayawardena 1985:59). As we will see shortly, the narrative of craft consolidated at this moment 
became something of a pivot in this “rediscovery.” 
 The conference was therefore held at a highly charged economic and political moment. 
Bearing these features of this broader moment in mind as we proceed, it is useful to begin by 
highlighting that the event’s title suggested a socially and geographically expansive 
consideration of “Traditional Cultures in Ceylon,” a potentially promising sign at a time when 
ethnic tensions were running high. And yet, reproducing a pervasive understanding of the region 
as the last holdout against colonial rule and by extension the culturally unadulterated heartland of 
the Sinhalese (Pieris 1956:17,2)—an understanding of great consequence at the moment—in the 
context of the meeting “culture” was semantically “restricted to the traditional arts and crafts, 
with special reference to the Kandyan provinces.”26 
Echoing those earlier anxieties associated with Sinhala Buddhist nationalism about the 
danger posed by the “Christianising” influence of British administrators and other foreigners 
(Jayawardena 1985:59), most contributors to the 1956 conference took the opportunity in the 
papers they presented to vent anxieties concerning the distinction between the foreign and the 
local. Reminiscent of what Abigail McGowan describes as the late 19th and early 20th century 
																																																								26 Little over a decade later, in her inimitable survey of The Kandyan Kingdom, Lorna Srimathie 
Dewaraja reinforces and helps us to appreciate the reasoning for this understanding of Kandy as 
the site of pure Sinhalese artistic traditions. By the close of the eighteenth century, she writes, 
“Kandy had become a definite cultural zone with its own art and architecture, arts and crafts, 
dance and music. Any form of artistic expression that has survived in Sinhala society today owes 
its origin to or has derived inspiration from Kandy” (1972: 9). 
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“slippage” in India between “crafts” and “national culture and history” rendering the threat of the 
Western influence on the former all the more “worrisome,” discerning the “purely indigenous” 
art and craft forms from those believed to be contaminated by “the foreign” was a central 
undertaking of the occasion (McGowan 2009:105). In accordance with the popular sentiment 
that helped to bring Prime Minister Bandaranaike into office that year, it was the threat of all 
things European, and things English in particular, to which many of the participating scholars 
directed themselves.  
Signaling his dismay over a recent trend to render ersatz “nineteenth century European 
water-colours” in temples where one once found “the ‘old-fashioned’ traditional murals,” for 
instance, sociologist Ralph Pieris asserted in his contribution to the conference that there is 
“ample evidence of external influence and uncritical innovation giving rise to artistic distortion 
and deterioration” (Pieris 1956:4). The matter at hand as far as conference participants was 
concerned, however, was not merely the “deterioration” of “traditional” forms, but also a more 
general onslaught against the “national culture” perpetrated by a small, Anglicized elite. The 
remarks, for instance, of Ediweera Sarachchandra were particularly pointed in this regard. Just 
eight months after the conference, Sarachchandra’s would become a household name in Sri 
Lanka following the debut of his “epoch-making,” rural folk drama-inspired play, Maname 
(Kirinde 2016). Born Weditantirige Eustace Reginald de Silva in the southern coastal town of 
Galle in 1914, he was the son of a postmaster father and devout Wesleyan Methodist mother 
(The Continuing Enigma 2012). Exposed by his “family of devout Christians…to the English 
language and western music,” Sarachchandra is said to have “rejected his early Christian cum 
western identity” when, as a young scholar, he became “caught in the ferment of anti-colonial 
nationalism and Buddhist revivalism” (Obeyesekere 2014). A student of Pali, Sanskrit, and 
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Sinhala, he wrote in his contribution to the conference that the 1956 “democratic move to give 
Sinhalese its proper place in the national life has created among the English-educated minority a 
psychology of self-defense, and their attitude to the national culture has turned from being a 
negative and cynical one, to an attitude of active antagonism” (Sarathchandra 1956:103; Kirinde 
2016). 
Conference participants like Pieris and Sarathchandra were in part responding, as 
Bandaranaike and his supporters were, to features of the economic landscape described above, a 
landscape that would by the 1960s give way to rampant inflation and the implementation of 
protective tariffs in the face of a massive shortage of foreign exchange (Wijesinghe 1976:7; 
Pfaffenberger 1993:350). In the early 1950s, the Monetary Board of Ceylon’s newly established 
Central Bank warned that the country “not only did not reduce, it ever increased its spending on 
imports as its export income fell and prices of imports rose” (Wijesinghe 1976:7-8). 
Pfaffenberger has argued that the mid-1950s saw the rise, epitomized in the work and writing of 
Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement founder A.T. Ariyaratne, of a “reconstitution narrative” that 
“rejects capital-intensive, Western-style, and urban-based industrialization altogether in favor of 
labor-intensive, Buddhist-inspired, and village-based development using ‘appropriate’ small-
scale technologies” (Pfaffenberger 1993:364). According to the narrative espoused by 
Bandaranaike’s party supporters, “the colonial value system and those who ape it” were 
regrettable for measuring “‘individual success…by power, wealth, and knowledge of 
techniques,’ while ‘character and virtue are of no account’” (Pfaffenberger 1993:364).  
One the one hand, the conceptualization of the “foreign” at the conference included those 
things against which Sinhala Buddhist nationalists had focused past energies—things English, 
namely. On the other hand, and in keeping with the “rediscovery” in “the chauvinist propaganda 
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of the Sinhala Buddhists” of Sri Lankan Tamils as a “traditional enemy of the Sinhalese” 
(Jayawardena 1985:59), in the promotion of the local and the rural-based, the antipathy that 
conference participants expressed toward things English emerged along the lines of ethnicity and 
class.  
With respect to the first line along which conference participants leveled their criticism 
against what many saw an English-educated elite, there was little in the conference to suggest an 
explicitly anti-Tamil sentiment. The equation of the “national culture” with what were believed 
to be identifiably Sinhalese arts and practices, however, as we see in Sarachchandra’s quote 
above, was reinforced by contributors’ not only setting the “local” in opposition to the English 
“foreign,” but also denying its equation with that which could be identified as Tamil. This trend 
is significant given that a “disproportionate number of [the] Anglicized elite” (Peebles 2006:7) 
with whose “artificial bi-culturality” (Pieris 1956:9) the authors took issue were identified as 
Tamil.  
At a time therefore when, as Tambiah reminds us, Tamils more so than Sinhalese were 
associated with things English—English language, English education, etc.—the subtle discursive 
handling of the unique threat posed by “European culture” in the conference papers was of some 
consequence (Tambiah 1986:78). Remarking on this threat, for instance, Lecturer of Education 
J.E. Jayasuriya cited the failure of the “Portuguese, the Dutch and the English…to satisfy the 
socio-psychological conditions for integration with the indigenous cultures” (Jayasuriya 
1956:65). He noted that whereas certain of “the Hindu-Dravidian” cultural “elements that 
entered from outside lost their foreignness in the process of entering, so much so that they 
became an integral part of Sinhalese culture,” identifiably European cultural elements were so 
alien as to be unable to “infiltrate to the level of the common man” (Jayasuriya 1956:65-66). 
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Notably, while the impossibility of integration with the “indigenous” and “traditional cultures” 
was a foregone conclusion with respect to the European “elements,” it was also only insofar as 
what were identified as Hindu-Dravidian elements became absorbed by Sinhalese culture that 
they were rendered “local” and therefore innocuous. Not all such elements passed muster in this 
regard. In a paper on “Sinhalese Music and Minstrelsy,” P. Dolapihilla explained that while 
“conquerors like Elara must have brought to Anuradhapura Indian Music and Indian 
Instruments,” in the end “a conqueror’s gifts are thrown away when reconquest takes place” 
(Dolapihilla 1956:39). Offering the thappu drum as an example, he related that he had “never 
seen a villager having anything to do with [it],” the explanation given that “eka demala vadak” 
(“that’s a Tamil job”). While concluding from this example that the Sinhalese are “satisfied with 
what instruments they had inherited,” Dolapahilla nonetheless lamented that “change is coming 
over us with a kind of education that had been arranged to welcome foreign things” (Dolapihilla 
1956:39). 
The conference papers thus restated a notion articulated by E.B. Denhman during his 
tenure as Superintendent of the 1911 census, that “of the races which are the most numerous in 
Ceylon—Sinhalese, Tamils, Moors, Malays, Burghers, and British—only [the Sinhalese] can 
regard Ceylon as the home of the nation and the shrine of its national traditions” (Denham 
1911:194). The selective elevation of Kandyan crafts in particular was further justified by the 
representation of Kandy as the culturally unadulterated heartland of the Sinhalese.27 T.L. Green, 
one of two non-Ceylonese contributors to the conference, questioned this ethnic and 
geographical delimitation, writing, “let me point out that the cultures of Ceylon have several 																																																								27 As Mick Moore (1992) has observed more recently, “the Kandyans have tended to represent 
themselves as the sole bearers of authentic Sinhalese tradition in the face of a long assault by 
outside influences of all kinds” (33). 
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phases and that, in restricting attention to that which is not merely Sinhalese, but Kandyan, you 
are neglecting much of your own culture” (Green 1956:95). His, however, was a lone voice. 
Generally, others echoed Colonial Secretary James Emerson Tennent’s much earlier observation 
that “‘from the earliest ages the inhabitants of these lofty ranges have been distinguished by their 
patriotism and ardent resistance to every foreign invader’” (Tennent 1860:11). For example, 
P.E.E. Fernando, then a Professor in the Department of Sinhala (and soon-to-be director of the 
Department’s newly created “Swabasha [mother tongue] Office”), concluded in his conference 
paper on weaving, lacquer work, and metal work, “just as Kandy has remained the last 
stronghold of the Sinhalese till 1815, so has it remained the last stronghold of arts and crafts of 
the Sinhalese up to the present day” (Fernando 1956:56). Arthur Molamuré reinforced this 
assessment, explaining that while “for the traditional arts of the country” the “consequences [of 
British colonial rule] have been calamitous,” the Kandyan dancing with which he was concerned 
had “retained its fundamental character and its basic purity of technique” because it had been 
“comparatively immune from foreign influences” (Molamuré 1956:25). Poet, literary scholar and 
art historian Siri Gunasinghe agreed. Having defended his doctoral thesis, “Technique of Indian 
Painting According to Silpa Texts,” at the Sorbonne just one year prior, in 1955, Gunasinghe 
argued the prudence of setting aside the painting practices of Ceylon’s Low Country since, 
unlike what he perceived to be the case with those associated with Kandy, the “overwhelming 
popularity of a new school of temple painting that has been inspired to the last detail by 
European methods and techniques” had left them “altogether dead” (Gunasinghe 1956:47).28  
																																																								28 To gesture toward the contemporary and popular resonance of this perceived difference, 
Gunasekera has remarked more recently that “[i]t is their lesser exposure to Western European 
influence that constitutes the basis of Kandyan feelings of superiority vis-à-vis Low Country 
Sinhalese. Although the latter live in a more commercialized society and are in general wealthier 
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The conference participants thus confirmed the “local,” “indigenous,” and “traditional” as 
referring exclusively to the “arts and crafts” considered identifiably Sinhalese and Kandyan. 
They were also keen to stress that it was the rural-dwelling “common man” rather than the 
urban-dwelling elite with whom they were associated. In the years following independence, it 
was not the working classes who retaliated most fervently against the economic and political 
privilege enjoyed by the English-educated and westernized in Colombo. Rather, it was what 
Jonathan Spencer has dubbed an “indigenous élite,” a “Sinhala-speaking, non-westernized class” 
of writers, journalists, monks, minor public and private sector employees, small-time traders, 
ayurvedic physicians, teachers and students to whom “the ideals of Sinhala Buddhist 
nationalism” had strong appeal (Spencer 35; Jayawardena 1985:64). Motivated by sentiments 
that also propelled Bandaranaike to power in the same year, and despite most having been at 
least partly educated in England, then, the conference participants channeled the nationalist 
impulses of a “Sinhala-Buddhist revival” generally “hostile to the spread of a ‘Western’ style of 
life” (Tambiah 1986:69). Like Colombo born and Oxford educated Bandaranaike, whose rise to 
power was facilitated in part by “playing on the traditionalist sentiments of the mass of the 
people” (Jiggins 1979: 10), and like the relatively new rural and Sinhala-educated intelligentsia 
“that would in time speak on behalf of the village fold from whose ranks they had sprung” 
(Tambiah 1986:69; See also Gunasinghe 2007), scholars at the conference bolstered their 
oppositional stance toward what they deemed the English-educated elite through a 
representational claim on behalf of a purportedly national “common man.” Evoking the figure 
Bandaranaike would conjure less than a year later in his University of Ceylon Convocation 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
and more sophisticated, the Kandyans claim superiority as the proud upholders of Sinhalese 
customs, traditions and religion within the Kandyan kingdom” (Gunasekera 1994:9). 
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Address, “The Age of the Common Man” (Jiggins 1979:13), schoolteacher and principal cum 
professor of Education Professor J.E. Jayasuriya reflected that, unlike those hailing from the 
“upper and upper-middle classes,” the “common man…accepts his cultural heritage in its 
wholeness” (Jayasuriya 1956:65). The son of a postmaster and born in a rural village in southern 
Sri Lanka, the University of London educated Jayasuriya explained that, “At the level of the 
common man…there was a total failure in cultural communication [with the English] and it is 
therefore not surprising that there was no cultural assimilation or integration” (Jayasuriya 
1956:66).29  
In these respects, Jayasuriya and his co-participants articulated a vision of what they 
hoped would ultimately be a collectively shepherded national heritage, and they had at least 
attempted to convey an image of this heritage as purified of any “foreign” (non-Sinhalese) 
elements. There was another and arguably more formidable task ahead of them, however. 
Jayasuriya’s professed faith in the “common man’s” wholehearted acceptance of “his cultural 
heritage” was contradicted by his anxious admission that, “in his desire to emulate and identify 
himself with the upper classes, [the common man] began to neglect and to be ashamed of his 
traditional culture and to practice it less and less with the passing of years” (Jayasuriya 1956:66). 
The problem that Jayasuriya identified gestured to a larger one whose remedy also absorbed the 
attention of his fellow conference participants. To remedy this neglect and, more generally, to 
make sense of their somewhat urgent cries for the preservation of the “traditional cultures,” 
Jayasuriya and his colleagues had to establish the antiquity of this heritage and, at the same time, 
allow for changes that would be consistent with the promises of democratic egalitarianism. In 
																																																								29 http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article-
details&code_title=97904 
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other words, they had to discern a strand of continuity between past and present while admitting 
the change that had motivated the conference and justified scholarly intervention in the first 
place. This entailed the identification of certain phenomena—caste-based identification foremost 
among them—as elements of a past that, while evidently continuing in the present, were better 
left behind. 
It is worth reiterating that UNESCO initially called for the conference in a climate of 
alarmist apprehension over the industrialization-driven plummeting “standards of traditional 
culture” in South and Southeast Asia (Wijesekera 1956:15). Participant Nandadeva Wijesekera, 
anthropologist, Commissioner of the Official Languages Department, and future President of the 
Sri Lanka Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society (Spencer 1990:198), therefore noted that a central 
objective of the meeting should be the generation of suggestions as to how the country’s 
“traditional cultures could be studied, preserved, evaluated and attuned to the life of a changing 
modern society” (Wijesekera 1956:15).30 
In striking what was ultimately an uneasy conceptual balance between the kind of change 
associated with “the modern” and the kind of stability associated with “the traditional,” 
conference participants relied upon a variety of rhetorical strategies. In the remaining pages of 
this chapter, I consider these strategies while highlighting parallels between certain contributions 
to the 1956 Conference on Traditional Cultures and ones made to a more recent meeting in the 
country, the 2013 Regional Seminar on Traditional Knowledge and Traditional Cultural 
																																																								30	 Wijesekera, whose PhD thesis, “Early Sinhalese Painting,” would be published in 1959 by 
Calcutta University, was also a nephew by marriage of the prestigious statesman, DB Jayatilaka, 
“the undisputed lay leader of the Buddhist movement” and leader of the Ceylon National 
Congress, the nationalist party whose “politicians gained an easy domination over the new 
administration established under the Donoughmore constitution” (K.M. De Silva, A History of 
Sri Lanka, 430).	
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Expressions of South Asia. Convened by the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC), the seminar was motivated by anxieties that were posed in remarkably similar 
language to those articulated by participants in the 1956 conference. In the words of the SAARC 
Cultural Centre’s director, G.L.W. Gunasinghe, the “traditional knowledges” with which the 
seminar was concerned and that are “practiced by the indigenous communities face a threat in 
the modern world due to the influence of modernization and globalization” (SAARC Cultural 
Centre, Sri Lanka 2013:v). Echoing the angst over industrialization driving the 1956 conference, 
Gunasinghe portrayed the urgency of the matter thus: “Heterogeneity which had been an 
essential component of the South Asian traditions and cultures is now being subjected to change 
with the extensive reliance on scientific knowledge and homogenization,” and “traditional 
knowledge systems are facing the threat of extinction” (SAARC Cultural Centre, Sri Lanka 
2013:v). 
Establishing Continuity 
 In carrying out the second project outlined above, the sanitization of the traditional-as-
preservation-worthy of the non-traditional, or the traditional-as-antiquated, conference 
participants sought to articulate that strand of continuity joining the past and the present while at 
the same time allowing for (or admitting) the change(s) that justified their intervention in the first 
place.  In this section, I examine the contradictions that resulted from their doing so to highlight 
the ways in which the politics of the present infused this post-independence consolidation of the 
traditional craft narrative. As we will see in later chapters, contemporary artisans in Sri Lanka 
continue to encounter these contradictions as they go about their lives.   
Advocates for “traditional” cultures, conference participants were quick in many 
instances to condemn what they viewed as an unfortunate preoccupation with the “new” or 
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“modern.”  In a notable inversion of the statement made by the NCC officer whose words 
introduce this chapter, for instance, Ralph Pieris noted that, since he and his colleagues were “no 
longer troubled by any alleged chasm between East and West,” it is “no longer necessary to harp 
on the necessity for innovation and novelty in order to revive interest in the arts which are 
supposedly ‘dead’” (Pieris 1956:5-6). 31 In fact, as his colleague Wijesekera would ruefully 
observe, it was precisely the beguilement of the “new” that had led Ceylon’s urban-dwelling 
populace—and the “elite” element of that populace, in particular—astray from their “traditional 
cultures.” In periods of foreign conquest, he argued, “the people in cities benefited by an 
immediate change” by taking advantage of “new processes, pleasures and advantages.” In doing 
so, and in contrast to the inhabitants of rural areas, they “sacrificed their culture and paid for it by 
loss of national conscience” (Wijesekera 1956:20).  
While they readily conveyed their disdain for an uninhibited fascination with the “new,” 
it is crucial to point out that conference participants were loath to deny or decry change entirely. 
On the one hand, there were phenomena in the present that they, like many of their 
contemporaries, viewed as anachronistic and better left behind. “In Ceylon today,” as Pieris 
wrote, “few would favour a wholesale reversion to the old order of society,” and certain practices 
historically associated with certain of the “arts and crafts”—those pertaining to “caste,” “magic,” 
and “superstition” foremost among them—had “few defenders now” (Pieris 1956 8). Caste in 
particular was seen as out of place in “modern democratic conditions” and, while there were 
some who attributed a certain preservation of “something of the [arts’] old vitality” to the 
“continued patronage” (Sarathchandra 1956:100) that artisans once enjoyed under a highly 																																																								31	Two years later, Peiris was appointed Associate Research Officer to the UNESCO Research 
Centre for Social and Economic Development in Southern Asia, and, nine years later, became 
UNESCO’s Delhi-Based Regional Social Science Advisor.	
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regimented system of caste-based service tenure (a notion voiced by some even today), the more 
prevalent opinion was that “the survival and development of some of the arts and most of the 
crafts” required that “practice on an exclusively occupational or caste basis should be replaced 
by practice on a wider basis by all segments of society” (Jayasuriya 1956:69). On the other hand, 
there were also changes and conveniences from which it was assumed that few would willingly 
abstain. As Ralph Pieris put it, “a money economy has come to stay, and we have accepted 
without reserve the cinema, the airplane, electricity, printing, and the radio” (Pieris 1956:8).  
To the conference participants, therefore, the task at hand was not the “futile” one of 
“resuscitating the various art-forms in their pristine purity, uncontaminated by external 
influences” (Pieris 1956:5). “The revival of the indigenous arts and crafts,” Jayasuriya argued, 
“does not…imply a cultural orthodoxy that builds a fortress round itself and resists the impact of 
the outside world” (Jayasuriya 1956:68). In other words, conference participants were not 
interested in claiming an essential sameness between the arts and crafts of the present and those 
of an imagined point of origin. Had they done so, in fact, they might have signaled their own 
redundancy as persons committed to the cause of preservation central to what was emerging as a 
“global norm of heritage governance” (Taylor 2009:41). At the same time, as we will see, they 
also carved out a rhetorical space to deem themselves and others “competent to express opinions 
on such matters” (Fernando 1956:57) and to discern the aesthetic and social parameters of the 
“traditional.” While not claiming that the arts and crafts of the present were identical to those of 
the past, in other words, they sought to arrogate to themselves the authority not only to designate 
which of the contemporary arts and crafts maintained an authentic continuity with those of the 
past they envisioned, but also to both discern and explain the basis of that continuity.  
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Of the contradictions thrown up by conference participants’ efforts to carve out this 
rhetorical space, one the greatest stemmed from the simultaneity of, on the one hand, an 
allowance for change, and, on the other, a sense of urgency conveyed in the assertion that “there 
is not much time to lose” (Wijesekera 1956:23). This sense of urgency is echoed in the 
introductory note of the 2013 SAARC Centre seminar, whose author urges his readers that, if 
“we” don’t seize the present opportunity to safeguard “Traditional Knowledge” and “Traditional 
Cultural Expressions” from “the influences of globalization, we will not be able to pass down 
this heritage to our next generations” (SAARC Cultural Centre, Sri Lanka 2013:1). In the 
conference papers, there on the one hand a seemingly relaxed acknowledgement that “change 
happens,” and that it is only natural and to be expected that the “traditional cultures” will not 
look the same tomorrow as they do today. On the other hand, there is a sense that something 
must be done immediately to safeguard them.  
One attempt at papering over this contradiction and maintaining a sense of essential 
timelessness in the arts and crafts centered on invoking a “dynamism” or “flexibility” inherent to 
“art and crafts, music and dance,” and other “traditional cultural elements” (Wijeskera 1956:17). 
In a chapter titled, “Dynamism of Traditional Cultures,” N.D. Wijesekera noted that it was in 
part the task of the conference participants to consider how “the traditional cultures” could be 
“attuned to the life of a changing modern society” (Wijesekera 1956:15). Without offering 
concrete examples, Wijesekera argued that there is a praiseworthy “dynamism” inherent to the 
process of transmission of “traditional cultures” such that the “irrelevant and the non-essential 
elements” are naturally “sifted and left behind in [the] process of time” while the “main current 
of values” is maintained (Wijesekera 1956:16). Contradicting this dynamism, however, he noted 
that it is because “the rural folk are averse to change” that the “traditional cultures” can “take 
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shelter in [their] heart and mind” and thus be “preserved” (Wijesekera 1956:20). Wijesekera’s 
description conjures what is effectively the “double-edged sword” of “tradition” (Herzfeld 
2004:5). In his formulation, their alleged reluctance to change makes rural masses the guardians 
of traditional culture. At the same time, it is this supposed reluctance to change that is believed to 
render them unqualified to participate in deliberations regarding the “modernization” of those 
things that they have unselfconsciously preserved. While these cultures are said to be 
characterized by an inherent dynamism, it is precisely the “rural folk’s” supposed aversion to 
change that leaves “genuine lovers of culture” responsible for leading the way in striking a 
balance between “change and stability.” Ultimately, in other words, Wijesekera arrogates to 
more worldly individuals such as himself the responsibility for helping these “cultures” avoid the 
two unwelcome conditions between which, according to his logic, they would otherwise be 
forced to choose: “primitiveness” on the one hand, and “total extinction” on the other. Herein 
lies the contradiction in his narrative: Despite arguing that there is inherent “dynamism” of 
“traditional cultures,” Wijesekera suggests that it is in fact up to newly trained “students of 
culture” to conduct “field studies” to arrive at an understanding of how, with their aid, the 
traditional cultures can be “attuned” to “modern society” and “preserved” amidst the shocks of 
industrialization (Wijesekera 1956:15).  
Jayasuriya echoed the contradiction in his colleague’s message. He argued that, in 
“adapting” to the present moment, the “arts and crafts that live must continually expand in new 
directions” and that this “expansion must come as a spontaneous growth of its active practice” 
(Jayasuriya 1956:68). At the same time, his suggestion of this capacity for such “spontaneity” is 
contradicted by his assertion that what was called for was a deliberate “psychological 
engineering” that would effect a “dynamic change in [people’s] values, attitudes and activities” 
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(Jayasuriya 1956:64). Such engineering was particularly necessary, Jayasuriya argued, when it 
came to those practices, such as pottery and weaving, that, because they “still have an 
occupational or caste association,” do not enjoy the regard enjoyed by those practices, such as 
painting and music, that are viewed as “cultural activities” and “considered embellishments in 
high society” (Jayasuriya 1956:68-69). Again, we find a tension between what is claimed on the 
one hand to be an inherent capacity for creative adaptability (“dynamism”) and on the other the 
need for proactive manipulation to ensure “survival.” This tension reverberates in the framework 
set forth for the SAARC Cultural Center’s 2013 seminar. The “Traditional Knowledge,” we are 
told by the Center’s Deputy Director of Research, Sanjay Garg, despite being “old,” are “highly 
adaptive, creative and even novel” (Garg 2015: xviii). As in the “traditional cultures” formulated 
by Wijesekera, there is a supposed dynamism or adaptive flexibility at work in the “Traditional 
Knowledge” and “Traditional Cultural Expressions” to which Garg abstractly refers. Yet both 
Garg and G.L.W. Samarasinghe, the SAARC Cultural Centre’s Director, also tell us that with 
“modernization” and “growing globalization and homogenization, the [Traditional Knowledge] 
systems and [Traditional Cultural Expressions] are facing the threat of extinction” (Garg 
2015:xvii; SAARC 2013:v). The analytical quandary that results from these formulations is as 
follows: How does one ascertain whether a transformation in these “traditional knowledges” is 
the (implicitly commendable) consequence of its adaptive (“dynamic”) quality or, rather, the 
(implicitly unfortunate and perhaps even deplorable) outcome of its being “subjected to change” 
(SAARC 2013:v)? How, in other words, does one recognize a given vector of transformation as 
positive or negative?  
We find both our answer to these questions and the deeply political nature of efforts to 
define the “traditional” in “traditional arts and crafts” in a closely related strategy upon which the 
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1956 conference participants also relied: the simultaneous essentialization and abstraction of the 
“traditional arts and crafts” and “traditional cultural expressions” from contemporary social life. 
The strategy is not unique. As Néstor García Canclini has convincingly observed with respect to 
a post-revolutionary project in Mexico to construct the notion of “a unified nation” in the face of 
socio-political discord, “most of the books on traditional handicrafts, fiestas, poetry, and music 
enumerate and exalt popular products without locating them in the logic of present social 
relations” (Canclini 1995:151). Chatterjee relates a similar occurrence in his discussion of Indian 
“nationalism as a project of mediation,” noting how “the popular,” in being “sanitized, carefully 
erased of all marks of vulgarity, coarseness, locality, and sectarian identity,” becomes “the 
repository of natural truth, naturally self-sustaining and therefore timeless” (Chatterjee 1993:72-
73). Venkatesan’s ethnographic monograph on Indian artisans similarly demonstrates how such 
makers, even while they secure a certain kind of agency through their association with a 
conceptualization of “traditional Indian craft,” are nonetheless positioned in ways that abstract 
them from larger social contexts” (Venkatesan 2009:79).  
In the case considered here, beyond associating the “traditional handicrafts” with a 
“Common Man” and calling for their being “uprooted” from their caste associations and 
practiced “at all levels in the community” (Jayasuriya 1956:69), conference participants also 
referred to an immaterial essence contained within such “arts and crafts.” A “test” of 
traditionality, as Pieris saw it, in fact, was one that established anonymity, since the traditional 
crafts were ultimately “impersonal, the manifestation of an experience and feeling which is older 
and deeper than the emotion or skill of the individual artist” (Pieris 1956:2). Along similar lines, 
Wijesekera observed that the nation’s transcendent “eternal values,” or “aesthetic values, human 
feelings and the national genius,” would be stripped of their “eternal strength” were it not for the 
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fact that people require the “spiritual food” contained within arts and crafts (Wijesekera 
1956:19). We find comparable language in Sinharaja Tammita-Delgoda’s recent, florid musings 
on Kandyan dance. As its “foundations have eroded,” he argues, “the nature of this art form has 
changed” and, “like all traditional forms of cultural expression, it is in danger of losing its 
identity and perhaps its very essence” (SAARC Cultural Centre, Sri Lanka 2013:75). 
Invocations of an “essence” or “nature” contained within “traditional arts and crafts” or 
“traditional cultural expressions” are apparently intended to serve as a check on the logical 
conclusion to which an unbridled “dynamism” within them could lead—they might end up 
looking like just about anything. At the same time, however, such invocations raise another 
problem: if, despite their “flexibility” and “dynamism,” there is as these scholars claimed 
something essential about the traditional arts and crafts, how and, more importantly, by whom, is 
it to be identified and preserved?  
Ultimately, the 1956 conference papers suggested, it is up to those who have a “feeling 
for the arts” to both discern the traditional and to moderate change. Those with such a feeling 
unequivocally did not include contemporary artists and craftspeople. Actual practitioners of the 
“traditional arts and crafts” were charged with a “laissez-faire orientation” that had led them to 
uninhibited and ““indiscriminate experimentation and innovation” (Pieris 1956:4). In Pieris’s 
estimation, it was precisely such “innovation” that had led to the fact that, while “the exorcists’s 
masks are rapidly finding their way into ethnological museums…only poor imitations are now 
produced for sale to tourists as ‘curios’” (Pieris 1956:4). It was also such a “laissez-faire 
orientation” that had led to what conference participants agreed was the regrettable instruction of 
Kandyan dance in girls’ schools: “Rather than drill girls in a dance-form suited to the male, it is 
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preferable to introduce the South Indian bharata natyam which evidence indicates was anciently 
practiced by women in this country” (Pieris 1956:4).  
Pieris concluded, “Kandyan arts such as dancing, painting, wood-carving and embroidery 
are all aesthetically satisfying precisely because the artist adhered to traditional canons which 
gave this particular art its distinctive form and proportion” (Pieris 1956:5). While he believed 
that innovation and change were a given in the “traditional arts and crafts” and that therefore 
“our quest should not be for origins as such,” he suggested that such innovation results over 
generations in each respective “art-form attain[ing] a certain maturity” and that, after that point, 
“innovation or compromise by artists who have lost the tradition only results in poor art” (Pieris 
1956:5). As far as Pieris and other conference participants were concerned, their contemporary 
artists and craftspeople were guilty of just such loss, and were therefore regarded as incapable of 
the kind of transformation that would ensure the safety of the “essence” at hand. Dumbara cotton 
weavers, to offer an especially fitting example, were chided for engaging in the “production of 
mere curios,” a practice that P.E.E. Fernando regarded as an upshot of their being “brought up 
and trained in a tradition that was somewhat rigid, not possessed of that flexibility of attitude and 
imagination to adapt themselves to the changing circumstances” (1956:56). The only change 
they could successfully manage, in other words, was the debasement of the practices in which 
they were engaged. (Suggesting similarly that the practices presently denoted by the label 
“Kandyan dance” had remained static up until the recent past, Tammita-Delgoda laments, “as it 
has struggled to survive in the modern world, Kandyan dance has been forced to change” and 
“many people no longer know what real Kandyan dance is” (SAARC Cultural Centre, Sri Lanka 
2013:75; emphasis added).) The task at hand, then, as one contributor to the 1956 conference put 
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it, was a controlled “evolution of society” in which the “judicious judgment” of a select few 
could be used to arrive at “fusible doses” of change (Wijesekera 1956:22).  
References to an “essence” or inherent dynamism can therefore accomplish only so much 
in terms of maintaining the illusion of cultural fixity to which Herzfeld refers. In the end, as we 
have seen, the strategy buckles under its own weight as these scholars seek to capture that 
arbitrary strand of continuity or timelessness and define what is “traditional.”32 While admitting 
the inevitability of historical transformation through the generous ascription of “flexibility,” the 
authors considered here demonstrate an ultimate interest in defining the parameters of change 
according to social and aesthetic sympathies about which they are reliably un-self-reflexive.  
To gesture once again toward what I presented earlier as the burden borne by 
contemporary artisans in Kandy, I want to offer an example of what this ultimate arbitrariness 
looks like for those presently engaged in what have come to be known as the country’s 
“traditional arts and crafts.” About a century ago, the individuals who participate in what is 
presently referred to as the hana industry used the fiber of a different plant, niyanda, to weave 
mats and other items still created in Atwaedagama. Even today, weavers in the village use the 
terms niyanda and kaendi (fiber) interchangeably when referring to the strands that they extract 
from the hana plant. However, the combination of a decline in the availability of niyanda 
throughout the early 20th century and a preference for the comparatively longer and thicker fibers 
yielded by the much bigger hana plant (a feature that, while not lending itself so well to the 
production of especially fine mats, does shorten labor time), motivated artisans to abandon it 																																																								32 Jonathan Spencer locates a comparable phenomenon in his analysis of Martin 
Wickramasinghe’s Aspects of Sinhalese Culture, noting: “Wickramasinghe’s arguments about 
cultural elasticity and borrowing would seem to lead inevitably to a radically contingent view of 
cultural identity. Yet his own position as a nationalist intellectual demanded, ultimately, that 
some element of continuity be postulated” (Spencer et al. 1990:286). 
		 	 	 	 120	
altogether. Today, hana is regarded as the traditional material used by these artisans and, in fact, 
as I will discuss in Chapter 4, it is often equated with the “identity” of the industry. Many of the 
individuals presently engaged in these productive activities, however, now find hana 
increasingly scarce and, as in the past, are turning to more readily available alternatives—in this 
case, woven fiber mats, or paeduru, imported from India—to meet certain of their needs. Their 
decision to do so is met with a combination of contempt and sadness by at least some designers 
and dealers in Colombo, individuals and businesses who, regarding it as a deviation from the true 
“traditional art,” refuse to purchase items in which such substitute materials have been used. The 
reaction evokes the “‘spectres of inauthenticity’” that Sahlins (Sahlins 1999a:411) has associated 
with one of the central (and “not too enlightening”) “illusions born of the Western self-
consciousness of civilization,” which, in ascribing a “historyless character” (which is also to say 
a timeless one) to “indigenous cultures,” bolsters the conceit that “when we change it’s called 
progress, but when they do—notably when they adopt some of our progressive things—it’s a 
kind of adulteration, a loss of culture” (Sahlins 1999b:ii). I would argue that this double standard 
is exposed by the fact that that one could just as easily imagine this contemporary instance of 
substitution—one understood as the adulteration of a “traditional craft”—being regarded instead 
as an instance of the “dynamism” to which Wijesekera refers. The example indicates the simple 
point that any appraisal of negative change or positive adaptation is ultimately an interested one. 
Making it seem as anything but interested, however, is among the chief undertakings of certain 
contributors to both the 1956 conference and the 2013 seminar.  
Concluding Remarks 
Insofar as the “rhetoric of tradition and modernity is not only the epiphenomenal 
expression but one of the most critical instruments of hierarchy,” Herzfeld reminds us, 
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anthropologists ought to “be less concerned to identify particular traits as traditional or modern 
than to describe the political dynamics in which such attributions are made” (Herzfeld 2004:30-
31). Orienting the discussion to the political dynamics to which Herzfeld refers, the preceding 
pages have examined the discursive production and handling of Sri Lanka’s traditional 
handicrafts at a post-independence moment marked by growing nationalist fervor. Gaining 
momentum in the decades leading up to independence, the early 20th century conceptualization 
of “crafts” as an obvious foil to industrialization and the Anglicization seen as accompanying 
foreign imports emerged as a central component of an expressly Sinhalese “cultural 
regeneration” (Gurusinghe 1936). The two post-independence projects examined in the 
preceding pages characterized efforts entailed in this regeneration. I have suggested that these 
projects encapsulate something that Duara calls discent, or the imposition “of a historical 
narrative of descent and/or dissent on both heterogeneous and related cultural practices” (Duara 
1995:66). First, participants at the 1956 conference at the University of Ceylon engaged in the 
selective privileging of items and practices associated with Kandyan Sinhalese as uniquely 
representative of the nation. This selective privileging accomplished more than the 
marginalization of communities, practices and things deemed non-Sinhala, however. More 
relevant to my purposes in the following chapters, it also consolidated a practical and ideological 
burden on the part of artisans in this region for reproducing what was and continues to be 
conceived of as collectively held national heritage. As we will see, despite calls both then and 
now to expand the practice of the “traditional arts” beyond those regarded as their lineage-based 
heirs, and despite the fact that such expansion has to some degree occurred, artisans in Kandy are 
reminded in varyingly subtle ways of their role as primary culture producers. To appreciate why 
this is so, we must consider the second project in which conference participants engaged, or their 
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efforts to establish the antiquity of these “traditional arts” in a way that would warrant their 
intervention. In establishing that thread of continuity linking past and present through craft, 
contributors were compelled to identify a path for craft that would be acceptable given “modern 
democratic conditions” and “a money economy [that] has come to stay” (Sarathchandra 
1956:100; Pieris 1956:8).  In articulating an abstracted and essentialized vision of the “traditional 
arts,” they were eager to silence a reality of social life, caste-based identification, that continues 
to trouble the notion of this heritage as one in which all Sinhalese, much less all Sri Lankans, 
have an equal stake. Such silencing would have been a reliable expedient in fashioning an image 
of such arts as ahistorical or, in Ralph Pieris’s words, “impersonal, the manifestation of an 
experience and feeling which is older and deeper than the emotion or skill of the individual 
artist” (Pieris 1956:2). And yet, as Herzfeld puts it, “[s]ocial relations on the ground disrupt [the] 
timeless fictions—or eternal images—of national culture” (Herzfeld 1996:28). As we will see 
with respect to both Atwaedagama and Redigama, conceptualizations of collectively shepherded 
heritage articulate in locally meaningful ways not only with practical and ideological entailments 
of a market economy and liberal democracy, cultural forms in which many Sri Lankans are fully 
invested. They also articulate, and with considerable unpredictability, with caste-based concerns 
that, as we will see, are often erroneously considered the purview of low caste individuals. 
To conclude, then, my aim in this chapter has been to examine a narrative of “traditional 
crafts” that, along with the contradictions found within it, continues to have salience in the lives 
of contemporary artisans. In the following chapters, I turn my attention to the ways in which the 
sentiments and logics driving the projects described above—the conviction that craft should be 
sanitized of caste, the notion that artisans themselves cannot be trusted with respect to the craft 
traditions for which they are nonetheless held responsible, the belief that those who engage in 
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craft production must not have economic gain as their chief motive, for instance—are reproduced 
and continue to do work in the present even as they are challenged by artisans themselves.  
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Chapter 3 
Heritage or Hana Bundle?   
The Indignities of Inheritance in a Sinhalese “Craft Village” 
 
On an afternoon in August 2014, I ascended the steep walkway leading to the Kandyan 
Art Association (KAA), one of Sri Lanka’s longest-running organizations established to support 
artisans in and around what is now regarded as the country’s cultural capital, Kandy. I had come 
in search of Damayanthi, a resident artisan at the KAA and a woman who, as a participant in 
what is known locally as the hana industry (hana karmantaya), is renowned locally for her skill 
as a weaver of the distinctive—and, by popular estimation, distinctly “traditional”—variety of 
woven fiber mats, Dumbara rata paeduru (Dumbara design mats), for which her village of 
Atwaedagama is known. Damayanthi and I had met on previous occasions, and she would 
always greet me warmly. The week prior, in fact, she had gone out of her way to assist me in 
locating another individual. Those positive encounters motivated my visit this day and, not 
knowing whether I would find her, occasioned my delight when I spotted her engaged in casual 
conversation with another artisan on the southern end of the building’s wide verandah. As I 
approached and began to explain that I had come to speak with her about her work, however, her 
eyes widened in resistance and, stiffening her posture, she waved her hands defiantly and 
declared, “Madam, I’m not going to tell you anything! Not after what they have put in the 
papers! Apoo! How can our children show their faces?!” When I persisted and stressed my 
interest in learning about how Damayanthi had come to weave, I was startled by her reply: 
“What’s there to be interested in? This industry is worthless.” Observing with approval that hana 
mat weaving is dying and that the next generation will not carry the tradition forward, she noted 
that a newspaper had recently published an article about the industry and, without her 
permission, had featured her photograph. “You see how our own people treat us? They are our 
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same flesh and blood [ekama mas le], and still they treat us like this. What has the president told 
us? The president has told us that we need to live—all Sinhalese, Muslims, and Tamils—
together, as one. But even one of our own has done this to us. And why is it? Just because we do 
this industry?” “Anyway,” Damayanthi concluded, her voice dropping almost to a whisper, since 
she acquired her skill in a class, she really didn’t know anything about Dumbara rata mat 
weaving. Unlike others in the village she calls home, she came to weave not because it was her 
family’s occupation—her children, she stressed, have nothing to do with it—but out of financial 
necessity. 
The setting of our encounter, a nearly century-old organization established to support the 
country’s “traditional craftspeople,” exaggerated the curiosity of Damayanthi’s outburst. The 
organization has long supported the variety “traditional arts and crafts” with which participants 
to the 1956 conference discussed in the foregoing chapter were primarily concerned. 
Damayanthi, whose skill has earned her a presidential award, is locally renowned as an 
accomplished practitioner of what is regarded as among the country’s most traditional industries. 
Yet here she was not only describing her knowledge, a knowledge she seemed eager to disavow, 
as an accidental expertise, but also forswearing the manner of family-based learning locally 
considered the truest mode of artisanal knowledge reproduction. Though taken aback by the 
scene, I admitted to myself that Damayanthi’s fervent reaction to my interest in her work was not 
unexpected. Beyond the threat that her words posed to the resolve of my fieldworker self, they 
were simply the latest utterance of a chorus I’d heard with disquieting regularity since I had 
begun my fieldwork in Atwaedagama some five months prior. Indeed, if there was one thing that 
the village’s residents had made sure to impress upon me in that time, it was their distrust of 
“researchers” and the sense of humiliation that they have felt as a consequence of their and the 
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hana industry’s scholarly and journalist representation as, among other things, especially ancient 
as “passed down from generation to generation.” The refrain that Damayanthi echoed, I 
reminded myself in this instance, centered on what many in Atwaedagama take to be the careless 
writings of scholars, students and journalists not at all unlike myself. More specifically, it 
centered on writings in which, usually through references to “old things,” the work in which 
Damayanthi and others in Atwaedagama engage is reaffirmed as the work of a people who are 
essentially different from and inferior to other Sinhalese. In this refrain, as I elaborate in the 
following pages, “old things” generally served as a euphemism for something that, while the 
subject of many of my conversations in the village, was rarely discussed directly, “that caste 
issue.” 
*** 
 There is a phrase in Sinhala, “hanamiti adahas” (literally, “hana bundle ideas”), that is 
generally used to comment on the unfavorable intrusion of old-fashioned or outmoded patterns 
of thought into contemporary life. The saying refers to an element of the work carried out by the 
individuals with whom I am primarily concerned here: that is, to the collection of the raw plant 
material, the leaves of the large succulent hana, from which those in the village of Atwaedagama 
extract long, floss-like fibers used to produce decorative woven mats and other handmade items. 
It is ironic that the phrase is typically used to condemn “backward” thinking since, to many of 
those actually engaged in the hana industry, it is others’ ostensibly old-fashioned thinking about 
them that is worthy of critical comment. To these individuals, this thinking, and more 
specifically what they regard as an anachronistic concern with caste-based identification, is 
nowhere so obvious as in popular and scholarly writing in which they figure as exemplars of the 
country’s traditional artisans.  For over a century, students, scholars, journalists and filmmakers 
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have rendered accounts in which their village and their work are portrayed as demonstrative of 
an essential socio-temporal difference to be studied, documented, and preserved in its archaic 
splendor. Until little more 
than a decade ago, the 
residents of Atwaedagama 
were far removed from the 
outlets of such 
representations, many of 
which took form in 
publications intended for an 
English-speaking 
readership. Today, however, as my encounter with Damayanthi illustrates, they are well aware of 
their portrayal in writings that, while often arguably intended as celebratory appraisals of Sri 
Lanka’s cultural heritage, they view as re-inscribing their difference by identifying them with a 
past they would just as soon forget. In this chapter, I analyze the double bind in which these men 
and women find themselves as they attempt to combat such representations. I will argue that, 
ironically, both their interpretations of what they regard as the insult at hand as well as the 
strategies that they adopt to wrest some control over the situation serve to re-inscribe the very 
social boundary they are anxious to overcome.  
This chapter begins with an examination of the historical trajectory of scholarly and 
popular fascination with Atwaedagama and those who live there, and more specifically with a 
discussion of a mid-20th century swell of interest in the village on the part of local and 
international scholars and student researchers. While writing on the village and, more generally, 
Figure 8-From The Nation newspaper kids’ section celebrating the 
country's 63rd Independence Day in 2012. In a series intended to 
showcase the country’s “ethnic variety,” the second photo 
clockwise from the top left is captioned: "A Kinnara couple-they 
were indigenous people." Save a photo captioned, “A Kandyan 
Sinhalese,” all of the remaining pictures are intended to represent 
groups regarded today as ethnically distinct from the Sinhala.   
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“the Kinnara,” the caste group to which its residents are said to belong, extends back to much 
further, it is during the 1960s and 1970s—a time when largely tourism-driven demand for the 
area’s famed Dumbara paeduru was peaking—that the village was consolidated as an object of 
scholarly and popular interest.  
The second part of the chapter details not only Atwaedagama residents’ reactions to their 
portrayal in contemporary writings, but also the way these reactions are subsequently interpreted 
by so-called outsiders (pita minissu), scholars and student researchers chief among them, who 
have visited and in some cases published accounts about the village in recent years. In general, 
some anthropologists have observed, “artisans do not control the publicity related to their work 
but instead make the most of the writings of outsiders” by capitalizing on their representation 
therein (Colloredo-Mansfeld 2002:118). The conversations that I had with the residents of 
Atwaedagama suggest that, for most of them, it is generally only the first element of this 
observation that bears out. In accounts that the casual observer might deem gratuitous marketing 
for the “heritage-rich” industry in which Atwaedagama’s residents engage, many of them do not 
see opportunities for financial gain. Rather, they explicitly condemn textual and photographic 
representations of what is typically depicted as an “ancient” and “traditional” industry as callous 
reminders of their historical marginalization as a socially and economically degraded 
community. To them, such representations not only misleadingly portray a community frozen in 
a decidedly unsavory state, but also reflect their authors’ preoccupation with what is often 
figured as among the most hanamiti or old-fashioned phenomena of contemporary Sinhalese 
social life, caste-based identification.  
As we will see, however, in both the articulation of and response to what they perceive as 
their unfavorable portrayal, Atwaedagama’s residents unintentionally collude with the local 
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students, scholars and journalists whose writings they begrudge. In formulating the object of 
their concern as a myopic fascination with “old” or “historical” things, they reproduce a logic 
that is used by others to undermine the legitimacy of their grievances. Figuring caste as a thing of 
“the past” that bears little force in contemporary Sri Lanka, they recapitulate the notion that 
grievances articulated in its terms cannot be taken seriously. What is more, the strategies of self-
preservation that many of Atwaedagama residents’ have adopted in retaliation for the collective 
insult they feel they have suffered at the hands of untrustworthy researchers are interpreted by 
the latter as evidence of the essential, caste-based difference initially assumed in their accounts.  
The Making of A “Traditional Handicraft Village” 
The fascination that Atwaedagama’s residents and their “traditional handicrafts” hold for 
contemporary scholars, students and journalists is itself a tradition. While it gained momentum in 
the 1950s and 1960s, scholarship on the village and the hana industry can be traced back much 
further to the work of art historian Ananda Coomaraswamy. Strongly influenced by William 
Morris and the Arts and Crafts Movement of the late 19th century, Coomaraswamy was in fact 
instrumental in the classification of what is today referred to as the hana industry and an array of 
other lineage-based occupational activities (including metalworking, Dumbara weaving, and 
wood and ivory carving) as “arts and crafts.” In the early 20th century, Coomaraswamy dedicated 
the brief, penultimate chapter of his Medieaval Sinhalese Art (1907) to a discussion of the fiber 
mat-weaving practices for which Atwaedagama is known. For all his more popular and heavily 
romanticized representations of “the traditional craftsman” in this work and in his subsequent 
The Indian Craftsman (1909), the chapter itself is notable for its emphasis on the bare procedural 
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and technical elements of mat production. 33 Coomaraswamy spares few remarks for the lives of 
those who produce these mats. However, both the chapter title, “Mat Weaving by Kinnarayo,” 
and his observation that the decorated mats with which he was concerned are “made by men and 
women of the Kinnaraya caste, practically the lowest of Kandyan castes,” reinforced the notion 
of a foundational link between this form of mat-weaving and the social inferiority of those 
engaged in it (Coomaraswamy 1907:426). In an Appendix to the chapter, he also reproduces 
what he describes as “a Kinnara song relating to mat weaving” and, in a note buried in the text, 
mentions Atwaedagama.  
A more substantive treatment of what many of Atwaedagama’s present-day residents 
regard as “unnecessary information,” or the area’s sociological topography, began with the work 
of M.D. Raghavan. In 1946, Raghavan was hired away from his founding chair position in the 
Department of Anthropology at the University of Madras to serve as an ethnologist for the 
National Museums of Ceylon (Raghavan 1962; Vidyarthi and Rai 1977). From this position, he 
carried out his ambitious ethnological survey of Ceylon and, beginning in 1951, served as a 
member of the country’s Backward Communities Development Board, a committee aligned with 
his own personal determination to “promote the living conditions” of “the Kinnarayas” and other 
populations that, as his Ceylonese colleague Richard Spittel agreed, had been “long neglected” 
by the government (Raghavan 1962:xiii). By the early 1950’s, Raghavan’s writing on “The Tribe 
of Mat Weavers,” whom he portrayed as having “little or no interests outside their craft” 
(Raghavan 1951:221), was hailed as a model for anthropological scholarship deemed “still in its 
infancy” in Ceylon (“A Ceylonese Tribe” 1952). Raghavan’s accounts of Ceylon’s “traditional 
																																																								33 For a comprehensive discussion of Coomaraswamy’s writing on craft in India and Ceylon, see 
McGowan 2009. 
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arts and culture” elaborated upon the anthropological data he had gathered in the course of his 
Ethnological Survey (Raghavan 1962:xvi). Like Coomaraswamy in linking the social set-
apartness of “the Kinnara” to the productive activity for which they were known, Raghavan 
portrayed these people as unlike any others he had encountered. Lamenting the inadequacy of 
Robert Knox’s cursory 17th century mention of ‘the Kinnaraya,’ Raghavan expounds in his own 
writing upon the “peculiar tribal traits,” dwelling structures, agricultural activities, household 
economies, and various caste-based proscriptions on behavior and dress that he and his 
collaborators observed in Atwaedagama and other villages so populated (Raghavan 1962:184).34  
Raghavan’s usage of the term “Tribe” is significant here. The Sinhala term “kulaya,” as 
noted in the Introduction to this dissertation, is typically translated as “caste.” As John Rogers 
(1994) points out, however, the meaning of the term is contextual. In keeping with this 
contextuality, and reflecting the ever-evolving technologies of identification in sociological 
writing across the 19th and 20th centuries, “the Kinnara” have been referred to at different points 
in time by each of the meanings given by Clough (1887) for the term “kulaya”: a tribe, a caste, 
and a race (see, for instance Supplement to The Tropical Agriculturalist’s “The Rodiya 
Commission and its Work-Who are Lower in Race: The Kinnaraya or Rodiya?” 1905:2). While 
“there was a gradual tendency [beginning in the 1820s] to use the word ‘caste’ to refer to groups 
that were employed for organizing the state’s compulsory labour,” there was little concern 
among the British administrators “about whether a particular group should be called a ‘caste’ or 
something else” (Rogers 2004:635). It is likely that it is in part due to this comfort with 
ambiguity that 20th century accounts identify the Kinnara variously as a “caste,” a “tribe,” and a 																																																								34 Bryce Ryan, whose seminal Caste in Modern Ceylon (1953) was published at around the same 
time, similarly reported, “The insignificance of the Kinnara in a meager literature of Sinhalese 
caste is striking, since their status is so low as to have attracted more attention” (130). 
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“race” (in his 1909 Ancient Ceylon, for instance, Henry Parker wrote, “There is only one race in 
Ceylon with curly hair; they are the Kinnaras or Karmantayō, the mat-weavers, the lowest caste 
in the island” (44)).  
The inconsistency in sociological vocabulary throughout much of the 20th century also 
stemmed, however, from the varying extent to which the Kinnara and other groups were 
perceived as integrated in broader Sinhalese society. In fact, in his 1951 Ethnological Survey of 
Ceylon, Raghavan was centrally concerned with documenting the degree to which the Kinnara 
and other groups were “absorbed” into “the general Sinhalese society” (219). He surmised that 
the Kinnara’s “integrated culture” and unique “technique of handicrafts” would ensure that it 
would be many years before they were so “absorbed” (Raghavan 1951:219). His use of the term 
tribe reflected his prediction that the rate of “cultural disintegration” among the Kinnara would 
be slower than that among the Veddas, for instance.  
Raghavan’s work likely helped to inspire the attention that Atwaedagama received in the 
1960s and 1970s when the village became a destination for foreign and local researchers and 
filmmakers seeking to document the newly independent island’s “traditional handicrafts.” In the 
early 1960s, Diongu Badaturuge Nihalsinghe, a man who later served as founding chairman of 
the National Film Corporation and earned recognition as having pioneered filmmaking in the 
country, collaborated with his undergraduate classmates at the University of Ceylon (soon 
thereafter the University of Peradeniya) to produce Niyanda Rata, a short documentary that 
featured the village and its mat weaving tradition. The student who conceived of the project, 
Lucky de Silva, first happened upon the village as a student at Kandy’s Trinity College. 
Participating alongside his classmates in a school-sponsored social service initiative much like 
those called for by the Backward Communities Development Board on which Raghavan served, 
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de Silva had visited the village to deliver medical supplies and, as he put it to me, “teach them 
how to look after themselves.” At the University of Ceylon, de Silva drew upon his experiences 
in writing an essay about the village for an undergraduate geography course before suggesting 
the idea for the film to his peers in the University Film Society and the Peradeniya University 
Social Service League. Though screened only a few times, Niyanda Rata was praised for its 
contribution to “documenting[ing] the vanishing crafts of Ceylon” (Gunawardena c.1963).   
 Beginning in 1966, just a couple of years after Niyanda Rata was completed, an 
American potter and Associate Professor of Art at Kent State University made repeated visits to 
Sri Lanka to study the country’s weaving traditions.  James “Mel” Someroski, or, as his name is 
localized by those who remember him in Atwaedagama, Samarasinghe, Someroski shared his 
own approach to design composition while commissioning a collection of decorative wall-
hangings from the weavers in Atwaedagama. For approximately six months in 1968, Someroski 
stationed himself at the Queen’s Hotel in Kandy and traveled regularly to Atwaedagama to 
oversee the creation of these items, most of which were of his own design. The wall-hangings 
would ultimately be displayed in a series of exhibitions upon his return to the United States (“Art 
Tent” 1969:3).   
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            In a brief account of his time in the village, “The ‘Real’ Beautiful People,”35 Someroski 
recalled his initial encounter with the area’s residents, writing, “when I first discovered them…I 
thought something had to be done fast to preserve some of this historical way of working for the 
future.” Confessing “a kind of romantic notion…in working with the Dumbara mat weavers,” 
Someroski reflected on an irresistible 
appeal in what he deemed an 
awareness of the fact that “they were 
weavers to the Sinhalese Kings” and 
“that nothing has changed much, that 
my wall hangings were produced the 
same way their great, great, great, etc., 
grandfathers produced mats.” This 
notion of a direct continuity between the Atwaedagama he encountered and an ancient past 
prompted Someroski to suggest that, “like the folk parks in Norway…and Sweden and the 
United States (Hale Homestead in Ohio),” the village should “take its place as an historical 
treasure worth preserving,” a “place where people from all over the world could go and see old 
houses and accoutrements of village life preserved just as they were…[w]ith the old looms still 
																																																								35 I have been unable to verify the source and date of this item, a magazine clipping that 
Someroski gave to one of the weavers he had commissioned in Atwaedagama. Although the 
article was written in English and the weaver who showed it to me decades later could not read 
English, he knew the contents of the article. When he presented it to me, he noted that it 
reminded him of the positive working relationship that he and others had with Someroski.   
Figure 9-Mel Someroski with two of the Atwaedagama 
weavers he commissioned to produce wall-hangings in the 
late 1960s. 
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set on cow-dung-and-mud-verandahs and weavers demonstrating their ancient art under thatched 
roofs.”36  
In 1985, evidently motivated by something like the Boasian “salvage imperative” 
characteristic of much early 20th century American anthropological scholarship (Stocking 
1989:211), Someroski produced a short film, The 
Mat Weavers of Ceylon, with the explicit purpose 
of capturing Atwaedagama before the signs of its 
antiquity disappeared for good.37 Reminiscent of 
James Clifford’s “ethnographic pastoral” and its 
“relentless placement of others in a present-
becoming-past” (Clifford 1986:114-115), the 
film’s initial scenes of the village are 
accompanied by a voice loosely quoting the 
forward to Mary Webb’s Precious Bane (1982): 
To conjure even for a moment the wistfulness 
that is the past is like trying to gather in one’s 
arms the color of the distance, but if it is 
achieved, what sweetness, that vivid present of theirs, how faint it grows. The past is only 
the present become invisible and mute, and because it is invisible and mute, its memoried 
glances and its murmurs are infinitely precious. We are tomorrow’s past. Even now, we 
slip away. The dial turns, and we that were the new thing, gather magic as we go. The 
whir of the spinning wheels is ceased in our parlors, and we hear no more the treadles of 
the loom, the swift, silken noise of the flown shuttle, the thud of the batten. But the 
imagination hears them, and theirs is the melody of romance. 
 																																																								
36 Thanks to Magnus Fiskesjö for pointing out that these parks in Norway and Sweden were not 
pre-existing villages.  
37 While The Mat Weavers of Ceylon was Someroski’s original title for the film, and the title 
noted in the film itself, the documentary has been re-titled Weaving of Ceylon, and is cited as 
such in the bibliography. 
Figure 10-Wall-hangings Someroski 
commissioned in Atwaedaga are displayed 
alongside pottery in this 1996 exhibition 
photograph. The photograph is presently in 
the possession of one of the weavers with 
whom Someroski worked. 
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For Someroski, the encounter with Atwaedagama’s present was an encounter with the 
“wistfulness” described by Webb, the village representing, as he put it, “a remarkable link” with 
the past. Importantly, and in keeping with a “globalist” notion of cultural heritage gaining 
traction at the time (Blake 2000:75)—a notion owing greatly to UNESCO’s efforts around “the 
task of preserving the crumbling remains of…the ‘global patrimony’” (Betts 2015:249)—
Someroski conceived of the “historical treasure” to be found in Atwaedagama as belonging not 
just to the past of Ceylon, but more broadly to “Our past,” a shared past of humanity in general. 
A team of Smithsonian Institution-sponsored researchers carrying out an island-wide 
“ethnotechnological” study would soon follow on Someroski’s heels. Their efforts would also 
reinforce the area’s representation as the seat of an ancient technology on the brink of irreparable 
loss to mankind. Beyond the many disciplinary scholars standing to benefit from the study of the  
“materials, processes, skills and artifacts of Ceylon’s highly creative arts and crafts,” the 
principal investigator of the study argued, “the world itself needs to know of their existence” 
(“Department of Anthropology Ancient Technology Program—July 1970”).  
To give a sense of the general and somewhat ironic impetus for this project, an excess of 
imports and a drop in the price of agricultural exports throughout the 1950s helped motivate 
Ceylon’s participation in the Food for Freedom program, an aid initiative that the United States 
implemented in the mid 1950s under The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, 
otherwise known as Public Law 480 (Bjorkman 2008; K.M 1958; Steinberg et al. 1982). A 
persistent drought between 1954 and 1956 compounded the difficulties that Ceylon already faced 
in meeting domestic food requirements, and the absence of a robust industrial basis from which 
exports might help to mitigate losses left it facing a tremendous shortage of foreign exchange 
(K.M. 1958; Pfaffenberger 1993; Wijesinghe 1976). An ensuing reliance upon the importation of 
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surplus agricultural products from the United States (made available through “Food for 
Freedom”) led at the same time to the country’s placement on the United States’ list of “excess 
currency” nations, or those for which, by the mid-1960s, the “U.S. government technically held 
staggering amounts of local currencies” (Lewis 2003:93). In 1965, after the U.S. Congress 
mandated that the money be spent, the Smithsonian Institution, which falls under Congressional 
authority, implemented its large grant-making “Foreign Currency Program.” Ceylon, along with 
Poland, Egypt, India, Pakistan, and several other 
countries, was targeted for a series of zoological, 
entomological, archaeological and anthropological 
projects, one of which was a “Study of Disappearing 
Traditional Crafts, Industries and Technologies” 
(“Abstract of Specific Projects”). Coomaraswamy and 
others had earlier lamented that the trend toward 
increasing reliance on foreign imports had left the “arts 
and crafts” of Ceylon “worsened and often wholly 
perished” (Coomaraswamy 2004:1). Ironically, this same 
trend had now helped to furnish conditions for the study 
of what Smithsonian Institution administrators, 
recapitulating a now firmly established narrative of 
perpetual demise, described as “the technology of the rapidly disappearing traditional crafts and 
home industries” (“Abstract of Specific Projects”). 
As part of the subsequent effort to spend these sums of foreign currencies, between 1968 
and 1973 Smithsonian-sponsored researchers from the United States, Ceylon, and Australia 
Figure 11-A man in Atwaedagama 
demonstrates the production of 
"dusters" for Smithsonian 
Institution-sponsored researchers, 
circa 1970. Human Studies Film 
Archive, National Museum of Natural 
History. 
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descended upon twenty-three local sites selected as exemplary of Ceylon’s “ancient technology.” 
Four of these sites were in Kandy, the region in which Atwaedagama is located. Researchers 
collected samples and documented the core technical elements of brass work, lacquer-work, 
ivory work, wood carving, mask making, pottery, and gold and silver work. In Atwaedagama, 
selected for its Dumbara mat weaving, they generated an array of photographs and film footage 
of the area’s residents. The silent film footage is a series of carefully choreographed 
demonstrations of individuals constructing a loom, weaving mats, producing “fly-whisks” 
(chamara) or what are today more popularly referred to as “dusters,” carrying bundles of hana 
leaves, and scraping, dyeing, and spinning the leaves’ long, white fibers (“Making a Whisk 
Broom, ca. 1970”; “Dumbara Spinning and Weaving”; “String Making,” “Preparation and 
Spinning of Jute Fibre; ca. 1970”; “Dumbara Spinning and Weaving”).  
Perhaps in part owing to the dictates of the videography equipment at hand, the need for 
light foremost among them, the Smithsonian researchers’ relatively abstracted portrayal of such 
activities also suggests their minimal concern with what contemporary residents of the area 
regard as “unnecessary, sociological information” unfit for wider consumption. Several lags 
between recording and action reveal the directorial contrivance behind the film’s subjects’ 
engagement in a sequence of undertakings that, while ordinary in purpose, are unusual in the 
context of their execution. Activities that, today at least, are otherwise pursued amid the bustle of 
household and village social life are filmed against more quiet backdrops to privilege their bare 
technical elements. A loom is constructed along the middle of a mud path under the blazing mid-
day sun, and a duster is fashioned by a man in the center of a field at the perimeter of the village.  
This relative decontextualization notwithstanding, in field reports collected alongside the footage 
researchers were sure not only to mention and thereby reinforce the industry’s caste association, 
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or the very “sociological detail” whose continued prominence in contemporary writing 
Atwaedagama’s residents resent so wholeheartedly, but also to highlight that caste 
“community’s” continued dwindling. Echoing a popular narrative of the industry’s regal origins, 
they observed: 
The Kinnarayo Caste have for centuries woven the traditional mats of Ceylon, using 
natural materials and dyes; they were in the time of the Ceylonese kings under royal 
patronage. Today few of these people are to be found and one of the principal centres…is 
in the Central Province. Full records were made of the craft, moving from the initial 
spinning with the ancient hand spindle, to the operation of the primitive loom. Examples 
of mats and all equipment were obtained for the Smithsonian Institution (SI Application, 
Ceylon and Pakistan).  
 
Clifford Evans, the Smithsonian program’s coordinator and then Chairman of the Department of 
Anthropology at the National Museum of Natural History, received a letter in February 1974 
requesting financial support for a study of the sort of information with which the Ancient 
Technologies project was only peripherally concerned. P. Wimalasiri, then a Research Officer in 
the Department of Education at the University of Ceylon, proposed to study the “Persistence and 
Change of Kinnara Villages” (“Department of Anthropology Ancient Technology Program, 
Haynes—January 1973”). Focusing on thirteen locales, including Atwaedagama, he would 
engage in the “collection of facts and data concerning the social, economic, and educational 
aspects of the Kinnarayas” in “order to get a complete picture of the community” (“Department 
of Anthropology Ancient Technology Program, Haynes—January 1973”). Wimalasiri’s project 
was not ultimately funded, the Smithsonian-sponsored research initiative on Sri Lanka’s Ancient 
Technologies having already wrapped up by the time his request was received. His proposal, 
however, is indicative of Atwaedagama’s by then established place in the scholarly imagination 
as the site not just of a “traditional handicraft,” but also of a population whose identification as 
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essentially traditional and socially unique would, to the dismay of the area’s present-day 
residents, recommend it for scholarly and journalistic investigation for many years to come. 
The Troubles of an “Exalted” Heritage 
Earlier scholars who visited Atwaedagama remarked on the enthusiasm with which 
residents related tales of the area’s past and of the hana industry’s origins. Raghavan, for 
instance, reported, “[T]hey are easily drawn into talking of themselves. They tell of the past, of 
their traditions and their ancestors, [and of] the brothers Satta Duraya and Gabada Duraya 
appointed by royal favour to supply mats to the Kandyan court, conferring on them the village 
site…by a royal decree or Sannas” (Raghavan 1951:221). Likewise, in The Mat Weavers of 
Ceylon, Someroski recounted the spontaneity with which the weavers he knew narrated the 
“former days”: 
The mountains are home for the world-renowned Dumbara weavers. In a settlement near 
Kandy, the former capital, they have lived for ages, simple lives, pursuing their craft of 
mat weaving. They will tell tales of former days, when their ancestors wove mats for the 
Kandyan kings, who in turn conferred the village site on them by royal decree. The old 
men nod in the tropical sun, but if you disturb their peace, they smile and are quick to 
reminisce about days past. 
 
A variation on this reported eagerness to “reminisce about days past” is reiterated in the 
comparatively recent writing of independent scholar Patrick Harrigan.38 Referring to “the 
Kinnaraya” as one of several indigenous communities in Sri Lanka, Harrigan writes of a 
tendency among them to trace their communal origins. The language he uses to characterize this 
phenomenon reinforces the image of a culturally integrated people set apart from broader 
																																																								38 Harrigan, a native of Michigan, has periodically lived in Sri Lanka since the early 1970s. He is 
reported to have focused his doctoral research in comparative religion on the country, although 
“his dissertation was never accepted” (Patton 2009). 
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society.39 Hailing them as “a community” who, “despite harsh economic conditions…still 
preserve a sizable share of the island’s indigenous heritage,” Harrigan explains that the Kinnara 
possess a “trait of tracing…ancestors back to the realm of yakshas and other semi-divine spirits” 
(Harrigan n.d., emphasis added). 
My own observations regarding Atwaedagama residents’ orientations to the past, made 
decades after Someroski and Raghavan visited the area, are quite different. I found that, to many 
such residents, there is a significant association between occupational departures from the 
industry for which the village is known and the positive transformation that they believe it has 
undergone since the period in which scholarly interest in the area first flourished.  
When I first arrived in Atwaedagama, I was explicitly advised by a local representative of 
the National Crafts Council (NCC) not to inquire of the area’s residents about their “past.” As I 
soon learned, “history” (itihaasa) was something of a dirty word, a term whose very invocation 
was one of the surest ways to terminate a conversation even before it had begun. Offering an 
illustrative example of the manner in which the sort of nationalist narrative of Sri Lanka’s 
traditional arts and crafts examined in the foregoing chapter articulates with the present-day 
operation of ostensibly pre-modern hierarchical forms, the man who advised me thus would, just 
a short time later, invoke “history” in a strikingly public forum. In a community meeting that, 
like all community meetings, was held in the village’s “Dumbara mat training center” (Dumbura 
paeduru puhunu madhyastaaneya), he delivered a speech (undoubtedly in part for my benefit) in 
																																																								39 Harrigan’s idiosyncratic use of the term “indigenous” recalls the inconsistency in the 
Kinnara’s sociologically categorization (as “tribe,” “caste,” and “race”) over the 19th and 20th 
centuries.  	
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which he implored the roughly fifty men and women in the audience to enjoy the pride that he 
sees deriving from the industry and, in particular, its history:   
[W]e must think, ‘my god, this is our industry. Are these the things that should be studied 
at the university level?’ And the answer is, ‘Yes, these are the things that should be 
studied. These are village-based industries. Their histories, how they have evolved.’ Such 
research is done and books are published because, in the end, that’s what will 
remain…You may also know that Ananda Coomaraswamy has written about this 
industry. You may have read that. Is there anyone here who has read the book? Have you 
heard about the Dumbara verses [kavi]? Have you seen them? Have you heard these? So, 
definitely, the present generation, you must have that pride [abimaaneya]. 
 
In a move reminiscent not only of Someroski’s equation of Atwaedagama’s present with “Our 
past,” but also of the discursive construction of collectively held national heritage examined in 
the previous chapter, this NCC officer refers to the industry as “ours” before setting the 
imperative to feel the “pride” emanating from it squarely on the shoulders of those convened. Of 
more immediate relevance to the present discussion, however, is his invocation of a past about 
which, as he is aware, those in his audience express remarkable unease. In doing so, the officer 
recapitulates the NCC’s more general interest in establishing the deep historical roots—and, 
thereby, reaffirms the connection between these roots and the contemporary legitimacy and 
praiseworthiness—of the country’s “craft heritage.” Elaborating upon what is presented as an 
“uninterrupted” history of “our crafts,” for instance, the homepage of the agency’s website draws 
upon the tale of the Theri Sanghamitta in delineating the origins of the country’s “ancient” and 
“exalted” heritage: 
When the nun Sangamitta, daughter of Emperor Asoka of Kalinga of India, came to Sri 
Lanka bringing a sapling of the Bo (Peepal or Pippal) Tree under which prince 
Siddhartha attained enlightenment, along with her she brought people of 18 castes (castes 
meaning crafts or professions). Commencing with such august beginnings, our crafts 
have, over almost 2500 years of development, chartered…[an] independent trail of 
artistic creativity and creative craftsmanship that is distinctly our own (National Crafts 
Council 2013). 
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The equation of caste with “craft” or “profession” is notable for its simplification of the many 
and historically variable social, political and economic implications of caste-based identification 
in Sri Lanka.40 It thus conjures the early post-independence efforts detailed in Chapter 2 to 
sanitize craft of its caste associations so that it might properly serve as the embodiment of 
national heritage. This narrative of the venerable origins and inherent worth of “national crafts’” 
may also deflect a reckoning, however, with the poverty that Atwaedagama’s residents have 
endured and that many of them associate with a history of caste-based marginalization.41 The 
notion of an illustriousness believed to stem from “august beginnings” has in fact at times 
competed with the impulse motivating Raghavan’s efforts to document and address the social 
and economic deprivation suffered by the so-called Backward Communities of the 1950s and 
1960s. In a review of Niyanda Rata published in the Ceylon Daily News, for example, author 
A.J. Gunawardena (c.1963) engaged in a certain whitewashing of such poverty in writing of 
Atwaedagama thus:  
Its tumbledown dwellings, ill-clad, unkempt children tell the sad tale of indigence 
common to such villages. But [Atwaedagama] is also different, as the sight of certain 
special activities informs the visitor. For it is here that the famed Dumbara mats are 
made. So, despite the appearance of material poverty, the people are actually rich: they 
possess a wealth of inherited and acquired skills. Those who own or have seen Dumbara 
mats and other ‘hana’ crafts will know what these skills are like (Gunawardena c.1963). 																																																								40 See, for example: Nirmal Dewasiri, The Adaptable Peasant; Newton Gunasinghe, Changing 
Socio-Economic Relations; Kumari Jayawardena, Nobodies to Somebodies; John Rogers, “Post-
Orientalism”; Yalman, “The Flexibility of Caste Principles”; Silva et al, “Castless or Caste-
Blind?”; Uyangoda and De Mel,  Reframing Democracy.  41 As Uyangoda has written elsewhere with respect to those identified as Kinnara in 
particular,“Poverty (duppathkama) is an indexical reference to both their economic deprivation 
and social marginalization” (Uyangoda 2013:290). Jabbar (2005) has recently documented this 
link between economic deprivation and social marginalization regarding caste status more 
generally: “Among the high castes—irrespective of location, a majority (75% and 54%) have an 
income level above the upper poverty line. In contrast, among the lower caste villages, only 45% 
of semi-urban and 30% or rural villagers are at this income level. The difference in income 
between the low and high caste villages is wider in rural areas than in semi-urban areas” (9). 
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For Gunawardena, the evident “material poverty” one would have witnessed in Atwaedagama in 
the mid-1960s obscures its residents’ enjoyment of a more substantial if less immediately 
perceptible affluence, the richness that obtains in the “inherited and acquired skills” entailed in 
“the traditional handicrafts of the Sinhalese people.” In a similar vein, the narrator of Weavers of 
Ceylon, as if anticipating a pitying response from the film’s viewers, soothes his apprehensive 
listeners, “If there is a certain poverty here, there is also a certain peace, and perhaps they are 
better off for that.” Citing “a Sinhalese folk song,” the voice beseeches an illusory, idealized 
artisan to suffer the indignities of his destitution for the sake of his knowledge as a craftsman: 
Oh, brother, if thou art bent on play and sport all the time, no crafts thou will learn and a 
silly man thou will be. Though clad in rags and going abegging, give up not the love to 
learn. With knowledge thus acquired, a bright future will be thy reward (Someroski 
1985).  
 
As noted above, in my own encounters with the present-day residents of Atwaedagama, I found 
little to suggest an essentially positive orientation to the past described by these authors. Nor did 
I observe anything like a happy acceptance of a trade between a wealth of “craft knowledge” and 
conditions of destitution. While many of my interlocutors were happy to report that poverty in 
the village has diminished considerably in their own lifetimes, they indicated that they identify 
that former poverty with the hana industry. To be clear, this is not to suggest that craftspeople 
and others in Atwaedagama are uniformly bitter toward the variety of activities denoted by “the 
hana industry.” Much like the narratives about them and their work, their sentiments toward the 
industry are multiple and even at times contradictory. Many of those engaged in such activities 
stress their appreciation for the “freedom” (nidahasa) of hana work—the ability to work at one’s 
own pace and while looking after one’s children, for instance—something seen as wanting in 
factory employment and other potentially more lucrative alternatives outside the home. Despite 
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the extent to which they feel the industry’s association with being “low” is reinforced in popular 
and scholarly accounts, several in Atwaedagama in fact voiced a preference for hana work 
because it does not require them to work “under” anyone else. However, in my conversations 
with them, in any case, individuals tended not to reference the industry’s “august origins” in 
expressing such preference. The ambivalence that I found tends to overwhelm expression of such 
liking for the work congeals around a discomfort with aspects of a “past” highlighted in 
contemporary representations of the village and the hana industry.  
To appreciate expressions of this discomfort and the plea that often accompanies them—
to consider the implications that the scholarly and popular fixation on their “history” and 
purported indigeneity has not for the adult residents of Atwaedagama, but for their children—I 
would argue that is necessary to recognize something that neither Someroski nor any of the other 
researchers and writers who descended on the village in the second half of the 20th century could 
have anticipated: to the degree that Atwaedagama’s present-day residents assert their removal 
from the penury that dominates representations of their past, they most commonly attribute such 
improvement not to realizing the “bright future” promised by their engagement in the hana 
industry, but to the alternative opportunities for wealth accumulation that they have met in the 
intervening years. 
In the time since Someroski and others described above visited Atwaedagama, the village 
has transformed in remarkable ways, the most significant and immediately noticeable of which 
as far as its residents are concerned pertains to the quality and durability of the homes to be 
found there. In my written correspondence with Lucky De Silva, he related, “While researching 
and filming Niyanda Rata I stayed almost two weeks in the wattle and daub houses with thatched 
roofs in the village that were so cool. The floors were polished with fresh cow dung. We slept on 
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rattan mats.”  By 2013, only a couple of wattle and daub buildings still existed in Atwaedagama, 
and neither was occupied. When I emailed him a photograph of a house typical of the structures 
that have taken their place, de Silva replied with a statement of his unequivocal aversion toward 
such “awful cement brick houses…now popping up in rural Sri Lanka.” He echoed a relatively 
common reaction among upper-class Sri Lankans as to the transformation from what they tend to 
view as sustainable architectural practices to those largely cement structures encouraged if not 
forced upon people by economic transformation. The residents of Atwaedagama do not share this 
sentiment, however, a fact that is unsurprising when one considers that, as Uyangoda has pointed 
out in discussing the dictates of a “caste-defined rural architecture,” there was a time at which 
those identified as Kinnara were “not supposed to build houses with permanent or 
semipermanent features such as mud or brick walls, or even roofs covered by coconut leaves” 
(Uyangoda 2012:39; see also Gilbert 1953:300).  
In my conversations with them, many in Atwaedagama pointed with pride to the 
structures that have taken the place of their once wattle and daub dwellings. They delighted in 
recalling what they regard as the exceptional generosity of “Premadasa Mahathaya,” or Prime 
Minister and later President Ranasinghe Premadasa, who they credit with this transformation. 
Premadasa’s own low caste status made his rise to power unprecedented in Sri Lankan politics 
and, while I did not encounter the idea in Atwaedagama, it is not unusual for those discussing his 
commitment to policies around rural poverty to invoke the leader’s lowly caste and class 
background to explain his efforts in this regard. In 1986, as part of Premadasa’s ambitious and 
highly controversial national housing development program, The Million Houses Project, 
Atwaedagama’s wattle and daub dwellings—much like such dwellings in hundreds of other 
villages around the country—were replaced with simple but comparatively durable brick and 
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cement block homes. Their roofs are no longer thatched, but made of tile or takaran (corrugated 
metal or asbestos sheeting). When increasing numbers of women from the area began taking 
employment as domestic workers overseas in the mid to late 1980s, the village’s newfound 
wealth was directed toward adding onto these homes or, in some cases, paving them over with 
foundations for entirely new and equally durable structures.42  
For all but a few of Atwaedagama’s present-day residents, the ability to independently 
finance the construction of brick and mortar homes or to add onto those built under Premadasa’s 
development program derives not from their success in the hana industry, but from avenues of 
employment that demand skills far removed from those they are said to have “inherited,” and 
more specifically from labor overseas. In his mid-20th century reports, Raghavan noted that “The 
Kinnaraya” not only “remains rooted to his traditional mooring in out of the way quarters of the 
Island, where even to ferret him out is difficult,” but also possesses “little or no interests outside 
[his] craft” (Raghavan 1962:180; Raghavan 1951:221). Raghavan would undoubtedly be 
surprised by the diversity of employment in Atwaedagama today. Sixty percent of the village’s 
ninety households reported in the last census (2011) to be somehow engaged in the hana 
industry.43 In fact, there are few households in which no one can be said to carry out at least 
some form of hana industry-related activity, whether it be weaving, sewing, making dusters, or 
something else. At the same time, however, there are few households for which earnings from 
such an activity are not just one among several streams of income, the others generally flowing 
from casual labor well beyond their “traditional mooring.” Mat weaving has always been and 																																																								42 Bernardo Brown (2011) documents a comparable phenomenon among Sri Lankan Catholic 
migrant workers in Negombo who, unable to translate wealth earned overseas into upward social 
mobility upon returning home to Sri Lanka, pour their earnings into the construction of large 
homes and the consumption of luxury goods. 43 Unpublished data acquired at the Department of Census and Statistics, Colombo, 2015. 
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continues to be privileged in accounts of “the Kinnara,” and in this sense serves centrally in the 
reification of “the Kinnara” as a social category conceived variously as distinct from and 
belonging but inferior to the Sinhalese. At the same time, however, this occupational diversity 
was documented in the early 1950s and very likely existed much earlier than that. About a 
decade prior to Raghavan’s observations, Ryan reported of the Kinnara in the Kandyan region 
that “their major sources of income are through weaving a particularly attractive mat, and 
through casual labor” (1953:130). 
Today, many men from Atwaedagama take advantage of day labor opportunities in the 
development of roads, housing, and telecommunications infrastructure both locally and in other 
parts of the country. There are several lorry, bus, and three-wheeler drivers, as well as a small 
number of young men and women who have taken up employment in a nearby garment factory. 
Within the village, there is a family that operates a spice grinding business, another that produces 
poultry feed, and several that run small shops or kades.44 By far the most popular form of 
employment beyond the hana industry, however, and the one that most consistently delivers 
good returns to those who engage in it, is that which may be secured overseas (See Chapter 1). 
At the time of my research between 2013 and 2015, at least one person from almost every 
household had either been abroad, was abroad, or was looking forward to going abroad as soon 
																																																								44 It is important to note here that, despite the range of employment opportunities available to 
Atwaedagama’s residents, there is very little in the way of “white-collar” jobs. This is consistent 
with recent findings on the relationship between caste and poverty among the Sinhalese and, in 
particular, with Jabbar’s observation that “the abandoning of caste-based occupations is not a 
sufficient indication of equal upward movement on the social ladder” and that “although the 
practice of hereditary caste occupations has declined substantially, it appears that the type of 
work and status available under the modern occupational hierarchy continues to reflect a caste 
dimension” (Jabbar 2005:16). 
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as her children were old enough.45 Engagement in the hana industry, though ubiquitous in 
Atwaedagama, typically supplements these other sources of household income or is resorted to 
when other opportunities dry up.  
As already indicated, dominant attitudes toward the activities that Atwaedagama 
residents today refer to as hana work are ambivalent. They bear little of the categorical pride to 
which geographer Chandima Daskon, reproducing the post-independence narrative of Kandyan 
craft superiority examined in the previous chapter, writes when she argues that “rural Kandyan 
villages with sufficient traces of traditional culture, skillful craftsmen, and their handiworks” 
may claim “superiority as the proud upholder of traditional customs, religion and national 
cultural identity” (Daskon 2010b:46). (Daskon is referring specifically to artisans in 
Atwaedagama and several other villages around Kandy.) Neither do such dominant attitudes 
conform to the surprising claim made more recently by another author with respect to 
Atwaedagama: “Members of the caste here do not look down upon this age-old occupation of 
theirs and have turned it into a lucrative business” (Hussein 2013:240).  
While it is true that some have turned relatively strong profits from the hana industry, 
they are a small minority. Many more express reservations about the work, and they do so 
precisely because it is so often written about, as it is in Hussein’s remarks, in reference to their 
caste status. Speaking of what he perceived as a decline in the number of people who dedicate 
themselves to the industry rather than to pursuing alternative employment opportunities outside 
																																																								45 In June 2013, the Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment issued a highly controversial 
circular mandating that all women must file a Family Background Report (FBR) before 
departing for overseas domestic employment and banning any woman with a child under the age 
of five from migrating (Jayasundere, Abeyasekera, and Idemegama n.d.:7). 
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of the village, a middle-aged man echoed Damayanthi’s declaration as to the “worthlessness” of 
the industry, noting, “It’s already mostly gone, and we like it like that.”  
I found pointed remarks such as this to be somewhat rare. More common were efforts, 
like that of Damayanthi, to establish a certain distance between oneself and the industry. During 
my initial visits to Atwaedagama, I was struck by the number of men and women who 
downplayed their involvement in or even denied outright that they engage in any sort of activity 
related to the hana industry. Gayan, a man in his early thirties and one of the first individuals I 
met in the village, was one such individual. When I first encountered him, he was standing at the 
edge of a narrow and soon-to-be paved dirt lane, casually engaged in one of the more elemental 
tasks entailed in hana work, preparing a bunch of recently dyed and dried bright orange hana 
fibers for the dusters he makes and sells to small shops and on the street in towns throughout the 
country. With his left hand, he gripped one end of the long fibers and, with the right, vigorously 
brushed out any tangles that might impede his labor later on. Catching his eye, I introduced 
myself and told him of my interest in learning about the work in which he was presently 
engaged. Gayan stuck out his tongue to indicate his displeasure and, kicking gently at the orange 
specks of dust settling at his feet, nodded over his shoulder toward the newly constructed and 
freshly painted lime green home directly behind him. “This,” he explained, turning out his hands 
to offer up his present task, isn’t really what he does. A smile lighting up his face, he related that 
he was in Qatar until recently and that it was with the money he earned as a driver there that he 
has been able to build his own home. “I had a van before, too, but I sold it to finish the house,” 
he noted with satisfaction. In my ensuing conversations with Gayan, many of them, it must be 
noted, carried out while he was sewing dusters in his neighbor’s small weaving workshop, he 
		 	 	 	 151	
would often stress his ability to do “any kind of job,” and would eagerly reminisce about his 
adventure living overseas.  
Assurances like Gayan’s as to the possession of skills beyond those required of the hana 
industry came most often from men in their 20s and 30s. On several occasions, they prompted a 
discussion about what residents perceive as their humiliating portrayal in local newspapers and 
scholarly accounts. Such discussions, which will be the primary focus of the remaining pages of 
this chapter, revealed a wish on the part of many of Atwaedagama’s residents to sever the 
industry from its historically recognized lineage basis, something that, though typically 
highlighted in writing about the industry, they deem irrelevant in the present. As importantly, 
they demonstrated the often creative indirectness with which nearly all my interlocutors in 
Atwaedagama would talk about that thing which, among the Sinhalese, is not to be discussed 
publicly: caste. Whereas a few individuals, including two I shall quote at length, were explicit in 
locating the impetus for such claims to shame in the publication of caste-related details, invoking 
either the Portuguese-derived English term “caste” or the term often regarded as its closest 
Sinhala approximation, kulaya, most were loath to broach the topic so directly. 
Where Caste is Past 
I arrived one afternoon at the home of an elderly widow, Yuvani, to find her sitting in the 
doorway to her small, blue house, bunches of orange and yellow hana fibers strewn across the 
floor behind her. A dozen or so Albizia branches, stripped of their bark and waiting to be shaped 
into smooth cylindrical handles, were neatly arranged against the outer wall of her home. Yuvani 
escorted me through the darkened entry hall behind her, where several more branches lay beside 
a heap of thick, green hana leaves, and into her living room. Pointing fondly to her husband’s 
framed photograph hanging on the wall, she explained how, until about five months prior when 
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he passed away, she had worked alongside him to weave entire mats and then incorporate the 
woven fabric into doll-shaped letter holders that he would either peddle on the street or sell to a 
middleman in the village. Without her partner in a task generally considered to be a two-person 
undertaking, she had given up weaving and was now exclusively making dusters.  
As Yuvani recounted the difficulty she now faced working on her own, a young man 
appeared in the doorway. Introducing him as her neighbor, Yuvani noted off-handedly that the 
man’s wife also made dusters. Turning to me and responding as if I myself had made the 
statement, he declared defensively, “No. Are you crazy? We don’t do it just because she 
[Yuvani] does it. Is this a job? This is no use!” Not long after our meeting, I would meet this 
man’s wife, a bunch of hana draped over her left forearm as she brushed the knots out of 
another, and would come to discover that his mother, Malini, was once regarded as among the 
most highly skilled weavers in the village. In Someroski’s 1968 film, Malini appears as a child 
joyously assisting her own mother in threading her loom. Referring to making dusters as a 
“disgusting job” (jaraa rassawak), her son now dismissed my suggestion that perhaps he finds 
the income insufficient and instead clarified, “This job just doesn’t suit us…there are so many 
other jobs to do, now.” Later, when we were alone again, Yuvani explained her neighbor’s and 
others’ fear that my ultimate intention was to do as they believed other writers have done—that 
is, to “write all these things” and to “look down upon the industry.” His performed abhorrence 
toward the industry stemmed, she suggested, from a belief that, I was like other students and 
scholars who have written of the village in recent years. He feared, in other words, that I would 
ultimately belittle Atwaedagama’s residents by reaffirming the industry’s caste basis or, in her 
words, writing about it “in such a way that it becomes historical” (i.e. reaffirming in the written 
historical record that the industry is caste-based).  
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He’s worried that you’ll write all these things and take it and put it in the papers, right? 
Like you will look down upon the industry [eeka karmaanteyaTa helaadaekimak 
washeyen]. They don’t like it. Even recently there was something written. [Lowers voice] 
It’s like disrespecting one’s race/nationality, right [tamange jaatiyata 
agawuruweyakeranawa wage nee]? …You know, [writing about] it in such a way that it 
becomes historical [itihaasagatawena widiyata owa keranawa]…A lot of people write 
things down and go and write books and publish it in papers, and they do this and that. 
You know, people don’t like it, right? Now, we can say that the elderly people will die 
soon, but what about the next generation?  
 
Before our conversation ended, Yuvani volunteered that it is her own financial desperation that 
motivates her to make dusters: “I don’t want to lie, but I’m doing this because there is no one to 
look after me. I rely on this so that I can at least buy bread. I have two daughters, but they also 
have kids, so they don’t look after me and, after my husband died, I just started doing these 
things to earn something.” 
On another occasion, my research assistant and I had been sitting in the workshop 
adjoining an elderly couple’s home, asking them about the kinds of work in which they had 
engaged as artisans over their lifetimes. As we were chatting, a group of six curious men settled 
into the space to listen to our conversation. Requesting clarification with respect to a division of 
labor across the village, noting that “some people clean hana, some stitch, some do both,” my 
assistant was abruptly cut off when a young man now settled against the brick workshop wall 
interjected, “Some are against it all!” Registering a look of disappointment on our hosts’ faces, I 
reassured them of our admiration for their work and suggested that they must feel proud of their 
abilities. To this, the same man replied with indignation, “You mean we should be proud of this 
job? Oh, man, we are so fed up with it!” Echoing Gayan’s emphasis on his ability to do “any 
kind of job,” he nearly shouted before falling silent, “There are plenty of other jobs that we can 
do!” Several of those present, including our hosts, began to explain his outburst by recounting 
the industry’s portrayal in a recent Sinhala newspaper article. My hostess reiterated how this 
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portrayal had resulted in a reluctance among the area’s residents to speak to students and 
scholars visiting the village (many knew that I had encountered this reluctance and was grappling 
to understand it.) Almost apologizing her for the young man’s behavior, she offered me an 
explanation peppered with references to villagers’ visual depiction in such accounts and to the 
“improper” inclusion of “unnecessary information” in writing about the industry:   
All the people are scared because of the newspaper article. They have taken pictures of 
people shirtless and of how women clean the hana plant and how they prepare the thread. 
Everything is in the papers. It was said like—it was put down in an improper way 
[nomanaa widiyata dalatibba]. We are telling the truth. That’s why nobody likes to give 
information about us. Students from Colombo used to come to get information from us, 
but now nobody likes to give out any details at all. It’s okay to take information and it’s 
even okay to put it in newspapers, but one should know how to put it properly. 
Unnecessary information should not be put in papers. It brings shame upon us 
[lajjaawata patkeranawa]. 
 
A middle-aged man agreed, “[they] come and take ugly pictures of us…[and describe] how this 
job is done by the lineage, how only the people who come from certain families do it.” When 
another noted that their primary concern was with the implications that such representations have 
not for themselves but, more importantly, for their children, an older man sitting beside him 
elaborated, “Right, even when it comes to getting the kids into a school, they will say, ‘Oh, this 
child is from that village, so they are like this and that, so…’ So that’s why [we’re upset].” After 
a young man pointed out that, despite there being several other villages in the area, 
Atwaedagama had been singled out, others agreed, one reiterating that journalists “ridiculed us 
and put it in the paper [charter kerala dala tibe],” and another adding, “It’s a huge disgrace 
[kaelala-black mark, stain, dishonor] for us.” 
Sarath and his wife, Chandi, both in their mid-sixties and reliant upon making and selling 
purses to meet their daily expenses, expressed a similar concern during a conversation in their 
home. “The thing is,” Sarath explained, “[people] come here and write everything, like from the 
		 	 	 	 155	
beginning. How we were born, everything. So, it hurts us, and our children also don’t like it. 
That’s what it is. That’s why it’s not nice. It’s okay to write about the industry, and ‘this is how 
they do the hana work,’ but they write about our lineage, our great grandparents’ time—[for 
example], ‘this is what they did, this is how they did it…’ Some people put everything about our 
racial differences [jaatibheda], this and that [ananmanan], and everything.” 
Ruwan, a man who, along with his wife and several close relatives, would become one of 
my most trusted and generous interlocutors in Atwaedagama, also complained of the popular and 
scholarly preoccupation with the industry’s supposed origins and with the “old ways” associated 
with the area’s residents. On an afternoon in early May 2014, my assistant and I visited him in 
the village’s training center (madhyastaaneya) to see if he could shed some light on the evident 
wariness with which many in the area received “outsiders” like ourselves. When we found him, 
Ruwan was vigorously pumping his foot at an old electric sewing machine. Noting that he had 
found the center without electricity when he arrived in the morning, he was now working 
tirelessly to complete an order for several dozen small change purses. As was always the case, 
however, he welcomed us with a smile and, despite the less-than-ideal working conditions, 
patiently explained:  
Some people collect information and put it in papers and they say this and that [anang 
manang]. We were insulted [sauttukera]…There was a person from Colombo and he 
collected a lot of information and then wrote it a very bad way. In the old way [pause] old 
stories [parana widihata…parana kataa]. He mentioned how it was before, in the olden 
times. 
Q: What do you mean by ‘old stories’? 
What I mean by old ways is how this job came into being. But those are things that are 
not relevant [adaala] to him. Collect the information nicely. That should have been it. 
Q: Why did that upset people in the village? 
The paper said how the job was done in the old ways. How it’s all lineage-based 
[paramparika]. The younger generation doesn’t like that. He mentioned a lot of things 
about the old ways. Things about the olden times [hanamithi kaale] were mentioned. In 
those days, people were very poor. Because those things were mentioned, people didn’t 
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like it. They didn’t even have proper clothing at that time. They wore the amude46…So, 
he had collected that information, all this old news [paranuwa puwat], and put it in the 
newspaper. 
 
As Uyangoda has observed with respect to the Kinnara, “poverty (duppathkama) is an indexical 
reference to both their economic deprivation and social marginalization” (Uyangoda 2013:290; 
See note 36, this chapter). This excerpt from my conversation with Ruwan indicates that the 
shamefulness of such portrayals obtains not only in their highlighting that the industry is based in 
lineage, taken generally as a reference to caste status, but also in their representation of what 
many in the village recall as the severe, caste-based poverty that past residents of the village 
suffered.  
Importantly, the accounts of Ruwan and the others presented here illustrate the 
indirectness and discomfort that I often encountered when it came to identifying the insult at 
hand. While many would readily launch invectives against the writings of “outsiders,” they 
became hesitant and discomposed when our discussions turned to the object of their complaint. 
Like Sarath and others above, my interlocutors in the area would generally not only become 
noticeably quiet when discussing their representation in writings about the village, but also 
would often rely on ambiguous expressions such as “writing in this way” (mehema liyanawa), 
“writing unnecessary things” [ona naeti dee liyanawa], or “writing old things” [parana dee 
liyanawa] to identify the general offense. Combined with references to lineage, poverty, origins, 
and “old ways,” such expressions served as references for caste, something that was not named 
explicitly.  
																																																								46 The amude has been described as “a piece of cloth used to pass between the legs from the 
front to behind for the purse of tucking up the lower garments” (Clough 2010 [1892]: 44). It is 
often translated as a “loin cloth” or “span cloth,” the latter amounting to “a broad cover piece 
hanging in front and a narrow band of cloth at the back” (Lakdusinghe 1999: 21). 
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To relate an especially remarkable instance of such obliqueness, my research assistant, 
Shifna, and I had been having a conversation with a young woman, Roshani, about newspaper 
articles that have referred to the village when the latter complained that writers “demean the job” 
[ee rassaawa baaldukeranawa]. I asked Roshani to clarify what she meant, and with adroit 
circuitousness she explained that the crux of the insult resides in the village residents’ 
identification as socially inferior: “That means, this job…that means, ‘this job is not good for 
you all.’ You know...have you gone to the police station in [the nearby town]? There is another 
village near there, so, like that…we are like that, so,” pausing as if to swallow her words, 
“[they’re saying] that we don’t match their status [tarama].”  
The nearby village to which Roshani refers is known locally to be inhabited by 
individuals identified as “Rodiya,” the only group commonly regarded as inferior to those in 
Atwaedagama in terms of caste status. While making clear that writers don’t simply demean the 
job, but more significantly the people doing that job, Roshani draws on this local knowledge to 
convey her message indirectly, noting in reference to the nearby village, “we are like that.”47 
In addition to using phrases like “mee paramparaawe jatiya” (this kind of lineage) or 
“mee game minissu” (people in/of this village), my interlocutors in Atwaedagama would 
regularly discuss the social difference reinforced in popular and scholarly writings about the 
village by deploying—and even still very hushedly—more ambiguous terms such as jathiya and 
jathibheda, words commonly glossed as “nationality” and “racial differences,” respectively, and, 																																																								47	While the word “Kinnara”—the name used to identify the purported “caste community” to 
which those in Atwaedagama belong—is bandied about in the scholarly and popular writing with 
which residents of the village take issue, I never once heard it invoked by anyone from 
Atwaedagama. This is not unusual in rural Sinhala areas. As sociologist Kalinga Tudor Silva and 
others have pointed out, “caste names are rarely used in public,” individuals often using phrases 
such as “‘our one’ (ape ekkenek) or ‘an outsider’ (pita minihek, pita minissue)” to identify 
themselves or others in terms of caste (Silva, Kotikabadde and Abeywickrama 2009:30). 
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as Stirrat has pointed out with respect to the former, more closely “related to the idea of ‘kind’ or 
‘species’ or ‘variety’” (Stirrat 1982:10).  
Ultimately, it is in reference to caste-based identification or, more specifically, to “the 
subterranean ideology of social superiority and inferiority associated with hierarchically 
imagined caste distinctions” (Uyangoda 2012:36-37), that the full substance of complaints about 
being photographed shirtless or being described as engaged in an industry “passed down from 
generation to generation” comes into focus. Indeed, these two particular grievances refer directly 
to signifiers of social difference long enfolded into practices of caste-based identification among 
the Sinhalese in and around Kandy.  
With regard to the first complaint, toward the end of the 19th century, John Ferguson, 
editor and co-owner of the Ceylon Observer wrote, “the people who consider themselves of the 
higher castes are now on the qui vive in many places to resent those of alleged lower castes 
dressing themselves above the waist” (Ferguson 1887:367). Well into the 20th century, A.P. 
Kannangara writes, “it could be said that the lower one was in the caste hierarchy, the less of 
one’s body one is permitted to be covered [sic]” (Kannangara 2011:170). In 1949, Nandadeva 
Wijesekera called specific attention to Rodiyas and Kinnaras as among “the 
outcastes…prohibited by the villagers from wearing the normal peasant dress” (89), and it is 
likely to such prohibition that Jayadeva Uyangoda refers when he remarks more specifically on a 
recent practice among elderly women identified as Kinnara “not to wear a jacket or a blouse to 
cover the upper part of the body” (Uyangoda 2012:39). The erroneous notion that this particular 
practice is alive today is found in at least some popular literature: In his 2012 Grandeur of the 
Lion, Carl Muller cites Viscount George Velentia’s early 19th century observation that “‘the 
privilege of caste extends to the dress of females’” (Muller 2012: 84-85). “Even today,” Muller 
		 	 	 	 159	
writes, “there is a general feeling that the low caste person should dress with no ostentation and 
women of the Pali, Kinnara and Rodi castes seldom wear a covering over the waist, avoid 
bangles, and the men wear no fancy sarongs, belts or shirts” (Muller 2012: 84-85). In light of 
such disparity in dress, the publication of photographs in which individuals historically regarded 
as among the most degraded of the Sinhalese castes are shown without their shirts may be 
understood as having a particular salience.48  
The “caste structure” of the Kandyan kingdom is commonly regarded as “essentially a 
system of labour organization,” castes being “endogamous occupational groups” whose 
membership “was determined by birth alone” (Dewaraja 1988:288). It is fitting, then, that an 
emphasis on the lineage basis of this “traditional craft” would also be interpreted as a concern 
with status. We might recall here not only Damayanthi’s effort to distance herself from an image 
of lineage-based, generation-to-generation transmission of weaving knowledge, but also the 
aforementioned claims to occupational latitude made by many of the young men in 
Atwaedagama.  
Unfortunately, as indicated above, such claims to occupational latitude say nothing of the 
role that caste status continues to play in one’s opportunities of occupational mobility. None of 
the alternative forms of employment in which residents of Atwaedagama are engaged would 
qualify as “white collar.” In the late 1990s, anthropologist Bob Simpson wrote, “[T]here is a 
progressive backing away from hereditary, stigmatized occupations among the low castes…such 
that the last vestiges of caste-based identity are rapidly being expunged” (Simpson 1997:44). As 
Jabbar notes, however, although there may be a general decline in the “practice of hereditary 
																																																								48 Also see Lakdusinghe 1999. 
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caste occupations…it appears that the type of work and status available under the modern 
occupational hierarchy continues to reflect a caste dimension” (Jabbar 2005:16).  
Initially confused as to why emphasis on the hana industry’s generation-to-generation 
transmission would be so troubling to them, I would often ask my interlocutors in Atwaedagama 
whether what we were talking about (without naming it as such) was in fact caste. While they 
would almost always nod their heads vigorously in confirmation, few would voluntarily 
enunciate the words “caste” or “kulaya” themselves. The indirectness and evidential discomfort 
with which they tended to broach the topic is remarkable because it typifies the very norm whose 
violation may be said to underlie the impassioned misgivings these residents harbor toward the 
journalists, scholars, and students who visit the village in the first place. For most Sinhalese, 
Jiggins writes, the discursive status of “caste” resembles that of “sex in Victorian society”: It is a 
“‘taboo’ subject, and rarely spoken of openly” (Jiggins 1979:7).  
One of the central reasons for this silence around caste, which, as I will argue, ultimately 
serves to disadvantage those in Atwaedagama who reproduce it, is that, as detailed in the 
introduction to this dissertation, caste is publicly regarded as, if not already in the past, then fast 
on its way there. Lakshman, a man who, as a skilled weaver, was highly regarded by all I met in 
Atwaedagama and someone who expressed a sharp sense of betrayal by one scholar who had 
visited and written about the area, both echoed this sense and demonstrated how his own 
grievances have been discounted as a result of it.  
Lakshman was unusually forthright with me in discussing the portrayal of backwardness 
that he and others find in dominant representations of the village. In one of our conversations 
about the issue, he began with an oft-repeated account of the industry’s caste-based origins. 
Going on to highlight the popularization of another historically caste-based practice, Kandyan 
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dancing and drumming, Lakshman criticized what he regards as the inclination among scholars 
to discriminately reinforce the link between such origins and the hana industry as it exists in 
Atwaedagama today: 
Of course, in Sri Lanka, when you take an industry from the beginning—there was a 
division of labor [waeda wasankremaya] fifty years ago…These industries belonged to 
several castes [kula]. It had been divided like that [venkera tibuna], but in the present 
[warthamaaneya] nobody likes it because now people even play the drum. Even though it 
belongs to a caste, even school children play the drum and dance. So, when this is the 
situation, which was not the case in the past, and they single us out and publish 
something about us in the paper, nobody likes it. So, when they see these things in the 
paper—you know, people come from universities to get information about our traditions 
and our lifestyle—those things are not necessary, right? They write down those kinds of 
things. I mean, things like habits and customs and traditions and language. So, they write 
and publish all of these things…Now, you see, this is a changing society, and we don’t 
just stay the same from day to day. In the past [yata giya dawas], like fifty years ago, 
society was very different… So, when they try to equate what the society was like then to 
what it’s like now, there will be problems! 
 
Lakshman was evidently troubled by what he perceives as scholars’ failure to admit changes in 
Atwaedagama, or to admit that what “society” was like “in the past” is not what it is like today. 
He decries such scholars’ neglect of the dissolution of a once-dominant caste-based division of 
labor (waeda wasankremaya) among the Sinhalese. To Lakshman, this dissolution is exhibited in 
the widely known popularization of ritual dancing and drumming, or what Susan Reed has 
described as the “classicization” and “rationalization” processes through which practices “once 
regarded solely as the province of low-caste Berava males became respectable within the context 
of Sinhala nationalism” (Reed 2002:247). In theory if not in actuality, this transformation of 
dancing and drumming signals the success of efforts described in Chapter 2 to purify the 
“traditional arts and craft” of caste and to render them valuable as expressions of a national 
heritage to be engaged in and shared by all Sri Lankans. There is a subtle contradiction in 
Lakshman’s account, however, that illustrates one way in which this nationalist vision of 
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heritage articulates with concerns with caste-based identification that, despite and perhaps even 
in part owing to the post-independence discursive sanitization of the “traditional arts,” are very 
much alive today. While things may not be as they were “fifty years ago” when there was a 
“division of labor,” the fact that suggesting otherwise has real implications, as Lakshman and his 
son would go on to indicate, points to the salience of caste in the present. When I asked 
Lakshman whether he had complained to anyone about the village’s representation in the 
publication with which he took greatest issue, he explained:  
I didn’t know about this book, but then I learned about it. There was this person who 
worked in Kadawatta. He got this book and he showed it to me and he said, ‘Look, 
there’s something being published about us, so look at it.’ So, I saw it and some others 
also read it and got really angry about it. After that, I gave [the author] a call and told 
him, ‘You even had tea at our place! We had a connection, we had a relationship, and 
you came to me and I helped you.’ I told him that what he had done was wrong and he 
said, ‘Oh, it’s not a problem for you all.’ [I said], ‘Well, look at the people who are 
politicians and big people—do you think that they would like their things [eyaalage 
dewal] to be published? Even you wouldn’t want such things to be published! So, it’s the 
same for us as well.’ 
 
The publication of “old things,” Lakshman explained, has induced the distaste that many in the 
village now express for the industry: “Now, see, our father’s generation also did this industry and 
we had that pride in us, but then, now, when the old things [parana dewal] come out in papers, 
even our children refuse to continue it.” Lakshman’s son, Nimal, agreed with his father and, 
echoing Yuvani’s complaint above, stressed a tendency for “people who come from campus” to 
engage in a thoughtless repetition of what they read about “the past.” “They read about us in 
books and they already have an idea in their heads,” he explained. “They come here and they see 
something completely different, but instead of reporting the things that they see, they report the 
things that they already have in their heads.” Nimal likened this vast difference between “the 
things written in those books and what you see when you walk through this society” to that 
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between “the sky and the earth.” To Nimal and his father, the fact that Atwaedagama’s economic 
development since the 1960s and 1970s doesn’t figure in such scholarly portrayals of the village 
is rooted in a sociological preoccupation not with the hana industry, but with “the society doing 
that industry.” Reflecting on the relative prosperity that his family has met, Nimal referred to a 
higher-caste childhood classmate who “is now at a lower level than we are.” “We have gone a 
little ways [api tikak dure gihilla inne],” he explained, “so how things were in those days is very 
different from how things are now.” When his father noted writers’ focus on “things about our 
society [samaaja toraturu],” Nimal elaborated:  
They observe our society [apee samaajeya] and go and talk about our society. They come 
only for that, to gather that information. Now see, in campus there is a subject called 
‘sociology’ [samaaja widyaawa], right? In that subject, they don’t talk about the industry. 
They talk about the society doing that industry and things like that…so, they come to get 
information like that. But they have previously read things about it and already have an 
idea that they bring with them. 
 
The charge that journalists and scholars simply reproduce what they find in “old books” is not 
unfounded. Sri Lanka’s Divaina newspaper’s 2013 publication of an article titled “The Kinnara 
Community of Sri Lanka” (Sri Lankaawe Kinnara Jatayaa) is an exemplary instance. Praising 
recent efforts by local newspapers and scholars to “impart a great deal of important information 
and knowledge regarding Sri Lankan culture and lifestyles to future generations,” the author 
relies almost exclusively on late 19th and early to mid-20th century texts to convey precisely the 
portrait that Lakshman and his son find so troubling (Athukorala 2013). The article includes two 
photographs. The first is of a small family going about their work in front of a thatch-roofed, 
wattle and daub structure. A young girl and the toddler she hold look at the camera while a 
shirtless man, presumably their father, squats at her left and slices into a large jackfruit. His wife, 
smiling, pounds rice while a small boy, squatting beside her in just a loincloth, rests his eyes and 
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fingertips on the sandy ground. In the second photograph, a shirtless man and a woman hold up 
woven mats for the camera. Through these images and un-contextualized references to 19th and 
early 20th century intellectuals like Wilhelm Geiger, M.D. Raghavan, James Emerson Tennent, 
and Ananda Coomaraswamy, we are introduced to “The Kinnara.” The bulk of the text is 
comprised of direct quotations from and paraphrases of Reverend Wimalawansa’s Apee 
Sanskruktiya (Our Culture)(1964), Nandadeva Wijesekera’s Veddas in Transition (1964), and 
Degammăda Sumanajōti’s Saelelehini Saŋdeshaya (1957). Citing Wijesekera in particular, the 
author of the piece remarks that members of this “very strange group of people…lead a very 
miserable life” and, noting that “they are usually looked down upon as low caste people,” locates 
“an unresolved mystery” in the fact that “people of such disgraceful origins are able to produce 
graceful mats” (Athukorala 2013). Before concluding that “the media” bears responsibility for 
“bridging the gap between tradition and modernity and also the gap between social groups,” the 
author stresses that “it is important to not neglect primitive communities and their cultures in the 
journey towards a global society” (Athukorala 2013).  
Lakshman and Nimal’s accounts give a relatively coherent form to the anger, resentment, 
and sense of humiliation that incite so many in Atwaedagama to refuse to speak to the scholars 
and students who have visited the village in recent years and have subsequently written accounts 
such as Athukorala’s. It is crucial to note, however, that the writings with which they take issue 
are the products of individuals whose actions, like those of the Atwaedagama residents who feel 
humiliated by them, are thoroughly conditioned by these individuals’ own structural 
situatedness. That is, they are conditioned by the fact that they are often in conversation with 
broader, globally resonant notions regarding cultural preservation. These writings, for instance, 
are in fact often consistent with narratives of cultural loss that, just as they were at the time of the 
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1956 conference on “traditional culture,” remain central in transnational efforts around the 
protection of traditional arts and knowledge. As just one of countless examples, take UNESCO’s 
recent statement on “Globalization and Culture”: “While [globalization] promotes the integration 
of societies and has provided millions of people with new opportunities, it may also bring with it 
a loss of uniqueness of local culture” (UNESCO 2016). This potential for loss, the author adds, 
“is especially true for traditional societies and communities, which are exposed to rapid 
‘modernization’ based on models imported from outside and not adapted to their context” 
(UNESCO 2016).  
The authors of the publications in which individuals in Atwaedagama see their caste-
based humiliation, I would argue, are as much persuaded by narratives of such loss as the 
scholars considered in the introduction to this dissertation are by the notion that liberalist 
political and economic development will necessarily deliver the demise of caste. It is in part an 
envisioned authenticity of “the old ways,” not a desire to offend, that motivates their 
reproduction of the accounts that Atwaedagama’s residents resent so wholeheartedly. 
Such writers’ documentation of what they view as the true social history of hana craft 
production also aligns with broader transnational calls for the respectful consideration of the 
various “contexts” of craft industries around the world. In a paper published jointly by UNESCO 
and the Craft Revival Trust, for instance, UNESCO Chief Indrasen Vencatachellum writes, 
“Crafts stem from a relationship between humans and their environment within their historical, 
cultural, and social contexts,” and argues that this “intimate relationship should be understood 
and respected by designers attempting to develop crafts” (Craft Revival Trust, Artesanías de 
Colombia S.A. and UNESCO 2005:vi).  
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 An instance of the articulation considered more generally here between broader 
narratives of heritage and caste-based identification, however, the documentation of such 
“contexts” does not translate universally as a demonstration of “respect of [‘artisanal 
communities’’] cultural identity” (Craft Revival Trust, Artesanías de Colombia S.A. and 
UNESCO 2005:vi). Indeed, what is privileged as “context” itself emerges in and out of local 
histories and patterns of meaning making. Such local histories complicate efforts toward the 
understanding and respect championed by entities like UNESCO. In Atwaedagama, in fact, 
many expressly view concerns with “context” or, as it is often described, the “unnecessary 
information” that typically surfaces in accounts about the industry, as disrespectful. When I 
inquired of Lakshman and Nimal what they might say in response to the students and scholars 
whom they regard as willfully blind to the changes that Atwaedagama has undergone over the 
last half century, Lakshman began, “This is the thing: they can write about the industry, but 
things that are with the industry [karmante eka tiyena dee], like, you know…” After trailing off 
momentarily into a soft murmur, signaling the unspeakableness of the matter at hand, he 
clarified, “what I’m saying is, for example, a person who plays the drum [bera] or dances, they 
also belong to some kind of caste. But they don’t talk about that. So, that’s the thing.” 
The Work of Humiliation 
There is a logic not only to the claim of humiliation that so many in Atwaedagama make, 
but also to concomitant expressions of disdain toward the work that, as Lakshman points out, 
their grandfathers also did. Gananath Obeyesekere’s writing on the “socialization of shame” 
among the Sinhalese is informative in this regard. Such socialization is not only ultimately 
generative of “anxiety or fear of ‘exposure’ to the contumely and scorn of others,” but also 
“leave[s] the individual particularly vulnerable to loss of self-esteem” (Obeyesekere 
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1984:502;504). A resulting sensitivity to “status precedence,” he argues, engenders a certain 
dread among many Sinhalese of “slights and ridicule especially in public” (Obeyesekere 
1984:506; emphasis in original). Given that, as Obeyesekere and others point out, “humiliation in 
public through posters, notices and the media is not uncommon” in Sri Lanka, there are actual 
precedents for the insult that Atwaedagama’s residents perceive in writings about themselves 
(Matthews 2004:92). To further appreciate their interpretation of and reactions to such writings, 
however, it is also important to recognize that the oblique identification of another’s low caste 
status is not a tactic that is unheard of when it comes to such public acts of defamation. As an 
example of this, Bruce Matthews explains how, when political scientist Jayadeva Uyangoda’s 
article series, “Inequality and the Hierarchy,” was published in the early 1990s, an “angry critic” 
wrote in a letter published in the The Island newspaper, “‘We know who your parents are,’” a 
move that Uyangoda subsequently interpreted as an assault intended to “publicly humiliate and 
silence him by identifying his caste” (Matthews 2004:92). 
Even presumably innocent public disclosures of individuals’ low caste status have 
prompted what might seem severe and perhaps even unintelligible reactions when considered 
without reference to the subtle ways in which concerns with caste identification continue to 
operate in Sri Lanka (a phenomenon that, we’ll recall, has prompted sociologist Kalinga Tudor 
Silva to call caste a “hidden identity” among the Sinhalese (Silva 1999:212)). Lakshman’s 
challenge to one author to acknowledge that he, not to mention “politicians and big people,” 
would not want his “things” to be aired publicly, for instance, recalls the Government of Sri 
Lanka’s reported 1989 deportation of a Canadian journalist for noting what were subsequently 
described in one article as the “humble origins” of the country’s first low caste President, 
Ranasinghe Premadasa (1988-1993). Recounting the episode, the journalist, a correspondent for 
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Toronto’s The Globe and Mail, conveyed the grievousness of the supposed slight thus: “‘Under 
the darkest days of President Marcos, I described him as a killer and a thug, and was never 
expelled from the Philippines…And yet here I simply accurately mention the caste of the 
President and get thrown out’” (Nuttall 1989:10). It is perhaps none too surprising that even 
Premadasa’s long-time friend and biographer, Bradman Weerakoon, makes no mention of caste 
in his book, Premadasa of Sri Lanka: A Political Biography (1992), published shortly before 
Premadasa’s assassination in 1993. If caste, particularly for those who are deemed low caste, is 
regarded as something best kept private, and if shame, as Herzfeld puts it, “centers on the 
revelation of matters considered as unfit for wider consumption,” then the claims to humiliation 
that we find in Atwaedagama are perhaps most productively read as entirely suitable reactions 
(Herzfeld 1987:64). 
Atwaedagama residents’ claims to humiliation are not just fitting reactions to their 
representation in popular and scholarly writing, however. They are also claims to status. For 
these men and women to claim the capacity for humiliation is to also claim a sentiment typically 
denied to low caste people in Sri Lanka. This sentiment, lajja-baya (literally “shame fear,” 
meaning “‘fear of ridicule or disapproval’”) is something low caste people are said not to have 
(Obeyesekere 1984:504). As Obeyesekere elaborates, “In Sinhala society, the higher a family’s 
social position, the greater the preoccupation with lajja-baya in socialization, and it reaches its 
epitome in educated urban people” (Obeyesekere 1984:504). If, as he explains, such variations in 
preoccupation with lajja-baya are gauged by one’s “[sensitivity] to the reaction of others who 
may shame them” (Obeyesekere 1984:504), then to claim that one has been shamed is to 
therefore also assert that one had status in the first place.  
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There are two primary and revelatory ways in which residents’ interpretations of popular 
and scholarly representations of Atwaedagama, and the reactions that they are held to justify, are 
challenged by individuals who have visited or written about the village in recent years. First, 
such visitors and writers do not interpret the grievances detailed above as reasonable reactions to 
the public disclosure of sensitive information, or as demonstrations of what Natalie Kwok 
describes in her own work on shame as the “acute self-consciousness and often painful 
inadequacy which arises when one is exposed…to the critical gaze of others” (2012:29). Such 
interpretations would require an acknowledgement of caste. Rather, they see these grievances as 
further evidence of the lowliness of those who express such complaints. They view them as 
proof, in other words, that at a moment in which the logic of a market economy and the promises 
of liberal democracy are publicly held to reign supreme, there are some who simply can’t seem 
to “get over” caste. The second and closely related challenge to Atwaedagama residents’ 
complaints stems from the convergence of popular attitudes toward caste as “not a problem” or 
“a thing of the past” and caste’s sanitized portrayal in scholarly and popular writing as something 
stripped of any discriminatory potential. We have already seen an instance of the latter 
phenomenon in the National Craft Council’s characterization of “caste” as meaning “crafts or 
professions.” 
Ayomi, an employee in the Kandy office of the Department of Industrial Development 
and Enterprise Promotion, had visited Atwaedagama some years prior to our meeting in the 
hopes of collecting data both in her capacity as a government officer and as a master’s student 
studying Sri Lanka’s “traditional handicrafts.” Relating the suspicion that she encountered and 
the reluctance of the area’s residents to speak with her, she explained very quietly but matter-of-
factly that the problem was “because of their caste. They’re at the bottom, right? So they always 
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suspect that others are trying to get them—it’s in their blood.” Noting that it has been less than 
two hundred years since the British overthrew the last ruler of the Kandyan Kingdom, an event 
marking the beginning of caste’s demise, in Ayomi’s opinion, she went on, “That means that it 
has only been a few generations since then, so, do you think that the things that are rooted in 
them will go away anytime soon? No. It will take around fifty to a hundred years!”  
Sanuthi, a young Goyigama (high caste) student from a neighboring village who was 
writing her undergraduate thesis on rural development, related that she selected Atwaedagama 
for her studies because its residents “live as a backward community” [eyaala godak pasugami 
widiyaTa jiiwatwenna janakotaasheya]. When I asked what she meant by “backward,” she 
replied: 
When you compare them to the people who live around them, in every way they are 
backward. Like, the way I understood it was, they are not interested in developing their 
economy and making their lifestyle any better [ee kiyanne maTa terenne widiyeta eyalla 
economyeka developkeregena eyaalaTa honda lifestyle-ekak hadanne uwamanaawak 
naehae]. 
 
I pressed Sanuthi further, asking how she could tell that her neighbors were “not interested in 
developing their economy.” Her response revealed a core contradiction in her assessment of the 
area and indicated the predicament that Atwaedagama’s residents face in their efforts to set caste 
aside: 
Well, one thing is that they don’t want to develop their business. And the other thing is, 
when we went there, they wanted to charge us for showing us how they do the industry. 
And they try to sell whatever items they have, thinking that we might buy those items. 
Those are the kinds of expectations that they have. They always consider their economic 
objectives, but they don’t want to protect their culture or take it forward. They have no 
interest in that. 
 
At the same time that Sanuthi reports her neighbors’ lack of interest in “developing their 
economy,” then, she also criticizes them for being, as she sees it, entirely money-driven. In this, 
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Sanuthi not only reproduces the notion that Atwaedagama residents are responsible for the 
reproduction of heritage claimed for the nation, but also echoes that strand of Sinhalese 
nationalist ideology privileging a “non-commercial image of the essence of Sinhalese culture” 
(an image linked, as Moore and others have argued, to post-independence “statist, anti-capitalist 
economic policies”) (Moore 1997:62).  More significantly, as we will recall from Chapter 2, this 
orientation to commerce was linked to the early-to-mid-20th century idealization of craftspeople. 
That idealization, promoted perhaps most forcefully by Coomaraswamy, figured artisans as 
individuals who, unlike “men who take only a pecuniary interest in the productions of their 
factories,” are fundamentally devoted to their craft for its own sake. On the other hand, while 
Sanuthi indicated that her would-be informants are concerned solely with the financial profit that 
their encounters with her might bring, she does not consider that such a motive might underlie 
their reluctance to freely share information about their work (that, in other words, the 
information might be made available to her for a price). Explaining that her neighbors in 
Atwaedagama “hide a lot of things from us when we talk to them,” Sanuthi suggested that the 
“reason could be because of their culture [‘cultural’]—or because of their caste issue.” To point 
to one contradiction here, while lamenting a disinterest on the part of the village’s residents to 
“protect their culture,” Sanuthi suggests ultimately that it is because of their “culture” that they 
are reluctant to give information away freely. The paradox recalls the discursive contradictions 
around dynamism encountered in Chapter 2. More germane to the present discussion, however, 
is the fact that Sanuthi ultimately attributes this reluctance to share information to caste, 
something she described as “a big problem in their minds” [loku awula egolange ‘mindeke’].  
A Sri Lankan design student completing her degree at a European university reported 
similar challenges in carrying out her research. Like Sanuthi, and echoing mid-20th century 
		 	 	 	 172	
scholars Pieris and Jayasuriya’s identification of caste as an impediment to the development of 
the arts and crafts (see Chapter 2), she pointed ultimately to caste as the reason why, as she sees 
it, the local industry is flagging. Efforts to “sustain the craft,” she explained, are encumbered by 
“the caste system that prevails in the Dumbara weaving, especially in Atwaedagama.”  
Each of these students explain the reticence they encounter in Atwaedagama (reticence 
that, I should reiterate, I too encountered) by suggesting that the concerns with caste-based 
identification emanated from or constituted a feature of the village or the industry itself (take, for 
instance, the simple phrase, “rooted in them”49). In a Catch-22, then, the very strategies that 
Atwaedagama’s residents deploy—silence, avoidance, denial of knowledge—in the hopes of 
securing a position of integrity in a situation that they feel is otherwise beyond their control, are 
																																																								49 The notion of caste as being “rooted in them” effectively places the reproduction of concerns 
with caste-based identification at the feet of those already regarded as low. I encountered similar 
ideas among certain scholars of handicraft industries as well as among actors differently situated 
within them (as, for instance, buyers, designers, and government officers). A buyer at one of the 
major crafts emporia in Colombo, for example, argued that an apparent tendency among the 
“younger generation” of individuals deemed inheritors of lineage-based artisan knowledge to 
“shirk” their presumed duties as artisans was due to their “bad attitude.” Those who turned away 
from their “inherited profession,” he explained, suffered from an unhealthy preoccupation with 
the historical caste-basis of the “traditional crafts” and were therefore incapable of recognizing 
the virtue of craft production. We find something similar in recent a master’s thesis on the 
“nature, problems and challenges” of the handicraft industry in Sri Lanka for the Department of 
Geography at Norwegian University of Science and Technology. Noting that, “after 
independence…the importance of the caste system became weak and an opportunity was opened 
for anyone to learn any knowledge,” the Sri Lankan author writes: “Craftsmen, who engage in 
the traditional crafts impart their knowledge and skills handed down from father to son, from 
generation to generation. But the present younger generation of these families seems to refuse to 
accept the family profession and has endangered the continuity of crafts” (Masakorala 
2002:56;73). In this formulation, the choice among young would-be artisans to pursue alternative 
and what they regard as less stigmatized modes of employment is figured as a selfish 
relinquishment of duty that threatens the country’s “traditional crafts.” In these respects, the 
burden placed upon such individuals is two-fold: to conserve the traditional crafts and, at the 
same time, to “get over” the caste-based origins of such industries. If, as is suggested, caste is a 
“thing of the past,” then any failure to achieve the latter may be attributed to nothing other than a 
combination of shortsighted self-interest and backward reactionism. 
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read not as justifiable acts in accordance with local norms governing the proper disclosure of 
caste details, but as confirmation of their lowly and backward status. It is possible that these 
residents’ silence has the unintended consequence of impelling students who wish to write about 
Atwaedagama or the hana industry to turn instead to “old books” and thus reproduce the 
narratives of social difference that these residents deem so problematic.  
A second and closely related source of trouble for claims to humiliation in Atwaedagama, 
and one in which we find a similar instance of residents’ unintentional collusion, pertains to the 
popular portrayal of caste as an “old thing” out of place in a modern Sri Lanka. Kalinga Tudor 
Silva, quoting Benedict Anderson, describes the 20th century promulgation of an “ethno-
nationalist conceptualization of ‘a deep horizontal comradeship,’” or an “egalitarian ethos” 
among the Sinhalese (Silva 1999:212). The convergence of this promulgation with what political 
scientist Jayadeva Uyangoda (1999) has characterized as a widespread public denial of caste’s 
significance in a modern liberal democracy provides steady ground for the ubiquitous claim 
among many I encountered during my fieldwork in and around Kandy that caste is “not a 
problem.” While it is not unchallenged, there is a popularity to the notion espoused even by some 
scholars that, as historian Mahinda Somathilake put it, “in the context of a modern society…a 
person who was compelled to be known as a man of low caste [can] now…raise himself in the 
spheres of educational, economic, political and social status” (1998:358).  
In her work on artisans in Atwaedagama and other areas around Kandy, Daskon adopts 
an orientation similar to that of Somathilake. While noting that in “historical Sri Lankan society, 
caste was an important factor,” she explains that, in “the context of present day Kandyan 
communities,” it is not considered significant and therefore not relevant to her analysis of 
“cultural traditions” as “real assets” (Daskon 2010a:16). At the same time, Daskon notes that 
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“caste-based professions, Kandyan ancestry and traditional craftsmanship are crucial 
determinants of these groups” (Daskon 2010b:50). Quoting a “key government informant,” she 
accepts without reservation that Kandyan “‘traditional craft communities,’” as “‘a separated 
‘group’ distinguished by their crafts, knowledge and even in their behaviour, social attitudes and 
caste,” simply “‘understand things differently than we do’” (Daskon 2010b:50). While espousing 
the very notion of cultural “set-apartness” criticized by residents of Atwaedagama, Daskon 
avoids the suggestion of social inferiority with which they and others in the village take issue. To 
the extent that caste is relevant, she argues, it is figured “positively as a ‘social honour and 
prestige’ of these communities rather than as an ideology that stratifies the society” (Daskon 
2010a:16-17). The implications of caste-based identification are by no means exhausted by the 
experiences of those whose voices we hear in the above discussion. However, Daskon’s 
generalization and its purported application to Atwaedagama at best conceals and at worst 
delegitimizes the more complicated and indeed harmful consequences that the persistence of 
caste-based identification may have for contemporary artisans in the very villages about which 
she writes. 
I encountered a similar understanding of caste’s irrelevance with regard to contemporary 
instances of discrimination in a conversation I had with the author of the offending article who, 
upon hearing Lakshman’s complaints about his depiction of Atwaedagama in a publication on 
Sri Lanka’s “indigenous peoples,” reassured him that the representation was “not a problem” for 
the village and its residents. Echoing a common refrain among many Sinhalese that 
considerations regarding caste status are limited to the domain of matrimonial matchmaking—
that, to cite an (erroneous) example he found expedient, one would never in contemporary Sri 
Lanka witness someone refusing the food of someone lower in caste status than himself—the 
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author stated adamantly and sincerely that the grievances of Lakshman and others in the village 
are unfounded. At the same time, however, and to return to an issue raised already, he concluded 
that their sensitivity just confirms their low and backward thinking—that is, their inability to let 
go of caste.   
Emerging from a structural position in which the reality and consequences of caste-based 
identification are less salient, this author’s denial of the legitimacy of Atwaedagama’s residents’ 
claim to humiliation as illegitimate is not to be understood here as an instance of malice or 
willful misapprehension. This denial relies in fact upon the same logic implied by such residents’ 
general characterization of the insult at hand: that is, that it has to do with the publication of “old 
things.” More pointedly, it relies on the notion that caste is a thing of the past. As we saw earlier, 
Lakshman refers to the popularization of Kandyan dancing and drumming to suggest the limits 
of caste distinctions in present-day Sri Lanka and, by extension, what he sees as the 
inappropriateness of referring to such distinctions when writing about the hana industry. 
Likewise, the author who Lakshman believes has betrayed his trust suggests that, caste being a 
“thing of the past,” claims of humiliation or marginalization that make reference to caste are 
unfounded. In both accounts, we find the confidence to which Uyangoda refers when he writes, 
“even raising the question of intercaste equality in the public domain is stigmatized in the belief 
that Sri Lankan society is adequately egalitarian not to make caste-centric demands public” 
(Uyangoda 2012:88). When I inquired of a local government officer about a rumor I had heard 
that some of Atwaedagama’s residents had sought to bring a lawsuit against one of the authors 
who had written about them, she explained the impossibility of such an endeavor by referring to 
a general legal proscription against caste-based discrimination as a pre-emption to such a course 
of action. Indicating the contemporary significance of caste-based identification, she stressed 
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both the “reality” of caste and the “reality” of its public disavowal to accomplish the sort of 
stigmatization described by Uyangoda:  
There couldn’t be a lawsuit because you can’t talk about caste or mention it because, in 
reality, one’s caste cannot be mentioned anywhere. Because, even if that’s the reality, we 
cannot mention caste. We can’t reprimand people just because of their caste. We can’t 
scold them by saying that they are of a low caste. In those days, there were Berava, Padu, 
Panna, Kinnara, Rodi—these people are Kinnara—write that down. They are Kinnara.  
 
In the instance with the author recounted above, in fact, the mere suggestion on the part of “low 
caste” individuals that their public representation as such will adversely affect them and their 
children elicits a delegitimizing response that says, “That is absurd because we all know that we 
are beyond caste.” In a place where, as Uyangoda argues, caste is publicly refused “as a source of 
social prejudice and violation of group rights” (Uyangoda 2012:88), the idea affording this and 
other authors the latitude to write freely about Atwaedagama’s residents’ “unnecessary 
information” is the very notion—caste is a thing of the past—that renders his account so 
disagreeable to its subjects. In the event, we find a recapitulation of the suggestion that a concern 
with caste is somehow a feature of the village or the industry itself. This suggestion evokes 
something Satish Deshpande (2013) and Ajantha Subramanian have elaborated upon with 
respect to caste in India, or the “persistence of caste privilege in the form of castelessness,” 
where “upper castes are naturalized as the ‘legitimate inheritors of modernity’ while lower castes 
are hyper-visible as the illegitimate purveyors of caste” (Subramanian 2015: 294-295). 
Importantly, the logic at work here recalls the discursive handling of traditional craft explored in 
Chapter 2. There, we saw how early post-independence scholars figured (low caste) artisans as 
individuals naturally averse to change, a quality lending to the latter’s simultaneous designation 
as bearers of tradition and as incapable of seeing that tradition through a course of adaptation to 
modern conditions. While in this contemporary Sri Lankan instance it becomes the privilege of 
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one untouched by caste-based discrimination—one who, for instance, need not worry that his 
own children will be ostracized or treated unfairly in school because they are regarded as 
essentially “low"—to deny caste, it becomes the burden of those who do fear such treatment to 
affirm its relevance in their own lives. Ultimately, this affirmation is itself taken as 
demonstrative of their distinctly non-modern and “low thinking.”  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have examined some of the ways in which Atwaedagama’s 
distinctiveness in the popular and scholarly imagination has been reproduced over the course of 
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The ethnographic material detailed above represents a 
significant departure from what I discussed in the preceding chapter as the mid-20th century ideal 
of crafts sanitized of caste, and more importantly of crafts as fundamentally symbolic of a 
unified and homogenous nation of Ceylonese. Through a consideration of exchanges that have 
centered on the area and its residents’ representation in journalistic and scholarly accounts, we 
have seen how those both within and beyond Atwaedagama share a responsibility not only for 
the reproduction of caste as a relevant category of identification, but also for the reproduction of 
the general silence around this category of identification. In the following chapters, 4 and 5, 
which focus on some of the more immediately local ways in which Atwaedagama’s set-apartness 
is both challenged and reinforced in the present, I examine a wider range of circumstances in 
which this reproduction—and the contradictions it so often entails—is unfolding in the present. 
 To summarize, I began this chapter with a description of an instance in which I 
encountered Atwaedagama’s residents’ reactions to the village’s and their representation in 
contemporary writing. My intention in the ensuing pages was to situate such writing in terms of 
Atwaedagama’s mid- to late 20th century consolidation as a research site for those interested not 
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only in an ostensibly ancient and traditional handicraft, but also in a population thought to be 
characterized by its socio-temporal particularity. As I have shown here, the area’s present day 
residents perceive restatements of this particularity in contemporary scholarly and popular 
writing as neither gratuitous marketing for the heritage craft in which they engage, nor as 
welcome statements of the sort of “identity-as-difference” that could be used to “carve out 
specific niches of value production” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009:4).  
That it might be otherwise is not inconceivable. Toward the end of my stay in 
Atwaedagama, I met a designer, Nimal, who, having worked with a weaver in the village to 
develop a business catering to an “upscale” market for woven wallets and other hana-based 
accessories, envisioned for Atwaedagama something very much like the “identity incorporation” 
described by John and Jean Comaroff in their Ethnicity, Inc. (2009:5). In a discussion of the 
area’s residents’ negative response to their representation in contemporary writing, Nimal 
suggested a solution: Rather than be ashamed of or “hide” their identification as Kinnara, the 
men and women of Atwaedagama ought to be proud of it and, seizing its marketing potential, use 
it to harvest “the economic power of cultural difference” (Colloredo-Mansfeld 2011:51). There 
are few in Atwaedagama, however, who seem willing to “concoct traditionality and re-create 
archaisms to fit the cultural stereotype of outsiders” in the hopes of profiting from a global “cult 
of heritage” (Forshee 2001:4; Lowenthal 1998:1). Nimal’s suggestion that the area’s residents try 
such an approach accords with the fact that, in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, a 
“globalizing idea of culture,” in proving “useful for generating income and securing recognition, 
particularly for indigenous peoples,” has in many places driven a “proliferation of essentialist 
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claims to identity” (Sylvain 2005:356).50 As Mary Taylor has noted, however, the “accumulation 
of capital through claims to cultural authenticity that frame both the uniqueness of a cultural 
product and its recognizable presentation also relies on processes that produce and reproduce 
differentiation and diversity in the process of uneven development” (Taylor 2009:51). Many of 
Atwaedagama’s residents are perhaps all too aware of this unevenness. In the way they respond 
to their representation by others, and in the way in which those others in turn interpret these 
responses, we find that the neoliberal ideal inherent in Nimal’s suggestion runs into the ground 
of lived and historically situated experience. Here, what we encountered in the previous chapters 
as a discursive formation around Sri Lankan national heritage in which craft is sanitized of its 
caste associations articulates with the subtle but powerful reproduction of caste-based difference 
as a difference that, for all the silence around it, continues to matter. In the subsequent chapters, I 
continue to examine how this is so while arguing that, throughout its uneasy articulation with 
other cultural forms—democratic egalitarianism and neoliberal entrepreneurialism for instance—
caste is reproduced not by particular groups or individuals, but by actors across social strata.  
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
Knowing One’s Place 																																																								50	It is important to note that, in terms of the marketing of items such as those produced in 
Atwaedagama and Redigama, while their characterization as “traditionally Sri Lankan” or 
“traditionally Sinhala” may appeal to their mostly foreign consumers, any reference to their 
historical association with a particular caste group is less likely to resonate. As Hannerz (citing 
Terence Turner) has pointed out, if “the assertion of difference is intended to mobilize 
support”—or, we might add, dollars—“among distant others…it probably helps if these can 
readily recognize one’s distinctiveness by way of established criteria” (Hannerz 1996:53). “Too 
alien an otherness,” such as caste, “may not do” (Hannerz 1996:53).	
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For residents of Atwaedagama, the reproduction of caste-based difference considered in the 
previous chapter with respect to popular and scholarly writing is just one mode within a much 
broader array of identificatory practices. Instantiating the kind of boundary making theorized 
long ago by Fredrik Barth (1969), these practices range from innocuous and even celebratory 
statements of difference (such as the cheerful circumambulation of the village during the annual 
Kathina festival, an event I had the opportunity to witness in October 2014) to palpably 
antagonistic articulations of hierarchical distinction (including, as we will see, public and 
aggressive restatements of Atwaedagama’s residents’ social and intellectual inferiority). As I 
argued in Chapter 3, in responding to their unfavorable representation by scholars, journalists, 
students, and others, the residents of Atwaedagama inadvertently help to maintain the boundary 
that they are otherwise anxious to overcome. The practices by which the distinction between 
village residents (mee game minissu, lit. “people in/of this village”) and “outsiders” (pita 
minissu) is reproduced are not, in other words, the sole purview of the latter. Conceiving of them 
under the rubric of knowing one’s place, in this chapter I examine how such boundary making 
practices illuminate the articulation between logics of neoliberalism, caste, and democratic 
egalitarianism in present-day Sri Lanka. As we will see once again, these practices challenge a 
popular and to some extent scholarly pattern of thinking regarding caste. This pattern and its 
implications are discussed at greater length in the introduction to this dissertation. Put simply, it 
centers on the notion that, with the ascendance of a fundamentally capitalist economic formation 
grounded in a market economy, we will soon see, if we have not already, an exchange of “the 
logic of [ascribed] caste identity” (Ciotti 2010:209) for neoliberal practices of identification that 
foreground (economically and consumer-based) achieved social status (Friedman 2002:295-296). 
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We do not encounter plain evidence of such an exchange in and around Atwaedagama. Neither, 
however, do we encounter anything like an unreserved grip on caste-based identification as a 
“tradition” to be upheld. Reminders of one’s proper social and geographic “place” are inflected 
with caste-based concerns. Further, in many instances, the forms that these reminders take 
indicate that historically recognized markers of caste distinction, while re-ordered amidst shifting 
patterns of social mobility, continue to have purchase even as caste itself is publicly disavowed. 
At the same time, these reminders suggest deep ambivalence (on the part of both high and low 
caste individuals) around the flux in moral and financial economies that recognizably neoliberal 
operations and ideological commitments have entailed. Many of my interlocutors in and beyond 
Atwaedagama would explicitly refer to the country’s national economic development in 
favorable terms as the ruin of caste, and would regularly invoke instances of mobility on the part 
of low caste individuals and communities to corroborate convictions as to caste’s demise. At the 
same time, however, there is a widespread if implicit notion that caste, while concealable by the 
trappings of monetary gain or “money power” (salli balaya), nonetheless remains something to 
be discovered. Here, I argue that money serves alternately as a “frightful leveler” (Simmel 
1969:52), permitting people to forget or hide their “true” place, and, in its capacity as “naked” or 
“mere economic power” (Weber 1998:180), as a mediating buffer in social transactions that 
might threaten the maintenance of hierarchical, caste-based social distance.  
Reminders of Place 
In September 2014, a small party of sharply dressed senior representatives from the local 
branch of Sri Lanka’s Regional Development Bank convened a meeting in Atwaedagama. The 
purpose of the meeting was to promote Isuru, a micro-finance program for women earning below 
the poverty line, and to publicly recognize a number of women who were already to receive 
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small group loans. The event, attended by approximately fifty women and perhaps half a dozen 
men, was marked by considerable fanfare. A representative from the National Craft Council, 
himself a resident of Atwaedagama, spearheaded the organization of a small exhibition of 
residents’ “handicrafts” (atkam nirmaana). In the days leading up to the occasion, a few eager 
volunteers aided him in soliciting such contributions from their neighbors and, by the morning of 
the meeting, had arranged a colorful display of wall-hangings, wallets, change purses, pencil 
cases, letter holders, handbags, and cushion covers on a row of tables along an interior wall of 
the village’s madhyastaaneya, or training center. (Notably, more than half of the items were 
partly or exclusively made of paeduru.) 
The occasion was marked by levity and felt more like an award ceremony than a meeting 
to distribute loans. In freshly laundered blouses and skirts and with their hair combed back into 
neat ponytails, the women in attendance smiled with anticipation as the festive event got under 
way. Eventually, the name of a representative from each of five groups of five women was called 
out. Approaching the bank officers seated at the front of the room, the women stepped forward 
one by one to receive white envelopes, some offering a slight bow in return, before returning to 
their seats, wide smiles across their faces.  
The bank’s executive director, also a professor of economics at the University of 
Peradeniya, presided over the meeting. Offering her audience some thoughts on how “to lead a 
good life” (jiiwita yamkisii gamanak yanne), she lectured on the value of saving and on the often 
overlooked economic and social burden of loans. She began, however, by establishing what 
seemed a rather basic point. In the presence of the objects displayed upon the tables to their left, 
she asked the audience assembled before her, “What do you do?” With a delay bespeaking a 
sense among the crowds that the answer was all too obvious, the men and women in attendance 
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at last replied in unison, “hasta karmaanta [the handicraft industry].” “And what do you do in 
the handicraft industry?” Observing a silent collective nod toward the items along the wall, she 
pressed them further, “Things produced using hana, right? I know, but I wanted to hear it from 
you. Now, you are not giving answers—you’re just looking there and thinking, ‘Why are you 
asking this question? Can’t you see it right there?!’” An eruption of laughter confirmed the truth 
in her words and, encouraged, she went on, “So, I know, but I want to know if you choose to do 
this industry because it comes from generation to generation…” Pausing to receive an 
affirmative reply that never came, she continued after a moment of heavy silence, “that is, 
whether you do this because you’ve gone to the market and seen the demand that you have for 
these products, or whether you keep doing it because you have been doing it from generation to 
generation.” Questioned directly, several in her audience replied as if they knew what she 
expected to hear, “We do it because we do it from generation to generation.” 
Beginning with a collective verbal affirmation that “we do a handicraft,” attendees at this 
meeting were compelled to endorse a pointed reminder that the hana industry is “what they do,” 
and that they do it not primarily because it presents lucrative employment, but more 
fundamentally because it is what “they” have done from generation to generation. The meeting 
was intended to advertise the bank’s efforts to alleviate poverty by supporting the growth of 
small-scale entrepreneurial enterprise in general. Held in a building constructed for training to 
“do the industry,” and in the presence of the items displayed along the wall, however, it served as 
a moment for collective self-identification along lines about which we already know many of the 
residents of Atwaedagama to be deeply ambivalent. Considered in light of grievances regarding 
the journalistic and scholarly preoccupation with the fact that “this industry is passed down from 
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generation to generation,” this collective pronouncement was not simply a neutral comment on 
the lineage-based transmission of knowledge. 
Individuals within and around Atwaedagama remind themselves and one another in 
varyingly explicit ways of their proper “place” within what many among them perceive to be a 
rapidly transforming social and economic landscape. The example just given offers a glimpse of 
an uneasy friction that often characterizes such reminders, or the abovementioned divergence 
between the “logic of [ascribed] caste identity” (Ciotti 2010:209) and economically and 
consumer-based achieved social status (Friedman 2002:295-296). The bank’s executive director 
began her lesson by challenging her audience to explicitly root their engagement in the hana 
industry either in their “inheritance” of that industry or in an economically motivated calculation. 
In doing so, she not only posed the choice as a mutually exclusive one, but also indicated that, 
while she expects her audience is engaged in the industry because it is “what they have always 
done,” they should be doing it because it is financially sustainable. In the lecture that followed, 
she stressed the primacy of sound financial planning in the development of one’s business, but 
she would have been loath to directly question the sensibleness of engaging in this “handicraft” 
simply because it is what has always been done. That the lineage basis of the enterprise would 
ultimately and reasonably serve as the justification for its pursuit was admitted without challenge 
and thereby publicly reinforced. While individuals within and beyond Atwaedagama assert the 
supremacy of pure economic logic, the moment presents a powerful instance of a competing 
logic—one bound up with investments in caste-based distinction—as regularly reinforced as it is 
disavowed.  
The examples that I consider in the following pages further instantiate an uneasy 
articulation between caste-based identification and a market logic in which exchange value 
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trumps all else. They center, more specifically, on an irresolvable tension between individuals’ 
convictions as to the leveling influence of economic development and the sense, at times 
regretful and at times celebratory, that such leveling is ultimately partial. In the moments in 
which such tension becomes most salient, we find the simultaneous maintenance and 
destabilization of hierarchical distinction.  
“Like Stirring an Empty Pan”: On Negative Monopolization and the Limits of “Money Power” 
One of the primary contexts in which hierarchical distinction between residents of 
Atwaedagama and the “outsiders” in their vicinity is renewed is in the articulation of boundaries 
around activities associated with the hana industry. There are a small number of individuals who, 
though not considered “from Atwaedagama,” for various reasons participate in activities 
associated with hana work. In the area across the main road from the village, for instance, there 
are several families who, because they own sewing machines, are paid by residents of 
Atwaedagama to, for instance, finish off the edges of letter holders. Likewise, in another 
neighboring village, there is a woman who, given the parts to assemble, sews purses by hand.  
The explanations such people offer for their engagement in these activities point not only to the 
boundary work that attends this craft labor, but also to the tensions that obtain in efforts of 
individuals around Atwaedagama to remind themselves and one another of their “place.”  
Here, I approach them in terms of what Weber conceptualized as “monopolization,” or the fact 
that certain “special trades,” among other things, may “become objects for monopolization by 
status groups” (Weber 1998:191). Such monopolization, Weber elaborated, “occurs positively 
when the status group is exclusively entitled to own and to manage them; and negatively when, 
in order to maintain its specific way of life, the status group must not own and manage them” 
(Weber 1998:191). Borrowing Weber’s notion of monopolization here, my concern goes a step 
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further to consider the social complexities and contradictions that are revealed when the 
expectation of negative monopolization is compromised.  
The “Fox Lady” 
Amani, a resident of Atwaedagama’s neighboring village Hisgoda, was in her mid-
thirties and a mother of two when we first met. She lived in a small, two-bedroom home with her 
husband with their two children, her parents, her younger sister, and her younger sister’s toddler. 
Her parents operated a small dairy while Amani had ambitions to build a food dehydration 
business. On a wide porch skirting the back of her house, a tall, metal dehydrator that she had 
secured with a small business loan collected dust kicked up by the two cows kept just feet away. 
Amani had completed a certificate program in food processing. However, the proximity of the 
cows, something that neither she nor her parents could do much about, posed a risk of 
contamination, forcing Amani to put her business plans on hold for the time being. Despite the 
relatively steady if modest income of the dairy, the household was under considerable financial 
strain at the time of our initial introduction. Amani’s husband had lost his office job in Kandy, 
and the family’s two alternative streams of income were insufficient to cover expenses for all in 
their crowded dwelling. Amani eagerly offered to assist me in my research, and, as someone not 
actually from Atwaedagama, presented herself as a disinterested outsider uniquely positioned to 
help me get to the “truth” about her neighbors there.  
Over the course of many conversations, most of them held in her home, Amani 
demonstrated the more widespread sense of inconsistency between what she described as “this 
current economic system” and the resolute presence of “old ideas.” She often declared the 
contemporary reality of caste-based identification as a phenomenon that, in a context suffused by 
the leveling promise (or threat) of money, is devoid of purpose or, in her words, “like stirring an 
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empty pan.” In this, Amani would communicate her faith in the advancement of an 
egalitarianism deriving ultimately from what some scholars have, I would argue, overstated as an 
“intense proliferation of exchange-value as the sole value metric” (Peacock 2015:9). Indeed, 
while convinced in some sense of caste’s irrelevance—what is the use in “stirring an empty 
pan?”—Amani also demonstrated the limits of this “proliferation” and the leveling it is thought 
to entail. Money, for Amani, ultimately militates against such a leveling, safeguarding the 
ideological and social space for, if not the appreciation of caste’s value, its steady maintenance.   
 Soon after we first met at a local Samurdhi meeting for residents of the two villages, 
Amani confronted me about a rumor she had heard regarding my efforts to recruit a woman from 
Atwaedagama as a research assistant.51 As far as Amani was concerned, the woman’s ultimate 
refusal of my request would be something of a blessing. While it would be fine for her to 
accompany me to households within Atwaedagama, she advised, the woman’s low caste status 
should deter me from taking her to areas or households beyond the village. Although concerns 
with caste are neither “truly Buddhist” nor in keeping with a moment in which “people are 
measured based on the economy,” she explained, they are a reality nonetheless, and one which 
would interfere in my coming to an appreciation of the lowly past of her neighbors in 
Atwaedagama. As far as Amani was concerned, I would learn little about this past were I guided 
in my research by someone known to be “low.” The problem was not merely that my 
conversations with those beyond Atwaedagama would go nowhere were I accompanied by such 
a woman, but also that, as a rule, the interest of the village’s residents to “conceal” their inherited 
lowly status would ensure that they give me waeredi (incorrect) or partial information to throw 
																																																								51 As explained more comprehensively in Chapter 6, Samurdhi is a government micro-finance 
scheme introduced in Sri Lanka in 1995 to eradicate rural poverty. 
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me off course. Those in Atwaedagama objected specifically to the telling of what they regarded 
as irrelevant information concerning the industry’s origins and the details of their past and 
present social life (Chapter 3). Amani, by contrast, stressing that she understood my needs as a 
researcher, maintained that I must have the “complete picture.” “If your book is about an 
elephant, and you only write about the ear or the nose or the tail,” she advised me during a 
chance meeting on the road one afternoon, “it won’t be complete. You have to write everything.” 
On another occasion, in her home, Amani pointed to what she believed to be the shallow efforts 
of those who study the hana industry without attending to its social and historical context, and in 
particular to caste. Referring to one of the more ubiquitous animal designs found on Dumbara 
mats and wall-hangings, she advised, “It’s like this: You can ask about the hana industry and say 
to everyone, ‘Do you think the elephant is beautiful?’ But without writing about this, you can’t 
explain the ‘gap.’ This is the ‘gap.’” At the outset, Amani knew little more than that I was 
interested in the hana industry. And yet, like many in the area immediately beyond 
Atwaedagama, she was adamant that understanding the industry necessitated knowledge of the 
village residents’ past, including what was often figured as the central aspect of that past: their 
caste status. 
 Amani’s intervention demonstrated her sense of conflict between the present economic 
moment and concerns with caste. At the same time, particularly in this privileging of an attention 
to the past as essential to comprehending the present, it also aids our understanding of how this 
conflict is negotiated. As we will see, the value of such attention derives not merely, as Amani 
suggests, from its illumination of the present, but more practically, in Yalman’s terms, from its 
capacity to serve as a “blueprint for the present”: “As a justification for the internal hierarchy 
within the Goyigama,” he wrote, “people appeal to the past—the time of the Sinhalese kings” 
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(Yalman 1960:87). In my meetings with Amani and other residents in the area immediately 
outside Atwaedagama who enjoyed a higher caste status than those in Atwaedagama, initial 
conversations would almost always immediately veer toward the ways in which “they,” residents 
of Atwaedagama, “used to dress,” “used to talk to us,” or otherwise “used to” embody their 
inferior status.52 Undoubtedly, the phenomenon may be explained at least in part by such 
residents’ familiarity with the kinds of inquiries most commonly carried out by students and 
scholars visiting the area; that is, the inquiries of individuals concerned with producing the sorts 
of accounts considered in the previous chapter. That such active recollection may be an artifact 
of conditioned expectations about the kind of knowledge that inquiring scholars, journalists or 
students are after, however, is a partial explanation. There are also two qualities of the accounts 
in which these eager retellings of the “past” tend to feature that suggest the kind of “blueprint” 
capacity to which Yalman refers. First, elements of this past are often narrated alongside 
examples of ways in which hierarchical social distances are maintained today. Relatedly, and of 
equal note, they are often invoked in narratives that demonstrate profound ambivalence around 
																																																								52 I cannot be sure of the caste status of my informants in the surrounding areas. P. Wimalasiri, a 
Research Officer in the Department of Education at the Unviersity of Ceylon reported in the 
mid-1970s that the village was “surrounded by other low-caste villages” (“Department of 
Anthropology Ancient Technology Porgram, Haynes--January 1973”). While, as noted later in 
this chapter, there is a village nearby that is known nowadays to be populated by individuals 
identified as Rodiya, the only caste typically considered inferior to Kinnara, government officers 
and residents of both Atwaedagama and the surrounding areas reported that the villages in 
Atwaedagama’s immediate vicinity are mostly populated by Goyigama families. I received at 
least one report that there is some caste diversity, however. According to one self-identified high 
caste (Goyigama) family in Hisgoda, that village was also home to “one or two” families 
belonging to Batgama, Berava, and Durava castes, all of which are considered low. It was also, 
they reported, home to one Timbili family. Scholarly references to this latter identifier are scarce. 
Ryan suggests that Timbili is another term for Patti and that those identified as such are 
considered an inferior “subdivision” of “undifferentiated” or “good” Goyigama (1953:100). 
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what are presumed to be the economically rooted challenges to such social distance. As Amani 
put it to me: 
The thing is, because I do social work [through Samurdhi], I try to maintain my family’s 
status and try to be fair with [her low caste neighbors in Atwaedagama]. The reason is 
that they give us a lot of foreign exchange. We don’t go for marriage contracts, but we 
are friends. These are old-fashioned ideas [hana miti adahas], but I can’t move away 
from [stop considering] my family. Now, say, when they come here and they shout out, 
“Amaniyo, Amaniyo,”53 it’s a problem for my mother. In those days, they used to call us 
Haamine, Mahathaya.54 In those days, they didn’t know our names. So, they used to call 
me Sudu Haamine [lit. fair/white madam]. So, now when they shout out, “Amaniyo, 
Amaniyo,” then it becomes a problem for my mother, because they need to speak 
respectfully [nambuwa diila katakeranna oone]. This is one of the reasons why I have 
left the Samurdhi society. But, that aside, this is why I said that you should try to help 
them…We treat them as our friends. I have never treated them badly—but I don’t go 
there to eat. I refuse, and I say I don’t want it. But I am always ‘friendly.’ I have been to 
their funerals, as well. Because they know me, they don’t offer me food…Even my 
mother went to a funeral because she could not avoid it. But we don’t go to eat. They also 
come to our funerals, and we treat them [to tea, etc.], and it’s not like in those days, 
because in those days there was a separate plate and cup for them. There was a bench set 
outside the house for them to sit upon, and once they had finished eating, the leaf was 
thrown out, just like that. It went that far. Now, of course, there is this thing about old-
fashioned ideas [hana miti adahas], and people are measured based on the economy. So, 
we are not ‘update’ with this society. Of course, we try to be friendly with them, but 
when they presume kin relations with us by using kin terms, we say, “don’t use kin 
terms” [naekam kiyanna epaa]. You know, at Samurdhi meetings, one called me “Amani 
Akka” [lit. big sister Amani], and I said, “No, all of you can address me by my name, and 
I will address you by yours.” 55 Because I have to consider my family. 
																																																								53 The addition of -iyo is a diminutive modification to proper nouns generally used to indicate 
affection toward or closeness with another. 54 The terms Haamine and Mahathaya, translating typically as “Madam” and “Sir,” are most 
commonly used as terms of respectful address toward one’s social equals or superiors.   55 Kalinga Tudor Silva has remarked on the emergence of a “notion of a brotherhood/sisterhood 
within the majority ethnic group” beginning in the late 1970s and associates this emergence with 
the influence of the Sarvodaya movement, which began around 1958. Noting its prevalence 
among office workers as an example, he explains: “[It] signifies the diffusion of a broad-based 
but somewhat diluted kinship ideology as a moral bond linking known people of similar rank 
irrespective of their caste backgrounds. It is likely that those who share such a perception of ‘a 
deep horizontal comradeship’ typically come from one’s own ethnic/linguistic community” 
(Silva 1999:211).” In “the emerging ethno-nationalist conceptualizations,” he writes, “all 
Sinhala-speaking people, irrespective of their caste and social status, are increasingly projected 
as members of an extended kin group. In offices all workers of similar or nearly similar ranks 
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My concern with this excerpt is with the way Amani navigates the conflict she feels between her 
loyalty to her family—a proxy here for status (caste) maintenance—and her felt obligation to be 
“fair” to her low caste neighbors.  Amani’s narration of extreme modes of caste-based boundary-
making in the past (“It went that far”) depicts present efforts to remind her neighbors of their 
“place” as comparatively relaxed. While not going quite “that far,” Amani still considers such 
reminders to demonstrate “old-fashioned” thinking. Indeed, she regards her own impulse to deny 
her neighbors a position suggested by the egalitarian relationality presupposed by the use of 
personal names or kin terms as temporally out of step with a paradigmatic feature of the 
authentic present, or the measurement of people according to the economy. Her own justification 
for working with her low-caste neighbors through Samurdhi is, after all, rooted in their financial 
contribution to the country. Amani simultaneously acknowledges and discounts the calls for 
“forms of equal recognition” described by philosopher Charles Taylor as marking a general 
historical shift from an ancient “notion of honor” premised on hierarchy to a “modern notion of 
dignity” premised on human equality (Taylor 1992:27).56 As the following illustrates, where kin 
relations are concerned, to Amani the question of something like honor remains, and it is the 																																																																																																																																																																																		
address each other as older brother (ayya) or younger brother (malli) and older sister (akka) or 
younger sister (nangi) depending on their gender and age” (Silva 1999:210). 56 Appropriately, given this example, Taylor remarks specifically upon the displacement of 
honorific forms of address in modern democracies. In noting a replacement of “honor” (“honor 
in the ancient regime sense in which it is intrinsically linked to social inequalities”) by 
“dignitiy,” he writes of the latter being “now used in a universalist and egalitarian sense, where 
we talk of the inherent ‘dignity of human beings,’ or of citizen dignity. The underlying premise 
here is that everyone shares in it. It is obvious that this concept of dignity is the only one 
compatible with a democratic society, and that it was inevitable that the old concept of honor 
was superseded. But this has also meant that the forms of equal recognition have been essential 
to democratic culture. For instance, that everyone be called ‘Mr.,’ ‘Mrs.,’ or ‘Miss,’ rather than 
some people being called ‘Lord’ or ‘Lady’ and others simply by their surnames—or, even more 
demeaning, by their first names—has been thought essential in some democratic societies…” 
(Taylor 1992:27). 
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idiom of money that serves centrally in reminders to oneself and others of one’s proper—that is, 
essential and historically sanctioned—place. To Amani, it is through money’s leveling capacity 
that all individuals are potentially subject to a modern, standard mode of evaluation. At the same 
time, she suggests, it is by virtue of money’s quality as a neutral mediator of interpersonal 
exchange that their hierarchical, caste-based distinctiveness may in fact remain uncompromised. 
As she explained to me in her home one morning, 
My mother’s family was far better off economically than we are now…We were doing 
much better. Then, one of our uncles’ daughters got married to [a low-caste] man from 
this village. Not from that village [Atwaedagama], but from this village, from here. 
Because of that, problems arose and the whole family left the village. They went away 
and our family in this area became even smaller. 
 
To Amani, her family’s downfall from a position of social and economic strength was directly 
precipitated by a caste-based violation—that is, by the shame brought upon them because of her 
uncle’s daughter’s marriage to a low-caste man who, being from the same village, could not hide 
his caste status. Amani’s uncle and other relatives departed the area following the union. Amani 
and her family chose to stay, but in doing so they have found it necessary to regulate their 
encounters with the couple to stave off the threat that the match continues to pose to the status 
they claim to have inherited. Money, defending against the intimacies of social proximity, has 
served centrally in this regulation. 
When, for instance, Amani sold a mosquito net to the woman in exchange for money that 
she acknowledged was undoubtedly “his” (the woman’s husband’s), it was money that saved her 
from the notion that the closeness suggested by the exchange might threaten her or her family’s 
status. Evoking “Vespasian’s axiom,” “pecunia non olet” (“money does not stink”), she 
defended the transaction by stressing that what she had received from the woman was “just 
money, so it’s no problem.” I would argue that the safe mediation of money or, in Weber’s more 
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eloquent terms, the limitation of all ‘social’ intercourse that “is not subservient to economic or 
any other of business’s ‘functional’ purposes” (Weber 1998:187), counters any threat that 
Amani’s family’s periodic interactions with the couple may have in terms of their own social 
position. It is also this notion of money’s fundamental indifference to status hierarchy that arose 
as central to Amani’s own self-preservation when, many months after we first met, she was 
financially compelled to take up sewing purses for a woman in Atwaedagama. Early on, Amani 
had explained the social (that is, caste-based) significance of work associated with the hana 
industry thus: 
Remember that day when you asked why others are not doing that industry? They are 
considered to be lower caste, and this is something that has been in existence since the 
time of the kings [raje kalaa indan]. So, nobody ‘moves’ with [engages in] that industry 
[kawurut karmante ‘move’ wenne naeae]. Someone who does it is low, so people see 
those who engage in it as nobodies [wasalaya]. “This is not good. This work is not 
good.” Like, our mothers, they won’t go [to their houses]. 
 
Some ten months later, I was surprised to see Amani leaving a home in Atwaedagama, a plastic 
bag filled with unsewn hana purses hanging from her arm. As I approached, she scrunched up 
her face to signal her displeasure and confirmed ruefully, “I’m sewing now.” A few days later, I 
sat across from her on a small couch in her parents’ living room and listened to her explain her 
engagement in this work reserved for “nobodies.” Explicit that what she was doing was “purse 
mahanawa” (sewing purses), not “hana work,” she nonetheless took great care to stress the 
superiority of the hana industry to other forms of identifiably low-caste labor. Offering the 
laundering work of “Dhobi people” for comparison, she noted that hana work is “clean” and 
“independent.” Irrespective of this, anyway, she emphasized that the caste status of an individual 
has little bearing on whether they can aspire to be a “good business person.” Reiterating the 
shared vulnerability implied by a notion of the “inherent ‘dignity of human beings’” (Taylor 
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1992:27; see note 32 above), she elaborated, “I mean, high caste people are doing heroin, right? 
That’s not smart! You can be low caste and clever, independent, a good business person!” In this 
formulation, the association of hana work with wasalaya (nobodies) is eclipsed by Amani’s 
conviction in one’s capacity for entrepreneurial self-invention. Amani went on to stress that her 
focus is on responding to the desires of her customers, relating that her foremost concern is with 
their satis (satisfaction) and with her own performance as a businesswoman. “My God is my 
customer,” she affirmed with self-assurance, and, intending to stress her cleverness as a 
businesswoman, added, “I am a fox lady.” Articulating a firmly neoliberal subjectivity, Amani 
expressed her chief concern as residing with business, not caste status, and thus sought to avoid 
the socially hazardous implications of her involvement in the hana industry and her interactions 
with the “nobodies” she deems to be its heirs.  
In and around Atwaedagama, then, one form of negative monopolization is the 
(re)definition of the labor itself such that its performance may not be mistaken as a 
demonstration of lineage-based occupational 
ownership. Amani stresses that the work is to be 
understood as a purely business-motivated 
undertaking (though, crucially, she still takes great 
pains to qualify the labor as superior to that associated 
with other low castes).  
To offer another example, not far from 
Atwaedagama, a group of around five women 
convene regularly throughout the week at a government-managed “Hana Training Center.” 
There, with hana purchased from a weaver in Atwaedagama, they dye and plait the long fibers 
 12-Products made of hana at a 
government-run Hana Training Center 
not far from Atwaedagama 
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before coiling them to create table mats, coasters, and other items sold at government-owned 
handicrafts emporia in Kandy and Colombo. As for those in Atwaedagama, hana serves as the 
foundational material in this work and, indeed, one could reasonably assume that their activities 
fall under the category “hana karmanteya” (hana industry). During a visit to the center, however, 
when I remarked upon the similarities between the work done there and that done in 
Atwaedagama, I was quickly disabused of the notion. Following on the combination of giggles 
and alternately surprised and stern expressions indicating the absurdity of the comparison, the 
manager of the center patiently asserted the fundamental difference between the two. Reminding 
me that what people in Atwaedagama do is a low-caste, lineage-based occupation, she stressed 
that the labor of the women in this center is more properly understood as a hobby (hobi ekak), a 
leisure activity that they choose to do to pass the time between domestic chores.  
On the Directionality of Aid and the Limits of “Money Power” 
 Signaling hana work’s embeddedness in a moral economy, the labor itself is in these 
ways qualified to militate against appearances of equivalence with what residents of 
Atwaedagama are understood to do. There is another manner, however, in which individuals 
considered “outsiders” to Atwaedagama achieve such negative monopolization despite engaging 
in productive activities that, were such persons considered to be members of “ee kattiya” (that 
group), would be recognized without question as “hana waeda” (hana work). Here, it is not so 
much the work itself that is qualified, but rather the nature of the exchange that prompts such 
work to begin with. To offer one example, I was standing in the garden at the home of a family 
in Atwaedagama one morning when my hosts’ neighbor, Thali, appeared at the low fence 
dividing their land from hers. She had heard my voice and, as it had been some time since we’d 
last met, had evidently come to see what I was up to. I could see that she was busy with her 
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hands and, as I approached to greet her, realized that she was sewing up the edges of a small 
hana change purse. I asked if, in general, she was sewing purses these days and, like Amani, 
Thali frowned slightly and gestured toward the home of a family on the other side of 
Atwaedagama. “For them [EyaalaTa],” she replied with quiet resignation. Thali’s family, the 
only Tamil family in Atwaedagama, has lived in the area for many decades and has enjoyed 
relative affluence by comparison to most of the surrounding households. Recently, however, she 
found herself struggling to provide for her four children. Within weeks of this exchange, she 
would depart for Kuwait, where she would take up a job as a housemaid and begin sending 
remittances to help cover her children’s educational and other expenses. Despite this, Thali made 
no reference to the income she earned from occasional sewing as mitigating the financial 
pressures upon her. As she would explain to me later in the privacy of her home, she and others 
in her family sew strictly out of a desire to help their neighbors. Invoking the logic of a market 
economy, she explained that they step in to assist “only if they are in a hurry” and “really need to 
meet a deadline.”  
A similar explanation related to helping was offered by a seamstress, Sayuri, who, though 
not residing in Atwaedagama, is regularly hired by village residents to carry out some of the 
more labor-intensive sewing that may be done by machine. Sitting in her roadside workshop one 
afternoon and remarking upon the dramatic development that Atwaedagama has undergone in 
recent decades, Sayuri, like Amani, drew comparisons between the asymmetrical inter-caste 
dynamics of “the past” with the relative parity that one may observe today:  
Now, I’m telling you, even when his mother [her husband’s mother] was around, if she 
had been walking on the road and they saw her, they would come out to the road to greet 
her [to show their respect]. These days, it’s not like that. They come and sit with us. They 
talk to us. That’s the situation [tatweya] now. Why? Because of money power [salli 
balaya].  
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“Honestly,” she concluded, “everything is second to money now, isn’t it?” Despite this “money 
power” and the leveling that it purports to effect, however, the seamstress nonetheless took great 
care to emphasize her difference from those for whom she sews and, like Thali, to highlight that 
she takes on such work not because she benefits from it, but rather because her neighbors in 
Atwaedagama require her assistance. “Generally speaking, I’m an outsider,” she explained, 
“because that [work] is done by a certain group [kotesheyak]. It’s because they asked me to do it 
that I’m doing it.”  
The social relational connotations of gift giving, commensality, and unidirectional 
hospitality in Sri Lanka and other parts of South Asia may facilitate our appreciation of the local 
significance of this stress on helping—that is, on giving rather than receiving—when it comes to 
“outsiders” such as Thali and Sayuri engaging in productive activities associated with the work 
of Atwaedagama residents. There is a wealth of scholarship on India and elsewhere in the region 
examining how unilateral giving maintains caste-based hierarchical distinction (Hardgrave 1969; 
Holmberg 1996; Parry 1986; Raheja 1988; Roy 2010; Solomon 2015). As Michelle Gamburd 
observes, “[i]n Sri Lanka, gifts given from patrons to clients and vice versa presuppose hierarchy 
and inequality” (Gamburd 2000:111). Such asymmetricality is central when it comes to 
commensality and to hospitality more generally, for, as Yalman has noted of the Sinhalese, “food 
exchanges are one of the critical ways in which caste inferiority and superiority is expressed” 
(Yalman 1973:288). 
We have already caught a glimpse of the significance of such asymmetricality as it 
pertains to commensality. Amani notes that she refuses to accept food prepared by her low-caste 
hosts. However, the reverse, that low caste guests would refuse her food, is not the case. In my 
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conversations with high caste individuals, I should note, such refusal was typically framed not in 
terms of a concern with purity and pollution, but in terms of indicating “connections” 
(sambandekam) that would imply, at best, status parity, and, at worst, a reversal of the 
hierarchical relation. It is framed, in other words, in terms of “interactional restrictions” like 
those Robert Hardgrave documented many years ago with respect to commensality among 
Hindus in India: “To accept cooked food from a person of another caste is to acknowledge 
inferiority to that caste; to refuse food is to assert superiority” (Hardgrave 1969:4). In this regard, 
the “refusal to partake with or of the other,” as Parama Roy has put it more recently, “is an 
important breakdown in or rejection of ethical reciprocity with the other” (Roy 2010:14).57 This 
is not to say that, among the Sinhalese, concerns with “purity” do not figure at all in the refusal 
of food prepared by someone who is low caste. Uyangoda (2013) reports, in fact, that in the 
mono-caste Kinnara village of Kohomba Kanda, “the monks of the local temples refused food 
prepared by residents of the village” (288). According to “upper caste temple patrons,” 																																																								57 A former GN for the area in which Atwaedagama falls explained to me one afternoon: “They 
may offer a cool drink. They’ll bring it from the shop along with a plantain and a biscuit or a 
piece of cake. Beyond that, however, they never give us anything that is made in the house, like 
rice or tea. They know that we will not eat or drink [from them].” To highlight the risk of 
accepting such hospitality, she explained how her younger sister’s as yet unmarried status had 
compelled her to decline an invitation from a man in Atwaedagama to attend his daughter’s 
wedding. The “connections” that would have been implied by her attending the wedding, she 
stressed, could have imperiled her family’s efforts to find a suitable (i.e. like-caste) marriage 
partner for her sister. She explained, “If the story gets out that I went to a Kinnara family 
wedding, it’s not good.” Observing that “all of the people he invited were big, big people,” the 
woman and her colleague noted that the man from Atwaedagama had figured that, if all of the 
high caste people he’d invited had actually attended, it would have given him “a good position.” 
The latter elaborated, “They try very hard to get that social status, what they didn’t have before.” 
The example speaks directly to Uyangoda’s concern with the ways in which “the institutions of 
local government do, or do not, constitute social and political spaces for democracy” (Uyangoda 
2012:83). For my purposes here, however, it is also worth considering insofar as it demonstrates 
the limits of any latitude we might expect a governmental position to afford—that is, of the 
extent to which one might justify one’s attendance at such an event by reference to one’s duties 
as a government officer.  
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Uyangoda explained, the monks did so because the houses of the individuals who had prepared 
the food “were unclean (kilitu) and unhygienic (apirisidu)” (288). (Notably, the monk at the local 
temple in Atwaedagama always accepted alms from the village’s residents, and when residents 
of Atwaedagama prepared a feast for monks from the larger temple in the nearby town as part of 
a Kathina alms-giving ceremony, I did not witness any of the monks refuse the offerings.) 
To offer an example that illustrates both the stakes of such reciprocity and the limits of 
“money power” [salli balaya], a pair of high caste, local government officers assigned to the area 
encompassing Atwaedagama related to me on one occasion how a Rodi man in a nearby village 
who had amassed considerable wealth performing gurukam (“maledictive incantations” (Holt 
1991:219) devised a subterfuge to “trick” the high caste members of a local temple into receiving 
food and drink from him. Secretly acting as the sponsor of a special event at the temple for 
Awuruddu, the Sinhalese New Year, they reported, the individual drew all of the “big people” 
from the temple to sit and dine with him in the same place. In the midst of this inadvertent 
commensality, the announcer divulged the name of the sponsor and the high caste attendees 
suddenly realized that they had been duped. Low caste individuals will do such things, the 
officers reported, because, having accrued power or strength (shaktimat) through their financial 
earnings, “they think they have a higher status” and, in “showing off,” hope to achieve 
recognition for that status. In this way, the officers figured the man’s attempt at hospitality as a 
kind of agonistic giving, a moment in which the purported goal amounts to an aggressive attempt 
by one regarded as low caste to assert his relative equality, if not supremacy, through others’ 
very act of consumption (Mauss 2000; Sherry 1983). In this instance, the man’s accrual of 
shaktimat through the acquisition of “naked economic power” (Weber 1998:192) comes up 
against the officers’ (and likely others’, as well) “movement of reprisal” (Hardgrave 1969), or 
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their refusal to recognize and therefore sanction or legitimize his apparent claims to higher 
status. If, as Weber once argued, “all groups [who] have interests in the status order react with 
special sharpness precisely against the pretensions of purely economic acquisition” (Weber 
1998:192), then I would argue that it is with just such “special sharpness” that the two officers 
interpret the apparent pretension recounted here: When I asked whether the man’s status had 
actually changed, they replied before giving a laugh, “Well, in his mind it has!”  
It is also out of an attentiveness to such “economies of hospitality” (Roy 2010:14) or, put 
otherwise, to the hazards of accepting the hospitality of one’s lower-caste neighbors, that those 
near Atwaedagama stress the vast difference between attending a funeral and attending a 
wedding. In general, one is not “invited” to a funeral. One simply attends, and the act is 
perceived as one of compassion. What is more, one is not obligated to accept food prepared at a 
funeral. By contrast, to attend a wedding, one must have received and accepted an invitation, the 
latter act also constituting an acceptance of the invitation to consume the food to be offered. 
Unlike a funeral, then, a wedding is perceived as an act of deliberate socialization, an acceptance 
of hospitality that communicates one’s willingness to engage in “ethical reciprocity with the 
other” (Roy 2010:14). It is for these reasons that Amani noted that she and other high caste 
neighbors in the area will attend the funeral of those in Atwaedagama (and they theirs). 
Defending her own family’s refusal to attend the weddings of those in Atwaedagama, however, 
Amani explained, 
Other people will think that we are associating [ashreya keranawa] with them and will 
not ‘care’ for us. You know that saying about marriage, that ‘for the marriage and for the 
muttettuwa’ [co-operative paddy work or other labor]? You know how rice is served in 
the kamatha [a clearing that serves as a threshing floor]? The message of the saying is, 
‘We should exchange food with people of our own caste’ [kameak ganadenu keranna one 
apee ‘same’ kula ekka]. We maintain that idea.  
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To stress the implications of violating this norm, an elderly gentleman in Hisgoda explained: 
If we go to weddings, in the end we’ll have problems. Some people would accuse us, 
saying, you know, “You went to this person’s wedding.” It would mean that we have 
connections [sambandekam] with them and it won’t work out. Other help, we’ll do. If it 
were a funeral, we would go and help because we must, because we need to help them 
when there is a sad occasion, and because it’s the humane thing [manusakama] to go. 
 
Helping, figured as a no-strings-attached charitability, is regarded therefore as a mode of 
sociality that is immune to the flattening implied by the “connections” that one might 
inadvertently develop by virtue of receiving aid or hospitality. To explain one’s engagement in 
hana-related activities as nothing more than a willingness to help, then, is also to invoke a set of 
locally meaningful understandings about the mutual constitution of hierarchical distinction and 
the roles of giving versus receiving. I consider such explanations to be among the other strategies 
of “negative monopolization” considered above. Where circumstance finds one engaging in work 
associated with “nobodies,” one might adopt, as Amani does, something Simmel described as a 
“blasé attitude,” or a “mood” that, effecting a “blunting of discrimination,” seems a “faithful 
subjective reflection of the completely internalized money economy” (Simmel 1969:52). 
Alternatively, one might characterize the work as a “hobby,” an activity connoting raw, self-
motivated choice deemed altogether lacking in an industry that, in the final instance, one is 
expected to carry out not even because it is marketable, but because it is “passed down from 
generation to generation.” Finally, as we see in the above, one might characterize the activity as 
emanating from a charitability through which one may preserve not only distance, but also a 
position of removed superiority.  
On the Conflation of Work, Place, and People 
 To understand the efforts of Amani and other “outsiders” to distinguish the labor or the 
justification for the labor from the activities carried out by their neighbors, we must consider the 
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mutual imbrication between characterizations of hana work and what are often vehement re-
inscriptions of the boundaries of Atwaedagama. There is a more literal sense in which 
articulations of hana work serve as reminders of place, and it is through the boundary making 
this entails that the “insider”/“outsider” distinction emerges in the first place. To those in 
Atwaedagama’s immediate vicinity and even, as we shall see, to some in Atwaedagama, the 
range of employment activities in which the village’s residents presently engage are of secondary 
consideration to a more fundamental fact alluded to by the bank official who, certain that she 
already knew the answer, asked her audience why they “do this industry”: to be of Atwaedagama 
is to do hana work, and to do hana work is to embody one’s identification as Kinnara. This 
tripartite association between place, people, and work marks the resilience of something scholars 
long ago regarded as having faded. As Gilbert wrote in 1945: 
The land rights and duties of the various castes under royal command have all lapsed 
since the abolition of compulsory labor or Rajakariya in 1832, and one cannot as a rule be 
sure of telling a man’s occupation from his caste. With the disappearance of the 
occupational character of caste restrictions has gone also the ecological linkage whereby 
particular artisan castes were located in the special localities that furnished the raw 
materials for their work (Gilbert 1953:300).  
 
It is true that one “cannot as a rule be sure of telling a man’s occupation from his caste.” 
Furthermore, as we have seen, Atwaedagama’s residents are increasingly compelled not only to 
venture further and further away to find hana, but also to rely upon more readily available store-
bought substitutes. To some extent, these latter phenomena might be interpreted as signaling the 
disruption of an “ecological linkage,” in Gilbert’s terms. In this instance, however, such 
disruption stems not from a “disappearance of the occupational character of caste restrictions,” 
but rather from the deforestation that has accompanied population growth and housing and road 
development in areas around Kandy. In important respects, the characterization of those who do 
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hana work as being yoked to a specific place and, at the same time, as being identifiable along 
caste lines, persists. While this persistence owes substantially to the scholars and journalists who 
have written about Atwaedagama and the hana industry, it is those in nearest proximity to 
Atwaedagama who, for very different reasons, are most keen to maintain it. To them, 
“Atwaedagama” signifies not a geographical area, but rather an articulation of people, place, and 
labor. 
To give an example of the way this tri-partite association is reinforced, soon after I began 
my research in Atwaedagama, my assistant, Kumoda, and I were invited into the home of a 
family who lived at the intersection of the major road running along the western perimeter of the 
village and the southernmost of three lanes running perpendicularly away from it. The home was 
more lavish than others on the lane, and I had been curious about its occupants, who I assumed 
must be engaged in some other form of employment more lucrative than the hana industry, since 
I had arrived. Owing in part to the shoulder-height cement block wall running the length of the 
small property, however, I did not feel as entirely comfortable “dropping in” on its inhabitants as 
I did with the surrounding non-walled properties. Still, I had hoped early on that I would at least 
meet everyone in Atwaedagama, and so was delighted when, one morning, a woman of about 
thirty greeted me over the wall and invited my assistant and me to come inside. We cheerfully 
accepted her invitation and moments later were comfortably settled upon two soft chairs along 
the wall of her tiled living room. I began to explain why I was in the area, telling our hostess, 
Chamali, about my interest in the hana industry and in learning about the lives of those engaged 
in it. After a minute, she gave a friendly indication for us to wait and disappeared through a 
doorway at the back of the room. An elderly woman with striking silver waist-length hair 
followed behind her when she returned moments later. This, she explained, was her mother in-
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law, a woman who had resided in the village her entire life and would therefore have much more 
to say to us than she, a relative newcomer to the area. Devika, the elder of our two hostesses, as 
though preparing to “get down to business,” twisted her hair into a neat bun at the base of her 
neck and, taking a seat upon a chair to our left, readied herself for a barrage of questions. Not at 
all certain that we weren’t interrupting more pressing work, my assistant and I wasted no time in 
broaching some of the more general topics with which we typically began many such 
impromptu, semi-structured interviews. The conversation began with our asking whether our 
hosts had other family members in the village and, if they were not engaged in any of the 
activities associated with the hana industry at present, what their household’s primary source(s) 
of income happened to be. The exchange proceeded thus: 
Chamali: All my mother’s relatives are around us in this village. 
Shifna: So, a lot of people in this village are doing the hana industry, but now— 
Devika: Oh! That village is different, and this village is different. 
Chamali: That piece is Atwaedagama. The next door and the next door’s next door and the next 
door’s next door’s next door [three houses away]—after them, only, those people are like a 
family. They do hana.  
Devika: That is different, this is different.  
Shifna: So this is not Atwaedagama? 
Chamali: No, this is not Atwaedagama. 
Aimee: What is the name of this village? 
Chamali: Hisgoda 
… 
Devika: This is a different place. This area doesn’t do that kind of work, and we are not those 
people [mee hariye ee waedekerannet naeae—ee minissut neweri] 
Chamali: You know…those people…you know that jāti…jāti beda [caste differences] and 
all…[laughs]58 
 
Not convinced that she had successfully disabused us of any notion that we were in 
Atwaedagama, or that we might not yet mistake them, our hosts, as Kinnara, the elder of the two 
																																																								58 In this instance, jātiya is most properly translated as “caste,” and, in keeping with the general 
discomfort around public discussion of the topic, may be considered a less direct reference to the 
“difference” being discussed than the term kulaya. 
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invoked an old name by which Atwaedagama was once officially known and persisted firmly: 
“Those people are Kinnara people. That is Kendapitiya. Those people weave mats [paeduru]. 
People from Kendapitiya weave mats…Along this [main] road, no one weaves mats. No one. 
People who weave mats are up there. People here are not Kendapitiya people. Those people are 
from Kendapitiya.” 
 Chamali began to explain how, under one of Premadasa’s large-scale housing 
development projects in the early 1980s (the same development scheme under which 
Atwaedagama’s residents received new homes), new names had been assigned to villages all 
over the country, including Atwaedagama (formerly Kendapitiya) and the neighboring village 
(Hisgoda) in which we presently found ourselves. In fact, as is rumored to be the case with 
regard to many of the village names that were changed under Premadasa, Atwaedagama’s 
renaming was by all accounts intended precisely to challenge the area’s reputation as low caste, 
the village’s old name by then associated at least locally with the lowly caste status of its 
residents.59,60 The effort has been undermined not only by scholars and government officials who 
																																																								59 To gesture toward one aspect of the significance that the name Kendapitiya carries for area 
residents today, Amani recounted to me how her son, in a fit of rage at a classmate who had 
called him an objectionable name, responded to the offender, a boy from Atwaedagama, by 
calling him “Kendapitiya.” According to Amani, the boy’s mother had even come to her home to 
complain about the episode and seek an apology. “As people with humanity [manushya 
dharmeya],” Amani explained to me, “We can’t just say, ‘you are from 
Kendapitiya.’…So…since these things are not in keeping with the times, I had to tell him, ‘even 
if they use a bad word, don’t say that…You become a nobody [wasaleyak] not by birth, but by 
your actions.’” The inherent contradiction in the event and Amani’s narration of it is worth 
noting. At the same time that that all parties affirm that the message conveyed by the simple 
statement, “You are from Kendapitiya,” is gravely insulting, an acknowledgement of 
contemporary realities rendering it thus is summarily obscured by the sense “these things are not 
in keeping with the times.”  	60 Notably, and although I cannot presently explain the discrepancy, while no one I ever met in 
Atwaedagama used the village’s old name, this is not what Silva (2009) reports: “The 
community benefited from the Gam Udawa Programme implemented by the Government of Sri 
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persist in using the name Kendapitiya, but also, and with arguably very different interests, by 
those in the immediate vicinity. Because the names that were given to the two villages were so 
similar and might therefore lead some to suppose that those in Hisgoda did the same work or, put 
differently, were the same people as those who lived in neighboring Atwaedagama, residents of 
Hisgoda rejected the new name (Atagolla) assigned to their village. “[Technically], this is 
Atagolla, but we don’t use that name,” Devika explained, “because Atwaedagama and Atagolla 
sounds similar, so people don’t like it.”  “We don’t do any kind of work that Atwaedagama 
people do,” she reaffirmed. To stress the seriousness of their opposition to the name change at 
the time, she noted with a hearty laugh, “We even uprooted the name board and threw it away!” 
   Devika’s neighbors in Hisgoda were also frustrated by the similarity between the two 
new village names. An elderly man who moved to the area in the 1960s reported:  
 Well, yes, they call this Atagolla, but it doesn’t suit us [apita hari yanne naeae]. I said, 
‘Atwaedagama is different and Atagolla is different.’…‘There aren’t any artists [kalaa 
kareya] in this village. Nobody is doing kalaa waeda. We don’t weave mats [paeduru 
wiyanne naeae] and we don’t twist thread [nul katine naeae]. We don’t do any of that [ee 
mokut keranne naeae].’ We don’t weave mats. And most of the people in this village are 
our people, people who don’t do that kind of work. Only a few people—I think you saw 
over there [at the boundary between the two villages]—are doing that kind of work. Only 
in that area are there a few families. They’re really close to the border. That is the area 
that was given to them. They aren’t mixed in with us. 
 
Some months after this encounter, I was walking home from Atwaedagama and passed the 
residence of an acquaintance who beckoned for me to come inside for a quick visit. I was 
carrying a brown envelope with copies of photographs I had taken in Atwaedagama the week 																																																																																																																																																																																		
Lanka (GOSL) in the 1980s whereby housing improvements were made particularly in socially 
depressed communities. As one of the steps for improving their social standings, the names of 
the communities too were changed in ways that removed any stigma associated with their former 
names. The name of the village was officially changed…but the new name did not get accepted 
with even the Kinnara people opting to use the former name” (45) 		
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prior and, upon seeing this, my hostess asked if she might take a look. Noting with a gentle smile 
that she thought she recognized some of the faces, she handed the pictures to her mother. The 
latter, sharing that she indeed recognized the individuals and had passed them on the road many 
times, reclined on the settee beneath her and very softly but adamantly informed me, “They 
aren’t our people (apee kattiya naeae).” When I asked what she meant, she explained, “I mean, 
they do hana work, right? They’re those people (ee kattiya minissu). They make things like 
paeduru [mats], chaamera [fly-whisks/dusters]—those things. They aren’t our people. We don’t 
go there, and they don’t come here.”61 
 As I would come to learn, and as indicated by the admission of the man quoted above that 
“only a few people in Hisgoda…are doing that work,” concerns over boundary work arose not 
only out of the perceived similarity between the names of the two villages, but out of an 
ambiguity regarding the location of the border running between them.62 At the time of my 
fieldwork, a number of families for whom engagement in the hana industry was a significant if 
not primary source of income resided on land that was, according to their postal addresses, 
located within Hisgoda. Many such homes being located well beyond the few that Devika 																																																								61	Lucky De Silva, who, as noted in Chapter 2, collaborated with his classmates at the University 
of Peradeniya in the early 1960s to produce the film, Niyanda Rata, reported: “Across the road 
from [the village] is a high caste village. One of my fellow undergrads lived there. He invited us 
to his house for all meals throughout our stay. His parents however forbade him from walking 
into [Atwaedagama] to meet us.” Of note here is not simply that the student’s parents did not 
allow him to enter the village, but also the fact that de Silva and his collaborators did not eat in 
the village.  62  The fear that the name “Atagolla” might register for those beyond the village as a place where 
mats are woven (which is to say, a Kinnara village), is, as I discovered during a casual chat about 
my research with a doctor in Kandy, not unfounded. Asked why I was living in Sri Lanka, I had 
briefly explained that I was learning about the lives of individuals engaged in the hana industry. 
The doctor noted earnestly, “we have to appreciate what they do, right?” She went on to explain 
that she knew the village where they carry out such work and considered it a lovely place. In 
fact, she explained, in organizing a medical conference, she had once commissioned a number of 
hana woven items from Atagolla to distribute as gifts to attendees.  
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identified in counting houses during our conversation, their occupants would at times confidently 
declare themselves residents of Hisgoda.63 To gesture to the topic I take up in the second part of 
this chapter, however, it is worth noting here that it is not only those from the “without” of 
Atwaedagama who problematize such administrative borders in ways that reinforce the essential 
relationship between people, place and work. One afternoon, I was chatting with two weavers at 
one of their residences along the border to which the man quoted above referred (several houses 
beyond those enumerated by Devika). As one twisted bright green hana fibers into small bundles 
of thread and passed them to her partner to work into the mat that she was weaving, I explained 
that I had received somewhat contradictory information regarding the border between 
Atwaedagama and Hisgoda. The two were adamant that the area in which they resided was 
Hisgoda and that the boundary of Atwaedagama lay to the northwest of their homes. A younger 
woman, their neighbor across the lane and someone who, while not engaged in hana work 
herself, would regularly pass the hours in the weaving shed where we were gathered, appeared 
toward the end of our conversation. Realizing that our discussion had been prompted by my 
struggle to make sense of the conflicting information I had received as to the location of the 
boundary between Hisgoda and Atwaedagama, she was eager to offer clarification. While not 
contesting that we were in fact presently in Hisgoda, she pointed down at the mat stretched out 
upon the floor of her neighbor’s weaving shed and explained quite simply, “Atwaedagama 
means doing this” [Atwaedagama kiyanne mee keranawa]. Her neighbors, who met the comment 
																																																								63 High caste residents in Hisgoda also commented on their annoyance that, when the Grama 
Sewaka compiled the voting list for the area in which they live, he “mistakenly” included 
Atwaedagama’s old name. “Even now we scold him!” one man laughed. 
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with silence, returned to their work as the young woman elaborated, “we are from Atwaedagama 
but we are in Hisgoda.”64  
It is not unusual for those at greatest “risk of cross-category confusion,” whether it be 
along racial, class, or caste lines, to be particularly concerned with and ardent about the 
reproduction of social boundaries (see Kwok 2012:34; see also Rudolph and Rudolph 1967:44). 
The instances of such reproduction considered here indicate why those who engage in activities 
typically regarded by Atwaedagama residents as constitutive of the hana industry but who do not 
consider themselves to be “from Atwaeadagama” take pains to qualify such work as different. 
Where a tri-partite association between place, people, and work is regularly re-inscribed by 
“close outsiders” (and even, significantly, as we see above, by some within Atwaedagama) to 
remind themselves and others of their essential social difference—where, in other words, the 
work at hand is also suggestive of one’s social and geographical “place”— demarcating such 
engagement as different becomes an act of negative monopolization and thus of maintaining 
one’s presumed superiority.  
 In concluding this section, I wish to note that the equivalence asserted here between 
place, people, and work is a contingent relationality. As Stirrat pointed out many years ago, 
variable understandings of the relationship between caste and occupation may be rather 
arbitrarily applied across groups of different caste status. Stirrat found, for instance, that 																																																								64 That, despite Premadasa’s apparent intentions, the name changes did not result in unsettling 
the village’s reputation as one populated by low caste individuals is reinforced for me when I 
reflect on a casual exchange I had soon after moving into a home up the road from 
Atwaedagama. Two relatives of the family I was living with inquired, “So, where exactly is it 
that you are working?” Myself unaware at the time of the significance of the name, I told them 
“Kendapitiya.” Detecting that they had little idea of where that might be, I offered, 
“Atwaedagama?” “Ahhhh,” they replied in unison, and after exchanging a knowing glance, the 
one leaned toward the other and whispered, “the Kinnara village.”  
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Goyigama individuals residing beyond the village of Wellagoda, the Sinhalese Catholic fishing 
village where he carried out anthropological fieldwork in the 1970s, were “unwilling to accept 
the Wellagoda Goyigama as ‘true’ Goyigama because their [non-cultivator] occupation put their 
claim to Goyigama status in question” (Stirrat 1982:18). Such unwillingness evokes an early 20th 
century tendency for “Goyigama judicial interpreters, who would never refer to a Goyigama 
witness as a cultivator unless he was one by occupation…[to] frequently describe a Kerava, 
irrespective of his occupation, as a fisher” (Gilbert 1953:130). Like the Kerava, residents of (or 
“from”) Atwaedagama do not risk surrendering the status they are believed to have inherited. 
Many not only do not weave hana mats but also increasingly rely upon alternative modes of 
employment as their primary source of income. Despite this, whereas the high caste individuals 
who take up activities associated with hana work are not reduced to those activities, their 
neighbors, irrespective of occupational engagement, remain (in some instances, by their own 
admission) “mat-weavers,” their essential “Kinnara-ness” thus taken for granted as a core 
essence. As one female weaver in Atwaedagama, Liyoni, reported to me one afternoon, “[Even] 
if you leave the job and go to a different village, people from this village are people from this 
village.” Relating that the meaning of “hiding hana mats” is precisely this—that “just because 
you hide that, it won’t change that you are from this village [and] that you are from this kind of 
lineage [paramparawe jatiya],” Liyoni concluded matter-of-factly, “We have to accept that 
someday.”  
*** 
 In the remainder of this chapter and in the following one, I shift my attention to the ways 
in which those regarded as “from” Atwaedagama simultaneously trouble the boundaries by 
which they are commonly distinguished from “outsiders” and remind one another of their proper 
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social and geographical “place.” Transitioning in this way from a consideration of “outsiders” to 
those “from Atwaedagama” risks reinscribing the very boundary whose actual constructedness 
and non-essentiality I aim to portray. My rationalization for doing so is that, beyond the 
convenience of such a distinction in arranging the material I present here, partitioning the chapter 
in this manner mirrors the forcefulness of the “insider”/“outsider” distinction as I encountered it. 
In fact, however, my purpose is to demonstrate that the distinction softens when we consider—as 
I do in the following pages—how assumptions about the implications of “forgetting one’s place” 
cut across this boundary in unexpected and complex ways. To indicate this softening, I conclude 
this section with an anecdote that demonstrates not only one of the more antagonistic forms of 
hierarchical boundary work that Atwaedagama residents encounter, but also one of the many 
forms that residents’ complicity in such work may take.  
In September 2014, the National Craft Council (NCC) official assigned to Atwaedagama 
joined members of the village’s artisan society, a secretary and a development officer from the 
local Divisional Secretariat office, and a representative from the Ministry of Traditional 
Industries and Small Enterprise Development to convene a meeting in the village training center. 
The primary order of business was to update residents on the progress of a 74 lakh rupee 
(roughly US $57,000) initiative to “protect this handicraft industry.” The plan included a number 
of projects, including the erection of a new “showroom” by the main road (something planners 
hoped would level the competitive commercial playing field for artisans by presenting a single 
store in which they could all display/sell their products), the distribution of work huts to weavers, 
the construction of a new roof on the village training center, the installation of a fence around its 
perimeter, and the repair of two roads leading up to the building. About an hour into the meeting, 
two individuals in the audience raised separate and unrelated complaints regarding the how the 
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initiative had proceeded. One suggested that no matter how much money was spent on the 
project, he regarded it as a categorical failure given that it did not include an adequate plan for 
the allocation of land to plant hana, which he argued was the artisans’ “primary need.” The 
other, reiterating a grievance she had already submitted in a written petition to the Divisional 
Secretariat, complained that the work huts intended to support weavers in the village had been 
unfairly distributed.  
I take up issues related to each of these complaints in the following pages. My immediate 
concern is with the dramatic turn in the tone of the conversation prompted by the second 
complaint. In an ensuing exchange between the NCC representative and those in attendance, the 
latter were reminded in subtle but forceful ways of their proper social place. It was not simply 
the key “outsider” involved in this exchange, the NCC representative, however, implicated in 
such reminding. To my surprise, he was joined in this effort by Chaminda, a man recognized as 
one of the most knowledgeable and established artisans in the village—the one, in fact, who 
leveled the initial complaint. 
  Expressing his dissatisfaction at hearing any objections pertaining to the initiative, the 
NCC official reminded his audience of the unusually generous and unprecedented sum of money 
allocated to Atwaedagama. “Now, you know, in the central province, and in this country,” he 
began, “this is the [artisan] village that the government spends the most on. Even in the 
president’s home area, they won’t spend like this on a village. No one has ever spent this much 
on an artisan village [shilpa gamaanaya].” At this point, Chaminda commiserated aloud with the 
officer. Referring to land disputes and other evident hindrances to the progress of the project, he 
noted, “And this is also the village with the most problems!” “Yes!” the officer agreed. 
Conceding that he was disappointed to encounter such problems, but noting that it is not at all 
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atypical for such obstacles to hamper “development work,” he re-directed the conversation from 
predictable hurdles to a problem that, in this moment, he found far more distressing. With more 
than a touch of sarcasm, he declared, “A lot of people are so good at writing petitions!”65 Amidst 
the laughter with which those in attendance received the remark, an elderly man soberly replied, 
“Yes, well, sometimes we can’t do without petitions.” Discounting this response and the 
expression of political agency and citizen literacy it defended, the NCC officer continued: 
Well, I have been working with this village and with this training center for 8 or 9 years, 
and this is the only village that has ever sent a petition to me. No other village has ever 
sent a petition to me. They never blamed me. [Before now], not one artisan has sent a 
petition in written or non-written form. This only happened in this village! 
 
He went on to explain how, when the present development initiative had first begun, he told one 
of his colleagues, a man from Atwaedagama, that he feared he would encounter problems like 
ones he had encountered in a nearby drum-making village—a village that, as all in attendance 
were aware, is populated by individuals said to belong to the only caste group generally 
considered to be inferior to the Kinnara, the Rodiya. The most common obstacle there, he 
explained, had to do with the recipients’ misuse of funds intended to support the industry: 
He said to me, ‘Don’t see this village as another Kolagala.’ That’s what he said, as an 
artisan and as an officer. But Kolagala people would never go against my word. If I said 
something, they wouldn’t say a word against it. They would accept it. But here it’s not 
like that. Here, there are so many people who are so clever [daksha-
capable/clever/skilled] when it comes to writing things [petitions]. [Sarcastically] We can 
say, ‘clever people [daksha aya]’! We could employ them, in fact! 
 
Indicating his sympathy for this eruption of frustration, Chaminda added mockingly, “Yes, 
people who went to campus!” “Yes,” the officer agreed, “they can write very well, and they’re so 
talented at it.” After challenging such writers to just try to “win by writing petitions [petsan 
																																																								65 The word for “petition,” or petsama, is frequently used (as it is here) to refer to a formal 
written complaint. 
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galahama dinaagannako],” the officer adopted a more serious tone and informed his audience 
that such a “win” would amount to nothing being given at all. “Even things that are supposed to 
be given will not be given to them. That’s what I will do, 
because why are you doing this?!” A moment of silence 
followed this final outburst before the officer assured his 
audience that it is in fact a small number of people—“only 
one or two”—who “do these things.” Thus attempting to 
allay any fear that he might actually somehow bring a halt to 
the project already underway, in this move he also indirectly 
addressed the individual for whom his words were actually 
intended, the woman, Liyoni, who had submitted the recent 
petition complaining of the way in which work huts had 
been distributed.  
 In an effort to temper the bitterness now hanging thick in the air, one of the 
representatives from the Divisional Secretariat began in a comparatively unruffled manner to 
clarify the real problem with petitions. Complaints are often sent directly to senior officials—
including the president—she explained, rather than to relevant local officers, and the grama 
sewaka (government-appointed village officer) in particular. Since the letters are then largely 
passed back down, ultimately landing in the hands of the grama sewaka to whom, she stressed, 
they should have been sent in the first place, the result is that “a lot of government officers will 
read unnecessary letters and waste time.” Beyond this, she stated, “if you write anonymously, 
then we can’t do anything about it. You need to have a backbone (konda) and write your name 
on it.”  
Figure 13-The construction of a 
work hut in Atwaedagama 
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 Taking this as a cue, Liyoni stood and addressed the officials before her, “Honorable 
Minister and Divisional Secretariat [Pradesheya Sabaha] and all of the officers, like you said, I 
have not submitted any letters anonymously. I am from this village and I have a good backbone 
and I’m speaking with it.” Addressing the NCC officer directly, the woman reiterated the 
complaint contained in her petition—that, despite by her own estimation satisfying all the 
eligibility requirements to receive a work hut, she had not received one, while others, who she 
believed did not satisfy the requirements, had. After learning that she had been deemed 
ineligible, Liyoni reported to her audience, she attempted to speak with the NCC officer in 
person before resorting to writing the petition now at issue: 
Honorable Minister, I wanted to talk to him. I tried to contact him by phone, and  
I went to his office, but I didn’t have an opportunity to speak with him properly. He just 
said, ‘if you come like this, I won’t give you anything.’ I said, ‘I’m talking in a fair way. 
I’m not talking in an unjust way.’…My husband is a bus conductor and I have been doing 
this industry for seventeen years. I have all of the qualifications...I’m saying it fearlessly. 
I can show all of the things that I have given to Laksala, to Lakpahana. How can they say 
that I don’t have qualifications? What more do you expect from me? That’s what I’m 
asking from you. 
 
“The main problem,” the NCC officer replied sharply, “is your mouth” (oyaage kata tamayi 
pradhaana prashneya). After he assured all that the allocation of the workshops was entirely fair, 
Liyoni replied,  
Well, it’s okay if I don’t get a workshop. I’m not afraid. I have a good backbone, and my 
mouth is not too much…I have the same mouth as everyone else, but I won’t keep my 
mouth shut when an injustice has happened to me…I am a woman from this village and I 
am a citizen of this country, and I’m asking you to not let this happen again in the future. 
That’s all I have to say. Thank you very much. 
 
As Uyangoda argues, any “local public space” may become “a contested domain in which caste, 
class and gender inequalities play out overtly as well as covertly” (2012:27-28). There are two 
aspects of the unsettlingly hostile exchange between Liyoni and the NCC officer that 
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transformed this meeting into just such a domain. Both indicate how, against the locally resonant 
ideal of a modern, liberal democracy and the form of political subjectivity it is believed to entail, 
residents of Atwaedagama are reminded by others and, more importantly, remind one another, of 
their essential social inferiority.  
 The first aspect of the exchange is animated by narratives of a historically rooted 
contestation between individuals identified as Kinnara and those identified as Rodiya or Rodi. 
Both said to be “nearer to the bottom than any other caste” (Gunasinghe 2007:114), the Kinnara 
and the Rodiya are generally mentioned in reference to one another. In the Report of the 
Kandyan Peasantry Commission of 1951, for instance, the Rodiya and the Kinnara were listed as 
the only exceptions to the Commission’s observation that “caste has ceased to impose any 
appreciable handicaps.” They were therefore regarded as the only castes for whom “state 
intervention” was regarded as necessary (Uyangoda 2000:23). Both are alternately described as 
“depressed castes” (Matthews 2004:87) and “naraka minissu” (lit. “bad people”)(Yalman 
1967:60). There is historical ambiguity, however, as to which group is superior, as suggested by 
the title of a 1905 Supplement to the The Tropical Agriculturalist, “The Rodiya Commission and 
Its Work-Who are Lower in Race: The Kinnaraya or Rodiya?” The Kinnara are more commonly 
regarded as superior to the Rodiya, though there are instances not only in which the opposite is 
said to be the case (see Yalman 1967:90), but also in which they have been reported as being one 
and the same.66 The close association between them is further suggested by the proverb, “Like 
the Rodiya meeting the Kinnara” (Rodiyaawa Kinnara hamba una wage), a reference to the tale 
of how the Kinnara came to be regarded as the “hereditary enemy” of the Rodiya (Senaveratna 																																																								66 In “A Prince and a Kinnara Woman,” included in his Village Folk-Tales of Ceylon, Henry 
Parker reports that the narrator from whom he collected the story “thought that Rodiyas are 
Kinnaras” (Parker 1910:307). 
		 	 	 	 217	
2005:51).67 The story, reportedly originally documented by Hugh Nevill, centers on the 
degradation of a princess who, after being discovered to have developed a gustatory penchant for 
human flesh, is cast out by her father, the king, and forced to marry a Rodiya “scavenger.” 
Indicating the disgrace into which she has fallen, the princess and the Rodiya man are “angrily 
repulsed” when, “as night came on,” they sought “shelter from a Kinnara” (Denham 1911:214-
215). 
 If the lowliness of the Kinnara serves the contrastive purpose of conveying the absolute 
degradation of the princess in this story, the NCC officer relied upon a similar strategy in 
shaming his audience for forgetting their place. Deploying the same discourse of help used by 
“outsiders” to convey their superiority to and distance themselves from their neighbors in 
Atwaedagama, about mid-way through the meeting described above, he scolded himself aloud 
for permitting his “pity” for artisans in both Atwaedagama and Kolagala to influence his work as 
a development officer: “My big fault is pitying you all. I have the same problem in Kolagala, as 
well. [The Divisional Secretariat] said, ‘don’t ever give the artisans anything out of pity.’” 
Invoking Kolagala, an area widely known among locals and particularly those in Atwaeadagama 
to be populated by individuals identified as Rodiya, has a certain force in this context. The 
officer would take the comparison a step further just moments later when, as we see in the above 
excerpt, he declared angrily that, unlike the residents of Atwaedagama, the residents of Kolagala 
would never question his authority. (“Kolagala people would never go against my word,” but 
“here, it’s not like that.”) By drawing on the historical ambiguity or contestation around the 
relative status of the Rodiya and the Kinnara, the NCC officer’s comparison was a reprimand, 																																																								67 In Senaviratna’s Dictionary of Proverbs of the Sinhalese (1936), “Like the Rodiya meeting the 
Kinnará” falls alongside “A struggle on a rock is no friendly encounter” and “Like the cobra 
meeting the ‘polonga’” under the entry “Fighting.” 
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“They are better at being low than you are” and therefore, “Unlike you, they have not forgotten 
their place.” 
 The significance of the second aspect of the exchange that I wish to highlight here, the 
NCC officer’s comment about ‘clever people’ [daksha aya], becomes evident when we consider 
the remark in light of broader expectations regarding educational achievement among Sinhalese 
identified as low caste, and among those identified as Kinnara in particular. A 2005 study 
suggests that the contemporary secondary school dropout rate among such populations is 
“substantially higher” than the national average (Jabbar 2005:18). Others have documented the 
relatively poor educational achievement among adult residents of Atwaedagama (GCE OL of 
5.3%, compared to the national average of 18%)(Silva 2009:44; Jabbar 2005:18). (Notably, 
however, Atwaedagama’s adult literacy rate of 89.9% approximates the national rate of 91.2% 
(UNICEF 2013)68,69). Kalinga Tudor Silva and Paramsothy Thanges (2009) report that Rodiya 
and Kinnara children were “traditionally” not “welcome in local schools,” and that “if they 
managed to enter these schools with some effort or through mediation of some sympathizers, 
they experienced discrimination from teachers as well as classmates of higher castes” (24). 
Anecdotal evidence compiled during a 2005 study conducted by the Colombo-based Centre for 
Poverty Analysis also indicates that such discrimination is by no means a phenomenon limited to 
Sri Lanka’s past (Jabbar 2005:19). In explaining their anger toward scholars and journalists who 
write about the lowly status of those in the village (the focus of Chapter 3), some in 
																																																								68 https://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/sri_lanka_statistics.html. Accessed February 6, 2017. 69 For the purpose of the study, the “lower castes” were identified as those generally perceived as 
inferior to the Vahumpura/Hakuru, or (in the order given by the authors) the Kumbal/Badhala, 
Bathgama/Padu, Panna/Bodhi, Nakati/Berawa, Kinnara, and Rodi. (Jabbar 2005:4) 
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Atwaedagama reported that their primary concern was that their children would be teased at 
school because of such writings and, as a result, would refuse to attend.  
 In this context, the NCC officer’s noting of those who have written petitions, “We can 
say, ‘clever people’ [daksha aya],’” carries a particular salience. Delivered with unmistakable 
irony alongside the comment, “we could employ them, in fact,” his words go beyond reinforcing 
the general sense among many I encountered in Atwaedagama that the NCC’s employment of his 
colleague, a man from the village, is exceptional. What is more important given my focus in the 
second half of this chapter is that his momentary ally in sanctioning Liyoni, Chaminda, is 
himself a resident of Atwaedagama. The supposed laughability of the notion that the individuals 
to whom they refer would have attended university and thus qualify for government employment 
extends directly from the abovementioned caste-based disparities (both historical and 
contemporary) in educational achievement. Publicly reinforcing the absurdity of the idea that the 
individuals being discussed would be university-educated, or “people who went to campus,” 
Chaminda’s mockery of Liyoni went beyond indicating a compliant awareness of such 
disparities. It also conveyed the message that the latter was putting on airs. While Liyoni’s act 
may be justifiably read as an actualization of the modern ideal of democratic citizenship so often 
counterposed to “the old caste hierarchy” in Sri Lanka, his response is more consistent with the 
maintenance of the latter. To invoke the terminology with which I have framed this chapter, far 
from viewing the writing and submission of the petition as an instantiation of modern political 
agency rooted in citizen literacy or a notion of shared humanity, he suggests that she has 
forgotten her place.   
 In the days following this contentious exchange between Liyoni and the NCC officer, 
residents of Atwaedagama would comment regretfully over what they regarded as Liyoni’s 
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brazen and disrespectful outburst. And yet, as far as Liyoni was concerned, her side of the 
altercation was marked by a certain restraint.  
 When I went to visit her to ask her about the confrontation, I found Liyoni sitting in the 
doorway to her home and cutting small circles out of a large sheet of cardboard. As if 
anticipating my unannounced visit, she smiled widely and, standing up, dropped her work and 
gestured enthusiastically for me to follow her inside. Brushing the white clippings off of her skirt 
and onto the pink tile flooring of her living room, she invited me to find a comfortable spot on a 
plush sofa as she switched on a nearby fan. The quality of Liyoni’s home attested to the three 
years she spent working as a housemaid in Cyprus to build it. Two tall brass vases bearing 
yellow, red and white silk flowers flanked a sizable entertainment center. Behind them, a framed 
wedding photograph of Liyoni and her husband was displayed alongside a series of other family 
photographs upon an elegant china cabinet.  
 In a conversation ranging from her time overseas to her daughter’s education, we at last 
came to the topic of the recent meeting. Liyoni recounted in detail how she had made the 
decision to submit a complaint about the distribution of work huts in the first place. Liyoni was 
confident in her justification for the complaint and proud of the self-assurance with which she 
had publicly confronted the man who had taken issue with it. At the same time, however, she 
noted that in the end she “kept quiet,” or decided not to press the issue as far as she might have, 
out of a fear that doing so would draw attention to a subject that is purposefully avoided. 
Reflecting on the NCC officer’s public condemnation of her filing a complaint against him, she 
explained:  
Do you remember that Mahathaya said that even if he speaks in a bigger voice [hayen 
‘hayi’ kiuwot] to villagers in Kolagala, nobody would say anything? That everyone 
would comply? You know, we spoke about this matter before? That subject 
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[mathrukaawa] we were talking about, about these villagers and such? That is the policy 
that he has. He doesn’t like people talking above him. That’s what he meant then. That he 
doesn’t like people talking like that. So, I just covered it up and said nothing [wahaagana 
hitiya]. That’s why I kept quiet.  
 
Liyoni offered her own paraphrasing of the NCC officer’s remarks—“‘If I say something in a 
louder voice, people in this [other] village wouldn’t say anything above that.’” Echoing the same 
discomfort with “things from the past” that underlies the sense of humiliation Atwaedagama 
residents feel with respect to writings about the village, she elaborated: 
I think he might have this attitude that comes from the past [issera indan ena kalpa]—
that people shouldn’t talk like that. I think he must think it’s a kind of disrespect 
[awanambuwa]. I think he might have thought that and that’s why he said what he said. I 
would have questioned him further, but if I stir things up [awisuwot], people will get 
angry because then the things from the past [issera eewa] and all of that will be drawn 
out [aedenawa] and people will become restless [kalabala enawa]. 
 
When I asked Liyoni what she thought of the “attitude” (a concern with caste) to which she 
referred, she laughed and replied, “I don’t have anything to say—what I think is that, as a citizen 
of this country, everyone has rights [mee rate purawaesiyek haetiyata onekenekuta tamange 
ayitiya tiyanawa]. People have the right to speak whenever they want to in order to get 
something. That’s what I did. I don’t care what other people’s notions [mateya] are.” 
 In this instance, the rationalization that Liyoni offers for her reported self-censorship 
accords with the moral evaluation to which her neighbors subjected her following the meeting. 
Like the latter’s condemnation of her outburst, it serves in the maintenance of a status quo with 
respect to grievances around what are felt to be caste-based slights and injustices. Put simply, the 
conviction that Liyoni had acted disrespectfully by voicing her complaint is compounded by the 
threat of what might transpire if one causes a fuss or “stirs things up.” As we saw in the 
preceding chapter, the threat—that by publicly suggesting that caste-based concerns play a role 
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in contemporary instances of marginalization, one merely draws attention to one’s own 
preoccupation with a “thing from the past”—is real enough. “Even raising the question of 
intercaste equality in the public domain,” as Uyangoda writes, “is stigmatized in the belief that 
Sri Lankan society is adequately egalitarian not to make caste-centric demands public” 
(Uyangoda 2012:88).70 Indeed, in a conversation about the reluctance of village residents to 
complain to any authority figures about their public humiliation by those who write about them, 
the Atwaedagama gentleman employed by the NCC explained to me: 
People are reluctant to talk about [‘things like that’ (ara wage dewal)] with big 
organizations. Like, they don’t want to say it out loud. So, see, when they talk about 
something like that and try to solve problems [related to it], it goes up [udaTa yanawa] 
and ends up becoming even more publicized [pracharaya]…They fear that it would 
become even more publicized than it is now. So, because of that…if we start writing 
about this to the president…like, about these things, ‘mmm, mmm, mmm,’ then it would 
be more publicized than it is now. So, that’s why they have stopped. 
 
In keeping with this felt imperative to remain silent, Liyoni ultimately weighed the risk of 
“stirring things up” against her own desire to “have questioned him further,” and resolved to 
remain quiet. Insofar as it demonstrates an inadvertent endorsement of one’s own 
marginalization, then, the exchange is among the less overt ways in which residents of 
Atwaedagama fortify notions of their own caste-based difference. It is to such fortifying 
practices that I turn in the following chapter.  
Conclusion 
Through a discussion centered on the characterizations of hana work and of the people 
who engage in such work, in this chapter I have drawn attention both to the ways in which 																																																								70	The emergence of an “ethno-nationalist conceptualization of ‘a deep horizontal comradeship’ 
among the Sinhala,” Kalinga Tudor Silva likewise argues, has resulted in an “increased tendency 
to conceal caste identities and to look down upon any open expression of caste distinctions” 
(Silva 1999:212).	
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Atwaedagama’s close outsiders—neighbors and government officials, in particular—re-insribe 
the boundary around the village and the people who live there, as well as to the contradictions 
that arise in moments of this re-inscription. I have examined, in other words, some of the ways in 
which these boundary-making practices illuminate the tensions that arise out of simultaneous 
commitments to neoliberalism, caste, and democratic egalitarianism in present-day Sri Lanka.  In 
the final section, I also demonstrated a complicity on the part of Atwaedagama residents in the 
reproduction not only of the notion of their social difference, but also of the silence around caste-
based identification. I expand upon this complicity in the following chapter by examining how 
the area’s residents themselves reinforce the parameters of caste-based difference according to 
which the social and geographical boundaries defining Atwaedagama are continually redrawn. 
As we will see, in negotiating local expectations and criteria of moral evaluation like the ones by 
which Liyoni’s actions are judged in the ethnographic vignette offered above, individuals in 
Atwaedagama are at times impelled toward collusion in their own social and economic 
marginalization. 
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Chapter 5 
Reminders from ‘Within’ 
 
 In the previous chapter, I examined some of the ways in which individuals in proximity 
to Atwaedagama and the industry with which the area is associated invoke the limits of “money 
power” (salli balaya) to militate against the collapse of social distance between themselves and 
their low caste neighbors in the village. To make sense of the moves of Atwaedagama “insiders” 
like Chaminda (the weaver encountered in Chapter 4) to affirm such distance, we must also 
consider the ways in which those regarded as “from” the village similarly reinforce the limits of 
“naked money,” or the “pretensions of purely economic acquisition,” in their evaluations of 
themselves and others (Weber 1998:180;192). Turning to this latter goal in the present chapter, I 
begin by more explicitly establishing a link between the reproduction of caste-based 
identification on the part of those within Atwaedagama, and broader, morally-inflected 
evaluations of the perceived disordering that economic development is supposed to have ushered 
in. Put otherwise, I establish a link between, on the one hand, the ways in which Atwaedagama’s 
residents remind themselves and one another of their proper “place,” and, on the other, 
indications of a moral economy in which upward mobility is rendered a potentially hazardous 
achievement. 
 The focus here, then, is in part on the “movement[s] of reprisal” (Hardgrave 1969) 
through which the status aspirations associated with “new” wealth are rejected as the 
presumptions of “greedy” upstarts. As we will see, these “movements” bear a strikingly 
similarity to the ways in which those in Atwaedagama evaluate and respond to individuals who 
they believe have distanced themselves from hana work in an effort to conceal who they “truly” 
are as “mee game minissu” (“people in/of this village”). These movements, which often take the 
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form of gossip, are akin to the disputes that, in his 1968 analysis of low-status Guyanese 
plantation laborers, Chandra Jayawardena found to result from an incongruity between the 
prevalence of an egalitarian ideology and the realities of uneven mobility. The egalitarian 
ideology and sense of shared deprivation that Jayawardena identified in Guyana echoes in the 
assertions of shared humanity, articulations of local commonality, and kinds of collective 
action—albeit, in this case, passive action—that we find in Atwaedagama. Like the Guyanese 
workers whom he studied, the residents of Atwaedagama, though not qualifying as what 
Jayawardena would have called a “closed” sub-community, have long been set apart both 
physically and socially. Historically held in low regard, “the Kinnara” have been segregated in 
mono-caste settlements. (In 1953, Ryan observed that, “Except for groups like the Rodī, and to 
some extent the Kinnara and Palī, intercaste residential proximity is not viewed with shame, 
horror, or fear” (203). Atwaedagama’s present-day maintenance of a separate cemetery and 
separate children’s and sports societies are just some of the indicators of the continuance of this 
segregation.) The unplanned and leaderless action of Guyanese laborers against plantation 
management as a “generalized protest against the injustice of the social order” (Bern 1987: 214), 
has a certain parallel in the deliberate but largely uncoordinated collective silence with which, as 
we saw in Chapter 3, residents of the village have protested against the journalists and others 
whose writings they believe have humiliated them by indicating their historical social and 
economic degradation.  
 While in Atwaedagama we do not encounter an equivalent for the Guyanese laborers’ 
concept of “mati” (“associate, fellow being, or equal” (Jayawardena 1968: 417)), then, we do 
find a sense of commonality and shared experience that arises out of a history of social and 
economic marginalization associated with the caste-based industry for which the village is 
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known. Most importantly, just as Jayawardena found disputes to occur when the “achievements 
[of individual laborers] became the basis for claiming greater prestige…or when there was a 
suspicion that this was so” (425), so we find that the successes of upwardly mobile residents of 
Atwaedagama who appear to have deliberately abandoned the hana industry risk interpretation 
as “reprehensible exhibitions of unjustified superiority” (424). In the face of such displays, as we 
will see, Atwaedagama’s residents remind one another of the form and parameters of acceptable 
social mobility in the context of neoliberal promises of (economic) freedom. In doing so, they 
not only demonstrate that there is a solidarity in “hana work” that is at odds with the 
individualization entailed in the neoliberal operations in which they are also caught up; they also 
reinforce the ideological bases underlying notions of their own caste-based inferiority. 
(Un)Virtuous Gains 
As noted in Chapter 1, the intensification of local road and housing construction in the 
region surrounding Atwaedagama has resulted in a relative scarcity of hana, the raw plant 
material that village residents have long relied upon for the manufacture of the decorative mats, 
fly whisks, change purses, and other items ultimately sold on the street and in shops throughout 
the country. As we have seen, this scarcity has driven those who would use the plant’s fibers to 
either venture further away from Atwaedagama to secure it or, as is increasingly the case, turn to 
alternative and more readily available materials.  
In addition to the inconvenience of having to travel often considerable distances to collect 
hana, many in the village report that, while they were once given free access to the plant 
wherever they happened upon it, since around 2013 they increasingly find themselves having to 
pay those from whose land they harvest it. Generally speaking, hana’s sudden acquisition of 
exchange value was met with discontent. Many of my interlocutors in Atwaedagama complained 
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about being refused outright or being asked to pay (reportedly, on average, Rs. 2/leaf) for a plant 
that not only had once been given freely to them, but also that, as far as they knew, was of no use 
to those on whose land it grows.71 Remarking on the phenomenon, some would refer to an 
aphorism retold in a popular children’s song about a selfish dog that, though not interested in 
eating the hay leftover from the harvest, jealously prevents a hungry bull from eating it. As one 
man put it to me, “Some have hana, but it’s of no use them. Still, even though it’s not use to 
them, they won’t give it to people to whom it is useful. They don’t use it, but they also won’t 
give it away. The dog doesn’t eat the hay leftover from the harvest, but he won’t give it to the 
bull to eat!” [Kawuhari wattaka hana tiyenawa, namuth eyaalata preyoojena naeae. Namuth, 
eyaalaTa preyojena naeti wunath, preyojena kerana ayaTa denne naeae. Pawicci keranne 
naeae, namuth dennet naeae. Balla piduru kannet naeae. Kanna gonaaTa denneTa naeae.] 
While most commented on the situation with at least some resentment, there was at least one 
person, Renuka, a woman who became my friend and de facto weaving instructor soon after I 
arrived in Atwaedagama, who almost welcomed it. In a conversation about the rising difficulty 
of securing the plant and about being charged for something once given freely, Renuka smiled as 
she discussed the change. She indicated, to my surprise, that the inconvenience of having to pay 
for hana serves as welcome confirmation of “outsiders’” recognition of the upward economic 
mobility of those who have historically used the plant. In her estimation, the actual price of such 
recognition was, if bothersome, worth every rupee for indicating others’ acknowledgement of 
																																																								71 Some in Sri Lanka plant hana as a decorative plant in their gardens or to create a perimeter 
around their property. A thirty-year-old man from Atwaedagama related how, when he and his 
brother went to cut such a plant on a small estate, “this woman came after us with a wak pihiya 
[curved knife]! We didn’t know what to do, so we crept into a small shop and that was that.” 
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their “equal footing” in the transaction at hand. Still, as we are about to see, Renuka is not one to 
volunteer such payment. 
The increasing difficulties in securing hana notwithstanding, in the months following my 
arrival in the area I saw dozens of bundles of broad hana leaves brought back to Atwaedagama, 
hundreds of leaves pressed, and thousands of shiny wax-like fibers extracted, dyed, dried, oiled, 
brushed, spun, and woven. Wanting to see what the beginning of the process—that is, the actual 
harvesting of hana—looked like, I regularly expressed my wish to join others when they 
ventured out to collect it. To my disappointment, however, the threats of the forest multiplied 
each time I implored someone to take me with them on their next trip: “There are little bugs! 
You wouldn’t like it.” “Little bugs?!” I would reply in exacerbation, “please, don’t let little bugs 
stop you from taking me!” Next, it was snakes: “Even I’m afraid to go,” a man in his mid-60’s 
confided, “They coil around the base of the plant and you might not even see one before it bites 
you!” When the threat of snakes did not put me off, it was boars. “They are very dangerous,” I 
was warned. I began to relent and, months after the first of my many requests, when we at last 
got to thieves—thieves lurking in the darkness of the jungle, waiting to pounce on my Pentax 
camera—I gave up. By this time, the inter-monsoon had overtaken the region. As hana 
collecting expeditions ground to a halt with the onset of heavy rains and suddenly treacherous 
conditions, I decided to set the issue aside.  
It was to my pleasant surprise, therefore, that one December afternoon as the rainy period 
was drawing to a close, I got my chance. As we finished threading the loom on the dung floor of 
her porch-cum-workshop, a backbreaking task that had taken us several hours, Renuka excitedly 
and quite unexpectedly whispered, “Let’s go cut hana tomorrow.” Hoping to be the first to seize 
on the break in rains and begin harvesting what little hana she suspected we might find in a 
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nearby forest, Renuka shushed my instinctive cry of gratitude and swore me to secrecy lest 
others learn of her plan. Delighted by the offer, I eagerly abided and, the next morning, Renuka, 
her aunt, Eromi, and I set off early as I followed their lead along a narrow dirt footpath abutting a 
manioc field between Atwaedagama and a still partially forested area to the east. Each armed 
with a sharp, curved blade, and Renuka with an old, folded sarong to place atop her head under 
the hana bundle she hoped to have with her on our return, the two ladies moved in swift silence 
ahead of me. As we proceeded, our path became a mud-filled gully before turning us abruptly 
onto a blindingly verdant paddy field. Under the rapidly intensifying blaze of the mid-morning 
sun, we scurried along the narrow bunds, I struggling to keep my balance, and then proceeded 
across a grassy meadow before diving into the cool shadows of the forest and beginning our 
gradual ascent up a wooded hill. I followed them along an intolerably labyrinthine route and, 
even when we arrived at the defined village lanes that would lead us to our destination, swore 
aloud that I’d be lost for good were they to leave me there.  
Eventually, we turned onto a dirt roadway cutting through an area that seemed to have 
been built up overnight, partially constructed houses scattered sparsely across a forested 
landscape. As I paused to catch my breath and absorb the scenery, Renuka and Eromi carried on, 
their eyes darting here and there in hopes of spotting the prize of our journey. At last, they 
wrenched me from my daze and gestured their intention to approach a woman sweeping the front 
garden of a newly constructed brick house just up the lane. They had spotted hana on her 
property, they signaled. Standing beside a steep pile of shiny gravel in front of her home and 
resting her arm momentarily on the handle of her broom, the woman heard my friends’ request to 
cut the hana growing behind her house before replying without a moment’s hesitation, “Go 
along further up the road. My husband told me just last night not to let anyone come onto the 
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property to cut it.” A recent theft in the area had reportedly left residents wary of strangers, 
Eromi quietly explained to me. After appealing once again to no avail, my companions urged me 
to ask again on their behalf, evidently figuring that my being a foreigner might assuage the 
woman’s anxiety and, inducing that fabled Sri Lankan hospitality, oblige her to let us cut the 
hana. “Can’t,” she repeated firmly.  
Standing under the now raging sun, a sign that the wet season that had kept these women 
away from collecting hana for more than two months was truly abating, I noted the contrast 
between the calm repose with which Eromi and Renuka accepted the woman’s refusal and my 
own restless disgruntlement at the reply. While the two appeared almost to have anticipated the 
response, the woman’s hard rejection left me with a sense of mild resentment and reminded me 
of something an older man in the village had told me some months earlier: “If we go to those 
areas and people are reluctant to let us cut hana,” he reported, “eventually we’ll beg from them.” 
However, younger people, he explained, in their rising preference for alternative modes of 
employment—sewing in garment factories, driving three-wheelers, working as domestic servants 
overseas—do not like to “beg” or “worship” others to get hana. Standing before this woman, 
whose simple act of refusal weakened my resolve even before we had truly begun, I suddenly 
had an acute awareness of what he had meant.  
The sour taste of rejection in my mouth, I followed Eromi and Renuka as they moved 
further up the road, my own spirits fading as I watched them excitedly begin to advance on spots 
only to find that the plants that had drawn their attention were either too immature to harvest or 
had already been cut. Whether or not Renuka’s secret plan to visit the area had gotten out, 
someone had evidently beaten us to it. Starting to accept the failure of our outing, we began to 
turn back when, after a short distance, Renuka caught sight of a plant some distance from the dirt 
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road. Without delay, she and Eromi drew their knives and began slicing methodically through the 
undergrowth barring our path, casting small stones ahead of us to drive off any wild pigs that 
might be in the vicinity. Emerging eventually from the dense thicket, we proceeded up a rocky 
incline—my counterparts moving barefoot with the ease and skill of seasoned hikers, I clumsily 
trailing behind—coming upon one large hana plant, then another, then another. Just above the 
tree line at the top of our ascent, on an expansive boulder extending what seemed to be hundreds 
of feet to our right, we discovered a plenitude of mature, uncut plants. I noticed the deliberate 
silence of my otherwise talkative friends just in time to muffle my squeak of delight at the scene. 
The owner of this stretch of land had allowed them to cut hana in the past, they quietly assured 
me, but the threat of being scolded by his neighbors nonetheless demanded our stealth. Renuka 
and Eromi therefore commenced their work in utter silence, their blades whooshing through the 
air the only sound to rise above the constant hum of insects. Cutting each stiff, broad leaf at the 
base of the plant, they deftly chopped off the prickly tip before scoring the long margins with 
their thumbs and, tearing away the spiny edges, tossing what was left into a series of piles that 
would eventually dot the large boulder. Some hours later, sweat dripping down our backs and 
brows, our hands bloodied from handling the plants’ spines, and Renuka’s arms burning from the 
contact dermatitis often triggered by exposure to the hana plant’s sap, we wearily gathered up 
these piles and descended back into the shade of the forest.  
            Reaching the base of the hill, we at last broke our silence as the women prepared their 
hana bundles for the trek home. Eromi, arranging the leaves she had collected on the cool forest 
floor, now readily expressed her displeasure with the encounter we’d had some hours earlier. 
Writing off the reference to thieves as a lie, she attributed the woman’s refusal to allow them to 
cut hana on her property to jealousy (irishyaawa). Drawing her knife to a vine dangling from a 
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nearby tree, she paused before cutting the improvised binding and explained matter-of-factly, 
“It’s like this: That woman used to live in a mud [waddle and daub] house, but now she’s built 
that new [brick] house. That’s how poor people are. They’re jealous.” Referring to the owners of 
the property where we had ended up, she added, “These people, they’re big people from Kandy. 
They aren’t like that.”  
The following day, during a break from planting paddy, Eromi elaborated upon this 
assessment in describing the encounter to several of her relatives. Resting beneath the shade of 
the tall manioc shrubs growing in 
an adjacent field and sipping my tea 
alongside her and four other women 
seated beside us, I nodded in 
agreement as Eromi voiced her 
frustration at the woman’s refusal 
to allow us to cut hana on her 
property. Explaining that the latter 
had recently become wealthy and was therefore “aadambarayi” [proud], Eromi and Renuka 
commented on the sympathetic kindness of those with old wealth who, in addition to allowing 
them to cut hana on their land, would serve them tea and food and offer them soap to remove the 
sap from their arms after cutting the plant. At my request for clarification, Eromi explained such 
treatment by referring to such individuals’ appreciation for the fact that she and others seeking 
hana “need to eat in order to live.” Echoing the NCC officer who vocally admonished himself 
for feeling sorry for Atwaedagama’s residents, Eromi noted with approval that they feel a 
sorrowful pity for those hoping to harvest the plant on their land.   
Figure 14-Newly dyed hana dries alongside clothing along a 
lane in Atwaedagama 
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 In refusing her request to cut hana on her property, the woman we encountered violated 
Eromi’s sense of the obligations that one of greater economic means has toward one of lesser 
means, or her expectation that she ought to be treated as one deserving of the woman’s 
assistance. Explaining this refusal, Eromi denounced the woman as driven by a jealousy deriving 
from her newfound wealth, a reasoning consistent with a more broadly prevalent (and indeed not 
at all Sri Lanka-specific) assessment of upwardly mobile individuals as possessed of an avarice 
lacking in those whose socioeconomic superiority is firmly established. To illuminate how this 
event and its subsequent interpretation by the women involved might inform our understanding 
of the kind of collective policing of boundaries I consider more generally in this chapter, I wish 
to make an important point about such evaluations: it is not atypical for the notion that “greedy 
upstarts” pose a threat to an established socioeconomic hierarchical ordering to intersect directly 
with understandings of explicitly caste-based virtues. As Gamini, an elderly gentleman in the 
village bordering Atwaedagama, explained:  
You know, child, it’s like this: There is a group of people who would be satisfied with 
what is given. If someone in this group is given something, he is satisfied with that. 
That’s one group. Then there is another group who, even when something is given, will 
not be satisfied. And even if you give them more, even then they will not be satisfied. 
There is a group like that, right? There is a group who is happy with what is given. They 
are higher up [ihalin inne]. What I mean is, they accept what is given, but they don’t like 
to take things given freely [nikan dee gannda kaemeti naeae]. They don’t like it. That is, 
they are high people [ihalin ina aya]. Then there is the one who is low [pahalin ina 
kenna], who accepts what is given but is not satisfied [saehimakaTa pathwenne naeae]. 
 
By contrast to those who are “low” and perpetually unfulfilled, the man explained, one who is 
high caste is “happy with what she has and gives things away—meaning that they don’t want to 
grab [udura ganda] things from somebody else.” A friend nearer to Kandy echoed this 
assessment. Remarking on what she saw as an unwarranted and dramatic recent increase in the 
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rates that low caste (Berava) ceremonial drummers charge for their performances in and beyond 
temples, she explained simply, “Poor, high caste people are very honest, but rich, low caste 
people are corrupted. They are all about earning money.”  
The notion of materially indifferent generosity as a virtue of those who are high caste, on 
the one hand, and limitless avarice extending from the “corruption” (or upward mobility) of 
economically disenfranchised low caste individuals, on the other, lends salience to the 
association that Eromi draws between the long-established economic superiority of those on 
whose land they have harvested hana and the implicitly commendable compassion such 
individuals have for her and others similarly positioned. I do not know the caste status of the 
woman we encountered on this outing, though I am certain she would have been identified as of 
a higher status than Eromi. Eromi’s scornful evaluation of the woman as plagued by a jealousy 
motivated by her newfound wealth nonetheless signals a commitment to a socioeconomic and 
often caste-based ordering with respect to which her own treatment as deserving of the pitying 
benevolence of others seems not merely sensible, but also desirable. Eromi’s appraisal of what 
she perceived as the woman’s bad behavior is rooted in the sense that the latter, suffering the 
corruption brought on by her own recent prosperity, has forgotten her place.  
 Signaling the moral economy at work here, Gamini and Eromi articulate quintessential 
“movements of reprisal” (Hardgrave 1969), or instances in which the status aspirations 
associated with “new” wealth are rejected as the presumptions of “greedy” upstarts. As we will 
see, the logic undergirding these movements—a logic centered on a notion of the corrupting 
potential of money—intersects with and bolsters Atwaedagama’s residents’ evaluations of 
individuals who they believe have sought to distance themselves from hana work in an effort to 
conceal who they “truly” are as “mee game minissu” (“people in/of this village”).  
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Hiding the Mat 
 In and around Atwaedagama, as we have seen, money is at times conceptualized as 
having an essentially dangerous and disruptive capacity to permit those who have recently 
acquired it to forget where they come from and who they “truly” are. This notion intersects with 
pointed moral evaluations of individuals seen as endeavoring with varying degrees of success to 
set themselves apart from either their neighbors in the village or from the industry for which the 
village is known. In the meeting detailed earlier in this chapter, Chaminda articulated the essence 
of such evaluations in an especially unvarnished manner. Remarking on his neighbor’s complaint 
regarding the National Craft Council’s distribution of workshops to weavers in Atwaedagama, he 
declared: 
I want you to know that I am not against anyone who is receiving these workshops, and 
in fact I’d be happy if a lot of people could get it, but the people who are involved in this 
industry did not come forward fearlessly. They do this industry in secret [mee karmante 
horen keranne]. They hide what they are doing when the son in-law comes to the 
house…like, some people don’t even want others to know that they do this industry. 
When the son in-law comes, they hide their mats. They act fake [viyaaja lesa 
haesirenawa]. Some people do this industry but tell others that they don’t do it. More 
than outsiders, the people in this village are the ones who spit on themselves [pita 
minissuTa wadaa mee game minissu tamayi udabalaagena kela gahaganne]. Now, if you 
spit while looking up, it’s going to fall on your own face. So, that’s the situation as well. 
To tell you the truth, I’m not a person who is ashamed [laejawenne naeae] of my—I’ll 
tell anyone that I do this industry and that I live in this village. This is my address and 
these are my parents. I will tell that to anyone, because that’s the truth. Man’s behavior 
doesn’t come from birth [Manusayage haeseriim rataawa uthpatthyen enne naeae nee].   
 
Chaminda’s final assertion that “man’s behavior doesn’t come from birth” evokes the 
egalitarianism theorized by Jayawardena (1968), or one rooted in a notion of essential human 
equality. In it, he appears to substantiate an “apparent popularization of an egalitarian ethos” 
among the Sinhalese (Silva 1999:212). At the same time, however, his public condemnation of 
those who “hide their mats,” or pretend that they do not weave, also reinforces the tripartite 
		 	 	 	 236	
association of people, place and work detailed above. While indicating a belief that one’s 
behavior is not defined by birth, in other words, Chaminda also suggests that the deliberate 
concealment of one’s engagement in the hana industry, which he equates with concealing who 
one’s parents are and where one lives, is tantamount to denying who one is by birth. In this 
regard, Chaminda’s diatribe against those who “act fake” is an example of the kind of “dispute” 
(where the meaning of “dispute” may range “from gossip, slander and abuse to physical 
violence” (Jayawardena 1968:425)) that may arise when, as Jayawardena observed of plantation 
laborers in Guyana, “norms derived from the [dominant egalitarian] ideology conflict with a 
degree of differentiation that actually exists” (Jayawardena 1968:425)). 
 The sentiment that Chaminda articulates is elaborated in the morally-laden evaluations to 
which certain residents of Atwaedagama subject neighbors who, as far as they see it, have 
deliberately sought to distance themselves from the hana industry. Notably, such evaluations 
tend to extend only to individuals who have achieved considerable economic success (most often 
indicated by the size and state of their homes) in domains beyond the hana industry. With an 
important exception discussed below, these evaluations do not, for instance, extend to the very 
small number of families who have accumulated wealth through their engagement in the hana 
industry. As with Jayawardena’s Guyanese plantation laborers, here we find that “success and 
achievement [do] not, in themselves, go counter to the norms of the group” (Jayawardena 
1968:424). Jayawardena found that claims to “a higher status while still a member of the local 
laboring community…led sooner or later to disputes” (Jayawardena 1968:424). Here, however, 
one’s membership in (or intentions to remain a member of) the community in Atwaedagama is 
implied as long as one does “hana work” (hana waeda), no matter how successful he or she may 
be.  
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To illustrate the sort of scenario in which an individual’s economic achievement may 
generate just such a dispute, one afternoon I was chatting with two women, Nirmala and Dilhani, 
when they volunteered an assessment of another woman, Piyumi, whose apparent effort to 
remove herself from the industry (and whose consequent economic achievement) had incited the 
derision of her neighbors. As the three of us stood at the side of a lane cutting across 
Atwaedagama, Nirmala nodded in the direction of Piyumi’s home and, referring to the latter’s 
regular departures to and returns from Singapore, where she had been working as a domestic 
laborer for many years, explained scornfully, “She’s always coming and going.” Nirmala related 
that she herself had worked overseas for about twenty years. When her husband passed away, 
however, she explained, she returned to Atwaedagama, taking a job first in a nearby garment 
factory and then as a custodian at a hospital in Kandy, a position she had held for around eight 
months at the time of our meeting. While Nirmala reported being satisfied with her current 
employment situation, she and Dilhani also stressed the many advantages of engagement in the 
hana industry and dwelled in particular upon the value of same-day earnings by comparison to 
the regular but not immediate payment schedule of formal employment. They reminded me that 
the intensiveness of the labor entailed in the work—of, for instance, collecting and cleaning 
hana, obtaining supplies like glue and dye, preparing the thread for weaving, and setting up the 
loom—often requires the collaboration of a husband and wife. Both women emphasized that it 
was therefore only because their husbands were no longer alive that they were not currently 
involved in the industry. In fact, Nirmala noted, after her husband passed away, she had tried for 
some time to carry on with weaving before realizing the absolute impossibility of doing so. 
Stopping was hardly a voluntary decision, she stressed, and certainly not one motivated by any 
dislike for the work. The same, she indicated, could not be said of Piyumi: “Now, that lady on 
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the other side of the village there says bad things about this industry, but she’s in my family! 
She’s in the same family! And she even used to do it herself! She worked in the training center, 
and her mother and father also did it. But now she’s been going overseas and has money…” 
Echoing Chaminda’s denunciation of those who “hide their mats,” Nirmala condemned her 
neighbor and relative Piyumi’s rumored expressions of distaste for the hana industry. To Dilhani 
and Nirmala, such distaste was hypocritical given not only that Piyumi’s parents once performed 
hana work, but also that she herself was once so engaged.  
While presenting herself as someone forced by circumstance to give up weaving for 
good, or as someone with positive regard for the industry in which so many of her relatives 
engage, Nirmala’s negative evaluation of Piyumi centers on the moral questionability of the 
latter’s deliberate shunning of the industry upon which she too once relied. To her and other 
industry participants in the village, Piyumi’s decision to work and accumulate wealth abroad and 
to forsake hana work entirely stripped her of the ability (and right) to speak of hana work in the 
first place. Noting that she was constantly “coming and going,” a critical euphemism for both the 
amount of time that she spent away from her home as well as her thereby becoming a “big” 
(wealthy) person, they believed she no longer had the knowledge or authority to speak critically 
or otherwise of the industry. As far as they were concerned, there was a strong link between the 
upward mobility that individuals like Piyumi have been able to achieve as a result of overseas 
employment and what is perceived as their failure to properly acknowledge or remember that 
they too once relied upon the hana industry.  
Speaking of Piyumi and others who, after accruing substantial earnings overseas, seem to 
their neighbors in Atwaedagama to eschew or express disdain for the hana industry, one weaver 
in the village drew on the dense symbolism of the jackfruit to convey the condemnability of 
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those who have willfully distanced themselves from their place of origin. Holding out a freshly 
sliced chunk of the ubiquitous substance, he remarked to me with a sneer, “[such people] don’t 
even recognize this jackfruit!”  As elsewhere in South and Southeast Asia, the significance of 
jackfruit in Sri Lanka extends beyond its value as a nutritionally rich ingredient of people’s diets. 
A semantically dense symbol of “fertility and prosperity” (Holt 1991:191), the ubiquitous jak 
tree bearing the fruit is often “cultically addressed and venerated” prior to being felled for either 
ritual use or to make way for construction (Holt 1991:171). The value of the tree and its fruit is 
indicated by the legal strictures concerning the tree’s felling. Before removing such a tree from 
one’s property, for instance, one is typically required to obtain a permit signed by an agricultural 
officer attesting either to the danger that the tree poses to those living near it or to its no longer 
bearing fruit.72  To say, then, that one doesn’t “even recognize this jackfruit” is to suggest that 
one does not recognize Sri Lanka—that, in other words, one has forgotten where one comes 
from.  
Avoiding the impression that she herself might have strayed from hana work as a result 
of working abroad and forgetting where she comes from, in her own self-presentation Nirmala 
stressed that, after returning home following her husband’s death, she tried to resume the work in 
which she and her husband once collaborated. Her ultimate departure from the industry, unlike 
Piyumi’s, she suggested, was neither motivated by a sense that she is “above” the work in which 
many of her other relatives engage nor the result of forgetting that she and her husband once 
relied upon the industry for their own income. Rather, she stressed, it was a consequence, and an 
unwelcome one at that, of circumstances beyond her control.   
																																																								72	SL Ministry of Agriculture- http://www.agr 
imin.gov.lk/web/index.php/en/our-services/89-implementation-of-oredr-under-falling	
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In my own meetings with Piyumi, I did not encounter the unbridled disregard for her 
family’s involvement in the hana industry that I might have expected given my conversations 
with Nirmala and others. In fact, Piyumi’s deep ambivalence with regard to the industry and her 
family’s role in it was one of the first things that I came to notice in her. Piyumi, born in 1957, is 
one of eight siblings, almost all of whom either live in Atwaedagama or are abroad. She had 
married a man of much higher caste status in the 1970s (a fact of which she often reminded me) 
and, upon his early death, took a job as a domestic worker in Singapore.  
By the time of our meeting, Piyumi had spent approximately 25 years working for 
different families overseas, most of them European or American. In our initial meetings, she 
happily shared pictures of these employers, referring to many of them as “like family,” and 
stressed in general how proud she was of the life she had built for herself abroad.73 The fact that 
Piyumi maintained an entirely separate life outside of Sri Lanka did not translate in our 
conversations into an expression of apathy toward or disregard for the goings-on in 
Atwaedagama. While dwelling at length upon the sense of injury that she believes her relatives 
and other neighbors in Atwaedagama have felt as a consequence of their caste status being 
published by scholars and others, it was to my surprise her own sense of affront that came 
through most powerfully when we spoke. During an early meeting in her home, Piyumi turned to 
me and, with an expression of sincere concern bordering on suspicion, asked me what I was 
writing and what I was doing in Atwaedagama. When I explained that my goal was to learn 
about people’s lives and about the hana industry, she stated very matter-of-factly but with much 
apology that, while she wasn’t referring to “Madam” (me), there were people who had come to 																																																								73 Notably, Piyumi stressed that she did not wish for the same future for her children, who she 
hoped would be able to stay in Sri Lanka and not risk the toll that overseas employment can have 
on families. 
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the village and had written unsavory things about its residents in the past. When I pressed her as 
to what she meant, she said that they had written about their caste. When Piyumi had recently 
learned that there were students (other than myself) coming to the village, she explained, she had 
therefore told some of the weavers who lived in her vicinity not to provide them with any 
information. “If they want to buy something, that’s fine,” she noted, “but they don’t need to 
know anything else.” While stating repeatedly that she did not question my intentions, Piyumi 
stressed that, although I may “come and go and forget about these people,” if I publish a 
“thousand” copies of a book in which I write, “these people are low caste, they only marry each 
other, they’re poor, they do this job,” they will suffer. In the end, Piyumi suggested that I read 
what had been written about the village and write a counter-narrative.  
In these respects, Piyumi assumed a representative position on behalf of her neighbors in 
Atwaedagama at the same time that she conveyed her own sense of affront at what had been 
published about the village. On the other hand, she was also eager to differentiate herself from 
her neighbors. Without elaborating on the reason but in keeping with a general effort to set 
herself apart from her neighbors in Atwaeadagama, she reported that, today, she deliberately 
minimizes contact with others in the village. When she is in Sri Lanka, she noted, she visits only 
her closest relatives and otherwise keeps to herself.74  
Piyumi demonstrated similar ambivalence with respect to the hana industry. She 
recounted with considerable satisfaction how her father, an individual she described as a highly 
regarded and very clever prize-winning weaver, had created or managed the design of many of 																																																								74	Another woman in the village who had also spent considerable time abroad similarly reported that she 
does not casually visit the homes of her neighbors. When I asked her why, she explained, “That’s not how 
we do things overseas.” It is possible that this behavior among those who have lived overseas for 
extended lengths of time is due in part to a decision to emulate what they see abroad. Of course, being 
abroad for extended periods can also mean that the regular cultivation of relationships within the village is 
suspended.  
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the decorative woven wall-hangings that American potter Mel Someroski had commissioned in 
the 1960s (See Chapter 3). Pointing to her father’s burial place on her small property, however, 
she stated explicitly that while she did not wish to “forget” where she comes from, she also 
desires a very different future for her own children—one not preordained by an identification as 
low caste. Piyumi seemed acutely aware of and sensitive to the ways in which this status might 
impinge upon her own life and the lives of her children.  
Piyumi’s orientation to her own family—their historical identification as low caste and 
their involvement in the hana indsutry—was not, in other words, defined by outright denial. 
Rather, she oscillated between prideful reminiscence of her father’s accomplishment as a weaver 
and a reluctant acknowledgement of the caste-based status accompanying such accomplishment. 
In this, Piyumi frustrates the unforgiving criteria of moral evaluation articulated by Nirmala, 
Chaminda and others. While loath to ignore the legacy of her father, she nonetheless feels that 
this legacy—and his identifiably low caste name in particular75—casts a shadow over the 
aspirations she has for herself and her children. 
 On the one hand, Piyumi was adamant about the irrelevance of caste distinctions and 
presented herself as strongly invested in the notion of human equality also articulated by 
Chaminda. On one occasion, corroborating the observation that a notion of “intrinsic or human 
equality seems to prevail in inverse relation to the prevalence of social equality” (Jayawardena 
1968:414), she expressed her frustration with what she sees as “outsiders’” preoccupations with 
their (caste) status. Pinching the flesh on her forearm, she looked at me intently and said, 
“Excuse me for saying, madam, but if you cut your skin, you bleed the same—If I cut my skin, I 																																																								75 When I first met Piyumi and began to enter her contact details into my mobile phone, she 
gently placed her hand upon my wrist and, referring to the surname by which I knew her, asked 
firmly, “No need to put my father’s name, no?”  
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bleed the same. Different color, but same blood.” On the other hand, Piyumi also reinforced the 
legitimacy of several conventional and historically salient parameters of caste-based hierarchical 
distinction. First, reproducing a notion that, as I discuss in relation to Gamini (a neighboring 
“outsider”), lends itself to the fortification of caste-based hierarchical difference, she portrayed 
money as essentially corrupting. Second, while railing against concerns with caste as a provincial 
phenomenon absent from the cosmopolitan social life she has enjoyed working abroad, she 
readily invoked several historically caste-based markers of difference in conveying a unique 
image of her own self-regard.  
Despite or perhaps owing to her economic accomplishment, Piyumi stressed the corrosive 
impact that money has upon people’s appreciation of where they come from. More specifically, 
Piyumi eagerly recounted tales of the ways in which money—especially money earned 
overseas—could loosen the social ties binding families together. During one of our meetings at 
her home, Piyumi thumbed through the pages of a weekly newspaper covering especially 
sensational court cases in the country. Stopping suddenly and tapping her finger on a page, she 
took a seat beside me on her living room couch and eagerly dew my attention to one particular 
story. The account centered on the case of a man who hanged himself after murdering his wife, a 
woman who had recently returned from working overseas. “You see,” Piyumi explained, “it’s 
because she had gone abroad and had earned lots of money and then came back and was 
probably saying things like, ‘See how pretty I am? See how much money I have?” To Piyumi, 
the man’s actions stemmed from the sense of inadequacy that his own wife had carelessly 
fomented in him by boasting of her newfound economic success. Stopping short of the 
suggestion that his actions were reasonable, Piyumi nonetheless saw them as making sense.  
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When it came to discussing her own experience overseas and the many perks it had 
afforded her, Piyumi did not refer directly to the danger of lording one’s new wealth over others. 
However, while excitedly discussing the ways in which the families that had employed her over 
the years in Singapore had lavished gifts on her—she once proudly furnished for me a large 
Brazilian amethyst that one woman had given her and, on another occasion, presented a still 
carefully wrapped purple stone bracelet she had received from another—she would stress that 
she neither displayed nor wore such items because she is “just a normal person,” or someone 
who is satisfied with what she has. Piyumi did not remark on and was perhaps not even aware of 
rumors that the wealth she had amassed overseas—wealth that, marking her as anything but 
“normal” (average), was primarily displayed in the comparatively large and nicely applianced 
home she had built for herself—was related to the distance she had evidently put between herself 
and the hana industry and, by extension, the community (and her family, in particular) into 
which she was born. Emphasizing that she is not someone who is given to pretensions or seeks 
more than her “lot,” Piyumi thus not only reinforced a criterion of moral evaluation to which her 
neighbors in Atwaedagama critically subject her, but also reproduced a virtue that, as we saw 
above, is more generally understood to vary inversely with caste status: those who are high caste 
are satisfied, while those “at the bottom” can’t get enough. 
 To address the second point raised above, Piyumi was as vocal as anyone in 
Atwaedagama about the unsavoriness of scholarly and popular accounts that dwell upon and 
reinforce the lowly status of the area’s residents. At the same time, however, she would stress 
that her concern was not for her own feeling of having been insulted (something that her own 
behavior seemed to contradict), but rather for her neighbors’ and relatives’ feelings of 
humiliation. Implying that she herself was successful enough and removed enough from the 
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community to not be offended, Piyumi railed against what she considered a narrow-minded 
preoccupation with caste in Atwaedagama’s immediate vicinity. She viewed such preoccupation 
as alien to what she described as the “real people” for whom she had worked over the years in 
Singapore. Referring to the latter, she exclaimed (quite rightly) to me on one occasion, “They 
don’t care about caste!” Suggesting that I write a counter-narrative to those with which so many 
in Atwaedagama have taken issue, she gave a hearty laugh and advised me, “The next time 
someone asks you why you’re coming to Atwaedagama, you just tell them you’re looking for a 
husband!”  
The sense of affront motivating Piyumi’s opposition to the writings of outsiders was 
bolstered by the conviction that “real people, foreigners,” don’t “care about caste.” And, it must 
be noted, she’s right. Many of the Euro-American families for whom she has worked over the 
years very likely have little idea of what caste is. As for me, this is a category of identification 
that, while on closer examination bears striking similarity to the racial hierarchical ordering with 
which many of us in the U.S. are familiar, has zero traction in their worlds. Apparently eager to 
likewise embody this indifference, Piyumi explicitly disregarded caste as an ultimately irrelevant 
and provincial phenomenon fully at odds with the more “real” cosmopolitanism with which she 
had become acquainted in working overseas. And yet it was Piyumi’s efforts to mirror this 
indifference that, as did so many other comparable examples, captured my own imagination as 
one of the “real people” to whom she referred by indicating that there was in fact another layer of 
complexity behind her outspoken disavowal of caste. In important respects, Piyumi betrayed the 
significance of caste-based concern in her impassioned declarations of caste’s irrelevance. In 
urging me to tell high-caste residents near Atwaedagama that I was seeking a husband in the 
village, Piyumi was not just urging me to model the behavior of the “real people” she had come 
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to know living overseas—she was also playing on a hierarchy that, as she is fully aware, is very 
much intact. More significant is the fact that Piyumi drew heavily upon historically salient 
criteria of caste-based hierarchical distinction—namely, the quality of one’s dwelling, the 
directionality of aid, and general cleanliness76—in endeavoring to translate the wealth that she 
had acquired overseas into a locally legible status transformation. Piyumi pours much of the 
wealth she has accrued overseas into constructing a house with a fully enclosed and tiled kitchen 
replete with electric appliances, including a refrigerator and large rice cooker, tiled flooring 
throughout, several bedrooms, and new, wood furnishings. As with the few other comparably 
stately homes in Atwaedagama, a shoulder-height fence—part of it a solid brick wall—lined the 
perimeter of the property, clearly demarcating her land from that of her neighbors. She reported 
with satisfaction that, in continuing to modify the freshly painted home, she had sought the 
advice of a professional architect, the daughter of one of her European employers in Singapore. 
A stairway leading all the way up to the ceiling of the central living area—a common feature of 
lower-middle-class and middle-class homes whose occupants plan to construct a second floor—
denoted the hopefulness underlying her ultimate aspirations for the structure. 
In addition to constructing a home of which she could be proud, one of Piyumi’s 
expressed concerns was that the floors and surfaces throughout it also remain pristine. In my 
casual visits to speak with her, I found that I often interrupted her efforts in this regard, and over 
																																																								76 There is some scholarly disagreement as to whether notions of purity or cleanliness figure as 
powerfully in conceptualizations or talk of caste difference in Sri Lanka as they do in India, if they figure 
at all. For instance, Dennis McGilvray argues that, “despite [Nur] Yalman’s claims, it is very difficult in 
Sinhalese Sri Lanka to bring together notions concerning personal pollution and notions concerning 
caste” (McGilvray 1982: 12). McGilvray notes that the term most commonly used to refer to such 
“personal pollution,” killa, is generally not invoked in regard to caste among the Sinhalese. He also 
reports that he did not encounter the related term pirisidu (which he translates as “clean, pure or chaste”) 
in regard to caste in the low-country village upon which his remarks on the topic are based. Although 
infrequent, my interlocutors around Atwaedagama did invoke the term “pirisidu” in discussions of caste. 
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the course of our conversations came to appreciate the somewhat idiosyncratic value that she 
placed on the cleanliness of her surroundings. Deriding what she saw as other returnee migrant 
workers’ wasteful expenditures on clothing and other “unnecessary” goods, Piyumi noted that, 
save the occasional household appliance that she will resell at a profit, the only items she brings 
home are high-quality cleaning products not available in Sri Lanka. Once, some weeks after her 
return from a several-month stint in Singapore, she excitedly sat me down upon the couch in her 
living room and enthusiastically presented an assortment of such products—Pine Sol, a Chinese 
floor cleaner, a Japanese laundry detergent, and concentrated liquid soap—that she had brought 
back with her. Her preoccupation with cleanliness became evident on another occasion when she 
complained of the difficulty of securing affordable housing during her brief stays in Singapore. 
On a recent visit, she related, she had been kicked out of the small apartment she had been 
sharing with six others when the building’s manager discovered their violation of the occupancy 
regulation. Piyumi didn’t mind having to move to a hostel as a consequence, she explained—it 
was the fact that the cleanliness of the hostel was beyond her control that she found distressing. 
Finding herself shivering under the frigid air blown out by the A/C unit in the room where she 
ended up having to stay, she refused to use the blanket provided: “Just think of how many people 
have used that blanket!” she exclaimed as she recounted the unfortunate sequence of events.  
To Piyumi, her own prioritization of cleanliness and the construction of a quality home 
contrasts sharply with the concerns of the higher caste residents of Hisgoda. In fact, she 
explained, there is a striking contradiction between the latter’s preoccupation with their own 
caste-based superiority and their actual performance along these lines. “They go to temple every 
day with flower offerings, but in their hearts they are devoted to caste,” she asserted, but it was 
they, in fact, who qualified as “the real low caste.” “You look and see their houses and compare 
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them to the houses in Atwaedagama,” she urged me, pointing out that “The houses in 
Atwaedagama are nice, now.” To Piyumi, Hisgoda’s residents’ lack of cleanliness was evident 
not only in the sanitation of their houses (remarking in particular on the filthiness of their 
bathrooms, she encouraged me to take note of the cleanliness of her own home), but also in their 
bodily hygiene: drawing her hand up as if to pinch her nose shut, she noted that they “smell” so 
bad that one cannot even drink one’s tea in their presence.   
While Piyumi disregarded concerns with caste as demonstrations of her high caste 
neighbors’ social insularity, or indications of their failure to be “real people,” it is ironically only 
in reference to historical practices and local conceptualizations of caste-based distinction that her 
assertions of her own relative superiority are fully intelligible. That she ties the “real low caste” 
status Hisgoda’s residents to her comparative superiority in terms of the home she has built and 
the cleanliness that she prizes is consistent with criteria underlying the caste-based hierarchical 
distinction that she is otherwise eager to disavow. With respect to her emphasis on housing, for 
instance, as we saw in Chapter 3, there was a time at which, per the dictates of a “caste-defined 
rural architecture,” those identified as Kinnara were “not supposed to build houses with 
permanent or semipermanent features such as mud or brick walls, or even roofs covered by 
coconut leaves” (Uyangoda 2012:39; see also Gilbert 1953:300). To make sense of Piyumi’s 
unusual emphasis on cleanliness, it is important to note that the idea of cleanliness/uncleanliness, 
although found in other parts of Sri Lanka to be inconsequential in conceptualizations of caste 
difference among the Sinhalese (see McGilvray 1982:13), is central to the ways in which at least 
some of the higher-caste resident of Hisgoda conceive of Piyumi’s and other Atwaedagama 
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residents’ historical inferiority.77 As one man in Hisgoda explained to me during a conversation 
about the danger of attending the weddings of Atwaedagama residents:  
For things like that, our people…don’t get involved no matter what. Why? Because of the 
caste differences [kula bedeya]. I must tell you the truth. Because of this caste issue, they 
wouldn’t go [to weddings]…If we were to go, then they would give us food and water. 
But, compared to before, now they are a little cleaner [pirisiddu]. Before, they didn’t 
have any kind of cleanliness [pirisiddu kama]…In those days, you couldn’t go in that 
direction [toward the village]—the hana smelled and, along with that, they were also 
unclean. 
 
Beyond pointing to the development of housing infrastructure in Atwaedagama and stressing her 
own prioritization of cleanliness, a third phenomenon that Piyumi invoked as indicating the “real 
low caste” of her neighbors recalls the issue of helping discussed earlier in this chapter. Noting 
that some high caste children from Hisgoda have come to her in the past begging for food, 
Piyumi explained that, by contrast, she is an “independent” person fully capable of providing 
well for her own children and, as such, does not rely upon the assistance of others to get by.   
The orientation that Piyumi seeks to convey with respect to both Atwaedagama in general 
and the hana industry in particular is therefore marked by ambivalence. Piyumi simultaneously 
resists and reinforces the morally coded criteria (“low caste people are greedy, high caste people 
are satisfied”) by which she herself is negatively evaluated by Nirmala and others as a marginal 
character (one whose present distance from the village is communicated by the phrase “coming 
and going”) in Atwaedagama. In a similar vein, in articulating the deservedness and 
recognizability of her own position of superiority vis-à-vis higher-caste individuals in Hisgoda, 
Piyumi disavows caste as a provincial concern fully at odds with the concerns of the “real 
people” she came to know in her work abroad. At the same time, however, in both her self-																																																								77 This is also consistent with Uyangoda’s findings regarding a mono-caste Kinnara village in the district 
of Kurunegala in Sri Lanka’s North-Western Province. In justifying the decision by monks at a local 
temple to refuse food prepared by residents of the village, upper caste temple patrons noted that the 
houses of those who lived there “were unclean (kilutu) and unhygienic (apirisidu)” (Uyangoda 2013:288). 
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presentation and in her narrative handling of money’s corrupting potential, she re-inscribes 
locally and historically salient indicators of caste-based hierarchical distinction according to 
which those in Atwaedagama have been deemed “low”—namely, cleanliness, the directionality 
of aid, housing quality, and a relationship between “greed” and caste status.  
Mohan, now a successful weaver and designer, is another individual whose apparent 
efforts to distance himself from the hana industry are regarded with a degree of reservation by 
his fellow Atwaedagama residents. Mohan is unlike Piyumi in that he ultimately embraced the 
hana industry in which his father also once engaged. Like her, however, he was keen in my 
conversations with him to distinguish himself from his neighbors. Mohan articulated the origins 
of and motivations for his involvement in the hana industry in ways deliberately intended to 
sever any ties to its caste association. At the same time, in his endeavor to step outside of and 
thereby challenge certain parameters of caste-based identification—namely, in his self-
presentation as an exceptional figure—he inadvertently reinforced a notion of the essential social 
difference of those in his own village.  
The first time that I heard of Mohan, it was in the context of a discussion in which I had 
explicitly asked Sajith, another weaver in the village, about Chaminda’s comments about “hiding 
the mat.” Summarizing the message as meaning that some “do it, but they don’t like it,” Sajith 
offered Mohan as an example: “[H]e said to us, ‘this job is useless, so don’t do it.’ He was [doing 
an unrelated job at the time], but now he’s doing this job using hana…So, what Chaminda 
Mahathaya said was the absolute truth—people disrespect the industry, but they still do it 
[karmaanteyaTa agawurwa keranawa, eeth keranawa].” Elaborating upon Mohan’s particular 
story, he noted, “he opened a small store and thought that he could develop through that and that 
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he didn’t have to do the industry, but then he went bankrupt and there wasn’t any other way for 
him to survive, so he started doing this job again.”  
Mohan did not attend the village meetings attended by other hana industry participants, 
and he was often away from Atwaedagama managing the relatively sizeable orders that he 
regularly secured for the woven hana items that he designed. It was only by chance, then, that I 
met him—and not even in Atwaedagama—several months before he would actually have the 
time and be willing to speak with me. It was in retrospect that I came to fully appreciate Mohan’s 
careful handling of this initial encounter, a somewhat difficult exchange that unfolded at the 
Department of Industrial Development and Enterprise Promotion in Kandy. My research 
assistant and I had gone to the Department to learn about its support of artisans in Atwaedagama 
and, upon entering, were happily surprised to find an impressive array of colorful and expertly 
woven hana items—boxes, cushion covers, wall-hangings and the like—stacked neatly on a 
landing near the building’s main entrance. Curious, I asked an administrator standing nearby 
where they had come from. Relating that the products had been on display in an exhibition that 
the department had recently sponsored, she shared that the individual who had designed them 
was in fact in the building to collect them and offered to locate him for us. Moments later, a 
gentleman in black slacks and a crisp, white, button-down shirt ascended the stairs. Noting a look 
of guarded expectation upon his face, I asked him if he was from Atwaedagama. With a hint of 
reservation and a stern look, Mohan acknowledged that he was. As I began to explain that I had 
been speaking with those engaged in the hana industry to learn more about it, Mohan, indicating 
his reluctance, interjected that he had “only started doing this three years ago,” having only done 
hana work as a “hobby” (winodanshaya) before that, and would therefore likely not have much 
		 	 	 	 252	
to say that would be of interest to me. Upon my explaining that I’d nonetheless like to speak with 
him, he handed me a glossy business card before replying curtly, “balamu” (“We’ll see”).  
Over the months following this encounter, I would reach out to Mohan on several 
occasions in an effort to schedule a meeting with him. When he at last agreed, he explained 
matter-of-factly that, as I could likely tell from the difficulty of meeting him, he is not someone 
who would be “chasing after” me. Unlike others I may have encountered in carrying out my 
research in Atwaedagama, he explained, he would not be begging to give me his time. 
Ultimately, Mohan was very generous with his time and thoughts. As I would come to learn, 
however, the tenor of our initial meeting, and this relative coolness in particular, was indicative 
of his presentation as a self-made entrepreneur. It was consistent not only with how he 
understood and articulated the origins of his involvement in the industry in which he was now 
thriving, but also with his rejection of the hierarchy implied in “begging” and accepting the help 
or handouts of others. 
According to others in Atwaedagama, Mohan’s father was one of the most accomplished 
weavers in the village when Mohan was a child. That his own involvement in the hana industry 
might in some way derive from the lineage-basis of knowledge transmission associated with the 
industry was not, however, a possibility that Mohan himself entertained. Articulating a firmly 
neoliberal subjectivity, he grounded his expertise as a weaver and designer—expertise he 
claimed to have acquired only as an adult—in reference not to a lineage-based inheritance of 
traditional knowledge, but to a broader and distinctly personal life trajectory defined by a 
dedication to self-improvement, self-help, and self-teaching. He attributed his present success—
the orders he regularly receives for the products he designs are so large that he consistently 
employs up to thirty-five people in the village to help him fill them—to his own individual 
		 	 	 	 253	
creative abilities and an internal drive instilled in him in his youth. Never mentioning his father 
to me, Mohan stressed, “I didn’t have any guides or teachers to teach me,” and explained that, as 
the eldest among his siblings, he “climbed up in society” by educating himself. On one occasion, 
Mohan pointed to an array of titles on his living room bookshelf—Concepts of Success, How to 
Develop Your Personality, and Aims for Life—and remarked proudly, “These are the kinds of 
books that I have.”  
In explaining how he had taken up the industry several years ago, Mohan did not 
emphasize the sense of desperation suggested by rumors of his having “failed” in developing the 
small shop he had attempted to run in Atwaedagama. Rather, he stressed the choice he made to 
prove to his neighbors that, even without years of experience, and by virtue of his own skill, he 
could develop a successful business in the hana industry. “Even if others may do well and win 
awards or certificates, if I enter something in a competition I always get an award even though I 
don’t have twenty or twenty-five years of training.” As Mohan narrated it, he had worked for 
some time in the government sector before deciding to open a small grocery in Atwaedagama. 
He explained, however, that many of his neighbors, jealous of the wealth he might thereby 
accrue, refused to patronize his business and, after struggling for a number of years, he was 
compelled to close its doors. “I got caught in that competition,” he related, “and I realized that I 
couldn’t do it. So, then, I thought, ‘Okay, if you all won’t help me with this…’—I wanted to 
show them that I could also do what they do. I made up my mind and, to tell you the truth, no 
one else can do these designs like I can…I didn’t even know how to do it, but the thing is, I 
picked it up quickly and just started doing it.” 
In recounting the impetus behind his involvement in the hana industry in this way, 
Mohan resisted the sense that, at the end of the day, hana work is his only option. He also 
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sidestepped the notion that his choice to develop the business he now ran was rooted in anything 
like the pride to which Chaminda refers when he stated his own willingness to declare, “this is 
my address and these are my parents.” To Mohan, who his parents were and what his address is 
are irrelevant when it comes to his occupation: 
[There’s this idea that] we are low caste or high caste [kula] according to what we do [as 
a job][api kuleyen pahat hari usas hari wenne api kerana dee]. I don’t believe that. We 
can go to different levels of society. We have options [ida], so we have to try. For me, 
there are no problems like that [caste is not a problem]. Everyone talks to me… because I 
interact with a lot of people in the society. So, there aren’t any problems. Now, my 
daughter’s wedding was there, in a hotel nearby. I’m not scared, so I invited 350 guests. 
Everybody came—people I knew. They know what I do, but they don’t have any issues. 
Why do we need caste? Why do we have to make it a problem! [Aeyi apita kula oone 
kiyanne. Eeka prashneak keraganna one naehae]  
 
A self-professed voracious reader and consumer of knowledge about “what’s happening in the 
world,” Mohan, like Piyumi, stressed the provinciality underlying concerns with caste status, or 
that to which one’s parents and one’s address are believed to point. Disregarding a preoccupation 
with one’s low caste status, in particular, as an excuse to not succeed, he explained, “We need to 
be open in whatever we do. Now, for example, in countries like Japan, they bow to anyone. They 
don’t have differences when it comes to their occupation. Like, even in Germany or Russia, 
whatever occupation one does, they don’t have any problems. Whatever we do, we shouldn’t be 
putting ourselves down [awatakseeru- underestimate].” Mohan stressed, “Skills aren’t the only 
thing that you need [to succeed].” He explained that one must also have “a good educational 
status and good psychological development [maanasika prevardhenaya].” Evoking a neoliberal 
ethos grounded in personal responsibility, Mohan noted, “If people want to get up, nobody tries 
to help them. If we fall down, we need to try and pick ourselves up.”  
While downplaying caste as an issue with which one ought not concern oneself in 
pursuing a given occupational path, however, Mohan was also unusually adamant about stressing 
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not only his exceptionality among the residents of Atweadagama, but the fundamental difference 
of the kind and quality of work that he does. Urging me to confirm that I found him to be 
“different” from others I met in Atwaedagama, Mohan would stress not only his comparatively 
substantial “social experience” [samaaje adekiima] in distinguishing himself from those around 
him, but also his particular self-sufficiency with regard to developing his business. Signaling his 
refusal of the hierarchy implied in the directionality of help, Mohan related that he had refused 
the NCC’s offer of a weaving workshop. He explained, “they came here to see [if I was eligible] 
and I told them, ‘I don’t want anything.’ So…I don’t like to follow after [beg from] people and 
be like that. I know what I need for my future, and I have prepared for it. I can do this at a high 
quality. I can earn a lot with the orders.” During one conversation in his office, a room in the 
building that he had originally constructed for his grocery, Mohan withdrew a multi-page 
contract for a large order for his products from his files and, handing it to me to review for 
myself, noted proudly, “I had to make a report, including everything. So, I made it on my own. I 
didn’t get help from anyone.” 
Beyond stressing his independence as a businessman, Mohan also grounded his 
difference from others in Atwaedagama in his flexible and creative vision and in the quality of 
his products. Suggesting the operation of a “spiritual economy,” or a “convergence of religious 
ethics and business management knowledge” (Rudnyckyj 2009:132), Mohan remarked: 
We need to know how to market ourselves. Now, I’m a Buddhist, and I know what 
Buddha has told us: He has told us, ‘even from a dead rat, if a person can live off of it, 
you should use it.’ Now, see, I don’t use just hana, I also use grass to do this 
industry!...No one else uses it. 
 
His work, Mohan concluded with pride, “is precise all the way down to the thread and the exact 
angle.”  
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In keeping with his emphasis on never following after or begging others for (in my case) 
time or (in the case of the NCC) resources, Mohan also stressed his careful selectivity when it 
comes to deciding which shops to work with. Pointing to an item on his desk, he related on one 
occasion: 
See this table set? It has very good demand. [I give it to] Laksala, Lak Pahana, Lak 
Medura, but I don’t sell these things through ‘pavement shops’…It has a high quality 
[usas tatweya] and if we sell this at the pavement level, that will be lost…So, if a normal 
shop comes and asks for an order, I won’t give to them. I go to the shop and I see whether 
or not it has a ‘quality,’ because if I put my things in that shop—now, miss, if you see 
this bag hanging in a shop in the Kandy town, then it doesn’t have any worth 
[watinaakamak]. So I don’t put my things there. …To tell you the truth, I produce these 
items not for people who are poor or for the middle class...I make my items for people 
who have money. 
 
In refusing caste as a relevant category of identification when it comes to his own life, Mohan 
thus points to his self-sufficiency as a businessman, the unparalleled quality of his products, his 
unique ability to select rather than “chase after” buyers, and, perhaps most importantly, his 
coming to the hana industry as a result of self-motivated choice rather than lineage-based path 
dependence. In this regard, he effectively sidesteps the sense among some of his fellow artisans 
in Atwaedagama that his ultimate pursuit of the business after attempting to flee it amounts to 
“hiding the mat.” To others, his reportedly forced “return” to the industry may be evaluated as a 
moral failing, or an ultimately botched attempt to “make it” in an enterprise other than that into 
which one is believed to be born and, thus, ought to give one pride. Yet Mohan’s own narration 
of the self-determined way he came to build a business around hana work not only suggests an 
effort to sidestep the question of shame, but is also directly counterposed to the moral economy 
according to which his neighbors evaluate his life trajectory. The satisfaction that he 
demonstrates with regard to his own involvement and success in the hana industry bears little 
relation to a fearlessness of admitting, in Chaminda’s terms, who his parents were or what his 
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address is. While not exactly “hiding the mat,” Mohan asserts his own exceptionality in a manner 
that breaches the collectively sustained moral economy by which the implications of doing so are 
determined in the first place. In his explicit embrace of “money power” (salli balaya) and, for 
instance, his pointed (though specious) invocation of Japan as a place where one’s occupation is 
unconnected with one’s social status, Mohan comes closer than any of the other individuals I 
encountered in Atwaedagama to exhibiting that “blunting of discrimination” characteristic of 
what Simmel calls a “faithful subjective reflection of the internalized money economy” (Simmel 
1969:52).  
 Mohan frames his involvement and success in the hana industry strictly in terms of a 
market economy. His proud display of the titles upon his bookshelf exhibits an espousal of 
marquee neoliberal virtues, stark individualism and self-promotion not least among them. At the 
same time, however, his energetic preoccupation with presenting as “different” from his 
neighbors suggests an orientation of more subtle complexity than a mere “faithful subjective 
reflection of the internalized money economy” (Simmel 1969:52). Mohan’s conscious struggle 
against the moral economy by which his actions are evaluated by others exemplifies what 
Sahlins has cheekily termed the “cunning of culture,” or those processes whereby the principles 
of a market economy are in their very instantiation structured by locally meaningful forms 
(Sahlins 1992:13). Regarding himself as unique or, in his terms, “‘one man’ in Sri Lanka” 
(mama Lankaawe ‘one man’), Mohan’s deliberate self-marginalization from his neighbors 
presents as an exception that proves the rule. He embraces the market economy by which he 
evaluates his own struggle and success at the same time that, through the very act of 
juxtaposition, he revitalizes elements of the moral economy he so earnestly wishes to escape.  
Conclusion 
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In the articulation of market-oriented subjectivities, the moral evaluation of selves and 
others, and the interpersonal dynamics in which individuals in and around Atwaedagama are 
reminded of their proper social and geographical “place,” we find resistance to what some 
describe as the “intense proliferation of exchange-value as the sole value metric” (Peacock 
2015:9). Indeed, as I have aimed to show in this and the two preceding chapters, the myriad and 
at times conflictual practices through which the boundaries of Atwaedagama are contested and 
redrawn thwart the ascendency of any one value metric. Here, the often mundane renewal of 
understandings of money’s selectively corrupting potential, of notions of cleanliness as a virtue 
of the socially superior, and of expectations regarding the proper directionality of “help” re-
energizes the ideological and practical underpinnings of the caste-based boundary making that so 
many regard as out of step in a modern, democratic Sri Lanka. As we have seen in this and the 
previous chapter, there are striking commonalities underlying the kinds of practices to which 
those in Atwaedagama’s close vicinity turn in maintaining an elevated social distance from their 
neighbors and the often morally inflected ways in which those identified as “from” 
Atwaedagama evaluate one another. These commonalities help us to make sense of fact that, at 
the very historical juncture at which scholarly and popular claims of caste’s inexorable demise 
abound, practices of caste-based boundary making find steady ground in the unique interplay 
between moral and financial economies according to which individuals struggle to evaluate 
themselves and one another. Acknowledging such commonalities not only facilitates an 
appreciation for the fundamentally local character of the phenomenon, but also draws our 
attention once again to the points of (uneasy) articulation between investments in caste, promises 
of democratic egalitarianism, and the supposed leveling influences of a market economy. In the 
following chapter, a comparable scene of such articulation unfolds in a place where, unlike in 
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Atwaedagama, the industry at hand is the object of explicit contestation. There, we’ll see, men 
and women on each side of this struggle draw variously on a post-independence narrative of 
traditional craft, competitive individualism, and a market logic in which heritage for profit is the 
order of the day. Caste, we will see, does markedly different work for those involved, but, as in 
Atwaedagama, its reproduction is shared by individuals across the strata of gender, age, class, 
and caste. 
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Chapter 6 
Broken Threads, Nefarious Designs: 
Tradition, Caste, and Conflict Among Dumbara Rata Weavers 
 
Although the patrimony serves to unify each nation, the inequalities in its 
formation and appropriation require that it also be studied as a space of material 
and symbolic struggle between classes, ethnic groups, and other groups. (Canclini 
1995:136) 
 
[T]oo much is asked of heritage. In the same breath, we commend national 
patrimony, regional and ethnic legacies and a global heritage shared and sheltered 
in common. We forget that these aims are usually incompatible. (David 
Lowenthal 1998:227) 
 
*** 
 
 In the foregoing chapter, I demonstrated how the high caste men and women around 
Atwaedagama, finding themselves engaged in an industry historically associated with low caste 
status, qualify such engagement to maintain their elevated social distance from those popularly 
considered to be that industry’s lineage-based heirs. They do so at a time when even many of 
those regarded as the lineage-based heirs to the hana industry are reluctant to admit their own 
engagement in hana work. While the engagement of high caste men and women complicates the 
presumed link between people of a certain caste status and the “special trades” over which they 
are deemed to have a monopolizing authority (Weber 1998:191), I showed that it has not 
undermined caste-based identification in any straightforward sense. At a moment when some Sri 
Lankan scholars insist that the irrelevance of caste permits “any person who chooses any 
handicraft as a living [to] do so without much resistance” (Masakorala 2002:75-76), in 
Atwaedagama we see instead an energization of the cultural labor by which caste-based 
hierarchical boundaries are redrawn at the same time that they are called into question. In 
Redigama, approximately 40 km to the west and the home of what is known locally as Dumbara 
rata (Dumbara designs) weaving, we find that, while the scene is quite different, a comparable 
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reproduction of caste boundaries prevails. In Redigama, the combination of a flagging local 
agricultural economy and a booming market for the village’s regionally distinctive decorative 
cotton textiles has fueled contestation over entitlement to an industry that, despite its historical 
association with the low caste Berava, now sees high caste Goyigama men and women make up 
the majority of its weaving workforce. This contestation, as the ethnographic material presented 
here will show, is precisely the struggle to which Canclini refers in the above epigraph. Notably, 
however, my analysis goes a bit further than Canclini’s observation of patrimony’s capacity to 
both unify and divide.  In focusing on the realm of patrimony, we see not only a struggle 
between groups. Of equal importance, we see the reproduction of those groups through such 
struggle. 
Instantiating the articulation of caste with, on the one hand, strong market logics that 
have shaped Sri Lanka since the 1977 implementation of “open economy” reforms and, on the 
other, the ideological and practical entailments of liberal democratic governance and citizenship, 
the dispute unfolding in Redigama highlights the difficulty of resolving one of the core policy 
debates concerning the protection of traditional knowledge in Sri Lanka, or the question of the 
extent to which “the preservation of [such] knowledge must be limited to [its] traditional 
bearers” (Silva 2013). This question, one of central concern to legal scholars presently trying to 
“[strike] a balance between cultural preservation and access to knowledge” (Andanda 2012), is 
typically posed with reference to the disenfranchisement of local communities by “big business” 
seeking to gain from indigenous “technical know-how,” musical and artistic productions, and 
genetic material.78 At a moment when “liberal state-based regimes of protection of patrimony” 
																																																								78 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual 
Property, Background Brief. 
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seem to have given ground to “marketized relationships which position cultural heritage as a 
resource” (Coombe and Weiss 2015:43), however, it pertains not only to the interests of “big 
business.” This question must also be considered in light of the fact that disputes over knowledge 
also play out within local communities, a fact that, it must be noted, undermines the visions of 
harmony and homogeneity projected by consumers, government officials, and others invested in 
the  “development of craft” in South Asia.79 In the struggle over Dumbara rata weaving 
examined in the following pages, caste-based identification figures centrally in the contested and, 
as we shall see, often contradictory, claims that individuals assert in their efforts to carve out 
socially and economically advantageous positions in relation to the industry in which they are 
engaged. Such identification fuels the tension to which David Lowenthal points in the above 
epigraph between local or communalist legacies and collectively shared and stewarded “global 
heritage.” I argue that at a moment when the industry with which their (low) caste has 
historically been associated seems to be slipping from their grip, those in Redigama who invoke 
lineage-based proprietorship in resisting the efforts of “outsiders” to assume independent control 
over Dumbara rata weaving are condemned as narrow-minded, anti-democratic, and generally 
hostile to a common national goal of developing the country’s heritage for global enjoyment and 
consumption. 
*** 
 As Chapter 4 argues by illustration, the population of producers associated with certain of 
Sri Lanka’s “traditional arts and crafts,” though historically limited to individuals at the lowest 																																																																																																																																																																																		
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/pressroom/en/briefs/pdf/brief_tk.pdf. Accessed January 
2015. 79 See, for instance, anthropologist Soumhya Venkatesan’s work on the discursive construction 
of “craft community” and its obfuscation of the varied interests, capacities and projects of 
individual producers. 
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rungs of what is often described as a Sinhala caste hierarchy, has in recent decades expanded to 
include members of other and, notably, higher, castes. 80 The Berava, the caste to which those 
who have long dominated the decorative handloom textile industry in Redigama are said to 
belong, have been no exception in this regard (Reed 2009; Simpson 1997). Historically serving 
as the performers of propitiatory, healing ceremonies, the occupational and ritual practices of the 
Berava, once executed as a matter of obligation under rajkariya (duty to the king), have included 
mask making, dancing, drumming, and weaving. Over time, these activities have not only 
become dissociated from one another, but have also taken on new significance to the now varied 
populations who engage in and consume them. Masks are no longer only carved and painted by 
members of southern Sri Lanka’s Berava community for ceremonial use, but are also produced 
in direct response to the high tourist demand for these colorful items.81,82 Likewise, Berava men 
once performed the dances that make up the kohomba kankariya as a post-harvest propitiation 
ceremony in the Kandyan region. As anthropologist Susan Reed has documented, many now 
treasure these practices as the country’s “National Dance.”83 Non-Berava and even non-Sri 
																																																								80 http://www.dailynews.lk/letters/citizens-mail-10-02-2014 81 To offer an extreme example of this trend, during a 2012 interview with a designer who had 
collaborated with Laksala, Sri Lanka’s government-owned marketing outlet for “crafts,” 
conversation turned to the brightly painted wooden masks that, while once made exclusively by 
individuals identified as Berava to be used in the performance of such propitiatory healing 
ceremonies, are now sold as souvenirs in shops throughout the country. An arguably perverse 
instance of the global shift from “state-based regimes of protection of patrimony” to “marketized 
relationships which position cultural heritage as a resource” (Coombe and Weiss 2015:43), she 
reported that the outlet’s director had suggested importing the masks from China to more 
profitably meet tourist demand. 82 And not so colorful, it is worth noting. Masks held in museum collections around the world 
are notable for being painted in bright pinks, yellows, blues and other vibrant colors. Masks 
nowadays are painted in more muted “natural” colors in response to consumer notions of what 
constitutes the authentically “antiquated.”     83 In Chapter 2, we encountered a weaver, Lakshman, who invokes this phenomenon in 
particular to argue the irrelevance of caste in contemporary Sri Lanka and to therefore criticize 
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Lankans perform them in tourist, diplomatic, and entertainment venues around the world (Reed 
2009; See also Simpson 1993 and 1997).  
These transformations notwithstanding, the knowledge and practical skill required of 
many such historically caste-based areas of artistic production remain “possessed by respective 
caste groups which are typically at the bottom of the [Sinhala] caste hierarchy” (Silva 2013:1). 
And yet, as we have already seen with respect to the hana industry in Atwaedagama, instances of 
a relative decoupling of such performances and items from the particular caste groups with 
which they have historically been associated has complicated such possession. As I have 
demonstrated in the foregoing chapters and as I will further argue by demonstration below, this 
complication neither reflects nor precipitates of the disappearance of caste-based identification 
when it comes to those engaged in such “traditional arts.” 
With respect to the individuals whose family has historically dominated the weaving 
industry in Redigama, caste remains a salient category of identification in the lives of these 
“traditional craftsmen” in at least two important and closely related respects. First, it has 
emerged as indispensable to their claims of control over the knowledge and skills demanded in 
their work. Second, it figures centrally in the accounts of personal and communal struggle and 
achievement that they share in making sense of perceived threats to the industry in which they 
are engaged. The quiet but constant companion of “tradition,” caste has in this way become a 
double-edged sword continually sharpened by the language of “heritage” and “identity,” 
terminology not only characteristic of the popular narratives of craft production upon which 
these individuals draw in claiming exclusive title to Dumbara rata weaving, but also 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
the preoccupation on the part of contemporary writers with the caste status of Atwaedagama’s 
residents. 
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fundamentally incompatible with the notions of competitive individualism and liberal democratic 
development in which challengers to these claims ground their own entitlements to the industry. 
Facing state-sponsored efforts to more evenly distribute the economic benefits of textile 
production to their low-income, high caste neighbors—individuals to whom caste, as we shall 
see, is no less significant as a marker of difference—those who own Redigama’s weaving 
workshops defend their claims to control over the local weaving industry by reference to 
“heritage” and “descent”; yet doing so necessarily entails a consolidation of their disadvantaged 
position within a caste hierarchy that, while no longer commanding their servitude, is regularly 
invoked in their own and others’ explanations of practices that ensure their continued social 
marginalization. 
*** 
An example of the institutional silencing of caste discussed at length in the introduction 
to this dissertation, Sri Lanka long ago removed caste from the census schedule. Official 
documentation of Redigama’s caste composition is therefore hard to come by. Demonstrating 
caste’s reproduction irrespective of this fact, however, local officials and residents report that the 
vast majority of Redigama’s approximately 400 Sinhala Buddhist residents identify as highest 
caste, while a small minority identify as low caste, and more specifically as Berava.84 To 
reiterate, it is members of this latter group who have historically been associated with weaving in 
the region, and it is they who privately and publicly claim sole ownership of the local handloom 
textile industry today.  
																																																								84 Approximately three percent of Sri Lanka’s Sinhalese population is identified as Berava 
(Silva, Sivapragasam, and Thanges 2009:32)	
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Coomaraswamy’s early 20th century Medieval Sinhalese Art and oral history accounts 
from Redigama’s current residents suggest that from the late 19th century until around the 1970s, 
the Berava of Redigama produced minimally decorated cotton cloth for local consumption while 
performing duties as ceremonial drummers and, like others in the area, engaging in paddy and 
chena cultivation. Though no longer supplying textiles to the Kandyan monarchy, some also sold 
articles of cloth to the Kandyan Art Association, an organization established in 1882 during an 
era when British residents’ and administrators’ attitudes toward “local crafts” began to shift from 
“disparaging to a more sympathetic and informed appreciation” (Jones 2008:392). By the early 
1970s, however, a surge in government interest in actively promoting the “traditional arts” of the 
still newly independent country—where, to reiterate, “traditional arts” referred to Kandyan 
artistic productions—initiated a transformation in Redigama’s weaving activities that would have 
significant consequences in terms of the Berava’s economic welfare and the relationships they 
have with their highest-caste neighbors.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, government attention to the “traditional arts” in the early years 
following Sri Lanka’s independence from the British was closely linked to what some saw as the 
need to replace the “superficial bi-culturality of the upper and upper-middle classes” with the 
“native heritage” found in the “indigenous arts and crafts” (J.E. Jayasuriya 1956: 66;68).85 
Although a strong “cultural awakening” and distinctly “nationalistic sentiments” emerged 
alongside Westernization throughout late 19th century Ceylon (Roberts 1982:223), the mid to late 
1950s in particular marked a period in which the flourishing of such cultural nationalism among 
rural, Sinhala Buddhists coincided with the triumph in certain quarters of what historian 
																																																								85 Sri Lanka, or what was called Ceylon until 1972, achieved independence from the British in 
1948. 
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Kingsley M. De Silva has called a traditionalist “aesthetic ideology.” To officials at the newly 
established Ministry of Cultural Affairs, for instance, “it became obvious [during these years] 
that westernization in the arts and literature, for all its attractions, could hardly hold its own 
against the powerful forces of traditionalism” (De Silva 1981: 517). Those convinced of the 
promise of “indigenous arts and crafts” called explicitly for government-led promotion of their 
“development.” In the paper he presented at the 1956 UNESCO-sponsored “Conference on 
Traditional Cultures in Ceylon,” for instance, historical sociologist Ralph Pieris deemed the 
contemporary moment one of “cultural malaise” and advocated explicitly for government 
intervention. He opined that the “state alone can furnish adequate assistance [‘for the 
preservation and development of the country’s cultural heritage’] at the national level” (Pieris 
1956:10).  
Pieris, who as we’ll recall from Chapter 2 called explictly for dissociating craft from 
caste, was, like many of his contemporaries writing on the topic, interested in supporting the 
growth of a new population of “competent artists” comprised of Sinhalese from across social 
strata. An initiative he found especially promising was one proposed by the Director of Rural 
Development and Cottage Industries. The scheme involved paying “prominent artists and 
craftsmen a regular monthly allowance of Rs.150/- with the sole proviso that they should impart 
their skills to apprentices and maintain high standards” (Pieris 1956:11). As far as Pieris’s 
colleague, J.E. Jayasuriya, was concerned, such formal training would draw “artist-
craftsmen…from all sectors of society,” irrespective of caste or class. By thus leading to a 
replacement of the “existing caste associated artisans-craftsmen,” so the idea went, it would 
ultimately result in a “revival of the indigenous crafts on an enduring basis” (Jayasuriya 
1956:70). It was precisely such a program that would come to Redigama by the early 1970s. 
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Alongside the growth of a largely tourism-driven market for Dumbara rata textiles, it set in 
motion a reconfiguration of local socioeconomic relations between the Berava and the highest-
caste individuals residing there and, in this way, motivated the struggle over the local “traditional 
industry” in which Redigama’s residents are presently engaged. 
Before turning to the details of this struggle, I want to note that the terms I rely upon in 
the following pages to identify the two “groups” involved in this contestation are drawn 
primarily from the most common ways in which my interlocutors in Redigama assert this 
groupedness or, in other words, from the language they deploy in identifying themselves and one 
another. For instance, the individuals who dominate the textile industry in the village tend to 
refer to “our family” (apee paula) while others refer to them as either “that family” (ee paula) or 
“people in that family” (ee paule minissu). I therefore generally use the terms Berava and 
“family” interchangeably in reference to them. Their neighbors, by contrast, generally refer to 
themselves and are referred to by the members of the family as “highest-caste.”  I therefore use 
the term “highest-caste” to refer to the latter.  
One could justifiably ask why I do not refer to those who are “highest-caste” by a specific 
caste name. To explain, these three highest-caste groups are reported to be Walawwo, Banda, 
and Goyigama, or “Cultivator.” I have found no indication that the terms “Banda” and 
“Walawwo” have been used historically to specifically designate separate caste statuses in Sri 
Lanka. In his 1967 account of kinship and marriage in Ceylon, Nur Yalman documented that the 
former, Banda, meaning “Lord,” was one among a number of “exclusively Cultivator names, and 
none of the low castes would appropriate them” (Yalman 1967:91). In other words, Banda 
indicated one’s caste status as Goyigama. The term “Walawwo,” or “Walawwa” in the singular 
form, generally refers to the pre-British Kandyan Kingdom “residence or residential complex of 
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a Sinhalese noble,” or one belonging to a ruling aristocratic group known as Radala (Roberts 
1982:xxiii; Silva 2009:21). At least during British colonial rule, however, “local landlords [also] 
used [the term ‘Walawwa’] although they were not aristocratic by caste status” (Silva 1986:51). 
Today, Radala is considered by some scholars to be the uppermost among three Goyigama sub-
castes (the lower two being Goyigama and Patti, respectively) (Silva 2009:32). (Although, it 
bears mention, Dewasiri recently noted that, historically speaking, the “inclusion of the upper 
echelon of society [i.e. Radala and other groups] in the Goyigama caste appears quite 
problematical” (Dewasiri 2008:193)). Some in Redigama differentiate between Walawwo, 
Banda, and Goyigama, identifying Walawwa as the highest stratum of the caste hierarchy, above 
both Banda and Goyigama. Here, however, I typically refer to all three as simply “highest-caste” 
because, at the moment in which I was conducting my fieldwork, and particularly in discussions 
pertaining to the struggle over Dumbara rata, almost all who identify has highest-caste used the 
phrase “our people” (apee minissu) to refer to them as one. Notably, given that caste 
considerations figure centrally in matrimonial matchmaking, had my research focused on 
marriage practices in the village, for example, I might have found that “our people” was a phrase 
used by those who identify as Walawwa to differentiate themselves from those regarded as 
Banda and Goviyama. 
*** 
To make sense of the present conflict in Redigama, it is essential to sketch the relatively 
recent evolution and formalization of the weaving industry in the village. In the 1970s, the 
government of Sri Lanka began funding training programs in and around Redigama in which 
highest-caste men and women learned to weave under the instruction of their Berava neighbors. 
From 1972 until 1980, for instance, the Department of Small Industries funded a weaving 
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training center in which every two years a group of ten students from the area learned to weave 
Dumbara rata textiles from, at least initially, one of the oldest members of the family that has 
historically dominated the industry. A late 1970s feud between two siblings within the Berava 
family over an order from a major buyer from Colombo had helped solidify an arrangement by 
which members of the family managed separate workshops, catering to and vying for the 
business of different government and private dealers in Kandy and Colombo.  When private and 
government-owned shops in these two cities began to increase their orders for Dumbara rata 
items in the early 1980s, these newly trained highest-caste weavers were readily absorbed by the 
several family-owned workshops now struggling to keep up with demand.  
The first and more predictable of two consequences of this industry arrangement is the 
competition it engendered within the extended family. When I visited the area for the first time 
in 2012, family members with whom I met were quick to point out that the separate ownership 
and management of Dumbara rata weaving workshops in the village had always fostered a 
considerable degree of competition among them. This business-oriented rivalry is reported to 
have become especially pronounced following the end of the country’s nearly thirty-year war in 
2009, when an influx of tourists and overall strengthening of the country’s economy drove a 
rapid increase in demand for Dumbara rata textiles. Unfortunately, some family members 
reported, even the possibility of missing out on opportunities presented by this surge in demand 
was not enough to unify them. According to Himali, the only female workshop owner in the 
area, any possibility of true business expansion was barred by long-standing discord between 
family members and their refusal to “work under” anyone else. Charges of the surreptitious 
“theft” of designs by one from another substantiated her observation that “there is no harmony 
among us.” Dilini, the wife of Himali’s nephew, shared a story in which one workshop owner 
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hired a journalist to take photographs of his relative’s textiles so that he could “steal” his designs. 
“When there are exhibitions,” she added ruefully, “those who can’t create new things look 
forward to copying from others.” 
Indications of the second major consequence of the industry’s arrangement in 
Redigama—that is, of the family members’ maintenance of separate workshops and the hiring of 
highest caste neighbors to weave in them—were brought to my attention when I returned to the 
village in 2013. Now, narratives of intra-family competition—at least those shared by family 
members themselves—were almost entirely eclipsed by tales featuring a new antagonist: non-
related workshop employees and others demanding the right to weave Dumbara rata textiles 
independently of the family. In this context, intra-family rivalry emerged as a favored topic of 
conversation not among family members, but among their highest-caste neighbors, who, 
invoking a notion of money’s corrupting potential, would describe the most hostile occurrences 
of this enmity as stemming from the greed, jealousy, and “inhumanity” to which the industry’s 
success had driven the former. A popular rumor told of a family member who had reacted 
violently to the alleged “copying” of a textile produced in his workshop. Paying a mid-night, 
drunken visit to the home of the transgressor, his own sister, he reportedly slashed the threads on 
one of her looms in retaliation. Remarking on the incident, an elderly woman and former 
employee of one of the workshop owners noted disapprovingly, “they’re so money-minded 
now.” 
This shift from talk of intra-family rivalry to that of tension between the Berava weavers 
and their highest-caste, non-relative neighbors marked high caste weavers’ active pursuit of the 
possibility of using skills developed in government-sponsored training programs and as 
employees of the family members to weave independently or at least beyond the workshops of 
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the latter. For this, the received the backing and encouragement of government officials who 
view Dumbara rata weaving as a convenient vehicle for poverty alleviation among Redigama’s 
neediest residents. In pursuing this agenda, Redigama’s highest-caste weavers and their 
sympathizers faced considerable and not entirely unexpected resistance from members of the 
extended family that have always reaped the most substantial profits from the growth of the 
industry.  
 At first glance, the immediate origins of this dispute—that is, the steady growth of the 
Dumbara rata industry and the fact that highest-caste residents of Redigama are eager to 
independently carry out a historically caste-based activity—would seem consistent with the trend 
discussed in the introduction to this dissertation. It would seem consistent, that is, with a 
purported exchange of “the logic of [ascribed] caste identity” (Ciotti 2010:209) for practices of 
identification that foreground (economically and consumer-based) achieved social status 
(Friedman 2002:295-296). Not only has such growth allowed many of Redigama’s Berava 
weavers to achieve economic well being comparable to and in some cases far exceeding that of 
their highest-caste neighbors, but some in the area do in fact interpret such financial 
accomplishment as both evincing and inducing a relative disintegration of what was once a 
firmly entrenched caste hierarchy. Further, there are both high and low-caste residents who view 
high caste individuals’ employment in the workshops of their low caste neighbors as firm 
indication that caste is a concern to neither the Berava employers nor their Goyigama employees. 
As one highest-caste gentleman (and, notably, not a weaver) put it to me, “If one were to have 
such a problem, how could one go and weave in one of their houses?...People go and weave 
under them. [In those workshops, the high caste employees are] the servants, and when the 
masters tell them to do things, they listen to them, so I don’t see [caste as] a big issue.” 
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I argue that despite what might resemble a modernity-driven demise of caste, it is in fact 
particularly in this context of recent industry growth and explicit government support of “small 
industries” that caste-based claims of self- and other identification are readily made. What is of 
anthropological interest here is not merely the existence of such claims, however. Rather, as my 
ethnographic work demonstrates, it is that they arise with equal force and equal contradiction 
alongside two irreconcilable ideological spheres: a “discursive field of heritage” (Smith 2006:42) 
long-reinforced by non-state and state actors alike—including, importantly, Sri Lanka’s National 
Craft Council (NCC)—and popular neoliberal ideals of economic freedom and competitive 
individualism. The industry’s de facto owners, evoking something akin to the communalistic 
resonances of “heritage” identified by Lowenthal, have positioned themselves in this dispute as 
the sole lineage-based proprietors of an ancient and “family only” weaving tradition. By contrast, 
their highest-caste weaver neighbors have invoked not only the family’s willingness to hire such 
individuals to meet a growing demand, but also the government’s record of explicit support for 
imparting such weaving skills to individuals beyond the family in an effort to both preserve the 
knowledge entailed and, by the same stroke, alleviate the financial hardship that many in the area 
presently endure.  
Government officials regularly refer to the economic vulnerability of Redigama and the 
surrounding region in justifying their recent efforts to “expand” the local Dumbara rata weaving 
industry through Divi Neguma. This large-scale development initiative was introduced by 
President Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2011 with the stated goal of alleviating rural poverty through 
the establishment of “one million domestic economic units,” including individual household-
based enterprises in gardening, dairy and poultry farming, and craft production (Ministry of 
Industry and Commerce n.d.; Gunasinghe 2013). Coordinated by the Ministry of Economic 
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Development, the official goal of Divi Neguma, a highly politicized program, is to “strengthen 
the village economy” by supporting rural household units to be “be self-sufficient, financially 
secure, and [to] rely less on the market for their daily food requirements” (Hirimuthugodage 
2012). Alongside home gardening, fisheries, and animal husbandry, Divi Neguma’s 
microfinance and infrastructure development programs have been oriented toward “cottage 
industries,” household-based manufacturing including the domestic production of handloom 
textiles (Kurugala 2012). The Samurdhi Program, a government micro-finance scheme 
introduced in Sri Lanka in 1995 to eradicate rural poverty, has been reinvigorated as a result of 
its recent incorporation into Divi Neguma. It is in the Samurdhi Program that Redigama’s 
highest caste weavers have found the most steady and explicit encouragement of their efforts to 
weave independently of the Berava family members who have historically dominated Dumbara 
rata weaving.  
The (In?)Alienability of Skill 
In November 2013, Redigama’s Samurdhi Program officer convened an annual meeting 
to elect the program’s local governing board members for the coming year. On this particular 
day, around thirty men and women, all qualifying as low income and therefore eligible for 
Samurdhi funds, had assembled to learn more about the resources that would be available to 
them in the coming year. 86 The emotionally charged exchange that followed, however, indicated 
that this government-sponsored initiative to develop such industries had also fueled the local 
dispute regarding control over Dumbara rata weaving. 
																																																								86 At the time, individuals earning a monthly income of less than SLR 4,000 (approximately 
US$30) qualified as low income. 
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Gathered in a shaded area in front of the home in which the Samurdhi officer meets with 
residents during his weekly visits to Redigama, men and women calmly inquired about support 
for home gardens, the use of Samurdhi funds to defray the costs of hospital visits, and how to 
galvanize participation in the village’s defunct “children’s society.” Twenty minutes into the 
meeting, however, a side conversation among a group of women abruptly escalated into a verbal 
scuffle between meeting attendees and a 45 year-old weaver named Rukshan.  Rukshan, a father 
of two, belongs to the extended family locally recognized as the caste-based heirs of Dumbara 
rata weaving. The manager of his own small workshop with two occasional employees, Rukshan 
is recognized as a skilled weaver and, like his relatives, receives commissions by dealers and 
designers in Colombo. He has not met with the same fortune that his relatives have, however. 
Generally on friendlier terms with his non-Berava neighbors—Rukshan offered to loan looms 
that he had in his possession to a young high caste man attempting to start his own weaving 
business—he is regarded by many in the village as the “black sheep” of the family. Despite this 
status, Rukshan acts as the family’s representative at meetings where he is the only Berava 
weaver in attendance. This occasion was no exception. Endeavoring to speak on behalf of his 
relatives, a suddenly nervous-looking Rukshan addressed the group of women sitting across from 
him: “If you all take loans to weave these textiles, then you all should demonstrate that you are 
doing them,” he told them. A woman shot back, “Rukshan, people are not weaving alone! They 
are weaving for your family. You know that!” “Yes,” agreed another, “we can get loans, 
Rukshan, but then we should have the right to weave alone. How can we pay back the loans 
when we are weaving for someone else?” After a moment, Rukshan declared with an air of 
uneasy confidence, “Everyone in the country knows that Dumbara rata is only done in 
Redigama and that it is our own family who is doing it. Everyone in the world knows that.” To 
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this, an outspoken woman in the audience replied, “But Rukshan, now there are a lot of people 
who can actually do Dumbara rata. So, someone should go and say that there is no point in 
giving [government] funds because only one family is doing it! Why bother making proposals to 
develop the small industries?”  
The brief argument that ensued focused on the question of whether Rukshan’s family 
could rightfully prevent others from using Samurdhi loans to start their own weaving businesses 
and whether it was fair for the family members to take credit for textiles woven by the men and 
women they employed in their workshops. Importantly, the occasion served as an opportunity for 
Redigama’s impoverished, highest caste residents to remark upon what they perceived as the 
fundamental injustice underlying Rukshan’s extended family members’ refusal to acknowledge 
the skill of the weavers they employed in their workshops and to allow them to weave 
independently. In doing so, they invoked a tale that many of them saw as epitomizing this 
injustice. The popular story circulating at the time centered on the experience of Danuka, a 
highest-caste resident of Redigama who had begun weaving in the workshop of a family member 
in 2000 when he was 20 years old. Some years after he had taken up weaving, Danuka had 
created a wall hanging that was subsequently displayed in the entrance hall of a local bank. What 
the highest-caste residents were often keen to point out was that it was the workshop owner, 
however, not Danuka, who had received credit (as well as a monetary award) for the piece. “We 
don’t have any grudge with you, Rukshan,” an elderly woman assured the only family member at 
the meeting, “but we are telling the truth. That’s why a lot of people have dropped weaving, 
now….The token of appreciation went to [the workshop owner]. So, now what do you have to 
say about that? The award and the money goes to him!” Agreeing with his fellow attendee and 
extending the implications of the event to the matter at hand, another skilled, highest-caste 
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weaver in attendance added, “Now, if a man knows carpentry, does that mean that anyone who 
works under him can’t go and open up his own place to do carpentry?”  
Importantly, interjecting and utilizing the indirect communicative force of a popular 
allegory, the Samurdhi officer leading the meeting sided himself firmly with those claiming their 
“rights” to the industry as rooted in individual effort and skill rather than privilege by birthright. 
Referring to a recent, failed government-sponsored initiative to establish a separate weaving 
workshop in Redigama, one that would have potentially been managed by a government-
appointed resident unrelated to Rukshan’s extended family, he invoked a Sinhala proverb by 
which to obliquely criticize the family members for their refusal to relinquish control over the 
industry in the interest of poverty alleviation. “Since this issue was brought up,” he announced 
with a smile, “I have to say this: Having shown little sister, big sister is given. I won’t let that 
happen again next year.” In the popular allegory to which he referred, the parents of two 
unwedded girls “show” the younger of the two to an unsuspecting man who, having agreed to a 
marriage proposal based upon what he sees, finds himself duped on the day of the wedding when 
the elder sister is presented as his bride. Invoking the tale in this context, where it was received 
with laughs of approval from many in his audience, the Samurdhi officer exhibited his alliance 
with those seeking “the right to weave alone”: like the young woman who wins a reward then 
claimed by her older sister, he suggests, there is a certain injustice to be found in the fact that 
credit for weaving done by highest-caste workshop employees is ultimately taken by the family 
members who own Redigama’s weaving workshops.  
Juxtaposed against Rukshan’s assertion that Dumbara rata weaving is done exclusively 
by his family, the Samurdhi officer’s intervention, and the exchange more generally, signals the 
articulation of two discourses to which weavers in Redigama currently appeal in their efforts to 
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capture the benefits of the industry’s recent growth: that of lineage-based occupational 
exclusivity on the one hand, and that of individual skill and equal opportunity on the other. The 
following discussion examines how the tension between these discourses arises alongside a topic 
of central importance with respect to the present contestation over the local weaving industry: 
knowledge. As will become apparent, in the narratives of both family members and highest-caste 
village residents alike, caste-based identification of self and other emerges as both a significant 
means and a meaningful byproduct of efforts to establish the legitimacy of one’s claims over 
Dumbara rata textile production and the knowledge it entails.  
In Redigama, the conceptualization of authentic knowledge of weaving, including the 
way it is obtained, is perhaps the fundamental point of contention between weavers who belong 
to the family and those who do not. While individuals on these two sides of the present dispute in 
the village differ in how they view the source of such knowledge, however, they display a 
striking albeit unintentional similarity when it comes to articulating these incongruent 
viewpoints. That is, despite dissimilarity in the strategies through which family members and 
their unrelated employees position themselves in relation to the industry and the knowledge it 
involves—as inheritors either by descent or by training—both often end up reinforcing caste as a 
meaningful category of identification in present-day Sri Lanka.  
There are two primary and, notably, somewhat contradictory, ways in which family 
members articulate the way they keep Dumbara rata weaving knowledge from “outsiders” such 
as their non-related, highest-caste employees and neighbors. The first entails claiming an 
inherited or inborn ability (pihitanawa) possessed exclusively by individuals related to the 
family. The second involves active strategizing to withhold information from non-relative 
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employees.87 Both strategies involve a claim that the legitimacy of the relevant knowledge 
derives from its genealogical transmission, and that the industry is safeguarded by this 
knowledge resting only with members of the family. By contrast, and as indicated above, 
highest-caste individuals advocating for the right to weave independently of the various family-
owned and managed workshops throughout Redigama stress individual talent, knowledge 
obtained through effort, and the importance of ensuring the perpetuation of that knowledge by 
sharing it with anyone who desires to learn.  
Dilini, a 30 year-old mother of two, is one of the most outspoken defendants of the 
family’s exclusive right over Dumbara rata weaving and one of the harshest critics of those who 
challenge this right. She began weaving in 2010, shortly after marrying the son of Bandula, a 
renowned weaver in Redigama and a prominent member of the extended family that controls the 
local industry. Two years later, when we met for the first time, Dilini recounted how she 
gradually came to learn that Redigama was known for the textiles produced there. Foreigners and 
Sri Lankans from other parts of the country would visit her father in-law’s workshop, she 
explained, inquiring about weaving techniques and eager to make purchases. At one point in our 
conversation, she noted with satisfaction that if a person outside her family attempted to start a 
Dumbara rata weaving business, it would fail. Initially, when I inquired as to why this might be 
the case, she said that she wasn’t sure. After a moment, however, she smiled and excitedly 
explained,  
Although others try to do it, they can’t. Only members of the family inherit that 
ability…Although others might invest and try to do this business, they can’t do it. 
																																																								87	In contemporary Sri Lanka, practices resembling the latter strategy are more generally referred 
to, and disparagingly so, as guru musthtiya, or the tendency for a teacher to deliberately reserve 
some knowledge from an apprentice or pupil.	
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They can’t. But if anyone in this family prepares to do it, they can go forward. It 
is only within this family. It’s not outside. 
 
The conviction that others “can’t do it,” as in, that they are unable because they lack an 
“inherited ability,” is one echoed by other family members in Redigama, but it is also one whose 
persuasive force is complicated by its rhetorical conflation with the assertion that others “can’t 
do it,” as in, they are not permitted. As Rukshan explained to me one afternoon in his workshop:  
Whatever happens, whatever they try, we are sure that this business will not go 
outside the family. Whoever tries to do this, they can’t develop it without the help 
of our family. The best example for that is that when I was an instructor with the 
Department of Small Industries, I didn’t hold anything back as a teacher [guru 
moshtiya tiyagannaeae]. I taught everything. Now, also, you can see Dumbara 
rata done by the [government] handloom center. But when you compare the 
designs they do there and our designs here, there’s a big difference. It’s a 
difference in quality.  
 
Rukshan is adamant that others “don’t have the talent,” that “although we teach them a lot, they 
can’t do it.” At the same time, he indicates that there are limits to this conviction regarding 
others’ lack in ability, recounting what happened recently when the suggestion arose that, in fact, 
they can:  
People are trying to do the business because this industry has a good market now. 
A few months back, there was a small issue of starting this business out in the 
village. We said, ‘if you all can, then try to do it.’ Then we informed the 
Divisional Secretariat. This industry is reserved for our family. And we disagreed 
with it, and somehow it was stopped. 
 
A moment later, he concluded, “Although they try to start this business, we believe that they 
can’t carry on with it.” 
There is a telling paradox in Rukshan’s representation of his family’s sole control over 
the industry—that is, the notion that this control is evidenced in an inherited and internal ability 
lacking in “outsiders,” on the one hand, and the felt imperative to prevent unrelated individuals 
from compromising that exclusive control, on the other. The notion of “inborn talent” that he 
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draws upon to explain and defend his relatives’ domination of the industry is to some extended 
controverted by the apparent need to appeal to government officials to actively prevent others 
from weaving Dumbara rata textiles independently of the family.  
Not surprisingly, Rukshan readily reproduces a narrative of privileged, inherited 
knowledge. Governmental and non-governmental advocates, not to mention scholars, of Sri 
Lanka’s “traditional arts” have long propelled the popularity of this narrative of inheritance, 
which has also served centrally in the marketability of the textiles produced in Redigama’s 
workshops. Rukshan and his relatives would often point to the fact that an ancestor’s photograph 
was displayed in the Colombo National Museum to as evidence of their lineage-based 
inheritance. Mentioning the photograph, Rukshan’s cousin stressed to me, “You see, we were the 
ones who did this generationally.” Today, however, Rukshan’s extended family must reckon 
with an unexpected contender: a government-sponsored program of rural poverty alleviation 
whose representatives publicly portray the family’s wish to exclusively control the industry as 
expressive of “narrow-minded” (i.e. caste-based) thinking incompatible with Sri Lanka’s status 
as a democracy. It is in meeting this challenge that Rukshan encounters the persuasive limits of 
the idea of an “inherited” or “inborn” ability. The inconsistency in his account is a consequence 
of this encounter and, as we will see, resembles other contradictions around the claims that both 
high and low caste individuals in Redigama make with regard to Dumbara rata weaving. These 
contradictions indicate both a genuine uncertainty as to how individuals ought to orient 
themselves within an economic and moral field of their own partial making, as well as the 
confusion that results in drawing on incompatible ideological reserves to do so. In any given 
moment, weavers in Redigama attempt to select the most compelling narrative with which to 
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negotiate new and tenuous positions in relation to an arguably thriving village-based industry, 
but the choice is not always obvious. 
A second way in which family members explain their exclusive control over Dumbara 
rata weaving is through reference to the active control of knowledge they strive to achieve in 
managing their businesses. Sitting alone at a loom in his empty workshop one morning, his arms 
and hands working furiously to complete an order, Bandula lamented that, despite the lesser pay, 
his former employees would prefer working in paddy fields to weaving for him.88 Bemoaning the 
difficulty of traveling to collect materials, locating the exact color thread needed to complete a 
custom order, and, most importantly, setting the warp threads on the loom, he concluded that the 
men and women who have worked for him in the past take his hard work for granted and are 
ungrateful for the fact that “all they have to do is sit and weave.” Bandula’s narration of 
employer generosity sets a unique spin on a phenomenon that his relatives more commonly 
describe not as serving the interests of their employees, but as necessary to ensuring that the 
industry does not “go out” from their family. If highest caste individuals attempt to start a 
weaving business on their own, his brother later told me, “They don’t know how to carry on 
because they don’t know the basics. They just sit at the machine and do what we say, but they 
don’t know what’s really behind it.” “We tell them to sit on the machine and do something 
small,” he explained, “but they don’t know what’s after that or before that.”  
																																																								88 In fact, most of Bandula’s employees complained that his salaries were the lowest of all 
workshops. As discussed in the overview of Redigama in the introduction to this dissertation, 
current and former highest caste weavers complained that not only are the salaries at all of the 
workshops inadequate, but also that none of workshop owners makes the government-mandated 
contributions to the Employees’ Provident Fund (a social security scheme). Despite this, and 
likely given the low rewards and general unpredictability of paddy farming, a number of 
employees working for Bandula’s siblings, cousins, or nephews reported that they had changed 
workshops rather than quitting because others paid (slightly) better than he did.  
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 While arguably more consistent with a philosophy of free and competitive production 
than the idea of kin-based, “inherited talent,” this active control of knowledge is often explained 
alongside appeals to the marker of difference in which such inheritance is believed to be rooted 
in the first place: caste. This is illustrated in the following excerpts from a conversation with 
Sumal, one of the younger Berava weavers and workshop owners in the area. Sumal had been 
sharing his concerns about highest-caste individuals attempting to weave independently when I 
asked him whether this had been an issue in the past. He said that it hadn’t, and so I asked why 
he thought it had recently become a point of contention. He replied: 
It’s like this: Recently, demand for the industry started to be really good. After the 
war was over, there was a good market for these products. That’s one reason. 
…There’s another one, too. The people who were involved in the industry in the 
past, they were afraid to speak openly. They never spoke like this in the past [like 
he is speaking with me]. They lived in fear of the highest caste people. In our 
grandfather’s time—it’s a really important thing—in that time, they never spoke 
openly like this. When someone acted against them in some way, they would give 
a small gift [bribe] and would stay silent. When they couldn’t escape from them, 
they’d give them some small things. They never went against them. But now we 
speak openly. 
 
Sumal’s suggestion is that others’ sudden intention to engage in Dumbara rata weaving 
independently of his family derives primarily from the rising post-war demand for the textiles. 
At the same time, he also indicates that the tension to which efforts to act on this intention has 
led derives largely from the fact that he and his relatives are no longer fearful or acquiescent in 
interactions with their highest-caste neighbors. To Sumal, the fact that the industry is “inherited” 
serves as legitimation for his family’s active control of knowledge regarding Dumbara rata 
textile production. However, while explicitly linking this mode of industry transmission to his 
family’s caste status, and thereby demonstrating how caste difference may serve them, he also 
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complains of what he sees as his former employees’ problematic preoccupation with their own 
highest-caste status as driving the present threat to that control: 
This is an inherited industry. In Sri Lanka, there’s a caste system. The people who 
wove clothing for the king, they belong to one caste. The people who make 
jewelry belong to another caste. Carpenters belong to another caste. It was 
separated like that at the kings’ time. It’s the same here, too. Some people here 
still have that caste problem. There are some people who think, ‘we are the 
highest caste.’ There are some people who came to learn from us. Although they 
used to come to us for work, now they are thinking about their caste, so they don’t 
like to come to our places anymore because they are concerned about their pride. 
We have to speak openly….This is a thing that belongs to us. We don’t need to be 
at their feet to give the knowledge to them. If they want to learn, they have to 
come to us.  
 
What I think is that some people want to take this from us and they want to keep 
this industry for themselves. We haven’t given the full knowledge of this industry 
to any outside workers, though, because it’s generation to generation. It’s an 
inherited thing. So, we have given them some knowledge of this industry.  
  
To Sumal, a transformation in the inter-caste interaction in Redigama—a transformation marked 
by the area’s low-caste residents’ feeling that they may now speak freely with their highest-caste 
neighbors—has compromised the latter’s willingness to work “under” him and other workshop 
owners. As far as he is concerned the imperative to withhold knowledge from employees and 
other “outsiders” is something that has allowed him and his family members to benefit from a 
heightened post-war demand for Dumbara rata textiles and to achieve an economic position 
from which they may live “without fear” of their socially privileged neighbors. This imperative 
follows directly from the caste-based “generation to generation” transmission of the industry and 
the knowledge of weaving that it requires. 
Rather than emphasizing an “inborn ability” possessed exclusively by members of his 
extended family, Sumal therefore centers his narrative around a tale of transformation from 
caste-based social vulnerability and compulsory deference to a position of advantage deriving 
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from the exclusive possession of one critical asset: knowledge. This account of socioeconomic 
improvement is common among the family members with whom I spoke. As Bandula related: 
In the past, when we were small, we went to work in others’ fields. After that, 
because of this industry, we became developed. We have sent our children to 
good schools in Kandy. My daughter and my son were both sent to good schools 
in Kandy. So [others in Redigama] are jealous of that development.    
Q: Why do you think they care about your development? 
Yes, that’s what I was going to say. From the very first up to now there was a 
caste problem here. So, they think, ‘In the past, these people were working for us, 
so now why should we go and work under them?’  
 
On an earlier occasion, Bandula had in fact complained that others in Redigama were not “free-
minded” enough to work under individuals belonging to a lower caste. They are conservative, he 
reported, and keen to maintain the caste distinction. Yet, as we see in Sumal’s words above, the 
suggestion that others are concerned about caste belies the extent to which caste-based 
identification also serves in the perpetuation of Bandula and his family members’ control over 
the production of Dumbara rata textiles in Redigama. At the same time that Sumal laments, 
“some people here still have that caste problem,” it is precisely by reiterating his own 
experiences in terms of caste-based identification that he aims to stake an unequivocal claim of 
ownership over the local weaving industry. When it comes to reckoning with “threats” to that 
industry in the form of potential competition from highest-caste weavers, in other words, Sumal 
and his relatives leverage their identification as Berava. What is more, they arm themselves with 
a narrative in which it is their overcoming a position of vulnerability imparted to them by virtue 
of their identification as low caste that reinforces a sense that their exclusive ownership of the 
local textile production industry is justifiably earned. 
 Efforts to control or withhold knowledge and the notion of “inherited ability” are 
therefore central to the narratives in which family members explain and defend their control of 
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Redigama’s weaving industry. The way their non-related highest-caste neighbors articulate their 
own claims regarding the production of Dumbara rata is quite different, with one important 
qualification: in doing so, they too reinforce caste as a socially significant marker of 
identification. In discussions of the industry and in conversations more generally, Redigama’s 
highest-caste residents disavow the importance of caste in their own lives and are quick to 
lament its persistence as a carryover from an unenlightened past. Early on in my research, I 
naively expected that, in their arguments for a more equitable distribution of control over the 
local textile industry, highest-caste individuals would affirm this position to undermine the 
family’s claims of occupational exclusivity. As we have seen, family members ground the 
justification for their exclusive control over the industry in claims regarding the lineage-based 
transmission of knowledge and in narratives of overcoming caste-based marginalization. 
Disregarding concerns with caste as irrelevant in contemporary Sri Lanka would be one of the 
surest ways to delegitimize claims of ownership that make reference to it. Highest-caste 
individuals did contest their Berava neighbors’ claims of exclusive control over Dumbara rata 
weaving by suggesting that concerns with caste are old-fashioned and out of step in a modern, 
democratic Sri Lanka. At the same time, however, they did not play this card quite as often or as 
vocally as one might expect them to. In fact, their disavowal of the importance of caste was 
almost always immediately controverted by demonstrations of investment in its perpetuation.  
The fortification of caste in family members’ narratives of control over the local textile 
industry reinforces the notion of an intimate relation between a (Berava) self and a commitment 
to weaving that encompasses more than just the satisfaction of economic wants. To be Berava is 
to have an indisputable claim of ownership over the industry and, likewise, to have an 
indisputable claim of ownership over the industry is to be Berava. By contrast, caste’s discursive 
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production among self-identified highest-caste individuals hoping to more directly reap the 
benefits of a growing demand for Dumbara rata textiles necessitates that claims of ownership 
over weaving knowledge be couched in very different terms. While undermining their Berava 
neighbors’ efforts at positive monopolization, in other words, their own pursuit of autonomous 
control over Dumbara rata textile production must leave the pretense of “negative 
monopolization” (Weber 1998:191) intact if they are to maintain their sense of social superiority. 
In demanding the freedom to weave independently, highest-caste residents of Redigama 
therefore highlight the wide and “caste blind” distribution of weaving knowledge, invoke 
individual skill rather than inherited ability, and insist that family members’ efforts to “keep the 
industry to themselves” are demonstrations of unabashed selfishness. In this circumvention of 
the language of tradition, heritage, and generation-to-generation transmission of knowledge, 
Redigama’s low-income, highest-caste weavers and others who sympathize with them thereby 
maintain a safe distance from an industry that they continue to associate with the low-caste status 
of their neighbors. Despite rejecting the latter’s domination of that industry, as we will see, they 
are also loath to claim the industry as their own or, in the words one Berava workshop owner 
used to describe his family’s relationship to the industry, as an expression of their “identity.” 
Doing otherwise would mean either jeopardizing their own social superiority, or, by the same 
token, allowing their neighbors to forget their lowly position. Like the family members, then, 
these individuals come up against the uncomfortable resistance encountered in “trying to have it 
both ways.” Whereas for the former this means facing the paradox that the growth of this “family 
only” industry owes substantially to the efforts of the non-relatives they have long employed in 
their workshops, for the latter, as the following shows, it has to do with keeping an arm’s length 
between oneself and an industry over which one feels one has some claim.   
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 To many of Redigama’s highest-caste residents, there is an indisputable contradiction in 
the family members’ characterization of Dumbara rata textile production as a “family only” 
enterprise at the same time that the majority of their workforce is comprised of individuals with 
whom they have no kin-based relationship. In pointing out this contradiction, these individuals 
are also quick to acknowledge that, even though the family members hire “outsiders” like 
themselves to weave for them, they have never deliberately imparted their weaving knowledge to 
their employees. Yet, as the latter are often eager to point out, the family members’ 
unwillingness to teach them has not prevented them from learning anyway; and it is precisely 
their experience of having learned despite this unwillingness that generates the legitimacy of the 
knowledge they claim as their own.  
In 2007, for example, not long after the incident with the wall hanging that he had woven 
for a local bank, Danuka, with the assistance of his parents and siblings, began preparing to 
launch his own weaving business. Danuka planned to weave both Dumbara rata textiles and 
saris and other handloom items. Members of the family reportedly responded with a heavy hand. 
They physically confiscated looms that the young weaver had borrowed from Rukshan and 
interfered in his ultimately failed attempt to secure a business loan from a nearby Bank of Ceylon 
branch (the same bank in which the wall-hanging that Danuka had reportedly woven and not 
received credit for was displayed). According to Danuka, the bank eventually told him “they 
couldn’t give [a loan] because it would create problems in the village.” As far as he and others 
were concerned, the family members must have used their substantial dealings with the bank as 
leverage to thwart his efforts and had perhaps threatened to take their business elsewhere should 
the bank issue a loan to a potential competitor.  
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Ultimately, Danuka secured a loan from the Kandurata Development Bank and was able 
to purchase handlooms cheaply at the Kurunegala Handloom Center. With the help of his parents 
and sister, all of whom were also able to weave after having worked in their Berava neighbors’ 
workshops, he was able to get things off the ground. The business was not a great success 
however, and, concerned about the increasing financial difficulties his family was facing and 
disheartened by the conflict to which his own efforts had led, Danuka followed two brothers who 
had already left Redigama to seek employment in Colombo. When his mother was paralyzed 
following a stroke in 2013 and his father was unable to get away from his construction job in 
another town to tend to her in the hospital, Danuka returned home from his job at the 
multinational conglomerate Hayleys. Asked by the Samurdhi officer if he would be willing to 
serve as a weaving teacher should they set up a separate weaving center for “outsiders” like him 
to weave independently of the family, Danuka declined, fearing that it would only lead to further 
animosity with his former employers.  
Agreeing to speak with me one afternoon after visiting his mother in the hospital, a 
friendly-faced Danuka reclined in a chair against the wall in his family’s living room and 
playfully whopped his pet dog with a plastic cricket bat as his sister served me and my assistant 
tea. Remarking upon the current conflict, Danuka recalled the challenges he had faced earlier and 
was quick to highlight an incongruity he and others perceive in the family’s claim of exclusive 
ownership over the production of Dumbara rata textiles. He explained, “I don’t know why they 
say that only they can do this. If only their family members can do it, then only they should 
weave! Not the others! But they hire employees.” Relating that he had done a weaving course at 
a handloom center in Peradeniya, Danuka noted in fact that the hana products woven in 
Atwaedagama were also called Dumbara rata. “These designs are designed there using hana,” he 
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explained. “If you go and ask the handloom center in Peradeniya, they introduce both these and 
the ones [in Atwaedagama] as Dumbara rata, so they can’t say that this is only done by their 
family.” Danuka went on to argue that, even if we set this contradiction aside, the family 
members’ typical self-representation as the exclusive bearers of the knowledge and skill 
demanded of Dumbara rata weaving is still erroneous: “When I was working there, I learned 
everything possible. Not only weaving, but also how to set the warp and how to adjust the reed. I 
learned all of the different thicknesses of the necessary threads and their types.” Significantly, he 
added, “But they didn’t teach me anything. I was watching.” 
Whereas Danuka is reluctant to involve himself in the present government-sponsored 
initiative to “develop” the local weaving industry, Uresha, a woman who reports a similar 
experience of learning despite not having been deliberately taught, has become one of the most 
outspoken critics of the family’s resistance to others producing Dumbara rata textiles. Uresha 
began weaving in a Redigama workshop in the early 1990s when she was about twenty years 
old. Recounting the financial straits that she and her husband found themselves in at that time, 
Uresha volunteered: 
In the past, there was a caste called Berawayo and a caste called Welawwo. In the past, 
the people who started weaving were the Berawayo [her voice drops]. It was one of the 
jobs that they did. They had also worked at the temple for the theewawe [drumming 
during daana]. My husband and I started weaving ten to fifteen years ago. Before that, 
we didn’t weave because it was work done by the Beravaayo. If we visited one of their 
houses for weaving, our families rejected us. Our family members never allowed us to 
work in a place like that…More recently, though, we joined them to learn. Because this is 
an industry, right [meka karmanteyak, nee?] 
Uresha implies here that the transformation of weaving from a job that “they,” the Berava, did—
that is, a set of practices embedded in “the old forms of authority and hierarchy that rājākāriya 
entailed” (Scott 1999:48)—to an “industry” (karmanteyak)—that is, a set of practices embedded 
in a market economy removed from the practical and ideological load of lineage-based 
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transmission—allowed her and her husband to begin weaving in their low caste neighbors’ 
workshops without worrying so much about being “rejected” by their own families.   
Eventually, Uresha and her husband’s financial needs would surpass what they were able 
to earn as weavers. After fifteen years, therefore, she took a position as a domestic worker in the 
Middle East to help pay for a surgery that her husband required. In 2013, several years after 
returning home, she decided to begin weaving again not for the money, she stressed, her husband 
having by that time recovered and secured a relatively well-paying job with a foreign 
construction company, but for the pleasure it affords her. Echoing the voices of the high caste 
women near Atwaedagama who refer to their work with hana as a “hobby,” Uresha 
characterized her work as a weaver as more of a diversion than a means of income generation.  
“Weaving is like music,” she related one afternoon as she stood leaning against the loom in her 
living room, “It calms you down a lot. You can forget all of your problems when you’re 
weaving. I really like weaving, and that’s why I’m weaving at home. More than doing it for 
money, it’s like my hobby now.” Money no longer a pressing concern, Uresha took the 
opportunity to weave for a nearby government-owned weaving training center and workshop, 
which pays less for each item she weaves than do the privately-owned workshops in Redigama. 
Despite the relatively modest pay, she reports a welcome feeling of independence and control 
over her own labor that was lacking in her experience as an employee of the family member for 
whom she wove in the past. To the dissatisfaction of the extended family of workshop-owning 
Berava weavers in Redigama, however, Uresha has eagerly met the government-owned 
workshop manager’s requests for Dumbara rata textiles.  
As far as Uresha is concerned, the family’s dissatisfaction with her decision to produce 
Dumbara rata textiles despite not weaving in one of their workshops is entirely unjustified. To 
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her, the contradiction that Danuka identifies in the family’s claims to exclusive ownership over 
the industry despite hiring “outsiders,” and the fact of her learning despite having not been 
explicitly taught, provide firm justification for the rejection of any notion of “inherited skill” or 
commitment to a supposed generation-to-generation transmission of knowledge: “If I learned, it 
isn’t their concern. Otherwise, they shouldn’t take people from outside and teach them, right?”  
Later, she explained, “There is no such thing called ‘pihitanawa’ [inherited skill]. My husband 
told me once, ‘if you want our children to be in a good place, then we shouldn’t cheat. We 
should teach others what we know.’” The following account of Uresha’s submission of a 
Dumbara rata wall hanging to a government-sponsored competition, a submission facilitated by 
the manager of the government-owned workshop and training center for which she now weaves, 
illustrates the difference between this orientation to weaving knowledge and that espoused by the 
family members who claim exclusive authority over the production of these textiles. 
In January 2014, I boarded a crowded bus in Redigama with Priyani, the manager of the 
small, government-owned weaving training center and workshop to which Uresha currently 
supplies Dumbara rata textiles. Dressed in a crisp, cotton sari and burdened with a long reed 
wrapped in newspaper, Priyani carefully placed her unwieldy package upon two large sacks of 
rice evidently headed in the same direction. Clinging to the bar above her head as the bus 
meandered along the winding road through the valley toward the training center, Priyani smiled 
and gestured toward the reed, explaining, “Uresha used it to weave a wall hanging for a recent 
government competition. I’m just taking it back to the workshop.” Uresha’s submission to the 
contest reportedly won the first award granted to a non-Berava individual for a Dumbara rata 
textile since the government competitions were introduced in the mid-1970s, a fact that, while 
giving her great personal satisfaction, aroused the antipathy of several family members. Upon 
		 	 	 	 293	
seeing Priyani, who had encouraged and arranged for Uresha’s participation in the competition, 
walking along the main road that runs through Redigama a few days prior to our meeting, Himali 
reportedly “scolded” her, shouting, “I heard what you have done. Don’t weave Dumbara rata! It 
is ours!” As we exited the bus and ascended the steep, rocky path to the government-owned 
workshop that morning, Priyani described how this encounter had troubled her. She explained 
that when she reported it to the Department of Textile Industries, they told her to ignore the 
family and to just weave Dumbara rata items. While Priyani explained matter-of-factly that she 
would never be able to fulfill this order given the number of pieces the Department requires each 
month and the relative difficulty of producing Dumbara rata cloth, she was encouraged by the 
Department’s reaction in part because it supported her own assessment of the situation. Himali 
and her relatives’ anger at Priyani for instructing the government-owned workshop trainees and 
employees to weave Dumbara rata textiles derives, she explained, from a conviction that the 
industry belongs to their lineage [paramparawa]. Echoing the logic underlying what Taylor 
describes as the rhetoric of “a common human heritage” (Taylor 2009:41), however, Priyani 
argued that if their concern is truly about safeguarding the knowledge that the industry’s 
propagation requires, as she believes it ought to be, then this fact is surely irrelevant. “Himali’s 
reaction was unfair,” she explained, “After we die, the things that we know die with us. So, to 
protect the things we know, we need to teach others!” 
To Uresha and others in Redigama who sympathize with high caste weavers’ desire to 
weave independently of their Berava neighbors, there is an indisputable link between 
“development” (getting “to a good place”), sharing what one has mastered, and the protection of 
knowledge. Moreover, they suggest that, to the extent that they are trained (intentionally or 
otherwise) in the workshops of the family members who dominate the local weaving industry, 
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that knowledge is indistinguishable from the skills they might acquire in any other context of 
instruction. As Gamini, Uresha’s husband and also a former employee of the family, explained to 
me: “If I go to an English or Math class or some technical center and if I get trained in that 
subject and if I am really good at it, then I have a right to start that. The teacher can’t say, ‘you 
can’t do that after I teach you this.’”  
In a February 2014 meeting convened to discuss how the local industry might be 
“developed” under Divi Neguma, government officials tasked with the promotion of the 
program, sitting before around twenty village residents (including half a dozen family members) 
offered a powerful and public legitimation of the perspective articulated by Uresha and others 
vying for the right to weave independently. Prefacing the discussion with an acknowledgement 
of the “different ideas and debates between people about this [industry],” a representative from 
the local AG office pointed to my own research interests as indicative of a “special value in the 
name Dumbara rata” and lamented that the discord that I must have witnessed in the village 
impeded efforts to safeguard the industry for the children of all presently engaged in it. In 
response, Sumal summarized his family’s position thus: 
We would like for us to do the handloom industry and for everyone else to do something 
else. It’s okay for them to do any other kind of industry, but not handlooms. If there are 
people who want to be involved in this industry, we will welcome them to come and 
work for us…We have received this knowledge from our fathers and grandfathers, so we 
have come a long way to get to where we are now…If somebody starts doing this, saying, 
‘Oh, I also can do Dumbara rata,’ its identity goes away [ananyathaawa bindila 
yanawa]. They don’t have the knowledge [denuma] relevant to this, so that’s a big harm 
to Dumbara rata. They are like ‘Super Stars’—like parrots, they practice the songs, but 
what about the commitment and hard work of those original singers? The government 
also tries to create job opportunities for people. In the brass [bittala] industry in 
Pilimathalawa, there are hundreds of shops, but those shops aren’t owned by people who 
have the traditional knowledge and ownership of this art. Those people work in their 
factories for a small payment. If this happens here, if just anyone has the chance to start 
their own business, then the same thing might happen in the handloom industry. If we 
allow this today, that means that we give businessmen the opportunity to know this art. 
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Likening highest-caste weavers to contestants on a popular and American Idol-inspired reality 
television program, Sirasa Super Star, Sumal suggests that efforts to weave independently of his 
relatives amount to a creative theft. Such “parroting” is not only injurious to the “identity” of 
Dumbara rata, he reasoned, but also would lead ultimately to the marginalization and 
exploitation of those in possession of “the traditional knowledge and ownership of this art.” 
Addressing the family members in attendance, the Assistant Government Agent 
responded to Sumal by acknowledging what all agreed are the industry’s indisputable origins in 
the latter’s lineage. At the same time, he framed the argument for a more even distribution of the 
local textile industry’s economic benefits in rather different terms, emphasizing the promotion of 
“our heritage” in the interests of national development and democratic ideals. His and his 
colleague’s response to Sumal, quoted at length below, illustrate the force of the authoritative 
narratives with which family members in Redigama must contend. As we will see, these officials 
ultimately discount Sumal and his relatives’ claims to lineage-based proprietorship by suggesting 
that they point to a preoccupation with caste and are therefore not only demonstrative of narrow-
minded and backward thinking, but also counter to the country’s economic aspirations and 
democratic foundation: 
The responsibility of the government is to spread this industry in the village by giving all 
of the villagers a chance to get involved in it. To get foreign income. This is the function 
of the government—to develop the village, and through the village, develop the country. 
So, you [addressing the family members in attendance] are given the credit for this 
industry since it comes from the families in your lineage [paramparaawen paulwele 
mulwela waedekerepu ekeTa]. But the responsibility of the government is to spread this 
among the other villagers, too. The government’s position is that this industry be spread 
further. The government’s aim is to make Sri Lanka the miracle of Asia by 2016, so they 
expect 50 lakhs of tourists here by then. The demand for handlooms cannot be met 
by this number of people involved in the production. Then your industry will 
expand and Sri Lankan people will also begin to speak about your industry. Like 
with brass, which everyone now knows about… Sri Lanka is a democratic country, 
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and anyone can start a business if he has the potential. If someone can weave cloth, 
that is their skill. Take the tale of Guthila Muusila—If someone learns from your 
lineage [paramparaawe], that is his or her hand skill [athee huruwa]…We aren’t 
saying that we want to grab your business and give it to somebody else. We are talking 
about the advantages of spreading this industry out. As a Sri Lankan citizen, my intention 
is to begin to do something for these people while protecting your ownership. That is my 
intention. For a long time, different races have lived as one race in Sri Lanka. But at 
different times there have been conflicts. But we all are the same citizens…Sri Lanka 
is under a lot of foreign attacks and foreign influences. If Redigama is like this 
today, what about Sri Lanka as a whole? So we have to exhibit our 
harmony…Without keeping rigid positions …because although some people have 
gone on their own paths with private, narrow motives, we are a race [jaatiya] who 
helps others. Redigama is a village is which the villagers contributed their labor to 
the fight for independence in 1818. Labor and life. So, I’m not telling you to change the 
method of your industry one hundred per cent. We came here to find out about the 
problem and to figure out how we can solve it. My idea is that we have to improve this 
industry and we have to spread this industry. Your family has a great responsibility in 
doing this…. 
We hope for the development of the area as a whole. Since people learned about the 
laksha industry, they expanded the business and it has spread beyond the families 
[paulwelin baahirawa wyaapta wela]. The lace [biralu] industry also was once done by 
just a few families. Today, under the small-scale industry project in the south, it has been 
developed a lot…Those things are our heritage, so we sell them to the foreigners. 
Therefore, my idea is that it is better to be in harmony and continue this industry 
than to be divided as a village. We are a great race/nation [usas jaatiyak]. We have 
to awaken our Sinhaleness [Sinhala kama] and continue this. People in this village 
have sacrificed their lives for the nation [raTa wenuwen diwi piduu], so we have to do 
these things harmoniously. And on that journey we have to forget about ethnic 
differences and other shortcomings [addu padu]…We should not let this industry just 
live and die in this village. We have to improve it. [Referring to the family] These people 
and their forefathers have brought this industry up to the present, and they are respected 
for that. That doesn’t change. A new community has been formed through you and they 
take your advice, so you can be proud of that. Now, if the production grows, the demand 
will also grow, the market will expand. So, get rid of this narrow-minded thinking. That’s 
what you can offer to the society. That is the biggest gift that your generation [the present 
generation of your family] can give. When we say Dumbara rata, it is from Sri Lanka. 
And where is this produced? Redigama. And who are the pioneers? Your family. So, you 
have that respect [gauruwera]. We are a people who help others, so let’s use that 
characteristic and continue this business… 
 
Elaborating, the officer’s colleague addressed the family members in similar terms:  
This is a traditional craft, and in the country today traditional crafts are valued. Awards 
are given—so, these are the types of things that are done to honor the people who have 
been protecting these crafts for a long time. Being educated means, learning means, not 
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being with guru mushti or keeping [knowledge] to ourselves [api adhyaapanaya 
labanawa kiyanne, igenagannawa kiyanne apee guru mushTiyawat api eeka api langa 
tiyaagena innawa kiyana ekawat newey]. Even our knowledge—the knowledge of the 
head or the knowledge of the body, the ability—we should give to others. That’s my idea. 
People in this village have joined your families and have gained some knowledge. So, 
these people can use that knowledge and guidance [guruharukam] with their own bodily 
talent [aengen aapudeyak]…So, you have to be proud thinking that your heritage has 
been broadened and become popular. The AGA said that we are not going to grab your 
heritage/inheritance [urumaya]. That’s correct. It can’t be grabbed. For example, 
when someone gets a patent for something, another person can’t get ownership over 
it. Like that, there may be some person in your lineage, among your forefathers, who 
began this craft. Now it has evolved over time and spread to the village and to the 
country. And if we can spread it to the world—you know that, today, our country is 
trying to bring our local things to the world…Now, the world knows that our country 
is divided by race, by religion, and by caste. So all the world is looking at us. When 
we switch on the television, the president always talks about the challenges we have to 
face as a country. So, people have to join him to overcome these challenges. Even here 
we have the same thing. This village has a challenge. When the villagers are angry and 
divided, the village becomes isolated…These divisions and anger with each other are a 
problem for us now. As a country, we struggle so much with being isolated. We need to 
work on this at the level of the village, too. So, we have to be a model 
[aadarshaya]…Today, people don’t have heads filled with social differences (samaja 
wishyemataawa) between people. Today, people are struggling to do any kind of job 
they can. To win the world and to strengthen economically. So, to [get to] that place, 
[why not go] with these people? I appreciate that idea of not grabbing heritage 
[urumaya udure ganna naeae]—I appreciate that idea and I think it will be there 
forever. They cannot grab the craft and say that they are the ones who have 
inherited it. But with all of your help, and with their ability, the village will be 
developed. So, everybody will live very nicely in the village. There will be fewer poor 
people. That is our aim. Reducing poverty is the concept. To reduce the poverty by 2016 
is the president’s aim. To improve the people’s living condition. So, we have to develop 
economically. The first step to develop economically is to develop as a society. That 
means we have to live as one person [in unity]. We must live harmoniously…That’s why 
I’m saying, I think we all need to go to that place by working together in this market 
as one and not thinking in a narrow-minded way. 
 
Importantly, neither officer suggests that the roots of Dumbara rata weaving rest with anyone 
other than those who claim lineage-based proprietorship over the industry. While the first 
invokes his and his audience members’ shared citizenship and nationality, he also reassures the 
family members in attendance that they “are given the credit for this industry since it comes from 
the families in your lineage.” The second also affirms that, indeed, such “inheritance” [urumaya] 
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“can’t be grabbed.” Like the highest caste weavers endeavoring to weave independently, they are 
thus unequivocal about the industry being “inherited” by the family members. Taking this 
inheritance as justification for the industry’s oligopolistic control by the family, however, is not 
only just as quickly rejected as “narrow-minded,” but also, significantly, regarded as detrimental 
to an otherwise “great nation” [usas jaatiyak-great race/nation].  
Both officials rely centrally upon a conceptualization of generosity of knowledge in 
challenging the monopolizing efforts of the family members in their audience. While the second 
refers simply to the phenomenon of guru mushtiya, or the (nowadays) often-disparaged practice 
of deliberately reserving some of one’s knowledge from an apprentice or pupil, the first invokes 
a popular Jātaka tale, Guththila Musila, to make the same point. As it was told to me, the tale 
centers on what transpires when a young and ambitious aspiring musician approaches a master 
musician in the king’s court with a request to take him on as his pupil. Suspicious of the young 
man’s intentions, the latter agrees after an initial period of refusal and, eventually, the 
apprentice’s skills come to rival his own. The apprentice, securing his own place in the king’s 
court, requests that he be paid the same amount as his teacher. The master musician from whom 
he has learned regards the possibility as unfair. While interpretations of the story typically 
condemn the pupil for his presumption and scheming, there are those whose readings are 
sympathetic to his request. The government official’s invocation of the tale here is clearly 
suggestive of such sympathy. Here, those suspected of pursuing “private, narrow motives” are 
not the high caste men and women who have learned in the workshops of their Berava neighbors, 
but rather members of the low-caste family who cling selfishly to their own knowledge and 
thereby demonstrate that they are not truly “educated.” 
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The first official links this endorsement of the notion that one’s skill, once acquired, is 
one’s own to do with as one chooses, to Sri Lanka’s status as a democracy. What is more, he 
suggests that the pursuit of such “narrow motives” is not only ultimately deleterious to the 
perpetuation of the practice of Dumbara rata weaving, but also a direct violation of the spirit of 
generosity and collective (national) sacrifice for which Redigama had recently been publicly 
recognized. The sacrifice to which he refers, the contribution of “labor and life” to the “fight for 
independence in 1818,” was an event about whose recent commemoration many of Redigama’s 
highest-caste residents had in fact been especially talkative in the months leading up to this 
meeting. In late November, the government had sponsored a ceremony to observe the 196th 
anniversary of the death of Weera Keppetipola, the leader of the ultimately unsuccessful 1817-
1818 Uva-Wellassa Uprising against the British. Individuals from Redigama had reportedly 
participated in the rebellion, and several of their descendants, all of whom are highest-caste, had 
been invited to the recent ceremony to receive awards in honor of their ancestors. The officer’s 
timely invocation of the uprising in this context reminded meeting attendees, and in particular 
members of the family who were present, that the “nation” trumps concerns with “ethnic 
differences and other shortcomings [addu padu].”89 Preoccupations with the latter, in driving 
internal discord and thus preventing the actualization of what is suggested as an inherently 
harmonious “Sinhala-ness” [Sinhala kama], not only hamper poverty alleviation but also permit 
																																																								89 A local farmer offered a rather contrary view on the significance of the commemoration 
ceremony. Referring to his low caste weaving neighbors, he remarked, “They like it if you go to 
their places and eat and drink what they give. That will bring us down to their level. We don’t 
like that. This is a good village. It’s very ancient. In the past, the leaders came to hide in this 
village. Recently, there was an award given to the village.” Here, Redigama’s recognition as a 
“good village,” or its residents’ contribution to the 1818 rebellion, is inextricably connected to 
their maintenance of the very boundaries this official characterize as “shortcomings” preventing 
the village from achieving unified harmony. 
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Dumbara rata, an element of “our heritage” that could and ought to be marketed to the world on 
a grand scale, to “live and die” in Redigama.90  
The officer’s colleague reinforces the message in a similarly oblique reference to caste 
and its popular condemnation as something with which people trying to earn a living today are 
not concerned (“Today, people don’t have heads filled with social differences [samaja 
wishyemataawa] between people” but rather “are struggling to do any kind of job they can”). She 
suggests that it is precisely the kind of lineage-based claims to the industry made by the family 
that, in instantiating the intra-national divisiveness that plagues Sri Lanka (“the world knows that 
our country is divided by race, by religion, and by caste”), prevent both the village and the 
country more generally from realizing its full economic potential.  
 Such public denunciation of what these officials portray as a narrow-minded 
preoccupation with caste-based occupational exclusivity bolsters resistance to the family’s 
claims of control over Dumbara rata weaving. According to this perspective, not only may the 
knowledge and skill entailed in Dumbara rata textile weaving “belong” to anyone to do with as 
they choose, but denying as much is tantamount to the very communalism that consistently 
undercuts the country’s world standing.  
In an important respect, such criticism of the family’s reluctance to soften their control 
over Dumbara rata weaving recalls legal scholar Madhavi Sunder’s (2007) observation in a 
piece on “the invention of traditional knowledge” that “[c]laims by native peoples to hold 
intellectual property are resisted as threats to the public domain, or as the false consciousness of 
neo-liberalism, or as a radical assault on our intellectual property tradition, which encourages 
																																																								90	The officer’s stressing the importance of setting aside “ethnic differences” is of course more 
than a little ironic given the overall ethno-nationalist tone of his message.	
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and promotes cultivation, not stewardship” (106). As Sunder stresses, the kind of “romance of 
the commons” implied in these officials’ calls to “spread” Dumbara rata weaving out to others 
relies upon the notion that “because a resource is open to all by force of law, it will indeed by 
equally exploited by all” (Sunder 2007:106). That such equal exploitation cannot be guaranteed 
in Redigama was suggested to me by someone from whom I little expected it, a young, high 
caste woman who, when we met, had been employed—notably, not to weave, but rather to assist 
with other tasks—in a family-owned workshop for several years. Remarking on a recent effort to 
establish a government-sponsored “common place” [poduwa taenak] for Dumbara rata weaving, 
she noted sympathetically: “Then there will be no workers for those [family-owned] workshops. 
So they are again putting them down to the same step where they were in the past.”  
It is by acknowledging the reproduction of caste-based difference—the implications of 
which this young employee is gesturing towards—that we may better understand the vehemence 
with which family members in Redigama resist the efforts of their neighbors and the government 
officials to soften their claims over Dumbara rata weaving. The notion of “equal opportunity for 
all” invoked by these officers is itself undermined by the way Redigama’s highest caste residents 
tend to contest their neighbors’ claims to occupational exclusivity. In fact, we find that some of 
the most outspoken challengers to the family’s claims advocate the notion that the industry and 
the knowledge it requires may be justifiably claimed by anyone else only up to a point beyond 
which, as suggested, they might run the risk of compromising their own sense of caste-based 
superiority. To appreciate why this is so, it is useful to consider that caste is often handled with 
remarkable ambivalence among residents of Redigama more generally, discussions of its 
importance in individuals’ own lives abounding with contradiction.  
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Remarking on the economic success with which Redigama’s Berava weavers have met in 
recent years and on its transformation of inter-caste relations in the area, Aruna, a farmer and 
bank employee, shared:  
Some of our [highest-caste] people, will go to them [a member of the family] to 
borrow money. They say, “Give me five hundred rupees or a thousand rupees.” 
After that, that person will ignore the higher caste person’s status, so it’s like that 
person is at a higher status. The caste matter will be the only thing between 
them…Our people go there and do things like that [ask for money]. Not my 
family. But there are other people who do it. Because of that, caste is decreasing. 
They are even going and working in their fields, so no one cares about [caste] 
now.  
Q: Do you help each other with the fieldwork? 
Aruna: Yes, we do. They come for paddy work. Now, just imagine, we go to their 
field to help with digging. However, the tea will be prepared in one of our houses, 
but they also bring something. After preparing the tea, the mugs are also brought 
from one of our houses. That’s how we do it. Just imagine, you’re a lower caste 
person and I’m a high caste person. When you come to help us, the tea will be 
prepared in our houses. We’re helping each other with the work, but the tea will 
come from our houses. So, we have separate mugs for them.  
 
While Aruna explains caste’s declining importance in Redigama as stemming from the Berava 
weavers’ new financial wherewithal vis-à-vis their highest caste neighbors, he is also quick to 
point out that his own family does not engage in the small loan transactions that reflect this 
transformation. Moreover, he suggests that even, and perhaps especially, when it comes to 
collaboration in paddy work, it is hardly the case that “no one cares” about caste. When I 
interrupted to ask about the consequences he might face were he to receive food or drink from 
his low-caste neighbors, Aruna replied in a manner remarkable for its subtle but undeniable 
inconsistency:  
[Caste] is a culture that comes from the kings’ time. People can’t change it… 
Other than that, there’s no problem. Now, take me. I’ve worked 31 years in 
[Colombo]. People like them live in Colombo, too, right? Don’t we eat from those 
houses? We do. In this area, also, there is a lower caste person. Their house is 
nearby. He had a position three grades above mine at the bank where I used to 
work. He retired as the area manager. He came one day and asked me, ‘Aruna, 
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how can I invite you to my wedding?’ We worked in the same department in the 
same company…After that, he gave me the invitation card. So, I went to the 
wedding. The wedding was in Colombo and all of these [low caste] people were 
also there. Our participation is a big thing for people like them. When they came 
back, they told the others that I was at the wedding. I don’t care because I ate the 
hotel food. So, caste is not a problem for me.  
 
In this conversation, Aruna reported to be pleased with his low-caste neighbors’ economic 
success, remarking, “Now, our people are at the same level that we’ve always been at, but they 
have developed, and I’m proud about that.” This avowed pride is matched by Aruna’s 
appreciation for the relaxation of the rules governing caste-based commensality in urban 
Colombo. Yet the professed insignificance of caste as “not a problem” for Aruna, something he 
seeks to illustrate in narrating his willing attendance at his neighbor’s wedding, is immediately 
controverted by the qualification that he “ate the hotel food,” or, in other words, upheld those 
very rules to avoid any confusion (perhaps his, perhaps others’) as to his own status. The 
importance of doing so, as far as Aruna and other highest-caste individuals in the area are 
concerned, was conveyed to me when I asked why he believes people are unable to change the 
caste “culture” to which he referred. He explained:  
If I go and eat and drink with them, there will be a problem because there are 
other [highest-caste] people. They will start to hate me, thinking, ‘We are not 
going, but he’s going.’ Those people have those ideas. When we go to the outside 
[of Redigama], there is no such thing. We go to their places and we eat and drink 
with them without doing any bad things. But we can’t do such things inside the 
village because of those people thinking like that.  
 
Contrary to the local government officer’s suggestion that, nowadays, “people don’t have heads 
filled with social differences (samaja wishyemataawa) between people” and are simply 
“struggling to do any kind of job they can,” the threat of social ostracism that Aruna voices 
weighs heavily on the minds of many past and present highest-caste weavers in Redigama. 
Inoka, a former employee of one family member, explained, “If I go there and drink and eat, I’ll 
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be neglected by my people. If someone sees that we are eating or drinking there, it will create 
problems for us. If someone from their family comes to my home, I serve them tea, but if I do 
the same thing at their places, it will be a problem.” Uresha, Inoka’s sister in-law, conveyed the 
same, noting, “Normally, when we go to work under them, we’re shunned [ayin kerenewa] by 
our own family members.”  
 Tharanga, who has been weaving for the family for nearly fifteen years, offered a unique 
exception to this reported fear of derision for breaching the conventional rules of inter-caste 
relations. Born in 1968, Tharanga lost his mother at a young age. His family lacking both money 
and land, he found the earnings from the limited amount of farmwork that he was able to do to be 
insufficient to support his family after he and his wife welcomed their first child in the late 
1990s. Tharanga attributed his ability to build a modest home and to care for his children to his 
and his wife’s earnings as weavers. In the early 2000s, his employer had loaned them a loom to 
keep at home so that they could care for their children and manage their household while 
weaving.  Rather than lament his reliance upon the family and the potential criticism he might 
suffer for his decision to work “under” them, he professed an absolute disregard for caste, noting, 
“We are all humans, right?” Meeting me at his home during a break from work one afternoon, 
we sipped tea in his small living room as he explained:  
Here, in the past, caste—there are those things. These high and low things. We of 
course don’t think about it [it’s not important]. We’re getting something [an 
amount of money] from there, right? We think in terms of Buddhism, we don’t 
think like that. People have different attitudes. Because we have the name [that 
we have], people have this idea that we are good [highest-caste]. We of course 
don’t care about it. But it exists among people… Others don’t have my thoughts. I 
work there, so people think that, because I work under those people, I don’t care 
about it. Other people don’t rely on them, right? That’s what I think. It’s not a 
problem for me. 
 
		 	 	 	 305	
To Tharanga, weaving for one of the workshop owners and accepting payment in return is 
consistent with his self-proclaimed thinking as a Buddhist. In his estimation, Buddhist thinking 
and the recognition that “we are all humans” run up against the notion that caste is worthy of any 
regard in contemporary Sri Lanka. Suggestions to the contrary would render his “getting 
something from there” unacceptable. As far as he is concerned, even his own high caste name is 
irrelevant. While it may or may not fully explain Tharanga’s unique adamancy about the non-
importance of caste, it is worth noting that he also reports feeling a significant dependence upon 
the family for the employment they have provided him. Interestingly, in a rhetorical query in 
which he asserts that ‘other people don’t rely on them,’ he suggests that others’ relative 
autonomy from the family might account for their differing perspective on the matter.  
While past and present workshop employees agree with Tharanga that they are “getting 
something from there,” they typically leave it at that, thus signaling the central dilemma whose 
resolution, from the position of non-Berava weavers, is aided most strongly by the language of 
competitive individualism and of skill/knowledge-based “rights” to this productive activity. In 
general, the fear of social ostracism by (caste-wise) equally positioned friends and relatives is 
prevalent and is likely the reason why highest-caste weavers often emphasize their engagement 
in the industry as strictly “for the money.” The significance of this trend is most striking when 
observed alongside the way some members of the family who control Dumbara rata production 
in Redigama explain their relationship to the industry. For them, as suggested in the preceding 
pages, caste is a double-edged sword, the idea that most compellingly establishes their claim 
over Dumbara rata weaving even as it may undercut their aspirations for social equality with 
their highest-caste neighbors. The assumption that the industry’s continuation rests in its 
generation-to-generation transmission is reinforced by many (but, importantly, not all) of the 
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government officials with whom Redigama’s Berava weavers interact and who encourage them 
to “carry on” even when demand for their textiles declines. The following excerpt from an 
interview with Rohan, one of the younger male weavers in the family, demonstrates this 
professed non-monetary dimension of the commitment to weaving: 
Rohan: The profit is not sufficient given how tirelessly we work. 
Q: So, you’re saying your profit is not sufficient. Why do you continue in this 
business? 
Rohan: Well, that’s what I am saying. Even though it’s not like the other 
businesses, we have some status [samanye tatweya]. This is what we’re used to. 
Compared to doing something new, it’s our identity [ananyataaweyak tiyenewa]. 
It’s the thing we desire. So, somehow we are pulling it along. Government 
departments and people here and there tell us not to stop doing this because it has 
a huge value [loku watinakamak]. They say, “don’t stop this. Teach this to your 
children.”…So, at times when the profit isn’t good, that’s why we continue to do 
it and don’t abandon it. 
 
The highest-caste weavers of Redigama face something approximating the inverse of this 
dilemma: they must find a way to establish their own claims over the industry while keeping it at 
arm’s length. Many of them seek to balance a drive toward negative monopolization with their 
decision to engaged in Dumbara rata textile production by underscoring that they weave not 
because of a conviction that it is their “identity,” but out of sheer financial necessity. For 
instance, Kamini, a former weaver born in 1956, articulated what she portrays as a rather painful 
decision to weave for the family in this way:  
I was thinking of my children. We needed money to educate our children. And my 
husband was in the army, and since it was wartime, everything was uncertain. I 
had my parents with me, too. Even now I can’t make it all right in my head. If I’d 
had a good job then, today I would have a pension, but I have nothing like that. I 
was thinking of my children’s future. In that respect, I’m happy about it. 
Q: Did you like weaving? 
Yes, earlier I liked it, but after that—with the [caste] problems we had to face, I 
stopped going. Since it was the war period in the country, my husband couldn’t 
come home. My parents were also old, so I had to take care of them and my 
children. And, when thinking about my education level, I was so upset with 
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myself doing that job. During that time, having A-level qualifications was really 
something.  
 
Kasun, born in 1963, is a subsistence farmer, weaver, and father of four children. He narrated his 
involvement in the industry since his mid-20s in comparable but more succinct terms, 
exclaiming, “We are not idiots. We do this because we don’t have anything else to do!” His 
brother, Aruna, eagerly elaborated, “It’s the low-caste people who are doing that business. The 
upper caste people go and weave under them, but that is to earn a living.” 
 The claims that Redigama’s highest-caste residents make over the Dumbara rata industry 
are qualified, then, by the assertion that one’s right to weave, and the decision to do so, derives 
from the conviction that one’s skills, however acquired, may be justifiably used to meet one’s 
financial needs. In this respect, a vehemence about wanting to weave that might otherwise be 
taken as an admission of an intimacy with the industry—one comparable to that proclaimed by 
their Berava neighbors—is tempered by the assertion that highest-caste involvement in Dumbara 
rata weaving is, at the end of the day, “just to earn.”  
Conclusion 
In the preceding pages, I have focused on the tensions and contradictions that have 
sprung up around Dumbara rata weaving and its contestation in Redigama. In doing so, I have 
highlighted a constellation of cultural forms, including caste, democratic egalitarianism, and 
neoliberal processes, not unlike that seen in Atwaedagama. Indeed, as in Atwaedagama, what we 
find in Redigama are individuals drawing variously, and at times contradictorily, upon the 
ideological and practical affordances of such forms as they make sense of (and even defend) 
their engagement in industries that are fraught in so many ways. 
		 	 	 	 308	
Writing with respect to India, Soumhya Venkatesan laments, “the loss of traditional craft 
is the loss of the nation’s and humankind’s heritage,” and suggests that “development is one way 
to protect” it (Venkatesan 2009:8). As we have seen in Redigama, however, the positive 
trajectories of “development” and “traditional craft” are not so straightforwardly conjoined. The 
contradictions that characterize orientations to Dumbara rata weaving point to an uneasy 
articulation between caste-based identification, nationalistic narratives of heritage, and 
conceptualizations of knowledge grounded in a market economy. What we find in Redigama, in 
other words, is the difficulty to which David Lowenthal refers when he notes that “too much is 
asked of heritage” (David Lowenthal 1998:227) when we attempt to balance an orientation to 
“national patrimony, regional and ethnic legacies,” on the one hand, and the development and 
stewardship of a “global heritage shared and sheltered in common,” on the other (David 
Lowenthal 1998:227). I have shown how a comparable tension is signaled by the assertion of the 
above-quoted government officers that Dumbara rata weaving cannot be “grabbed” from those 
who claim lineage-based proprietorship over it, and at the same time that the goal is nonetheless 
to “spread” the industry out for the benefit of the nation. This contradiction mirrors the conflict 
between, on the one hand, assertions on the part of highest-caste weavers and their sympathizers 
that, to properly steward Dumbara rata, the knowledge and skill entailed therein must be 
imparted to anyone interested in learning, and, on the other hand, assertions on the part of the 
Berava family members that the industry is their “identity.” Arguably neoliberal notions of 
commercial freedom and competitive individualism, notions that resonate with the idea of 
“global heritage,” allow Redigama’s poor, high caste residents to claim a certain right to the 
industry without comprising their own caste superiority. By contrast, the avowed commitments 
of Berava weavers to the industry’s “inherited” quality and to the “identity” that Dumbara rata 
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textiles reportedly mirror back at them serve centrally in their resistance to such claims at the 
same time that, to the extent that such inheritance is linked not to “the nation” but to their own 
extended Berava family in Redigama, they re-inscribe their caste-base inferiority. 
As we have seen on both sides of this dispute, articulating a position of control with 
respect to the industry is also an opportunity for the reassertion of difference along caste lines. I 
hasten to stress, however, that only one “side” is called out, as in the meeting described above, 
for seeming to cling to caste as a category of identification, which we’ll recall is publicly 
disavowed in Sri Lanka. The industry’s de facto owners, evoking something akin to the 
communalistic approach to “heritage” identified by Lowenthal, have positioned themselves in 
this struggle as the sole and lineage-based proprietors of an ancient and “family only” weaving 
tradition. Yet the celebration that often attends the consolidation of “regional and ethnic 
legacies” elsewhere is not to be found here when it comes to caste. Rather, claims that manifest 
publicly as caste-interested are condemned as “selfish” and “narrow-minded.” 
Those contesting their Berava neighbors’ efforts at exclusive control over Dumbara rata 
are limited in the terms with which they may assert rights over the industry without 
compromising their privileged social position. Eschewing intimations of personal or collective 
intimacy with their livelihood, they find an advantage in appealing to neoliberal notions of 
economic freedom and competitive individualism. In thus framing the discussion of knowledge 
and skills entailed in Dumbara rata weaving, they justify their demands to weave independently 
while sidestepping the suggestion that their actions may be motivated by a “narrow-minded” 
concern with caste—despite the fact that, as we have seen, caste-based concerns do shape the 
manner in which they position themselves in relation to the industry. 
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Those who have historically controlled and benefited most from the industry, by contrast, 
are publicly portrayed as narrow-minded, anti-democratic, and generally hostile to an ostensibly 
common national goal of developing the country’s “heritage” for global enjoyment and 
consumption. Not having found a way to harness the system of values upon which their highest 
caste neighbors draw, a system rooted in neoliberal ideas of equivalence, they invoke notions of 
cultural heterogeneity (non-equivalence) that serve to reinforce local status differences. While 
drawing on ideas (“tradition,” “heritage,” “identity”) central to a “discursive field of heritage” 
(Smith 2006:42) out of which much of the perceived value of Dumbara rata textiles derives, 
they inadvertently reiterate their own disadvantage when it comes to a category of identification 
that, while publicly rejected, continues to shape social relations among the Sinhalese. Subject to 
the criticism that they have failed to “awaken” their “Sinhala-ness,” they have yet to call upon an 
ideology that might successfully rival that upon which their high caste neighbors draw.  
I would suggest that, in contrast to the situation faced by the much more marginalized 
Kinnara in Atwaedagama, the stakes here are simply too great at the moment. The fact is that the 
Berava in Redigama have done well. They are able to provide their children with educational 
opportunities once barred to them, and at least some of these children have in turn been able to 
secure good jobs as teachers, civil servants, customs officials, and so forth. And yet, for those 
still in Redigama, where identification as Berava may matter much more than it does elsewhere, 
the economic strides that Dumbara rata weaving has facilitated may not be irreversible. It is to 
this fact that the young high caste women alludes when she noted disapprovingly of her high 
caste neighbors’ efforts to weave independently of the village’s Berava workshops: “Then there 
will be no workers for those [family-owned] workshops. So they are again putting them down to 
the same step where they were in the past.”  
		 	 	 	 311	
From what I have shown here, as long as those currently controlling the weaving industry 
in the village refer to caste in their efforts to maintain this advantage, such maintenance is far 
from guaranteed. Government officials discount invocations of ownership grounded in lineage as 
backward. In the end, they may therefore succeed in “spreading” the industry out. There is some 
indication that things may change, however. Toward the end of my stay in Redigama, one family 
member reported to me that he and his relatives had recently decided to form an association and, 
using a phrase I had not encountered in my conversations with them, perhaps consult a lawyer in 
the hopes of securing protection for their “intellectual property” (buddhimaya deepala). 
Deploying the legal framework inherent to the same (idealized) neoliberal forms invoked by 
their neighbors, he and his relatives might thereby position themselves on the same playing field 
as those who have challenged their historical control over Dumbara rata. Should they do so, one 
could imagine a situation in which their claims upon the industry might not be disregarded so 
easily as demonstrative of “narrow-minded” thinking.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
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I began this dissertation by relating the quiet drama that I encountered early on in my 
fieldwork around disclosures of caste’s significance in present day Sri Lanka. The “transgressive 
uncovering” that I described aroused my attention to something that, as I sat down to write up, I 
felt uneasy about documenting. Noting with respect to India that it is “impossible to treat caste as 
the object of nostalgia” but that caste can also “hardly be the marker of a satisfactory present,” 
Nicholas Dirks has noted that caste “can only be embraced ambivalently” (Dirks 2001:314). 
Beyond applying to what we have seen in Atwaedagama and Redigama, his observation about 
ambivalence also resonates with my experience in deciding to write about caste at all. In this 
case, such ambivalence stems from two primary and closely related considerations. 
In the first place, writing about caste among the Sinhalese as I have done here is 
definitively not in the spirit of that local moral economy in which, as we have seen with clarity in 
Atwaedagama, those who “cause a fuss” or “stir things up” are to be admonished. The 
instruction “kiyanna epaa” (don’t tell) at times still ringing in my ears, I have drawn explicit 
attention to something that, when it is not drowned in silence, is disavowed as soon as it is 
acknowledged. Perhaps there is something in the nature of public secrets that leaves the 
anthropologist who has finally gotten ahold of one with a sense of unease about what to do with 
it. After returning to the United States, I often worried about how I might honor the sentiment in 
my interlocutors’ evident wish that I not focus on caste and, at the same time, analyze the ways 
in which this wish itself figures in the reproduction of caste among the Sinhalese.  
Ultimately, I decided that working toward the latter goal would facilitate rather than 
impede my efforts with respect to the former. As we have seen, while post-independence Sri 
Lanka has witnessed a “horizontal strengthening of democracy” (Uyangoda 2012:88), and while 
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structural transformations in Kandy have helped to erode the “economic base of caste” 91 
(Gunasinghe 2007:74), neither of these developments may be said to have purged Sinhala society 
of caste-based identification and the indignities that it entails (See also Silva 1992). Not writing 
about caste would not only reproduce the reigning public silence on the topic and thereby 
reinforce a primary condition for the reproduction of caste-based discrimination. More 
importantly from my perspective as an analyst trying to make sense of this aspect of 
contemporary Sinhalese social life, it would also leave unchallenged some of the more subtle and 
insidious aspects of thinking around caste in contemporary Sri Lanka. Foremost among these are 
the notions that caste is necessarily on the decline, that it is a vestige of another era, and that it is 
primarily a “characteristic” of low caste persons. The salience of caste that I encountered—a 
salience owing not to something about the individuals upon whom my fieldwork focused but 
rather to their structural position—is not destined to wither, just as it is not destined to linger in 
some putative original form. As I have demonstrated in the foregoing pages, caste is actively 
reproduced out of concerns that are not only stubbornly grounded in the present, but also hardly 
limited to those regarded as “low.” To reiterate, the reproduction of caste as I have examined it 
here is something for which individuals across the strata of caste, class, age and gender are 
responsible.    
And yet, and here is the second and related consideration underlying my initial 
ambivalence in writing about caste, in focusing on caste’s reproduction by persons across these 
strata of gender, age, caste and class, I worried that I might run a risk at another level: I might 
																																																								91 Newton Gunasinghe argues that this structural transformation (1956-1976) was prompted in 
part by a decline in aristocratic authority in the region. While entailing a noticeable intra-caste 
socio-economic stratification, this transformation was not accompanied by a significant 
disintegration of "caste consciousness" or a heightened class-based communality.  
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reproduce a scholarly handling of caste as “the core symbol of community” or, as it has long 
been depicted with respect to India, the “defining feature” of social organization (Dirks 2001:5). 
Ultimately, I hope, the approach that I have adopted with respect to caste has allowed me to 
avoid such essentialist reduction. Indeed, the preceding analysis is fully inspired by the 
constructivist approach to ethnicity pioneered long ago by Fredrik Barth. In his recent Beyond 
Caste (2013), Sumit Guha in fact also deploys this “boundaries paradigm of ethnicity” to 
challenge caste’s Dumontian (1970) formulation as the governing logic and mythopoetic kernel 
of South Asian societies. Seeking to disrupt the apparent “‘ubiquity and strangeness’ of caste that 
drew foreigners to its study,” Guha points out that we find “’caste-like’ features in a range of 
societies” and that in South Asia caste became a “highly involuted, politicized form of ethnic 
ranking shaped by the constant exercise of socio-economic power” (Guha 2013:2-3).  
Assuming a similar orientation to caste in the preceding pages, I have figured it here as 
one of many cultural forms around which the contradictions and paradoxes that shape life in 
contemporary Sri Lanka coalesce. To reiterate, it was not simply the salience of caste in the lives 
of the men and women upon whom this dissertation is based that caught me off guard; I was 
struck even more forcefully by the contradictions that caste-based identification serves to 
highlight. As we have seen, these contradictions around caste draw our attention to a range of 
forces that shape the lives of Sinhalese artisans and others invested (or explicitly not invested) in 
Sri Lanka’s traditional handicrafts. While concerns with ostensibly pre-modern forms of 
hierarchy and honor exerted a unique tug on my scholarly imagination by demanding that I not 
notice them, such concerns are not to be read here as somehow more fundamental than the range 
of others with which they are imbricated. Preoccupations with caste-based identification 
articulate with the practical and ideological entailments of, among other things, neoliberal 
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processes, narratives of heritage, and conceptualizations of democratic governance and political 
subjectivity. Documenting this articulation is crucial not only to understanding what it means to 
engage in Sri Lanka’s “traditional industries” today, but also and more specifically to making 
sense of the contradictions that such engagement can entail.  
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